At this moment, aptly or otherwise, there was an air raid warning. The meeting moved into Hitler’s air raid shelter. According to Speidel, Rommel took the opportunity to tell Hitler that the Western Front could not be held and the same applied to Italy and the Eastern Front. With Germany thus isolated Hitler must bring the war to an end. Hitler’s response was: ‘Don’t you worry about the future course of the war. Look to your own invasion front.’ Blumentritt confirmed that the political factor was raised, but that Rommel brought it up again when he was walking with Hitler to his car at the end of the conference. Hitler apparently told him that putting out peace feelers was no option since the Allies were bent on unconditional surrender – ‘fanatical resistance’ was the only answer. Von Rundstedt recorded after the war: ‘After we had explained the situation, we told the Führer that something had to happen militarily, in other words away from the coast, and politically. Consequently he left the room and Generaloberst Jodl said: “No other Field Marshal could have told him this.”’22
The conference did little to raise von Rundstedt’s spirits. This was in contrast to Rommel, who wrote next day to his wife: ‘A quick enemy breakthrough to Paris is now hardly a possibility. We’ve got a lot of stuff coming up. The Fuehrer was very cordial and in a good humour. He realises the gravity of the situation.’23 There were a number of reasons for this. First, Rommel seems to have been uplifted by Hitler’s almost hypnotic delivery. Jodl had also assured him that reinforcements were on their way, including Hausser’s II SS Corps which was being transferred from the Eastern Front. Furthermore, Hitler had agreed to visit him at his headquarters at La Roche Guyon on the following day. As it happened, a defective V-1 crashed close to Margival that evening. So upset was Hitler that he and his entourage immediately left for Berchtesgaden. He did not bother to inform von Rundstedt or Rommel of this and this was the trigger that probably caused Rommel to finally lose any faith in Hitler that he might have had left.
The American attack into the Cotentin Peninsula went as predicted by Rommel. By 22 June, Cherbourg had been invested and the garrison surrendered five days later. Previously, on the 20th, Hitler had sent a directive to von Rundstedt ordering an armoured counter-attack to be mounted under Geyr von Schweppenburg’s control. Hitler laid down that I and II SS Panzer Corps and XLVII Panzer Corps (von Funck) were to take part. Rather than adopting Rommel’s idea of a withdrawal followed by a counter-attack into the flanks of the following up Allies – the voluntary surrender of ground had become an anathema with Hitler – this operation was to attack the Anglo–US boundary at Caumont in order to drive a wedge between the Allies. Once again Hitler was directing operations himself and making von Rundstedt and Rommel mere post offices, although Rommel was to be responsible for the detailed planning. His post-Margival optimism now changed to one of utter pessimism, he wrote on 23 June to Frau Rommel: ‘Militarily things aren’t at all good. The enemy air force is dealing extremely heavily with our supplies and at the moment is completely strangling them. If a decisive battle develops, we’ll be without ammunition. You can imagine how worried I am.’24 Certainly, the SS Leibstandarte had a frustrating move from Belgium, being forced to detrain in Paris because of the air threat. 2nd SS Panzer Division (Das Reich), which OKW had agreed could be released from southern France, suffered difficulties of another kind in the form of the French Resistance. Such was their frustration that one unit ran amok in the village of Oradour, murdering men, women and children. Von Rundstedt’s conclusion was that, in view of the difficulties, the counter-stroke could not be mounted before 5 July. But on that same day, 24 June, Hitler ordered him to examine an attack against the rear of the American forces besieging Cherbourg with a view to relieving the garrison. Von Rundstedt immediately replied that this was not possible and that Caen must remain the priority.25 Hitler, however, would not leave this particular bone alone. On 26 June, having detected the arrival of the Panzer reinforcements through Ultra, Montgomery launched Operation EPSOM; the object was to break through the German lines and pre-empt the planned German counter-stroke. That afternoon von Rundstedt and Blumentritt visited Rommel’s headquarters and sent a further reiteration to OKW of the impossibility of the Cherbourg option and stated that priority must lie with resisting the British attack. The OKW reply of the following day showed Hitler to be unconvinced by this argument. ‘The Führer holds firmly to the idea of attacking not the strength, but the weakness of the enemy west of Vire where weaker American forces are located on a broad front.’ Von Rundstedt, having spoken to Rommel, replied by return. Ignoring Hitler’s view he demanded that commanders be given latitude to withdraw to more favourable positions to avoid encirclement. Further: ‘In conjunction with Field Marshal Rommel, I therefore ask for a free hand to order even extensive adjustments of the front … and for a corresponding directive.’26 Both von Rundstedt and Rommel had had enough of Hitler’s interference. He, likewise, was becoming fed up with their complaints.
