On 14 March, Hitler ordered von Rundstedt to Breslau, where, secretly, he was to set up Headquarters Army Group South. His place as C-in-C West was taken by Erwin von Witzleben, who was commanding Army Group D at the time which covered Occupied France south of the River Seine. En route to Breslau, von Rundstedt had to report to Berlin. On 27 March, von Brauchitsch held a day long conference for all army group, army and Panzer group commanders. A number of operational queries were raised, but, it would seem, no basic objections to BARBAROSSA. Three days later, the generals were subjected to a two and a half hour’s harangue by Hitler in his office in the Chancellery. After reviewing the war situation as a whole, Hitler went on to say that Britain put her hope in the United States and the Soviet Union. The former would not be on a full war footing for four years. Invading Russia, on the other hand, would provide ‘the final and drastic solution to all land problems’. The aims of BARBAROSSA were to ‘crush’ the Red armed forces and ‘break up’ the Soviet state. Hitler mentioned the large Russian tank and air forces, but stated that most of their weapons systems were obsolete. The enormous expanse of the Russian terrain meant that the German forces must concentrate on key points. The Luftwaffe also could not cover the entire front and its operations were to be tied closely to those of the ground forces. Not too much could be expected of the Finns and Rumanians. Hitler then went on to describe the coming campaign as a clash of two ideologies. In Halder’s diary notes, from which this account of what Hitler said is taken, Hitler described Bolshevism as a ‘social criminality’.
‘We must forget the concept of comradeship between soldiers. A Communist is no comrade before or after the battle. This is a war of extermination. If we do not grasp this, we shall still beat the enemy, but thirty years later we shall again have to fight the Communist foe. We do not wage war to preserve the enemy.’
Having described how German occupied Russia would be organised, Hitler went on to stress the ‘extermination of the Bolshevist commissars and of the Communist intelligentsia’. The formation of a new class of the latter had to be prevented.
‘This is no job for military courts. The individual troop commanders must know the issues at stake. They must be leaders in this fight. The troops must fight back with the methods with which they are attacked. Commissars and GPU [Secret Police] men are criminals and must be dealt with as such. This does not mean that the troops should get out of hand. Rather, the commander must give orders which express the common feelings of his men.’29
This was the first mention of what would become the infamous Commissar Order, something which was to haunt von Rundstedt and many of his fellow high commanders in the immediate postwar years. No evidence exists as to what von Rundstedt’s reaction to this was at the time. He himself stated after the war that Hitler had said that Commissars were not soldiers according to International Law and hence were not to be treated as normal prisoners of war.30 Von Manstein, now a Panzer corps commander in Army Group Centre, was not at the conference, but was a recipient of the order when it was formally issued by von Brauchitsch on 8 June 1941. He considered that:
‘… from the point of view of international law, the status of these political commissars was extremely equivocal. They were certainly not soldiers, any more than I would have considered a Gauleiter attached to me as a political overseer to be a soldier. Neither could they be granted the same non-combatant status as chaplains, medical personnel or war correspondents. On the contrary, they were – without being soldiers – fanatical fighters, but fighters whose activities could only be regarded as illegal according to the traditional meaning of warfare. Their task was not only the political supervision of Soviet military leaders but, even more, to instil the greatest possible degree of cruelty into the fighting and to give it a character completely at variance with the traditional conceptions of soldierly behaviour.’
Even so, von Manstein felt that it went ‘against the grain of any soldier’ to shoot commissars if they had been captured in battle.31 As for von Rundstedt, he said that he and his brother senior commanders went ‘spontaneously’ to von Brauchitsch immediately after the conference and complained.32 Von Brauchitsch, who had failed in the past to represent the Army’s views in a strong enough way, was still not prepared to take any action. Next day he sent a draft of the Commissar order to OKW.33
After his morning diatribe, Hitler invited his generals to lunch and continued in the afternoon. Some would have known already, but possibly not von Rundstedt, that Hitler’s eye was immediately on the Balkans. In December 1940, he had ordered plans to be drawn up for the occupation of the Balkans in order to secure his southern flank for BARBAROSSA under the codename MARITA. Albania, Hungary and Rumania had already joined the Axis and pressurised diplomacy persuaded Bulgaria also to join at the beginning of March and Yugoslavia on the 25th. On 27 March, however, there was a bloodless coup in Yugoslavia which overthrew the pro-Axis regent Prince Paul and replaced him with a government of national unity, with the youthful Prince Peter being crowned king. The new government immediately signed a non-aggression pact with Russia and expressed interest in creating an anti-Axis coalition with the British. Furthermore, on 7 March, Greece, which had been successfully resisting Mussolini’s invasion launched the previous October from Albania, had finally accepted Churchill’s pressing offer to send a British force to support them. On hearing of the Yugoslav coup, a furious Hitler immediately ordered MARITA to be put into effect. D-Day for the implementation of the hastily amended plan was to be 6 April. Troops earmarked for BARBAROSSA would have to be used and, as far as von Rundstedt was concerned, this included the use of Panzer Group von Kleist. The conference ended with the commanders giving reports on their preparations. Halder noted that von Rundstedt made a ‘clever plea’ for the Hungarians to be brought in to attack from the Carpathians. This would give him a more continuous front and remove the problem of the initially exposed left flank of his southern thrust. It was in fact Hitler’s intention that the Hungarian Army should take part in BARBAROSSA, but he distrusted the Hungarians because there was still an element of sympathy for Britain in the country. There was also Rumanian antipathy towards Hungary because of the Vienna Award of September 1940. Through this, Hitler had forced Rumania to cede Transylvania to her neighbour in order to pacify the Hungarians and safeguard Rumanian oil supplies to Germany, which had to pass through Hungary. As a result of this, Hitler had decided not to bring the Hungarians into BARBAROSSA until the very last moment.
