The Way of the Knife

by Mark Mazzetti

  the largest and most complex: Richard H. Schultz Jr., The Secret War Against Hanoi (New York: HarperCollins, 1999): 337.

  The war ended before any kidnappings: Douglas Waller, Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster Who Created the OSS and Modern American Espionage (New York: Free Press, 2011): 316.

  the principal focus of its hearings: L. Britt Snider, The Agency and the Hill: CIA’s Relationship with Congress 1946–2004 (CreateSpace, 2008): 275.

  “once the capability”: United States Senate, “Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities,” April 26, 1976.

  “avert a nuclear holocaust or save a civilization”: Ibid.

  London School of Economics: Author interview with Ross Newland.

  in an attempt to kill Castro: T. Rees Shapiro, “Nestor D. Sanchez, 83; CIA Official Led Latin American Division,” Washington Post (January 26, 2011).

  each shadowy front of the Cold War: Duane R. Clarridge with Digby Diehl, A Spy for All Seasons (New York: Scribner, 1997): 23–39.

  Dewey Marone and Dax Preston LeBaron: Ibid., 26.

  infuriated State Department diplomats: CNN interview with Duane Clarridge and kept by the National Security Archive, 1999.

  “shallow and devious”: Richard N. Gardner, Mission Italy: On the Front Lines of the Cold War (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005): 291.

  a covert war in Central America: Clarridge with Diehl, 197.

  than the CIA had to spend: Ibid., 234.

  CIA covert-action programs: Richard A. Best Jr., “Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy Questions,” Congressional Research Service (December 27, 2011). The restrictions that came to be known as the “Casey Accords” were signed in 1986. But the horse was already out of the barn, as the accords came several months after President Reagan signed a secret finding authorizing the secret transfer of missiles to Iran.

  authority to “neutralize”: Robert Chesney, “Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 50 Debate,” Journal of National Security Law and Policy (2012). This is an excellent study on the laws buttressing the work of the CIA and the Pentagon and how the work of soldiers and spies has increasingly blurred in the years since the September 11 attacks.

  “Do you know what”: Joseph Persico, Casey: From the OSS to the CIA (New York: Penguin, 1995): 429.

  the training of Lebanese hit men: Timothy Naftali, Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism (New York: Basic Books, 2005): 152.

  “fighting terrorism with terrorism.”: Ibid., 150.

  the new threat: Vincent Cannistraro, an operations officers, said that “Casey came to the CIA believing that the evil Soviet Union was behind all terrorism in the world.” By this logic, Cannistraro said during an interview, Moscow could dial up and ratchet back terrorist attacks whenever it chose to.

  destroyed any hope that terrorism: Naftali, 180. Naftali quotes future Counterterrorism Center deputy Fred Turco describing Casey’s views about the terrorism violence.

  an expansive new war: Casey had been getting pressure from the White House to “do something” about terrorism, and told Clarridge to come up with a new covert strategy for the CIA. And as usual, Clarridge wanted as much running room as he could get. He pushed for new legal authorities that would allow him to build two teams that could hunt terrorists globally and kill them if doing so might prevent an imminent attack. One of the teams would be made up of foreigners who could move easily in the bazaars and crowded streets of Middle Eastern cities, and the second would be made up of Americans. Members of the teams were chosen based on proficiency in foreign languages, facility with weapons, and other specialized skills. One was a mercenary who had fought in the African civil wars. Another was a former Navy SEAL. See Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin Press, 2005): 139–140; see also Clarridge with Diehl, A Spy for All Seasons (New York: Scribner, 1997): 325 and 327.

  to penetrate the Abu Nidal organization and Hezbollah: Naftali, 183.

  “The wheels had fallen off for Reagan”: Ibid., 199–200.

  cut by 22 percent: Author interview with senior American intelligence official.

  trying to get a meeting with the president: R. James Woolsey public remarks at George Mason University, September 13, 2012.

  “ordered, planned, or participated”: Intelligence Oversight Board, “Report on the Guatemala Review,” June 28, 1996.

  “Going back to the history”: Author interview with Dennis Blair.

  “What’s the president”: Ibid.

