The Siege of Derry 1689

by Richard Doherty

  Notes

  Most of the information on which this chapter is based is from Richards’ Diary of the Fleet and these sources are not annotated individually.

  1: Powley, op cit, p. 226. A ‘large mile’ may be a nautical mile, which is 2,025 yards or 1.85 kilometres. In this context it is unlikely to refer to an Irish mile, which is longer than an English mile.

  2: Ibid

  3: Ibid, pp. 226–7

  4: Powley, op cit, p. 229

  5: Mackenzie, op cit, p. 56

  6: John Rylands Library, Manchester; Bagshawe muniments, B3/2/38(i) & (ii); B3/2/38; Cunningham & Whalley, Queries Against Major General Kirke, Irish Sword, Vol. XVI, No. 64, pp. 208–16

  7: Gebler, op cit, p. 256

  8: London Gazette, 25–29 July 1689

  9: NA Kew, ADM52/9, Captain’s log, HMS Bonadventure; Richards, op cit, p. 34

  10: London Gazette, 29 July–1 August 1689,

  11: Ibid, 1–5 August 1689

  12: Gilbert, op cit, p. 54

  13: London Gazette, 1–5 August 1689

  14: Powley, op cit, pp. 239–43; NA Kew, ADM52/9, Captain’s log, HMS Bonadventure

  15: Richards, op cit, p. 38; Walker does not record sending the letter to Kirke.

  16: London Gazette, 1–5 August 1689

  17: Ibid, 18–22 July 1689

  18: Ibid, 11–15 July 1689

  19: Ibid

  20: Ibid, 15–18 July 1689

  21: Ibid, 25–29 July 1689

  22: Ibid, 1–5 August 1689

  __________

  1 By one of those coincidences that litter history the name HMS Ferret was chosen for the Royal Navy’s base at Londonderry during the Second World War, when the city played a major role in the Battle of the Atlantic.

  2 The rank of major and above.

  3 Although Burt castle sits on a small hill on the mainland and is clearly visible from the lough there is another castle on the south west corner of Inch, less than two miles from Burt, and it is probably this castle to which Richards refers.

  4 One of the smallest of contemporary artillery pieces, this fired a round weighing 3.75 pounds; only the faucon, or falcon, with a round weighing 2.125 pounds and the fauconet, or falconet, with its 1.125 round, were smaller.

  5 The lowest-value coin, worth a quarter (fourthing) of an old penny and removed from circulation in the 1950s.

  6 His rank is given as lieutenant in the London Gazette of 1–5 August, which carried the report of the action.

  7 A fusil, pronounced fusee, was a lighter flintlock musket used by special service troops whose role was to defend the artillery. These soldiers became known as fusiliers.

  8 Bushel = a measure of capacity, equivalent to about eight gallons or about 36.37 litres.

  CHAPTER EIGHT

  Knocking on the Gates of Derry

  While Kirke was waiting in Lough Foyle and deploying most of his force to Inch, the situation in the city was worsening. Earlier in this study of the siege we saw how Robert Lundy felt frustrated at the failure of those in authority in England to provide support for the garrison of Londonderry. By now, had he remained, he would have been confirmed in his attitude to those same authorities while his feelings for his former comrade-in-arms Percy Kirke can but be imagined. His successors as governors, Henry Baker and George Walker, must also have felt frustration, but Baker died before the siege was raised and so left no account while Walker’s account leaves as much unsaid as it includes. Walker is much more enthusiastic about relating the defenders’ successes, and his part in them, than elaborating on the many difficulties faced by them. Nonetheless, there is much information between the lines in Walker’s account that he did not realize that he was imparting.

