The Siege of Derry 1689
Page 35
This latter fire was one of Vauban’s developments and was known as ricochet fire. It could be used by skilled gunners to ensure that their rounds skimmed the top of the walls and skipped off to create more damage in the buildings within the defences. Alternatively the rounds could ricochet off the rear walls of outworks to cause greater damage to the main defences. The effect was akin to a boy skimming a stone off the surface of a pond. Flying pieces of masonry added to the effect of the bombardment. Meanwhile, the heavier weapons were pounding at the lower part of the walls with the intention of crumbling the stonework and bringing down the upper part of the wall. If those heavier pieces were used for ricochet fire they used a smaller powder charge than for bombardment.
To perform their task effectively, and in the least possible time, the larger guns had to be moved as close as possible to the walls. As noted in the text, this was done by digging parallels and connecting trenches to bring the guns to within some 200 yards of the walls. This was achieved through co-operation between engineers, gunners, pioneers and infantry. There is probably no other aspect of the gunners’ role that illustrates so effectively the scientific nature of siege warfare. Bringing the guns to within 200 yards of the walls not only allowed the maximum effect to be achieved from each round but it also made the task of aiming much simpler since each weapon could be fired point-blank. (This method could be used up to about 800 yards.)
Bearing in mind that the gunners who created the breach in the city walls at the end of June that permitted Skelton and Clancarty’s attack were firing from ground on a lower level than the walls and at about twice the optimum range, their gunnery must have been excellent since they would have had to fire at an unusual angle of elevation and maintain a high rate of fire; it is possible that the guns, probably 24-pounders, fired about 90 to 100 rounds per day in direct fire at the walls. This achievement has never been acknowledged before in any account of the siege, having been hidden by Walker’s account of the event and, more recently, by Macrory’s acceptance of Walker’s account as accurate. St-Rémy estimated that it would take three batteries – two of ten and one of eight 24- or 32-pounder pieces – two days of steady bombardment to achieve a practicable breach wide enough for thirty men to advance abreast although Vauban believed that two batteries would suffice. A practicable breach was defined as one where enough masonry and earth had been blown into the ditch to permit an attacking soldier to climb it with ease, allowing him the use of both hands to use his weapons. Obviously, the single battery of two guns firing at the Butcher’s Gate did not provide the firepower suggested by either St-Rémy or Vauban but, in the space of perhaps three days – we cannot be certain of the exact length of the bombardment – it managed to create a viable breach in the city walls. Paradoxically, these gunners may also have been among those who, a month later, failed in their endeavours to prevent the relief fleet passing through the narrows.
In Chapter Five (page 116) reference was made to the arrival at Derry of six large cannon which had been hauled overland from Dublin. Although there is no evidence to indicate that these were specialised siege pieces it is reasonable to assume that they were. These weapons used larger powder charges than their field artillery equivalents and their carriages had to be proportionately stronger to absorb the forces of those charges. Whereas an English 24-pounder field gun had carriage cheeks, or sides, of nine feet in length and 4.5-inches wide, a 24-pounder siege gun had thirteen-foot-long cheeks which were also twice as thick as those of the field gun; wheel sizes also differed with the field gun having smaller diameter wheels, by eight inches, than those of the fifty-eight-inch wheels of the siege gun.
This made the siege guns more difficult to move, and thus the reason why it was preferred to move them by water. But the reluctance of the French navy to play a full part in the operations at Derry meant that the guns had to be hauled from Dublin on roads that were no more than earth tracks. When the guns were moved, at the end of May, the ground would have begun to dry out but it would have been rutted and any rain at all would have turned the roads into quagmires. The initial part of the journey would not have been as bad as the final stages since the eastern side of Ireland has much less rainfall than the north-west. Once into Tyrone and County Londonderry it can be assumed that travelling became much more difficult.
We have no account of the progress of the artillery train, nor of its composition, but we do know something of the standard operating procedures for a train. By this period, most guns were provided with a limber, known to the French as an avant-train, which was a pair of wheels on an axle with either a pole or shafts to which the team of horses would be harnessed. The rear of the cannon’s trail was lifted onto the limber to allow easier movement by road. With the weight of the gun distributed over four wheels rather than two it became possible to reduce the number of draught horses needed for each although a single gun, weighing about three tons, needed a team of six or eight horses. In addition to the guns, the train would have included wagons to carry ammunition and stores and had to be escorted by infantry while engineers and pioneers were also included to carry out any improvements needed to the road; at least one wagon was required to carry their tools and equipment. Many civilians had to be recruited as drivers for the horse teams and they were apt to take to their heels at any sign of danger. It took time for the train to get underway each day and it had to stop early enough in the day to make camp for the night and allow an evening meal to be prepared. It is likely that it took as much as two weeks to cover the 140 miles from Dublin to the outskirts of Derry. Had the French navy not been intimidated into virtual inaction following the Battle of Bantry Bay the guns could have been brought by ship in much less time and would have arrived in much better condition.
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1 So called because early gun barrels were made in the same fashion as wooden barrels and bound together with metal staves.
2 The contemporary spelling was coyne.
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Unpublished
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&nbs
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1. King James II. Britain’s last Roman Catholic monarch, it was the popular belief that he wished to impose his own religious beliefs on his people that led to James’ downfall. In March 1689 he came to Ireland in an attempt to regain his lost thrones but his failure to provide firm leadership and demonstrate clear strategic thinking doomed his efforts. (St Columb’s Cathedral)
2. King William III. Son-in-law and nephew to James II, William Henry Nassau, Prince of Orange, was the choice of those who wished to depose their monarch and he led the last successful invasion of Britain, landing at Torbay in Devon on 5 November 1688. The two kings met only once in battle in Ireland – at the Boyne in July 1690. (St Columb’s Cathedral)
3. King Louis XIV. The Sun King, he supported James in his expedition to Ireland but only to divert William’s attention from the continent. French support for James’ cause fell far short of what was needed to bring about a Jacobite restoration. (Tony Crowe)
4. Richard Talbot, Earl of Tyrconnel. King James’ Lord Deputy in Ireland, Tyrconnel, known to Protestants as ‘Lying Dick’, initiated a policy of replacing Protestants with Catholics in the government and army of Ireland and thus ensured that Ireland’s Protestants would have no sympathy with King James. (St Columb’s Cathedral)