That same evening both received a message from OKW summoning them immediately to Berchtesgaden. They were not allowed to fly or go by train and were forced to make a 600 mile car journey. The conference that they were to attend began at 1800 hours on the 29th, which cannot have given them much, if any time to recover from their journey. Blumentritt, however, wrote that von Rundstedt arrived to be informed that the time of conference had been put back, and then further postponed, which did little for his temper.27 Present, initially, were Hitler, the two Field Marshals, Keitel and Jodl, but later Goering, Doenitz, who had relieved Raeder as C-in-C of the Navy in January 1943, and Sperrle joined in.
As was now always the case with Führer Conferences, most of it consisted of a long monologue delivered by Hitler which did little to address the practicalities of the true situation in the West. Once again, it was dominated by the new ‘miracle weapons’ which Hitler was convinced would turn the tide. As for Normandy itself, the Allies must be halted and then the beachhead cleaned up. The Luftwaffe strength must be increased and jet and rocket fighters (Me262 and Me 163 respectively) deployed to the theatre. To counter the Allied naval gunfire, which the Germans treated with a respect only just short of that for the overwhelming air supremacy, special bombs were to be used against battleships. The Navy was to play its part in mining operations and the use of all available craft, both surface and subsurface, to harry the Allied shipping. He glossed over the question of further ground reinforcement. The truth was that on 22 June the long expected Soviet summer offensive had been launched and was already threatening to break the back of Army Group Centre. Hence, such reinforcements as were available were being rushed eastwards. Von Rundstedt and Rommel probably realised this, for they do not seem to have pushed their demands for a further strengthening in the West.
The two Field Marshals did, however, make one concerted protest. On arrival at Berchtesgaden they had been informed that General Eugen Dollmann, commander of the Seventh Army, had died that day of a heart attack. This was, in part, caused by the strain of the previous weeks, but also on account of Hitler’s demand for a witch hunt over the fall of Cherbourg and the sending to Normandy of a commission to investigate the circumstances. Hitler had wanted court-martial proceedings to be instituted against Dollmann, which von Rundstedt refused to do, but clearly the imputed slurs against his name were the last straw for the Seventh Army commander. The two Field Marshals now demanded that Hitler halt the investigation. Rommel, certainly, and, according to his postwar testimony to the IMT Commission, von Rundstedt as well, also raised the issue of peace terms, which was once more dismissed out of hand by Hitler.28
Von Rundstedt and Rommel arrived back at their respective headquarters late on 30 June. Awaiting them was a fresh directive from Hitler. It demanded an immediate counter-attack against the EPSOM offensive. Whatever happened, Seventh Army must not allow itself to be driven out of the bocage and into the more open country to the south. Rommel, however, had reports from Geyr von Schweppenburg and Hausser, who had just taken over Seventh A
rmy, demanding permission to withdraw their forces from Caen so that they could take up a new line out of range of Allied naval gunfire. Breaking with his normal practice, von Rundstedt promptly telephoned OKW to tell them this and ordered Rommel to make preparations for a withdrawal. The Commander-in-chief followed this up with a letter stressing the need for I SS Panzer Corps and 21st Panzer Division to be ‘released in good time from an ever narrowing encirclement’ and ‘thus be free for further operations. These troops, which are our best, must be preserved east of the Orne at fighting strength; this decision is urgently necessary, lest valuable forces once again be destroyed by the enemy.’ He received the OKW answer at 1740 hours on 1 July. There were to be no withdraw-als.29