  The completion of the boom was one of the rare occasions on which Walker admits to real concerns. Learning of the work that the Jacobites had just finished he wrote: ‘This account, as we had it from the prisoners, did much trouble us, and scarce left us any hopes.’1 He was also concerned about the epidemic of disease that broke out in the city from early-June onwards.2 But he does not include any information about the concerns that others felt about him and which we noted in Chapter Five. A further worry was that the Jacobites intended ‘some mischief’ against him. This information he received from ‘a friend in the enemies camp’ and, before long, he became aware that some of the garrison suspected that he had considerable quantities of provisions hidden in his house. When this suspicion increased to such a degree that a danger of mutiny was perceived, Walker claims that he then remembered the warning. Thus he suggests that this was the ‘mischief’, a Jacobite plot to discredit him. He showed his own guile by arranging to have his house searched privately but with the negative results of the search made known to all, after which the garrison returned ‘to the good opinion of their governor’.3 Mackenzie is confident that Walker had something to hide and recorded that a search of the latter’s house on 16 June uncovered beer, mum1 and butter, which was removed to the store. Rather than the garrison being restored to a good opinion of Walker, it was only the intervention of Baker that saved his fellow governor from being incarcerated or shot.4

  Walker was also suspected, as we have seen in Chapter Five, of being prepared to betray the city to King James. He recalled that this story surfaced again later in the siege. Among the prisoners taken by the Jacobites in the early days of the siege was one Mr Cole whom Mackenzie refers to as Captain Cole. This individual remained a prisoner of the Jacobites for some time but then fell into conversation with Richard Hamilton, who asked him what kind of person was Walker and with whom was he most intimate. Cole told Hamilton that he counted himself one of Walker’s friends ‘hoping by this means to be employed on a message to him and to obtain his liberty’. In this hope he was justified when Hamilton asked if he would carry some proposals to Mr Walker; these were proposals that King James had ordered Hamilton to make to the city’s leaders. Cole agreed, was granted a pass allowing him to leave the Jacobite lines, and left with his message to Walker. According to Mackenzie, however, Cole returned to the city ‘about the 10th or 12th of May’ when Baker, suspecting that he might be acting for the Jacobites, had him confined ‘till he was satisfied he had no ill design against the city’.5

  The story now enters the realms of farce for, by Walker’s account, Cole reached the town, where he ‘was received with great joy’ and was so delighted to be free that he simply forgot to deliver his message to Walker. However, he did mention it casually in the course of a later conversation with some members of the garrison who subsequently greeted Walker with what the latter describes as ‘some great names and titles’. Now, it seems, Walker realized the danger he was in, saw that it was caused by the ‘discourses of Mr Cole’ and had the unfortunate Cole confined immediately and interrogated. That interrogation allowed Walker to solve the mystery. Once again, when presented with the explanation from Walker, we are told that this gave ‘all people satisfaction, so that they remained in no more doubt of their governor’.6 Walker’s stories seem to be just that: stories. They also seem implausible and the work of a man determined to cast himself in the best possible light. How else can one explain the differences between his and Mackenzie’s accounts of the Cole affair?

  The day after he intervened to save Walker, Henry Baker’s physical condition deteriorated to the point where he was forced to take to his bed. He became dangerously ill, another victim of the fever endemic in the city, and appointed Jonathan Mitchelburne to act in his place while he was ill.7 It seems that their dispute of the previous month had been forgotten. Baker’s distrust of Walker must have been considerable by this time and, in appointing Mitchelburne as his deputy, he was ensuring that a man with considerable military experience governed the defence of the city rather than the clergyman turned amateur soldier.

  Before Baker became dangerously ill, a number of citizens ‘and others concerned for the public good’ held a meeting and called on Captain Alexander Watson, commanding the artillerymen
in the city, to order his men to make a search for provisions within the city. Watson ordered such a search to be conducted and the result was enlightening. The gunners dug up cellars and other possible hiding places and unearthed ‘much provision under the ground’. Not everyone, it seemed, had entered into the spirit of mutual support and there must have been many who were highly embarrassed to have their private stores uncovered. Some of the provisions that came to light in this search had been hidden by people who had left the city in the early days of the siege, but much was the secret hoard of others who were still within the walls. The degree of embarrassment created is indicated by the fact that the search prompted others, whose provisions as yet remained undisturbed, to bring out their own hidden treasures to add to the communal stores.8 Thus the garrison was provided with a meagre bread ration from then until the end of the siege.

