Von Rundstedt rarely went to Paris, even though it was so close, but did not discourage his staff from doing so. Blumentritt recalled:
‘In the good mood in which everyone found himself the young officers hit upon the following idea: in the orderly officer’s workroom hung two large maps of Paris; every visitor to the city had to map out his experiences on both of these. One map contained blue, the other red, dots with numbers. The blue dots showed where one could eat particularly well, and the red onces indicated where something for the heart could be found. When the broad-minded Rundstedt entered this room one day he inspected the two maps, whilst the young officers stood near. Rundstedt merely made the laconic comment: “Here, your red map isn’t nearly full!”’7
SEALION meant, however, that von Rundstedt’s staff had only limited time in which to relax and savour the pleasures of victory. They were soon hard at work transforming the grandiose OKH scheme into a practical and detailed plan.
In postwar interrogations and interviews von Rundstedt stated that he viewed the prospect of SEALION with gloom from the outset. He told Liddell Hart that he often thought of how Napoleon had been baffled by the same prospect.8 To Milton Shulman he said that there was insufficient shipping to transport the force across the Channel and that he and other army commanders involved regarded the whole concept ‘as a game’.9 This is supported by Blumentritt, who said that his chief regarded the venture as ‘an impossibility’.10 Indeed, he appears to have openly expressed the view ‘Sealion, rubbish’ and to have left most of the planning to Busch.11 Contemporary evidence also seems to support this attitude. True, von Rundstedt visited Ninth Army at Dieppe at the end of July, and a few days later toured units of Sixteenth Army at Ostend, Dunkirk and Gravelines, but he never attended any amphibious landing exercises. Even when von Brauchitsch and Halder came to see such demonstrations by Sixteenth Army at Le Touquet on 16 August, neither von Rundstedt nor his chief of staff were present, and the army group was represented by Blumentritt, a mere Colonel at the time. According to Blumentritt, von Rundstedt, at one stage in July, did declare that the headquarters should move from its comfortable billet at St Germain to a more spartan existence in a hutted camp in woods near Amiens in order to be closer to the coast, but he never bothered to put this into practice.12
Meanwhile Goering’s Luftwaffe had been trying to draw the RAF into battle over the Channel, but without success. At the end of July, Hitler accepted that he had been over-optimistic in fixing 15 August as a potential D-day, especially because of the problems being experienced in gathering together from ports and waterways throughout Western Europe the 2,500 barges and other craft needed for the invasion. On 1 August, he issued Directive No 17, which ordered Goering to begin intensive operations to break the back of the RAF. At the same time Keitel issued an instruction to the relevant army commanders laying down that all preparations were now to be completed by 15 September and that Hitler would decide 8–14 days after Goering’s renewed air offensive began whether the invasion would take place in September or be postponed until Spring 1941. The Navy, however, continued to object to the Army’s plan for landings on a broad front and, at the end of July, Raeder tried to persuade Hitler to postpone SEALION until the spring. On 12 August, Goering switched his efforts from the Channel to RAF airfields and fighter bases and for the three and a half weeks there were desperate air battles in the skies over southern England, actions which the Germans convinced themselves were destroying more British aircraft than they were losing themselves. Yet, the RAF showed no signs of weakening.
On 14 August, von Rundstedt and the other newly promoted Field Marshals attended Hitler at the Reichs Chancellery in order to be presented with their ceremonial batons. Before he left for Berlin, Ditha wrote to her father-in-law: ‘Thank the Lord who has brought you home from all these perils. I hope you will live through a few unique hours in Berlin, as a token for what you and your troops have done for us.’13
As was inevitable on an occasion like this, Hitler harangued his commanders. The OKM War Diary recorded the gist of what he said as follows:
‘The Führer stated that he does not intend to carry out the operation if the risk was too great, as he considers that the aim of defeating England is not exclusively [sic] dependent on invasion, but can also be achieved by other means. Whatever final decision may be taken, the Führer wishes that, in any case, the threat of invasion be maintained.’14
SEALION was still very dependent on the success that the Luftwaffe had against the RAF. But, according to one source, Hitler actually told von Rundstedt in private that SEALION was merely ‘a deception’.15 Even so, Hitler’s speech on its own was enough to confirm von Rundstedt’s view that the Führer’s heart was not in it and that it would not take place.