For von Rundstedt this was the last straw. He immediately telephoned Keitel. As to what he actually said has been the subject of debate. The most popular version, which was recounted by Blumentritt, who was present in the room, to Shulman, was that Keitel said: ‘What shall we do? What shall we do?’ Von Rundstedt is supposed to have replied: ‘What shall we do? Make peace, you idiots! What else can you do?’ He then hung up.30 Blumentritt in his biography of his chief stated that von Rundstedt’s reply was not quite so insulting and that he merely told Keitel that he should end the war.31 This is supported by a report on an interrogation of Blumentritt in January 1946.32 Von Rundstedt himself told the IMT Commission that what he said to Keitel was: ‘Please rescind this order. If you don’t do it, I have to assume that you have no trust in my person anymore and I have to say get someone else.’33 Schmundt, however, recorded in his diary on 1 July: ‘Field Marshal v. Rundstedt tells Field Marshal Keitel that he does not feel able to cope in the long run with the increased demands. Consequently, the Führer has decided on a change in the high command …’34 It is probable that von Rundstedt was irrascible to Keitel over the telephone and also intimated that he had had enough and mentioned his health. It seems likely, however, that von Rundstedt had already spoken about his health while at Berchtesgaden on 29 June and that the decision to replace him had been made then. His successor was, as Keitel had told him the previous December, von Kluge, who had been summoned to Berchtesgaden on 30 June, while von Rundstedt was on his way back to St Germain. Thus, whatever he said or did not say to Keitel on the telephone on the evening of 1 July, made no difference; the decision had already been made.
The next morning, 2 July, von Rundstedt and Rommel attended Dollmann’s funeral in Paris. Von Rundstedt was told by OKW that one of Hitler’s adjutants, Lieutenant Colonel Borgmann, was on his way to see him with a letter from Hitler. According to Warlimont, Keitel also told von Rundstedt that he ‘gave the impression of being much in need of rest and had therefore better take a long leave’.35 Borgmann duly arrived, bringing with him the Oakleaves to the Knight’s Cross which he bestowed on the Field Marshal on Hitler’s behalf. As for Hitler’s letter, von Rundstedt said that it was ‘very cordial’ and explained that it was merely the ‘impaired state of my health’ that was causing him to be replaced.36 On the same day, he was officially transferred to the Reserve, although the accompanying news release said that Hitler would employ him on ‘special assignments’ in the future.37 He was not the only commander in the West to be removed at this time. The axe fell on Geyr von Schweppenburg and on von Sodenstern, who was still commanding Nineteenth Army in southern France. On 3 July, von Kluge, who had been sufficiently ‘brainwashed’ at Berchtesgaden to be convinced that von Rundstedt and Rommel were unnecessarily pessimistic over the situation, arrived at St Germain to take over the Western theatre. That same day von Rundstedt issued a special order of the day:
‘As a consequence of my notification, which I made dutifully and with a heavy heart, that at the moment, because of reasons of old age and the present state of my health, I am certainly not up to the physical strains, as one can expect them, resulting from the developments on the Atlantic front, the Führer has ordered my transfer to the Führer Reserve OKH from 2 July 1944. From the same day he appointed General Field Marshal v. Kluge as Commander-in-Chief West and at the same time Commander-in-Chief Army Group D.
When I say goodbye during the hour of crucial test for the three branches of the Wehrmacht on the Western Front which are subordinated to me, I feel urged to express my thanks and recognition for the work during the years of preparation for defence against the invasion.
The first weeks of the unbelievably hard battles on the Atlantic front have shown that this work has not been in vain. We are still at the beginning of the struggle. We don’t know how long it will last and what shape it will take. We only know that the Anglo-Saxons won’t spare any means to achieve a decisive success. But we also know that, whatever the extent of the enemy’s efforts, the heroic resistance of our troops and our unshakeable belief in the final victory will defeat all the enemy’s efforts to achieve operational and war-deciding success.’38
Next day, accompanied by Hans Gerd, he left St Germain for the last time. He called in at Rommel’s headquarters to say farewell and, according to Speidel, told Rommel that he would never accept another command.39 He then motored to Bad Tölz to take a further cure. Bila probably joined him and Hans Gerd almost certainly took the opportunity to go and see his family in Austria. Once more, von Rundstedt was not to be left in peace for long.