  CHAPTER 4: RUMSFELD’S SPIES

  “We seem to have created”: Frank C. Carlucci, “Memorandum to the Deputy Under Secretary for Policy Richard Stillwell,” Washington, D.C., May 26, 1982, declassified in 2001 via Freedom of Information Act Request by the National Security Archive. Jeffrey T. Richelson and Barbara Elias of the National Security Archive compiled other declassified documents used in this chapter. Also invaluable to this chapter, Robert Chesney, “Military-Intelligence Convergence and the Law of the Title 10/Title 50 Debate,” Journal of National Security Law and Policy (2012).

  “Given the nature of our world”: Donald H. Rumsfeld, “SECRET Memo to Joint Chiefs Chairman General Richard Meyers,” October 17, 2001.

  without harming the captives: Author interview with Robert Andrews. Also, Rowan Scarborough, Rumsfeld’s War: The Untold Story of America’s Anti-Terrorist Commander (District of Columbia: Regnery, 2004): 8–10.

  “We had to clear”: Author interview with Thomas O’Connell.

  since the days of the OSS: Richard H. Shultz Jr., The Secret War Against Hanoi: Kennedy’s and Johnson’s Use of Spies, Saboteurs, and Covert Warriors in North Vietnam (New York: HarperCollins, 1999): ix.

  how the military would fight: Author interview with Robert Andrews.

  “little birds in a nest”: Donald H. Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir (New York: Sentinel, 2011): 392.

  relying on American newspaper reports: Mark Bowden, Guests of the Ayatollah: The Iran Hostage Crisis: The First Battle in America’s War with Militant Islam (New York: Grove Press, 2006): 122. The CIA’s one success before the operation was a lucky break, when a CIA officer on a plane out of Tehran happened to be sitting next to a Pakistani cook who had recently been working inside the American-embassy compound. The cook gave the Americans the crucial piece of information that all of the hostages were being held in the same location, inside the chancery building.

  “reliable human observers”: Lt. Gen. Philip C. Gast, “Memorandum for Director, Defense Intelligence Agency,” Washington, D.C., December 10, 1980.

  “I’ll be damned”: Steven Emerson, Secret Warriors: Inside the Covert Military Operations of the Reagan Era (New York: Putnam, 1988): 39.

  soldiers shouldn’t also be spies: The most significant of these operations was a secret Navy unit called Task Force 157. Using a fleet of electronic eavesdropping ships disguised as luxury yachts, Task Force 157 spies positioned themselves at the opening of the Panama Canal, inside the Strait of Gibraltar, and other maritime “choke points” to keep track of Soviet ships. The Pentagon never discussed the group’s work in public, and when in 1973 the deputy chief of naval operations testified before Congress, he made only one oblique reference to how the “Navy’s human intelligence collection program is expanding operations in sensitive areas.” When he was the CIA’s station chief in Istanbul, Dewey Clarridge worked with Task Force 157 spies who were monitoring shipping traffic on the Bosporus. For the best treatment of Task Force 157, see Jeffrey T. Richelson, “Truth Conquers All Chains: The U.S. Army Intelligence Support Activity, 1981–1989,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 12, no. 2 (1999).

  “Also I heard”: Ibid., 171.

  to whomever might be watching from the sky: Ibid., 172.

  the mission into Laos: Emerson, 78.


  whether local sources: Ibid., 79.

  front companies used: Seymour H. Hersh, “Who’s In Charge Here?” The New York Times (November 22, 1987).

  a Rolls-Royce, a hot-air balloon: Emerson, 81.

  “We should have learned”: Frank C. Carlucci, “Memorandum to the Deputy Under Secretary for Policy Richard Stillwell.”

  “Our intelligence about Grenada”: Quoted in Tim Weiner, Legacy of Ashes: The History of the CIA (New York: Doubleday, 2007): 454.

  “Mr. Casey, what you say”: Duane R. Clarridge with Digby Diehl, A Spy for All Seasons: My Life in the CIA (New York: Scribner, 2002): 229.

  “If I had known”: Author interview with Robert Andrews.

  to send its officers anywhere in the world: Although any government agency technically can carry out a covert action, these activities have generally been accepted to be the preserve of the CIA because the spy agency was seen as more capable of carrying out missions officially denied by the U.S. government.

