Chasing Gold: The Incredible Story of How the Nazis Stole Europe's Bullion
Page 11
Hitler, though, had other things on his mind. He wanted to talk about his next political and military moves. The meeting lasted from 4:15 P.M. to 8:30 P.M. The colonel’s notes, which historians have labeled the Hossbach Memorandum, were typed up five days later. They provide the best outline of Hitler’s thinking and strategy during the first period of Nazi aggression.3
Hitler began by explaining that the topic for discussion was too important to be discussed with the full cabinet. He quickly explained that his overall political goal was “to make secure and preserve the [country’s] racial community and to enlarge it.” That meant expanding Germany’s population beyond the current eighty-five million and enlarging the country’s borders by bringing into the Reich territories where ethnic Germans lived, such as Austria and Czechoslovakia.
The chancellor explained that Germany had to become economically self-sufficient, especially in war materiel. It was possible to achieve that immediately in coal, but it would be more difficult with petroleum, iron, copper, and tin. Agricultural self-sufficiency was impossible in the short run, which was why it would be necessary to expand Germany’s territory to the east and gain sufficient farmland. Hitler also said that the country had to regain the colonies lost after World War I, notably the area known as German East Africa and German Southwest Africa, which could become a new source of raw materials and foodstuffs.
Hitler spelled out three different political scenarios or what he called cases. The first covered the period from 1943 to 1945, after which he said the German military situation would deteriorate because Britain, France, and the Soviet Union would have rearmed with new weaponry. Therefore action had to be taken before 1943. “Nobody knows today what the situation would be in the years 1943-45,” he said. “It was while the rest of the world is still preparing its defense that we are obliged to take the offensive . . . Only one thing is certain: we can not wait longer.”
Hitler’s second premise was that France would continue to be weak because of the country’s ongoing economic and political problems. Hitler believed that would preoccupy its political and military leaders, and as a result France would not react to German military moves despite Prague’s mutual defense treaty with France.
The Führer’s conclusion was that Germany should take over Austria and Czechoslovakia as soon as possible in order to protect its southern flank. Hitler believed that Britain and France had already written off Czechoslovakia, and Italy would not offer any objections as long as Mussolini was in power; he still considered Austria part of his sphere of influence. Hitler confidently proclaimed that neither Poland nor the Soviet Union would go to war to protect either Austria or Czechoslovakia.
Hitler concluded the presentation by saying that Germany should undertake a diplomatic and military offensive against the two countries early in the following year. The German military move against Czechoslovakia, he said, should be conducted with “lightning speed” to forestall Britain or France from mounting a counterattack. The Führer’s overriding strategy was to avoid the protracted conflicts that led to his country’s defeat in World War I. His objective was to win a series of small wars with Blitzkrieg attacks. His immediate goal: “For the improvement of our military political position, it must be our first aim . . . to conquer Czechoslovakia and Austria simultaneously.” The annexation of the two small countries would improve Germany’s strategic position in eventual, and expected, conflicts with Britain and France. Securing his southern border would also increase the country’s military might during the ultimate, and inevitable, attacks on Western Europe.
Hitler, as always, dominated the meeting by the force of his personality. Not everyone in the room, however, agreed with him, and Hossbach devoted two long paragraphs to objections from Blomberg, Fritsch, and Neurath. They argued that France and Britain “must not appear in the role of our enemies.” War Minister Blomberg said that the Czech defenses were now stronger because the country had built a kind of Eastern Maginot Line that would make a German attack both difficult and dangerous. Foreign Minister Neurath argued that conflict with France, Britain, and Italy was more likely than Hitler assumed. Hitler replied that he wasn’t thinking of an immediate conflict with the small countries, but perhaps one in the summer of 1938. He also repeated his belief that neither Britain nor France would mobilize its forces to defend Austria or Czechoslovakia.