Von Rundstedt and von Sodenstern set up a small headquarters in Breslau at the beginning of April. The bulk of his staff was, however, based at Cracow, almost 150 miles away and for three weeks von Rundstedt was not allowed to visit them for security reasons.34 Preparations for BARBAROSSA were further frustrated by both MARITA and the late arrival of the spring thaw. The latter swelled rivers and created a sea of mud, which slowed deployment. On 30 April, Hitler was therefore forced to postpone the launching of the invasion from mid-May until the second half of June. Since the original plan laid down that all objectives had to be achieved by mid-October, before the onset of the Russian winter, the postponement placed increased pressure on those who had to execute BARBAROSSA. Von Rundstedt had even greater difficulties than his two fellow army group commanders. Breslau was a comparatively long way from Rumania. Furthermore, political considerations left the command relationship between himself and the Rumanians vague. General Ion Antonescu, the Rumanian dictator, for reasons of national pride, would not formally place his troops under German command. Von Rundstedt, for ease of command and control, had wanted to put von Schobert, commander of the Eleventh Army, in charge of the southern thrust, but Antonescu’s stance made this difficult and the best that could be achieved was agreement that Rumanian forces be placed under von Rundstedt’s strategic direction. The Hungarian forces also had to be kept apart from the Rumanians, for reasons stated earlier. The situation was to be further compounded by the allocation of an Italian corps under General Giovanni Messe and a Slo
vakian motorised division. Furthermore, none of the Allies were to be told about the operation until the last moment, which aggravated the planning difficulties still further. But, given this polygot collection, it becomes understandable why von Rundstedt, with his natural tact and courtesy, should have been appointed to Army Group South.
Operationally, life was made more difficult by the fact that Hitler now decided that the southern prong of Army Group South should be deployed more cautiously. The Pruth and other rivers were natural tank obstacles and he was also fearful that too much activity might attract a Soviet counter-offensive which could threaten the Ploesti oilfields. Consequently, he removed all Eleventh Army’s armour and passed it across to von Kleist. The southern wing of his offensive was thus reduced to no more than a slow advance into Bessarabia designed to pin down Soviet forces. This, of course, ran counter to the map exercise that von Rundstedt had conducted for Halder in February, which had demonstrated only too clearly the difficulties of the northern thrust creating pockets on its own. As far as the northern thrust itself was concerned, von Rundstedt had placed his fellow Field Marshal, von Reichenau, in charge. Halder indicates that von Reichenau made difficulties over his plans for handling his armour and that it took some persuasion to get him to allot some of his infantry corps to von Kleist, who would be spearheading the advance.35
Von Rundstedt’s own overall postwar view of the plans for BARBAROSSA was that the main thrust should have been in the north, with Leningrad as the objective. This would have cut the Russians off from the Baltic states and enabled a link-up with the Finns to take place. Once this had been achieved, the German forces could have then tackled Moscow.36 He also considered that the delay in launching BARBAROSSA was fatal. He told Milton Shulman that he had made the following comment to his staff during the February map exercise at St. Germain: ‘Gentlemen, if you are going to conduct a war in Russia you must remember that campaigning weather ends early there. Once winter comes it becomes very difficult. One must start operations in Russia as soon as the swampy period is over, which is usually in May.37 As it happened, the late spring meant that, Balkans or not, the ground had not dried out sufficiently until June. Furthermore, Hitler remained imbued with an unreal over-optimism that by the time the German armies had closed on the Dnieper, all opposition would have been destroyed.38
While von Rundstedt was in Breslau, Ulrich von Hassell (who, it will be remembered, was an active member of the covert opposition to Hitler) gave a lecture on the economic problems of South East Europe during the annual business fair in the city. He recalled in his diary that the Gauleiter of Silesia, Karl Hanke, was sitting in the audience next to a counsellor from the Soviet Embassy in Berlin. The latter turned to his other neighbour, a German industrialist, and said ‘with a very naive expression on his face “I think I saw Field Marshal von Rundstedt on the street. Is the Supreme Command located here?”’ Von Hassell himself had seen von Rundstedt at an hotel, but had not spoken to him. He had, however, had a word about him with von Salviati who had said that the Field Marshal ‘saw clearly almost everything that was wrong, but that was as far as it went’.39 This reinforced von Hassell’s view that there was little point in trying to recruit von Rundstedt for the resistance to Hitler movement. As for the Russian counsellor’s comment, this would have certainly been passed back to Moscow and should have set alarm bells ringing there, but Stalin, of course, refused to take seriously the growing evidence of what the Germans were preparing.