  That Enniskillen was still holding out was well known to those inside the walls, and it was decided to send a messenger or two to the Fermanagh town. This was to be done under cover of a raid on fish houses along the Foyle using the garrison’s new boat which by now must have had the position of its oars corrected. The raiding party was commanded by Adam Murray and included Captains Noble and Dunbar, two lieutenants and some twenty soldiers. Walker claims that the party was led by Noble and that its intention was to ‘rob the fish house’; his omission of Murray’s name and misrepresentation of the aim of the mission would suggest that Walker was keen to play down Murray’s role as far as possible. On the night of 18 June the raiding party left the city with the aim of putting the messengers ashore some distance upriver. According to Mackenzie, they were to travel about four miles which would have taken them to the area of the modern village of Newbuildings, but he goes on to state that they went as far as Dunalong, where the messengers were to be put ashore.9 This is some eight miles by river from the city.

  However, although the party must have taken to the water after darkness, there was still sufficient light for the boat to be spotted and a gun at Evans’ wood fired on the party but without scoring a hit, although the gunners ‘narrowly missed’ the vessel. Other Jacobite troops along the river were alerted by this firing and musketeers on both banks fired on them as they rowed along. When they eventually reached Dunalong wood the two boys who were to go ashore and head for Enniskillen were so terrified that they would not quit the boat.10 Thus the prime objective of the mission was thwarted.

  Worse was to follow. With the sky lightening, Murray’s men saw two large boats between them and the city. These were manned by Jacobite dragoons whose intent was to cut off the return of the Williamites. Not one to run away from a fight, Murray turned his boat towards the pair of Jacobite boats so that his men could open fire on their pursuers. There was a sharp exchange of gunfire, after which one of the Jacobite boats closed on Murray’s. The intention seemed to be to board the Williamite boat and capture it, but this plan was soon foiled when Murray’s men seized the initiative and engaged the foe, beating some of them into the water and killing four or five, including a lieutenant. This was too much for the Jacobites, who threw down their arms and surrendered. Thirteen of them were made prisoner. Seeing the fate of their fellows, the dragoons in the other boat made off speedily rather than wait to be engaged by Murray’s men.11

  With their prisoners ‘and some small prize’, the latter it seems including the dragoons’ boat, the party now made for home. Once again they came under fire from both banks of the river but only one of the party had been injured in the entire operation. That single casualty was Adam Murray, ‘who received some shots in his head-piece, that bruised his head, and for a time indisposed him for service’. One prisoner was wounded on the return journey, struck by a shot from the riverbank.12 Murray might have been killed but for that head-piece, which was probably a small skull cap of steel worn under the hat, and known as a ‘secret’, intended to protect the head from downward slashes from cavalry swords; it more than served its purpose on this occasion.13

  Murray’s raiders were so pleased with their success that, having landed the prisoners and handed them over to the guards, they decided to attack some Jacobites who were ‘drawing off one of their guns’. Spotting the Williamites the men at the gun fled, abandoning the weapon. Murray’s men then followed until they reached the top of a nearby hill where they spotted a second, strong, party of Jacobite infantry who were using the hill as cover to cut the Williamites off from their boats. The latter withdrew quickly to the water’s edge and were just in time to avoid being captured by the Jacobites.14

  This episode emphasizes the skills and leadership of Adam Murray, but it is also noticeable that his companions on this occasion included Captains Noble and Dunbar, two men who were to be prominent less than two weeks later in the repulse of the attack by Clancarty’s men near Butcher’s Gate. Soldiers and leaders of such quality are an inestimable asset to any force, and these men must have played a major role in maintaining the confidence of the city’s garrison. Both Noble and Dunbar came from County Fermanagh and seem to have shared the aggressive spirit of their comrades who were defending Enniskillen.