Göring offered his strong support for the plan and added that in view of Hitler’s presentation, Germany should immediately halt its military involvement in the Spanish Civil War. The support for General Francisco Franco’s rebels consisted of supplying military equipment as well as providing air cover and undertaking selected aerial bombings. Hitler agreed, but added that he wanted to wait for the appropriate time to make that move. Displaying behaviour he was to exhibit repeatedly throughout the war, he wanted to do everything at the same time and refused to sacrifice one objective in order to achieve another. Militarily, Hitler always desired to push his armies to do more and rebuffed anyone who tried to set limits.
Hossbach’s notes ended with a terse one-sentence statement that the second part of the meeting dealt with a detailed discussion of armaments.4
Four days later, General Fritsch met with Hitler and objected even more strongly to the plan put forth at the meeting. Foreign Minister Neurath tried to get an appointment with the Führer to voice his opposition, but Hitler slipped out of Berlin and went to his Berghof retreat in order to avoid another confrontation. Three months after the Reich Chancellery meeting, Blomberg, Fritsch, and Neurath had all been relieved of duty. The two military leaders were removed because of sexual charges. Blomberg was accused of having recently married a prostitute, and Fritsch was labeled a homosexual, which was untrue. Joachim von Ribbentrop, a wine salesman before becoming Hitler’s diplomatic troubleshooter, replaced Neurath as foreign minister. General Walther von Brauchitsch, another Prussian nobleman, but one who followed Hitler’s orders, replaced Fritsch.
By early in 1938, Hitler had effectively silenced all diplomatic and military opposition. On February 4, he held a cabinet meeting to explain the government shuffle. It was to be the last cabinet meeting Hitler ever held. The same night he went on German radio and declared, “From now on, I personally take over the command of the armed forces.”5
No one should have been surprised that Hitler had his eyes on Austria. In the second paragraph of his opus Mein Kampf he wrote, “German-Austria must return to the great German motherland . . . One blood demands one Reich.”6
The Führer had already sent agents into Austria to stir up unrest and prepare for military action, and now he sped up his plans to incorporate the country of his birth into his Reich. Immediately after World War I, a majority of Austrians probably wanted to unify their country with Germany, but by the mid-1930s only a minority still desired to take that step. The move in German was called Anschluss or annexation. Austria was economically and politically unstable, and thus an easy target. Paramilitary units operated on both the right and the left, and high-level political assassinations had taken place, including the murder of Austrian Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss in February 1934 during a failed Nazi-led coup attempt. Hitler sent Franz von Papen, the centrist politician who had helped bring him to power, to Vienna as ambassador. The same day that Hitler met with his cabinet in Berlin, he recalled Papen and fired him. Hitler didn’t need good relations with the country he was planning to annex.
On February 12, 1938, Hitler demanded that Kurt Schuschnigg, the Austrian chancellor and a strong opponent of Anschluss, meet him at Berchtesgaden. Dressed in the Nazi brown-shirt of a Storm Trooper and flanked by three generals, Hitler immediately launched into a two-hour tirade against Austria. Schuschnigg offered no response and did not ask what Austria should do about the complaints. Hitler and Schuschnigg then adjourned for a convivial lunch that totally belied the earlier diatribe. After eating, though, Schuschnigg had to wait for hours before Hitler presented the Austrian leader with a detailed ultimatum that included
putting Nazis in key Austrian cabinet posts, integrating the country’s economy into that of Germany, and releasing all Nazi political prisoners. Hitler said there could be no discussion about his demands. “You will either sign as it is and fulfill my demands within three days, or I will order the march into Austria.”7
Schuschnigg played for time by explaining that under the Austrian constitution only the president had the power to accept the agreement and carry it out. Hitler exploded and ran to the door, shouting to General Wilhelm Keitel, the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces and a Führer favorite, to join him. Turning to Schuschnigg, Hitler bellowed, “I shall have you called later.” Once outside the room, Hitler smiled and told the general that he had no orders to give him. Keitel was simply a bit player in a pièce de théâtre to scare the Austrian chancellor.
After letting his guest stew for half an hour, Hitler sent Schuschnigg a message saying that he wanted to see him. When the Austrian arrived, the Führer said, “I have decided to change my mind—for the first time in my life. But I warn you. This is the very last chance. I have given you three additional days to carry out the agreement.”