While in Berlin, von Rundstedt and his fellow Field Marshals attended the first night of a new propaganda film Sieg im Westen (Triumph in the West). An American journalist was present and described von Rundstedt as the ‘frog-eyed man with a moustache’. He noted that he and von Bock sat in adjacent boxes at the theatre, but exchanged no words. ‘They just sat there poker-faced, and gazed blankly into space.’ Apart from a possible coldness between the two, as a result of the arguments over Case Yellow, it is likely that von Rundstedt, with his distaste for publicity, was uncomfortable in this gala atmosphere, as was von Bock. The journalist also described their reactions when Hitler’s labour minister, Robert Ley, and his wife appeared. They both ‘rose stiffly in succession to kiss the hand of the beautiful blonde-haired woman…. But they only nodded at the grinning doctor.’16
The festivities over, von Rundstedt returned to France, but almost immediately departed on leave. This was at the time when the SEALION preparations were reaching their height, and was confirmation that he was now convinced that no invasion would take place. It was also the first time that he had seen Bila since well before the invasion of France. There was also another reason for going on leave at this time. He was about to be a grandfather for the third time.
Whether he had the chance to see Hans Gerd and Ditha when he was in Berlin is not known, but it would be surprising if he did not. Ditha, commenting on the general situation in Europe, had written to her mother-in-law: ‘How will everything continue with high politics – the calm before the storm [presumably SEALION] really takes one’s breath away.’17 Her condition was not helped by the fact that on the night 25/26 August, RAF Bomber Command raided Berlin for the first time, with fifty aircraft and with further attacks taking place during the following nights, albeit with smaller numbers of bombers. Ditha commented in another letter to Bila:
‘Though Tommy visits us every night and then cannot tear himself away, we have, thank God, come through everything unharmed. Please keep your fingers crossed that it won’t be too awful in the nursing home, because I do not think it much fun having babies surrounded by falling bombs. But these thoughts do not help; Tommy won’t be so gentlemanly as to stay away from Berlin during my crucial days.’18
Eberhard himself was born on 7 September. His grandfather had been aghast when he had learnt that Ditha was pregnant for a third time and wondered how Hans Gerd and his wife could afford so many children. Ditha reassured him by saying that children attracted generous tax allowances. This they did as part of the Nazi policy for the propagation of the Aryan race. Accordingly, Hans Gerd used to refer to Eberhard as ‘our tax bonus’.19 Von Rundstedt’s attitude may help to explain why he and Bila only had one child, but another reason was possibly the memory of his mother’s exhaustion after bearing four children in such rapid succession.
While Ditha had withstood the rigours of the RAF’s first attacks on Berlin with seeming sangfroid, she and her children left the capital the following spring. Her best friend was married to a Swiss and had a house in Goisern in Austria, where the friend’s mother was living. The mother found a holiday house there which Ditha was able to rent. Here she settled, returning just once to Berlin for the birth of her fourth and last child. She
and the children would remain at Goisern until well after the end of the war.20
While von Rundstedt was away from France there were some significant changes to the overall SEALION plan. Most important was a narrowing of the invasion front, although it was still not enough to satisfy the Navy’s demands. The Lyme Bay landing was cancelled and Worthing would now be the western boundary. Von Bock’s Headquarters Army Group B was now relieved of any involvement with SEALION and, indeed, was ordered east to Posen as the first stage of the preparations for the invasion of Russia. Furthermore, on 3 September, Keitel had issued a directive postponing the invasion until 21 September. This would be confirmed on the 11th, with final orders being issued on the 18th. Von Rundstedt thus found himself in sole charge, as far as the land forces were concerned, of an operation which was receding into the realms of theory, merely confirming, even further, his belief that it would never be mounted. His staff seem to have thought the same way. When von Brauchitsch and Halder visited his headquarters on 10 September, whilst von Rundstedt was still on leave, in order to check on the operational planning, Halder complained that it had been done ‘much too mechanically’.21 On that same day, Hitler postponed the operation until 24 September and, four days later, put it back until the 27th, the last day of the month on which the tides would be suitable. By now it was becoming clear to Hitler that the Luftwaffe, in spite of Goering’s assertions, had not yet won the Battle of Britain, although he blamed the weather rather than any failings on the part of his air force. Finally, on 15 September, Goering, deluding himself that he now had the RAF on the run, launched an all out daylight attack on London. He lost 58 aircraft, as against 26 RAF fighters. Accepting that he could not overwhelm the RAF by day, he decided to beat the British people into submission through bomber attacks by night. Two days later, Hitler postponed SEALION indefinitely and turned to other things.
