Mike Guardia

by American Guerrilla

  After forwarding his memorandum to the Army Chief of Staff, Volckmann began work on a study called “Findings and Recommendations re Special Operations Training,” synthesizing his ideas and the hard-fought lessons he had learned over the years. Upon receipt of Volckmann’s papers, General Collins gave his blessing to the Special Forces project. 413 The Army Special Forces gained their own responsibilities for training and planning special operations—just as Volckmann had wanted. However, the CIA retained its paramilitary capabilities, and bureaucratic friction with the Pentagon over special operations responsibility continues to this day.

  If followed exactly, Volckmann’s advice may have improved the efficiency of the civil intelligence and special warfare apparatuses. While his advice may not have been followed to the letter, it seems to have made some lasting impact. Today, CIA agents do not supervise military operations and largely serve as auxiliaries to special warfare troops instead of competing with them. Though friction still exists between the military and the civil intelligence community, the distinctions between their responsibilities and physical areas of operation are clearer today than they were over half of a century ago.

  Reviewing Volckmann’s contribution to the development of Special Forces, it begs to question why he receives virtually no recognition for his involvement and why history has given the lion’s share of the credit to Aaron Bank. At Fort Bragg, North Carolina, memorials dedicated to Bank cite him as the true “Father of Special Forces.” There are two possible reasons behind this affirmation.

  The first is that Bank created the Table of Organization and Equipment (TO&E) under which the Special Forces currently operate. While OCPW determined what structural format the Special Forces teams would follow, Bank suggested a derivative of the Operational Group concept from the OSS.* This is Bank’s major contribution to the program. Using this concept, Bank created an organizational table that divided Special Forces units into three tiers. These tiers would officially be called Detachments and given a letter designation—A, B, and C. The finished product would be similar to a conventional brigade, but with fewer personnel. The first tier, the A-Detachment—or A-Team, as it would later be known—consisted of twelve soldiers. One captain would serve as a Detachment Commander with a 1st lieutenant as his executive officer. The remaining ten were enlisted men who worked in pairs according to their primary specialty, for example demolition, combat engineering, combat medics, field communications, and heavy weapons. Three “A-Detachments” comprised a “B-Detachment,” commanded by a major with a complement of nine NCOs. Three “B-Detachments” made up a “C-Detachment” (run by a lieutenant colonel) and three “CDetachments” made a Special Forces Group. 414

  *Operational Groups were 30-man units designed to conduct irregular warfare behind Axis lines.

  The second reason is that Bank commanded the first operational Special Forces unit—the 10th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. As Bank was the first Special Forces Group commander, and was responsible for its TO&E, it is not surprising that he is often heralded as the “Father of Special Forces.”

  By any reasonable standard, Aaron Bank was a bright, talented, and extremely competent officer. However, the title “Father of Special Forces” is not appropriate for him. It was Volckmann, not Bank, who articulated and designed the mission capabilities and operational framework upon which the Army Special Forces would operate. It was Volckmann, not Bank, who represented OCPW at General Collins’ Fort Benning conference and authored the memorandum explaining the strategic purposes of special operations and the mission parameters defined by the six numerated functions. Furthermore, these were concepts that Volckmann had already codified in FM 31-20 and 31-21, both of which he wrote before Bank ever joined OCPW. Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, in a letter dated 23 February 1969 addressed to the History Office at Fort Bragg, Bank actually credits Volckmannfor “the development of position, planning, and policy papers that helped sell the establishment of Special Forces units in the active Army.” 415

  Even though Army Special Forces operate under Bank’s conception of the TO&E, their operations today have more in common with Volckmann’s USAFIP-NL. As per FM 31-21, Volckmann advocated many of the tenets he had developed in the Philippines and lessons he drew from his time with Eighth Army Headquarters in Korea. Volckmann knew that the first thing Special Forces needed was a unified command structure under full military authority. The OSS, for its part in the war, was still a civilian agency and did not take its orders exclusively from the Army. Moreover, Volckmann did not strictly focus on utilizing the Special Forces for “behind the lines” activities. He also envisioned the Special Forces operating in environments where the front lines had disappeared, as had been the case for him in the Philippines.* Furthermore, Volckmann’s initial memorandum to General Collins and his “Findings and Recommendations re Special Operations Training” envisioned a force that would both train and equip indigenous peoples for guerrilla warfare.