Schuschnigg returned to Vienna, and Austrian political leaders wrestled with how to avoid the inevitable. On February 15, the deadline, the government finally gave in. The next day Vienna granted an amnesty to all Nazis and reorganized the cabinet to include Nazi representatives. Five days later, Hitler made a speech to the Reichstag, thanking Austrians for the concessions and for agreeing to new and closer relations between the two countries. At the same time, he issued an ominous warning: “Over 10 million Germans live in two of the states adjoining our frontiers . . . It is unbearable for a world power to know there are racial comrades at its side who are constantly being afflicted with the severest suffering for their sympathy or unity with the whole nation.” That was a none-too-subtle reference to the seven million Austrians and three million Sudeten Germans residing in Czechoslovakia.8
Hitler named Wilhelm Keppler his commissioner for Austrian affairs. He was already Statβecretär, the number-two position, at the foreign ministry. Keppler was a veteran Nazi and member of the much-feared Schutzstaffel. He had joined the party in 1927 and by 1931 was an economic advisor to Hitler. While working at the Reich Chancellery, Keppler formed a group made up largely of business leaders called the Freundeskreis der Wirtschaft (Friends Economic Circle). Göring considered him weak, but Hitler liked him. In early March he made a first visit to Vienna in his new role. While there, he met with leading Nazis and with Schuschnigg. Upon his return to Berlin, Keppler briefed Hitler, who was pleased with how things were going.
On the morning of March 8, however, a top Austrian Nazi called Keppler with the rumor that Schuschnigg was going to hold a plebiscite on the question of union with Germany. The information was immediately passed along to Hitler, who doubted it but nonetheless told Keppler to take a government plane back to Vienna and check things out on the ground.
The scuttlebutt was correct. On the evening of March 9, Schuschnigg announced at a rally in Innsbruck that a national plebiscite would be held the following Sunday, only four days later. The Austrian people would be asked to respond either Ja or Nein to one question: “Are you for a free, German, independent and social, Christian and united Austria, for peace and work, for the equality of all those who affirm themselves for the people and Fatherland?”9
When Hitler learned of the referendum, he blew up and ordered that plans for an invasion of Austria be drawn up immediately. The vote had to be stopped! The Führer immediately called Göring, who was relaxing at his Carinhall retreat. As they discussed next moves over the phone, it quickly became clear that Germany would respond militarily. Keppler returned from Vienna to get a lay of the land, while Göring left for Berlin.
The following day was hectic in both Berlin and Vienna. Göring’s worries about Keppler had been born out, and the report he presented to Hitler at 10:00 A.M. was a masterpiece of indecision. The Austrian Nazis could not agree on a clear strategy, and he sided with moderates who wanted to let events play themselves out. That was not good enough for Hitler, who had built up a great army and now wanted to use it.
Hitler’s only real concern was whether a military action against Austria would push Italy’s Duce Benito Mussolini to action. The Italian considered Austria to be his protectorate and a symbol that Rome was once again a world power. Hitler feared that if the Italians mobilized their army, France and Britain might take similar steps. In 1934, when Nazis killed the Austrian Chancellor Dollfuss, Mussolini had mobilized five divisions to forestall any German action. After the confrontation at Berchtesgaden, Schuschnigg instructed his military attaché in Rome to meet with the Duce and explain what had happened. Mussolini doubted the Germans would act, saying confidently, “This is something they will never do. We have Göring’s word of honor.” Il Duce also told the Austrian that the plebiscite was a mistake.10
Meanwhile in Berlin, Hitler told General Wilhelm Keitel, the new Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, that if the Austrians went ahead with the vote, he would invade. Keitel had Colonel Alfred Jodl bring him the Special Case “Otto” plans for an invasion of Austria. The report was skimpy and had been drawn up in case the Austrians tried to restore the monarchy headed by Otto Von Habsburg. “We have prepared nothing at all,” reported General Ludwig Beck, the head of the general staff.