No evidence remains of von Rundstedt’s reaction to this news, but one suspects that it was one of ‘I told you so’. On 1 October, however, he was formally appointed Commander-in-Chief West, tasked primarily with the military occupation of Northern France. Life at St Germain could resume its previous tenor of comparative lightheartedness, although, according to Blumentritt, von Rundstedt himself showed little interest in the fleshpots of Paris. He did, however, grow discontented with life at the villa, perhaps because he felt that he was isolating himself too much from his staff. Acordingly, he moved into two rooms in a detached annexe of the Henri IV. Von Rundstedt maintained a virtually ‘open’ headquarters, with very little security – no fences, and ‘only in the evening did a couple of elderly soldiers go on patrol’.22 He himself took much pleasure in walking in the neighbouring woods, often totally unaccompanied, and, no doubt, quite willing to practise his French on any local people that he met. All this helped to maintain a relaxed and happy atmosphere, but it was not long before his headquarters was given further planning tasks.
Apart from beginning to prepare seriously for the invasion of the Soviet Union, Hitler’s attention had also turned south. On 27 September, he had signed the Tripartite Pact with Italy and Japan by which each country undertook to support any of the others if they were attacked by a country not already at war. The Pact also included mutual recognition of the right to establish the ‘new orders’ in the Far East and Europe. Two weeks later, Hitler met Mussolini in the Brenner Pass to agree strategy for the future. At the time, the Italians, although they had overrun British Somaliland and secured two small lodgements in the Sudan, had done little to impress their German ally. Their much heralded invasion of Egypt from Libya had come to a halt after 60 miles and British convoys still seemed to be slipping through the Straits of Gibraltar and across Mussolini’s supposed Mare Nostrum. Africa was the only theatre in which Axis troops were engaged with the British on land and there was also the lure of Middle East oil. Accordingly, during autumn 1940 Hitler drew up grandiose plans for removing the British presence from the Mediterranean and the Middle and Near East. This envisaged a double envelopment around the shores of the Mediterranean. List was to overrun the Balkans and then drive through Turkey, ignoring the fact that she had declared herself neutral, and then thrust for the Suez Canal. A force commanded by von Bock was to take passage from Italy to Tripolitania in order to bolster the Italian forces in Libya. Simultaneously, under the codename FELIX, an army group under von Rundstedt was to move through Spain, capture Gibraltar, cross to Morocco and then drive east to Tunis. This, of course, disregarded the June 1940 armistice with the French, in that French North Africa was part of the Unoccupied Zone. The plan foundered because Franco refused to allow German troops to traverse Spain, but it kept von Rundstedt’s staff occupied for a little while.
The spectre of Hitler’s plan to invade Russia was beginning to loom large, however. Any German who had read his Mein Kampf With any attention realised only too well that Bolshevism was Hitler’s ultimate enemy. In this context, the August 1939 pact with Stalin could be seen merely as the measure of temporary expediency that it was. Indeed, it was nothing more than the traditional German policy of trying to avoid simultaneous war on two fronts. By July 1940, while the German commanders in the West were grapping with the problems of SEALION, Hitler was already turning his attention eastwards. On the 19th, General Erich Marcks, Chief of Staff of Eighteenth Army, was detailed to produce a study on the invasion of the Soviet Union. He completed it in two weeks. According to Halder, Hitler’s justification to the German High Command for invading Russia was that she was Britain’s only remaining hope in Europe and that if she were smashed, Britain must fall.23 He also laid down the aim as the destruction of Russian manpower and gave the main territorial objectives as Kiev, Moscow, and the Caucasus oilfields. The invasion was to take place in spring 1941. Marcks’ plan was based on reaching a final line sufficiently far to the East to put Germany out of range of Soviet strategic bombers. This line he defined as Archangel-Gorki-Rostov-on-Don. He estimated that 147 divisions would be needed. On this basis, OKW issued a directive on 9 August for Operation OTTO, the build-up of the invasion forces in Poland.