  But a success such as this could not bring the siege to an end. The garrison was tiring and its numbers were being reduced steadily by disease and casualties, while Mackenzie commented that ‘the close siege’ began soon after the return to the Jacobite camp of Marshal de Rosen.15 Action by Kirke was needed, but that seemed to be as far away as ever, and many within the walls must have wondered if the relief fleet would weigh anchor at all to attempt to run upriver to the beleaguered city.

  In the previous chapter we looked at Sir James Caldwell’s charges against Kirke. Caldwell believed that Kirke was quite willing to change sides and support the Jacobites and that, among other faults, he showed ‘a total lack of appreciation or understanding for those who had carried on the struggle for King William in Ireland both before and during the siege’.16 Although Caldwell was engaged in the actions in County Fermanagh, he seems not to have been aware of the amount of help that Kirke sent to the defenders of Enniskillen which included arms, ammunition and senior officers to take command of the locally-raised regiments. In doing so Kirke was acting on intelligence obtained from Enniskillen, whereas intelligence on the situation within the walls of Derry was lacking, in spite of the fact that the city lay only a few miles from his anchorage point in Lough Foyle. But Kirke’s perceived dilatoriness had much to do with the overall strategy for relieving Ireland, which raised many questions about the preparedness for war of both the Royal Navy and the Army.

  In Chapter One we saw how the English Army had lost many officers and men in late-1688 when John Churchill switched his support from James II to the Prince of Orange. The manpower loss then sustained had yet to be made good, while the shortage of officers was another major problem. Furthermore, William was not fully aware of the degree of the problems facing his cause in Ireland and was still concentrating on the broader European campaign that faced him. He had not expected to be distracted from that by a war at his back door, and therefore his mind was not focused on Ireland and certainly not on the people besieged in Londonderry. Not only did he have a problem with the English Army but he also had a major crisis to deal with in the Royal Navy. This service had come close to mutiny in the days since James had fled. Not that this was a sign of support for the deposed Stuart king – although James was popular in the navy – but it was a symptom of the chaos that had reigned in the administration of the country since November 1688.

  On 16 January 1689 the Prince of Orange issued a proclamation to seamen. This assured sailors that they would receive their pay, the principal cause of unrest in the navy, and urged those who were absent without leave to return to duty. No action would be taken against those currently absent who reported back to their ships, but action was promised against any who neglected their duty.17 Although this proclamation would have done much to restore discipline in the navy, there continued to be some disarray which lasted until the sprin
g; money and supplies were still short. Not until April was it possible to assemble a force of any strength, and thus James and his entourage was able to sail from France to Kinsale without being intercepted by the Royal Navy. One naval historian notes that King James was escorted to Ireland by no fewer than twenty-five French warships, of which fourteen were ships of the line, eight were frigates and three were fireships; eight merchant ships carried the deposed monarch with his supporters. However, another authority puts the number of warships at twenty-three.18

  As the fleet that had carried James to Ireland left Kinsale on 17 March for the return voyage to France, the French navy was preparing a second expedition to Ireland carrying supplies for James’ forces as well as additional French advisers. This expedition left France on 26 April with the Brest fleet of Admiral the Marquis de Chateaurenault in support and made for Bantry Bay where it unloaded its supplies and dropped the advisers. In addition to Chateaurenault, who commanded the centre of the French fleet, Jean Gabaret, who had commanded the expedition that landed James, led the van, while Job Forant had charge of the rear. This expedition did not have the same clear run as the earlier fleet that took James to Kinsale as Admiral Arthur Herbert, later the Earl of Torrington, had finally obtained authority to engage French warships. This authority was given on 28 April with Herbert being told that he could engage the French ‘wherever he meets them’ as England and France were now at war.19