The premise on which the Court of Honour was based was that upon which it always had been, that an army officer could not be tried by a civilian court. Hence, for this to happen he had first to be dismissed from the Service. Hitler, however, clearly believed that the Court needed added status. So, on 9 August, he laid down that von Rundstedt was to preside over it and no further sittings would be held until the 14th.44 Von Rundstedt, still at Bad Tölz, was informed of this on the 11th. He gave his own views on the plot when appearing for a witness for the defence in the trial of the German High Command and General Staff at Nuremberg in 1946:
‘I would never have thought of such a thing, that would have been base, bare-faced treachery, and could not have changed the situation. The Army and also the people still believed in Hitler at that time, and such an overthrow would have been quite unsuccessful. Even if I, perhaps with the aid of the Allies, had brought about an overthrow, the fate of the German people, according to the famous statement of the Big Three, would have been exactly what it is now, and I would have emerged and been considered for all time as the greatest traitor to my Fatherland.’45
Further, during one of his postwar interrogations he declared:
‘If anything at all like that is done with a likelihood of success, it can only come from the troops. That is, if the armies in the East and in the West don’t act together to a certain extent – what can the stupid crowd at home do? They can’t do it. Thank God I was never approached as commander in the field or otherwise.’46
As for the Court of Honour itself, he told the IMT Commission:
The Court of Honour to which I belonged, despite not being an active soldier, had to prejudge the assassinations.
The following had to be considered:
Somebody who was brought in front of the court in Berlin, guilty or not guilty, could not be a soldier any more. If the person in question expected a certain sentence by the court, having been found guilty on the grounds of his own evidence, and it could only be prison or death, we had to sentence him to expulsion from the army.
If, on the contrary, there was the possibility that the person in question was not guilty, we only sentenced him to discharge. This is a game with words but there is a difference and later on, if the judgement was ‘not guilty’, he was reinstated.
Thank God, in many cases we could apply the latter form, just discharge. The whole Court of Honour was a very heavy burden for me. But, in the interest of the Army, I could not evade it.’47
Earlier, to Liddell Hart, he made it plain that it was not a court martial, but admitted that the only evidence which the Court had was that which was laid before it by the Gestapo. The Army had wanted him to take on the task because they trusted him to ‘make the best of a bad job’.48 Even so, according to SS Obersturmbannführer (Lieutenant Colonel) Dr Georg Keisel, who was working in the RSHA Head Office at the time, the evidence presented was a mere fraction of that available and the proceedings were unusual in that not a single accused officer appeared in person to defend himself. Each case lasted ‘only a few minutes’.49 No wonder that von Rundstedt later said ‘it was a terrible job to take on the task of presiding over that Court of Honour’, especially as it meant sitting in judgement over officers with whom he had been closely connected. On another occasion he said that it was ‘the worst thing I’ve ever experienced in my military career’.50
While von Rundstedt saw clearly where his duty lay, however unpalatable this might be, others were surprised that he agreed to take part. Speidel, in spite of Keitel telling the court that Hitler believed him to be deeply implicated in the plot, which, of course, he was, was one of those whom von Rundstedt and his fellow members refused to expel from the Army. Consequently, he was saved appearing before Freisler, although he spent the remainder of the war in various prisons. Yet, he found it ‘difficult to understand’ why von Rundstedt acted as he did.51 Another whose life was saved was Halder, although he spent the remainder of the war in a concentration camp, which goes some way to explain the coolness of his relationship with von Rundstedt after 1945. It was thus probably just as well that at the beginning of September 1944, the Field Marshal was summoned once more by Hitler to tackle yet another task, and one that would give him little time to dwell on the rights and wrongs of the Court of Honour.