As yet, the planning had been carried entirely by OKH, but Jodl and Walter Warlimont, his chief staff officer, worked out their own plan in September. Marcks had laid down the main axis as north of the Pripet marshes and directed on Moscow, with a subsidiary attack to clear the Baltic states and seize Leningrad. He also envisaged a further subsidiary thrust south to Kiev and across the Dnieper, and thence to the Caucasus oilfields. Jodl was less influenced by economic factors and more by Hitler’s stated aim of the destruction of Russia’s military power. He therefore proposed that the invasion force should be split into three army groups. Two would advance north of the Pripet marshes and the other to the south. The army group objectives were to be Leningrad, Moscow and Kiev. This plan was further refined by Friedrich Paulus, newly appointed OKH Assistant Chief of Staff (Operations) and later to be forced to surrender at Stalingrad. Paulus, however, did raise questions over time and space and pointed to the vast preponderance of Russian manpower. He even queried the popular assumption that Stalin’s purges had resulted in poor quality leadership. At the end of November, Paulus conducted a series of war games designed to examine the questions which he had raised and then, on 5 December, Hitler presided over a confirmatory conference with von Brauchitsch and Halder. He emphasised the need to destroy the Red Army by creating pockets and wanted the army group south of the Pripet marshes to be strong so as to better split the Soviet forces. He also stated that Moscow was of no great importance and, although von Brauchitsch and Halder tried to argue the case for the Russian capital as the main objective, Hitler would have none of it. Instead, he declared that the wings of Army Group Centre must be made strong in order to be prepared to exploit north through the Baltic states and south into the Ukraine. It was on this basis that the final plan was drawn up. Before the directive for BARBAROSSA, as Hitler codenamed the invasion after the 12th century Holy Roman Emperor Frederick Hohenstaufen, the army gro
up and army chiefs of staff were briefed at an all day conference in Berlin held on 13 December. Five days later Hitler signed Directive No. 21.
The same team that had won the victory in the West, von Bock, von Leeb and von Rundstedt, was to command the army groups for BARBAROSSA. This time, however, von Bock was to be in the centre, von Leeb would be in the north and von Rundstedt the south. After the war, von Rundstedt said that his initial impression of BARBAROSSA was that it was a contingency against a Russian attack, which was always possible once they had concluded their war with the Finns in March 1940. This, however, runs contrary to what Hitler had told him at Charleville at the beginning of June 1940 (see page 124). Even so, the prospect of war with the Soviet Union, was to him both ‘unpleasant and sinister’. He recognised the innate toughness and bravery of the Russian soldier from his experiences on the Eastern Front during the period 1915–1918 and also recalled the difficulties of much of the terrain.24 Blumentritt, too, stated that von Rundstedt was against an attack on Russia from the outset and considered that if Stalin had intended to atack, he would have done so in May 1940.25 There is, however, no evidence that von Rundstedt voiced any objections, even when von Brauchitsch conferred with the three army group commanders in Berlin at the end of January 1941. This gave them the outline of the operational instruction for BARBAROSSA, which was issued by Halder on 3 February. Two days later, he was conferring with von Rundstedt and his staff at St Germain. Here von Sodenstern conducted a map exercise on how Army Group South intended to overrun the Ukraine. Halder was clearly pleased with the way that it went, commenting on how well thought out the exercise was and the good discussion. Von Rundstedt had been allocated 41 German and 14 Rumanian divisions. These were to attack on two axes so as to facilitate the double envelopment of the Russian armies facing them. Ewald von Kleist’s Panzer Group, von Reichenau’s Sixth, and Karl-Heinrich von Stülpnagel’s Seventeenth Armies were to attack from southern Poland. Geographically divorced from this blow by intervening Hungarian territory, von Schobert’s Eleventh and two indigenous armies would attack from Rumania. What von Sodenstern’s planning exercise demonstrated, according to Halder, was that it would be virtually impossible for the northern thrust to carry out any form of envelopment on its own west of the Dnieper, especially since it had to guard against the likelihood of Russian counterstrokes from the Pripet marshes. Also, the southern group tended to advance in too northly a direction too early in its desire to link up quickly with the northern thrust.26 Von Rundstedt mentioned this planning exercise to Bila in a letter he wrote to her that evening, but without, of course, telling her the object. He also commented on the wintry weather; ‘the poor French must be freezing’. Just over two weeks later, he wrote to her of the worsening food situation in France and remarked that even ‘our food stocks will soon be exhausted as well’.27 His gloom was probably influenced by the harsh wintry weather which prevented him from taking his daily exercise. ‘Sleep and mood are suffering’, as he told his wife.28
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