  *This is important considering the operational environments of the Vietnam War and the current War on Terror.

  For their part, Bank and McClure shared with Volckmann their experiences in the OSS and the Psychological Warfare Branch. However, Volckmann arguably had a better grasp on the fundamentals of guerrilla warfare and understood these concepts in ways that Bank and McClure never could. Although the OSS and USAFIP-NL both conducted “subversive activities,” the OSS operated within an established framework that experienced no discontinuity in its operation. At the start of the war in the Philippines, USAFFE handled all military operations but, after the Fall of Bataan, it ceased to function as a military organization. Volckmann’s guerrillas picked up the pieces of the shattered Philippine Army and organized them into the USAFIP-NL, a guerrilla force that operated under fighting doctrines that Volckmann developed as he went along.

  Additionally, the OSS did not carry on its missions at a distance from other Allied units. Europe was a densely militarized theater of war with high concentrations of Axis and Allied units. In Volckmann’s case, however, the nearest Allied ordnance lay thousands of miles offshore. Also, it was easier in Europe for OSS personnel to blend in with the local population, since both the Europeans and Americans were ethnically white. Volckmann and his American comrades in North Luzon could not duplicate this feat. In fact, this was a condition that highlighted Volckmann’s need for civilian support—his Filipino spies could go into places that a white American could not.

  It would also not be appropriate to bestow McClure with the title “Father of Special Forces.” Although McClure established OCPW with the expressed desire to maintain unconventional forces, he regarded the Special Forces solely as a means to an end. McClure’s primary objective was to establish special operations forces within the Army’s existing psychological warfare community and bring psychological operations to the forefront of Army doctrine. Initially, Special Forces were subordinate to the Psychological Warfare Center. Although today this relationship is reversed, in 1951, it was the natural consequence of McClure’s leadership. Conducting psychological operations in World War II, McClure regarded them as the banner under which all special operations should fall.* There was nothing hazardous in McClure’s setup, but as time progressed, it was evident that a more efficient structure would be one under which Special Forces took the lead.

  * McClure’s focus on the psychological aspect of the program was probably the reason why Volckmann had so much independence in designing the Special Forces component. McClure obviously trusted Volckmann’s expertise in guerrilla and unconventional matters.

  Although Bank and McClure were talented officers, their contributions to the development of Special Forces were neither as far-reaching nor as contemplative as Volckmann’s. Had Volckmann not written FM 31-20 and 31-21, McClure may have had no one to seek for adequate help or advice in developing an operational format for unconventional forces. Furthermore, the Army’s doctrine for counterinsurgency did not exist until Volckma
nn wrote it down. FM 31-20 gave the Army it’s intellectual, tactical, and operational foundation for counterinsurgency from 1950 until the present day. Likewise, FM 31-21 provided the inaugural framework and operational theory for Army Special Forces.

  For the reasons outlined above, the title “Father of Special Forces” rightly belongs to Russell William Volckmann.

  Portrait of Brigadier General Russell W. Volckmann, 1957.

  The Volkmann Family Collection.

  EPILOGUE

  Understanding Volckmann’s Legacy

  Volckmann was neither the first nor the only American in the Philippines to organize a guerrilla movement; several others fled to the mountains in the wake of Japanese aggression. Yet, the common denominator among the majority of these guerrillas is that they ultimately failed— many of them dying within the first year and a half of combat. As many records were lost during the war, categorizing the other movements remains a difficult task. Furthermore, it is entirely possible that many units kept no records at all, especially considering the scarcity of paper.* When Allied forces returned to the Philippines, the guerrilla records they received were written on a variety of odds and ends: newspapers, leaves, milk and cigarette cartons, and anything else that could be used as a writing surface.** It is also likely that many of these phantom guerrillas either dissolved into larger units or were eventually snuffed out by the Japanese.