When Beck met with Hitler, he told him bluntly, “I cannot take any responsibility for an invasion of Austria.” The Führer responded that his own SS troops could then carry it out. “They will march in with bands playing. Is that what the army wants?” Later Jodl sent a message to the armed forces telling them that if they encounter Czech troops during the invasion they should treat them as enemies, but any Italian ones should be “treated as friends.”11
The German generals didn’t need to worry about London or Paris. The new government of Neville Chamberlain was anxious to get along with Hitler, and once again a French government was falling. The French thought little of the new British prime minister, joking that his name as a pronunciation pun was “J’aime Berlin” or “I love Berlin.” During a rambunctious session of Parliament, Chamberlain said little more than, “I have no statement to make.” Ribbentrop traveled to London and met with both him and his new foreign secretary Lord Halifax. After the talks, the German sent a cable to Hitler saying, “England will do nothing in regard to Austria.”12
In the early afternoon, Keppler was handed a message significantly addressed to him as SS Gruppenführer. It provided a list of the Austrian Nazis or party sympathizers who were now supposed to run the country. At the top was the name Dr. Arthur Seyss-Inquart. He was a trained lawyer who had grown up in the mixed ethnic area of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. He had been associated with the Austrian Nazi Party since 1931, but did not actually join it until the day after the Anschluss. In the Schuschnigg government he had held the crucial post of Minister of Security and Interior.
The Austrian government continued to organize the referendum that was now only three days away. Schuschnigg had a long talk that evening with Seyss-Inquart, who complained that he had not been informed in advance about the plebiscite. Since he didn’t have instructions yet from Berlin, he only argued about a few technical issues. At the end of the conversation, he said that his followers would vote for the referendum. Demonstrators both for and against the referendum filled the streets of Austria that night, and a whiff of civil war was in the air.
At 2:00 A.M. on March 11, the Berlin government issued Directive Number One for Operation Otto. It instructed the German army and air force to be ready to invade Austria at noon the following day “at the latest.” Hitler wanted to take action before the scheduled referendum.13
At 5:30 that morning, the phone rang in Chancellor Schuschnigg’s bedroom. The Austrian chief of police informed him that German troops had closed the border at Salzburg, stopping rail traffic between the two countries. Military forces were also building up just over
the border. An hour later, Schuschnigg headed for his office, but stopped at St. Stephen’s Cathedral to attend mass and pray for his country. As he sat in the last pew, the chancellor could only think of the phone call warning. By the time he got to his office, a telegram from the Austrian Consul General in Munich had arrived with the cryptic message, “Leo ready to travel.” The chancellor knew that meant the German army was preparing to invade.
At 11:30 A.M., Arthur Seyss-Inquart arrived at the Vienna chancellery with Edmund Glaise-Morstenau, the vice chancellor in Schuschnigg’s cabinet, who had just flown back from Berlin with a letter demanding that the plebiscite be put off for several weeks. In the early afternoon there ensued a series of threatening phone calls that involved Göring in Berlin, who was working out of a phone booth at the chancellery. He was now the puppet master, pulling strings from afar. Seyss-Inquart first presented Schuschnigg with Hitler’s order that the plebiscite be called off “within the hour.” The Austrian leader refused to comply, but went to see President Wilhelm Miklas, the head of state. The two finally agreed at 2:00 P.M. to comply with the German demand and cancel the referendum. Seyss-Inquart informed Göring by phone at 2:45.14
Twenty minutes later, Göring was back on the phone orchestrating a coup d’état in Vienna. He told Seyss-Inquart that he and all the Nazi cabinet ministers should resign. In another call less than an hour later, Seyss-Inquart told Göring that Schuschnigg was on his way to the office of the Austrian president to hand in his resignation. Göring responded that a new government had to be in place by 7:30. He added that the referendum also had to be cancelled and that Keppler would be returning to Vienna with the list of new cabinet members. Göring also said that military units would be arriving soon and would be at Seyss-Inquart’s disposal. He was also instructed to send Berlin a message asking for German troops to reestablish law and order in the country.