  “ongoing” or “anticipated” hostilities: Jennifer D. Kibbe, “The Rise of the Shadow Warriors,” Foreign Affairs (March/April 2004).

  “We had the ability to finish”: Bradley Graham, By His Own Rules: The Ambitions, Successes, and Ultimate Failures of Donald Rumsfeld (New York: Public Affairs, 2009): 584.

  “If we’re at war”: Author interview with Thomas O’Connell.

  making use of groups like Delta Force: Graham, 585.

  You don’t need to put your troops: Ibid.

  the CIA had the authorities: Thomas W. O’Connell, “9/11 Commission Recommendation for Consolidated Paramilitary Activities,” August 30, 2004.

  the CIA was set up to grade its own work: Stephen A. Cambone, “Memorandum for Secretary of Defense,” September 30, 2004.

  meant for only him to see: Author interview with Edward Gnehm.

  CHAPTER 5: THE ANGRY BIRD

  but insisted that they fire weapons: The deployment of American troops to Yemen was authorized in an “Execute Order” signed by Donald Rumsfeld and Joint Chiefs chairman General Richard Myers. The EXORD is discussed in a classified CENTCOM chronology of operations September 11, 2001–July 10, 2002, obtained by the author.

  the first place outside of Afghanistan: Account of meeting with Saleh comes from former senior American official.

  al-Harethi was always careful: James Bamford, “He’s in the Backseat!” The Atlantic (April 2006).

  the surveillance net got its first big catch: Rowan Scarborough, Rumsfeld’s War: The Untold Story of America’s Anti-Terrorist Commander (Washington, D.C.: Regnery, 2004): 25 and Michael Smith, Killer Elite (Great Britain: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2006): 237.

  the CIA was now authorized: Bamford, “He’s in the Backseat!”

  found at the scene: “U.S. Missile Strike Kills al Qaeda Chief,” CNN World (November 5, 2002).

  “bloody struggle”: “Intelligence Policy,” National Commission on Terrorism Attacks Upon the United States, 9/11 Commission Staff Statement No. 7 (2004).

  he would have refused a direct order: Ibid. The commission’s staff statement states only that “a former CTC chief” told the commission he would have refused the order to kill bin Laden. A member of the commission staff identified the CTC chief as Geoff O’Connell.

  “You know”: “The 9-11 Commission Report: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,” (2004).

  insufficient for White House approval: Author interview with Richard Clarke.

  various options for spying: Ibid., and author interview with former senior CIA official.

  a crude e-mail link: Public remarks by R. James Woolsey at George Mason University, September 13, 2012.

  the CIA’s war in Afghanistan during the 1980s: Ibid.

  the photo was upside down: Author interview with Curt Hawes.

  whom al Qaeda would end up killing: See Henry Crumpton, The Art of Intelligence, and Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 to get fuller accounts of Blee’s trip to Afghanistan in 1999. In both books he is identified only as “Rich.”

  the direction of clandestine operations: James Risen, “David H. Blee, 83, CIA Spy Who Revised Defector Policy,” The New York Times (August 17, 2000).

  “There’s no POW issue here”: Author interview with Richard Clarke.

  a satellite company with transponder space to rent: Author interview with White House official during the Clinton administration.

  Sandy Berger and his staff: Crumpton, The Art of Intelligence, 154.

  an abandoned church building: Author interview with Curt Hawes.

  hit a target tank in its path: Richard Whittle, “Predator’s Big Safari,” Mitchell Institute for Airpower Studies, Paper 7 (August 2011).

  as he controlled the Predator joystick and fired a missile: Author interview with Curt Hawes.

  spinning the turret thirty degrees: Air Force Press Release, February 27, 2001. Available at www.fas.org/irp/program/collect/docs/man-ipc-predator-010228.htm.

  “the United States is very clearly”: Jane Mayer, “The Predator War,” The New Yorker, October 26, 2009.

  no authority to fire a Hellfire missile: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, “9-11 Commission Report,” (2004).

  the spy agency was now hawking images: Author interview with Ross Newland.

  he demanded that American spies: Author interview with former senior American official.