  The only guerrillas that provide any useful information for historians today are those who left behind some record of their activity. The archival landscape is littered with the names of guerrillas who fought valiantly against the Japanese, but tragically did not survive the war. Where they failed, however, Volckmann succeeded. Among the more notable of the early guerrillas included Walter Cushing, Roque Ablan, Claude Thorp, Marcelo Adduru, and Ralph Praeger. There are several conflicting stories of how each man ultimately met his demise, but their tactical missteps collectively fall into six categories.

  * There were several small, isolated bands of guerrillas that operated in teams of no more than 30 men. Volckmann confirms their existence in his diary but there is no substantial record of their activity.

  **The Philippine Archives section of the National Archives II has several such documents. Some have been written on the back of voting ballots and Philippine government job applications. Brigadier General Donald D. Blackburn had many of these in his private collection.

  First, many of them tried to accomplish too much, too soon. Some began conducting guerrilla operations before the Japanese had even reached Bataan. While their initiative in bringing the fight to the enemy was commendable, it violated what is known as the Principle of Deliberate Delay. 416 In this, they failed to wait until the Japanese had settled into a regular routine of occupation duty and a lower state of readiness.

  Second, each of the early guerrilla movements maintained a limited geographic scope. By this, they did not extend their immediate regions. This was not necessarily problematic in the early stages of the war, but to affect any long-term impact on the Japanese, there had to be a synchronization of effort. Operating on a localized basis only facilitated the counterinsurgency efforts of the Japanese. If guerrilla activity became concentrated only within certain areas, the Japanese could easily redistribute their manpower to quell the localized resistance.

  Third, these guerrillas had no means to retain any of the prisoners they captured. Rather than burden their operations by keeping track of prisoners, these guerrillas simply released them and moved their operations to another area. 417 This tactical faux pas was one of the greatest liabilities to the resistance movement. A released prisoner would do little more than travel to the nearest Japanese garrison and report the guerillas’ last known location. Consequently, the Japanese would dispatch entire rifle companies into the landscape to intercept the “banditos.” Volckmann, however, not only retained his prisoners, he put them to work on his staff. 418

  Fourth, the early guerrillas had no effective means for dealing with spies and collaborators. With informers indistinguishable from the general population, many guerrillas simply treated the problem as unsolvable and hoped that the “fifth column” would never cross their path. Ralph Praeger, the guerrilla Captain who led remnants of C Troop, 26th Cavalry (Philippine Scouts) in Apayao sub-province, died in 1943 when collaborators betrayed the location of his hideout. 419 Volckmann, however, knew that if he expected to survive the war, he would have to make the collaborators fear him more than the Japanese.

  Fifth, some guerrillas agitated the local Filipinos rather than solicit their help. This may have been the reason behind Claude Thorp’s demise. Thorp, a Lieutenant Colonel, was unique among the USAFFE guerrillas in that he was the only one specifically tapped by a higher authority to conduct guerrilla warfare after the Fall of Bataan. Whether it was MacArthur or General Jonathan Wainwright (MacArthur’s second-in-command) who ultimately gave the authorization, Thorp nonetheless disappeared into the Zambales Mountains to organize a resistance among the displaced Americans in Western Luzon. According to Blackburn, however, Thorp’s temper and condescending attitude earned him the hatred of the local civilians and the wrath of the Hukbalahap. Disgusted by his attitude, local civilians shunned him and one eventually reported Thorp to the Japanese. If this is true, then Thorp’s behavior was undeniably self-destructive—especially in light of USAFFE’s humiliating defeat and the circumstances of the Japanese occupation. He was captured in August 1942 and summarily executed a year later. 420