On 14 June, Hitler had a final conference of his army group and army commanders at his headquarters in the East, the Wolf’s Lair at Rastenburg in East Prussia. Once again, he reiterated that Russia’s collapse would force Britain to give in. It is also possible that he may have repeated the Commissar Order and that it was after this that von Rundstedt and his fellow commanders protested to von Brauchitsch, but certainly Halder makes no mention of it. One point that the conference did finally confirm, however, was the command relationship between von Schobert and the Rumanians. Up until the attack itself, Antonescu would exercise supreme command in his country, with von Schobert’s headquarters attached to him as his ‘working staff’. In this way it would hold the reins of control, but would pass out all orders in Antonescu’s name. The German Military Mission to Rumania would act as liaison between the two. The Hungarians were still not to be told what was about to happen, but merely advised that their defence measures should take the strength of Soviet forces on their borders into consideration. Slovakia, too, would be kept in the dark and only told to organise its troops to repel a Russian attack once BARBAROSSA had been launched. The date of the invasion had already been fixed and now H-hour was confirmed as 0300 hours. On 21 June, the codeword DORTMUND was transmitted by OKH, confirming the following day as D-day. As to what von Rundstedt was thinking, some clue may be gained from a remark he made to von Leeb at the beginning of May: ‘So, see you again in Siberia.’40
8
Russia 1941
AT 2100 HOURS on the evening of 21 June 1941 a German deserter from von Reichenau’s Sixth Army crossed the lines and told the Russians that the German armies were going to invade early next morning. It was but just the latest of a growing number of indicators that the Soviet commanders on Russia’s western borders had been receiving during the past days and weeks. Up until now, Stalin had allowed only minimal precautionary measures because he was fearful of provoking the Germans into doing exactly what they were now about to carry out. Further deserters crossed during the next couple of hours and bore the same message. News of this was passed to Georgi Zhukov of the General Staff, who in turn passed it to Semyon Timoshenko, the Commissar for Defence, and to Stalin himself. Stalin at once summoned both across to see him and asked what should be done about it, stressing that he was still fearful of doing anything which might be interpreted by the Germans as provocative. After some discussion, Timoshenko and Zhukov issued an order, timed at 0030 hours on the 22nd, to the frontier military districts warning of the possibility of a surprise German attack during the next 24 hours. Fire positions on the frontier were to be manned immediately, aircraft dispersed and troops not actually on the frontier to be brought to combat readiness, but to be kept dispersed and under cover. It was too little and too late.
At 0100 hours Army Group South passed the codeword WOTAN to OKW indicating that all was ready. Two hours later the attack began on a frontage of some 500 miles, stretching from the Baltic to the Hungarian border. Facing von Rundstedt were, in the north, running from the Pripet marshes to the Rumanian border, the four armies of the Kiev Special Military District. It was commanded by Lt Gen M P Kirponos, who had distinguished himself as a divisional commander in the Russo-Finnish War. On the outbreak of war, his command, which could call on the equivalent of some sixty divisions, was automatically retitled the South-West Front. Kirponos was ill-equipped to meet the initial shock of BARBAROSSA. His static defences were only partially completed and most of his formations were well back from the frontier and dispersed, with his armour well to the rear of his infantry divisions. Nevertheless, he was better prepared than the other front commanders in that he had reacted to the German Sixth Army’s deserter by instigating alert measures without recourse to Moscow. Furthermore, Soviet appreciations had always considered that the prime German target would be the Ukraine, because of its abundance of natural resources. Opposite the Rumanian border was the one army of the Odessa Military District, shortly to become the South Front under I V Tyulenev. This was of little consequence during the opening days of BARBAROSSA, however, since the Germans and Rumanians remained on the defensive during the first week.
Von Rundstedt’s plan for the northern thrust was for von Reichenau, who had 25 infantry, five Panzer and three motorised divisions at his disposal, to use part of his own Sixth Army as flank protection, advancing from south-east of Lublin eastwards along the edge of the Pripet Marshes. Von Kleist was to aim for Kiev and then turn southeast along the line of the Dnieper, with the remainder of Sixth Ar
my following in his wake, in order to seize the crossings over it and prevent the Russian forces withdrawing across it. Von Stülpnagel’s Seventeenth Army would advance in step with Sixth Army on the axis Lvov-Vinnitsa. Von Rundstedt, apart from his concern about the 100 kilometre gap created by the Pripet marshes between himself and von Bock, also faced three other disadvantages at the outset. First, he only had one Panzer group, which meant that large pincer movements were virtually impossible. This was aggravated by the fact that Kirponos had more tanks than the fronts to the north. Also, Army Group South had to tackle more river lines than the other two army groups.
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