  CHAPTER 6: A TRUE PASHTUN

  He asked one of his lieutenants: Zahid Hussain, The Scorpion’s Tail (New York: Free Press, 2010): 73.

  just like the Soviets had years earlier: Shaukat Qadir, “Understanding the Insurgency in FATA.” Available at http://shaukatqadir.info/pdfs/FATA.pdf.

  the illiterate youth: Muhammad I. Khan, “Nek Muhammad Wazir,” The Herald (September 16, 2005).

  even when his commanders: Syed Saleem Shahzad, “The Legacy of Nek Mohammed,” Asia Times Online (July 20, 2004).

  American firebases across the border: Christine C. Fair and Seth Jones, “Pakistan’s War Within,” Survival 51, no. 6 (December 2009–January 2010): 168.

  not only his clothes but his pillow covers: Ibid., 169.

  some parents refused to accept: Hussain, The Scorpion’s Tail, 71.

  The crowd cheered wildly: “Making Deals with the Militants,” part 4 of Return of the Taliban, PBS Frontline, October 3, 2006.

  “Whatever happened”: Ibid.

  “That should make it clear”: Iqbal Khattak, “I Did Not Surrender to the Military,” Friday Times (April 30–May 6, 2004).

  “If [Pakistani troops]”: Author interview with Asad Munir.

  “There is no al Qaeda here”: Dilawar K. Wazir, “Top Militant Vows to Continue Jihad,” Dawn (April 26, 2004).

  “Nek Muhammad really pissed off”: Author interview with former CIA station chief in Islamabad.

  mountain camps where Kashmiri: Author interview with senior American intelligence official.

  HE LIVED AND DIED LIKE A TRUE PASHTUN: Hussain, The Scorpion’s Tail, 73.

  preventing the simmering dispute: Syed Shoaib Hasan, “Rise of Pakistan’s Quiet Man,” BBC News (June 17, 2009).

  where he would shop for suits and ties: Author interview with former CIA official.

  “the price of Soviet presence in Afghanistan”: Major Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, “Strengths and Weaknesses of the Afghan Resistance Movement.” Thesis paper for Kayani’s Masters of Military Art and Science at the Command and General Staff, Fort Leavenworth, 1988.

  years more of bloody conflict: The final passage from Kayani’s thesis, a section under the heading “Political Settlement,” is particularly illuminating if you were to consider substituting “Americans” for “Soviets,” and “Washington” for “Moscow”: “It is not likely that the Soviets will be willing to negotiate about Afghanistan itself but their presence there could be a bargaining chip or a point of leverage to bargain for concess
ions in some other areas as part of a package deal. If that happens, the central problem for Moscow will be the inability of the Afghan regime to survive in the absence of Soviet troops. Logically the Soviets will trade for concessions which ensure the continuation of their influence in the Afghan government. The most that they could be expected to accommodate is the ARM sharing power with the Kabul regime but as a weaker partner.”

  CHAPTER 7: CONVERGENCE

  There was about to be: Four former CIA officers described the events surrounding the al Qaeda meeting and planning for a military operation in Pakistan.

  riding around the mountain villages: Peter L. Bergen, Manhunt: The Ten-Year Search for Bin Laden—from 9/11 to Abbottabad (New York: Crown, 2012): 160.

  “This is a really bad idea, Stan”: Author interview with former CIA station chief in Islamabad.

  had used the technique: Memorandum for John Rizzo from Stephen Bradbury, May 30, 2005.

  “unauthorized, improvised, inhumane”: CIA Inspector General, “Special Review: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001–October 2003),” May 7, 2004, 102.

  The waterboards were bought locally: David Johnston and Mark Mazzetti, “A Window into CIA’s Embrace of Secret Jails,” The New York Times (August 12, 2009).

  The entertainment was taken away: Ibid.

  were the political winds to shift: Author interview with senior Bush administration official.

  “the U.S. government will not stand behind them”: CIA Inspector General, “Special Review: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001–October 2003),” 101.

  the plans had been temporarily shelved: Author interview with two retired CIA officers.

  he had played a leading role: Henry A. Crumpton, The Art of Intelligence: Lessons from a Life in the CIA’s Clandestine Service (New York: Penguin, 2012): 173.

  to sell programs back to the government: Details about Blackwater’s role in the assassination program comes from three former CIA officials. See also Adam Ciralsky, “Tycoon, Contractor, Soldier, Spy,” Vanity Fair (January 2010).