  Finally, many of the resistance leaders’ organizational skills were so bad that their guerrilla movements collapsed under the weight of their own mismanagement. A representative sample of this is the MosesNoble operation.* In his diary, Volckmann never openly indicted the colonels for their lack of planning. Blackburn, however, was never at a loss for words concerning Moses and Noble’s missteps. Accordingly, Blackburn indicated that the colonels’ mistakes were ones that he and Volckmann strove not to repeat. 421

  The only guerrilla whose fate remains a mystery is Roque Ablan, the provincial governor of Ilocos Norte. Rather than surrender to the Japanese in Vichy-ite fashion, Ablan foraged a nearby Philippine Army camp for arms and ammunition. Arming his governor’s staff, he took to the wilderness and began launching raids against Japanese outposts. Although spies repeatedly betrayed the location of his hideouts, he managed to escape the Japanese fury every time. 422 However, after his last escape in early 1943, Ablan simply disappeared. There is no official record of him beyond February 1943.

  Cautious not to duplicate the mistakes of his predecessors, Volckmann exploited the geography of North Luzon as a critical element to his success. Hideki Tojo commanded a fearsome army, but it was one that operated on a finite amount of resources. Petroleum, ores, and steel were the Achilles Heel of Japan’s war machine. An economic power in their own right, the Japanese relied heavily on Western imports to satisfy their industrial needs. This condition heavily influenced Imperial war policy: to maintain its conquest of the Pacific, Japan had to seize key points of industry without interference from the U.S. Navy. Manchuria and Borneo were the first areas targeted under this policy. 423

  *Colonel John P. Horan (see Chapter 2) also falls into this category.

  Japan eyed the Philippines for the same reason. There were 7,107 islands in the archipelago, but Luzon was the priority target. The largest of the Philippine islands, Luzon was home to the nation’s capital and the heart of Philippine industry—with the northern provinces housing the region’s only mining network. What the Japanese had accomplished in Manchuria, they hoped to repeat in Luzon: control of the mineral resources. During the campaign, the Rising Sun scattered throughout the Philippines, but the bulk of the occupation force remained in and around North Luzon. 424

  Strategically opportunistic views of the Philippine Islands, however, were not one-sided. The Allies, too, saw the Philippines as critical. Victory meant denying the Japanese an important resource enclave in the Pacific. If the flow of r
aw material continued, Japan would still have an outlet for making tools of war. Retaking North Luzon, therefore, meant closure of the nearest Japanese mineral reserve. 425 Unwittingly or not, Volckmann found himself operating in one of the most strategically critical areas of the entire Pacific War.

  Volckmann wisely kept his base of operations in the Cordillera Central of North Luzon. He had no concern for the region’s mineral resources or what the Japanese could gain from them; the decision to remain in the mountains was a function of pragmatism and utility. The central and southern parts of the island were plains that allowed easy access for Japanese foot patrols. The mountains, on the other hand, provided significant cover and numerous hiding places. The rugged terrain restricted enemy patrols to the narrow network of mountain passes. With enemy patrols often confined to a single column, their movements became slower and made them more susceptible to ambush. Conversely, the Cordillera was ideal terrain for Volckmann and his guerrillas—the mountain crevices and ridgelines offered enviable redoubts against enemy camps and patrol lanes.

  In the spring of 1944, General Tomiyuki Yamashita assumed command of the Fourteenth Army. Shortly thereafter, he reorganized the entire defense scheme on Luzon. Drawing his forces away from the coast and the central plains, he consolidated his forces within the Cordillera Central of North Luzon. 426 Yamashita recognized that this action would draw the Americans into a prolonged campaign to dig his forces out of the mountains. It could be done, but not without severe losses to the Americans. What Yamashita did not know, however, was that his new defense plan put him right in the middle of Volckmann’s guerrilla network.*