Von Kluge, after an immediate clash with Rommel, soon realised that he and von Rundstedt were right about the situation in Normandy and matters quickly began to go from bad to worse. Then, on 17 July, while returning from a visit to Dietrich’s headquarters, Rommel was badly injured when his car was shot up by a marauding Allied fighter. Three days later, far off in East Prussia, a bomb exploded in the middle of a Führer Conference at Hitler’s headquarters at Rastenburg.
Many words have been written on the July Bomb Plot and its subsequent failure and it is not proposed to describe it in detail here. What should be stressed, however, is that while the plotters included members of all the key headquarters, as well as a number of distinguished retired officers, the plot had a critical weakness in that no active field commander was directly involved. Consequently, they had few if any troops upon whom they could call directly in order to consolidate their hold on the country once von Stauffenberg’s bomb had exploded. Thus it was that Goebbels was able to turn the tables on Fromm and Olbricht, commander and chief of staff of the Replacement Army, in Berlin by bringing a single Army (and not SS) battalion commander, Major Otto Remer of the Berlin Guard Battalion, on to his side. It was soldiers, and not SS men, who made up the firing squad, on Fromm’s orders (in a desperate attempt to save his own skin), that executed von Stauffenberg, Olbricht and others, and despatched Ludwig Beck after he had bungled his suicide attempt. True, von Stülpnagel in Paris was able to arrest all the SS elements in the capital, but failed to gain von Kluge’s support, since the C-in-C West had heard that Hitler had survived the attempt. In consequence, von Stülpnagel was forced to release them all. Zimmermann later stated that the events of 20 July had had no effect on the troops fighting in Normandy.40 They had matters of more immediate concern to occupy their minds.
Hitler’s reaction to the attempt on his life was to become even more suspicious of the Army. On 23 July, he decreed that from henceforth the Nazi salute would finally be mandatory for all ranks of the Wehrmacht. This was something that von Rundstedt himself was able to evade by merely giving a wave with his Field Marshal’s service baton (Interimstab). Hitler’s heavy hand on the conduct of operations would also become even more weighty. In the meantime, the Gestapo, under Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Heydrich’s successor as head of the RSHA, set about rounding up all those who had been even remotely involved in the plot.
On 2 August 1944, General Wilhelm Burgdorf (who had succeeded Schmundt, one of the fatalities of the 20 July bomb, as Hitler’s Wehrmacht Adjutant in OKW) noted in his diary that Hitler had ordered the setting up of a Court of Honour to investigate all army officers suspected of being involved in the plot. It was to assemble on the 4th.41 Among its mem
bers were to be Keitel and Guderian, who had taken over from Zeitzler as Chief of Staff, albeit in an acting capacity on the grounds of the latter’s ill health, on the evening of 20 July. Guderian himself had been quick to condemn the plotters. In a national radio broadcast on 23 July he accused them of having ‘lost courage and by an act of cowardice and weakness preferred the road to disgrace to that of duty and honour’. Six days later, he issued an order which stated: ‘Each General Staff officer must be a National Socialist. That means he must show and prove himself by way of exemplary conduct in political questions, through active instruction and advice to younger comrades on the thoughts of the Führer in the political field as well as a member of the “selected few”…’42 According to his biographer, Guderian made these utterances in order to ‘attempt to maintain the status of the Army and that of the General Staff, along with resistance to further encroachment by OKW and the SS in the province of OKH’.43 Although no firm evidence exists, it is more than possible that Guderian suggested the Court of Honour to Hitler in the first place, though he himself managed to avoid taking part in its proceedings for some time, pleading pressure of work, and sent General Heinrich Kirchheim to represent him. Among the first defendants were Field Marshal von Witzleben and Generals Hoepner and Stieff. Being at the centre of the plot they were found guilty, stripped of their ranks, and arraigned on 7 August in Berlin in a court presided over by the notorious Nazi judge Roland Freisler. Pronounced guilty, they were strung up on meat hooks in the Plötenzee prison.
The Last Prussian Page 27