11
Recalled Once More
BY THE beginning of September 1944 the situation in the West was grim for the Germans. Apart from the Channel ports, which remained as Festungen with orders to resist to the last man, the whole of Northern France had been liberated and Army Group B, or what was left of it, was reeling back eastwards, having been decimated in the disastrous Mortain counter-attack and suffered unparalleled carnage in the Falaise Gap. US Sixth Army Group, which had landed on the French Riviera in mid-August, was now pursuing the Nineteenth Army, now commanded by Friedrich Wiese, up through Central France. Since von Kluge’s sacking and suicide on 16 August, Walter Model had been both C-in-C West and Army Group B and was finding it increasingly difficult to cope with both as he grappled with the problem of trying to salvage at least something from the wreckage of Army Group B, a task in which he and his subordinate commanders achieved a near miracle of recovery – so that the Allies soon found that they still had a very tough fight on their hands. Thus Model spent his time at Army Group Headquarters while that of C-in-C West had to be run by Blumentritt. This was not easy, since the two headquarters were not co-located and, by the middle of August, were some sixty miles apart, C-in-C West near Reims and Army Group B near Soissons. According to Blumentritt,1 he and Zimmermann decided that this situation could not continue and that the only answer was for von Rundstedt to reassume the duties of C-in-C West once more. Blumentritt wrote to Jodl, who asked for confirmation that Model agreed to this proposal. Model, apparently, was delighted. The idea was therefore put to Hitler, who gave it his blessing. On 1 September von Rundstedt was summoned to the Führerquartier, where Hitler apparently said to him: ‘Field Marshal, I would like to place the Western Front in your hands again.’ To which von Rundstedt replied: ‘My Führer, whatever you order, I shall do to my last breath.’2
Accordingly, on 5 September, von Rundstedt, accompanied by Hans Gerd, arrived at his headquarters, now at Arenberg, near Koblenz. The familiar faces of Blumentritt and Zimmermann, and others, too, were there to greet him. Sadly for both, the reunion with Blumentritt was brief. After von Rundstedt had previously relinquished as C-in-C West, Blumentritt had asked to be given a field command. This had now just come through and Blumen tritt was posted to command the newly created XII SS Panzer Corps, which was to be deployed to the northern part of the Western Front. In his place came Siegfried Westphal, who had been Rommel’s Chief of Staff in North Africa and held the same post under Kesselring in Italy. Both had praised him highly, as did the defender of Cassino, the highly intelligent von Senger und Etterlin, who called him ‘one of the best horses in the stable’.3 Thus, once again, von Rundstedt was being given an excellent chief of staff and one who had a cavalry background. Even so, just over two weeks after reassuming command, von Rundstedt did make a request for Blumentritt to be returned to him as ‘General on Special Duty’, but Hitler turned this down,4 probably quite rightly since it would not have been fair to Blumentritt’s new command.
The Allied view of von Rundstedt’s reappointment was summarised in a crowing British 21st Army Group intelligence review:
‘Just as von Rundstedt has never been strong enough utterly to disregard the Party, so has his ability (or his reputation) been too convenient for the politicos to ignore. If his own health has improved, the state of his armies has deteriorated in his absence. To bring back the Old Guard implies that the situation is desperate, and since little can be done about it, it may mean that the Old Guard is to take the blame. The return of von Rundstedt is reminiscent of the description of the role of cavalry in modern war: ‘to add distinction to what otherwise might be a vulgar brawl.’ The reappointment is interesting as exhib
iting muddle and desperation; but (unlike the cavalry) it doesn’t really make much difference. The task of Commander-in-Chief in any German theatre has degenerated into that of local Chief-of-Staff to Hitler and liable to dismissal as much for carrying out quaint orders as for protesting against them.’5
Von Rundstedt would have certainly agreed with the last sentence, but, in his eyes, what choice did he have? He had been summoned again and his code would not allow him to refuse, especially in this dark time. To turn his back on the soldiers struggling back to the West Wall would have been desertion.
His own appreciation of the situation was that his main task was ‘to stop the entire withdrawal movement and stabilise the front’.6 This was reinforced by Hitler, who ordered a fierce delaying action in order to buy time for Army Group G to complete its withdrawal from southern France and to enable the defences on the West Wall to be enhanced. However, according to Bodo Zimmermann, von Rundstedt differed from Hitler in the significance of the West Wall as a bastion against the Allied onrush. To him the only feasible defence line was the Rhine and one of his first steps was, discreetly, to secure all crossing places. He would make repeated efforts during the winter to persuade Hitler to think again and not pin his hopes on the West Wall, but in vain.7 As it happened, Army Group G did manage to get back reasonably intact and took up position on the left of the German line.
The German forces were now organised as follows. The northern part of the front was the responsibility of Model’s Army Group B. Under him was Gustav von Zangen’s Fifteenth Army, which was being pushed back through Belgium and into Holland by Montgomery’s 21st Army Group, Karl Student’s newly formed First Parachute Army, now deploying in Holland, and Erich Brandenberger’s Seventh Army, falling back through the Ardennes to the German border. Then came Army Group G. This was still commanded by Blaskowitz, but on 21 September he was to be succeeded by Hermann Balck. Otto von Knobelsdorff’s First Army covered Lorraine, Hasso von Manteuffel’s Fifth Panzer Army, which, after its predecessor had been lost in Tunisia, had been reformed in early August from the remnants of Panzer Group West, was in Alsace, while in the extreme south stood Friedrich Wiese’s Nineteenth Army, now recovering its breath after the long withdrawal up through the centre of France.
Hitler told von Rundstedt that his immediate tasks were to prevent the Allies from opening up the port of Antwerp, to create a strong base in Holland and to protect the Ruhr and Saar regions. The city of Antwerp itself had been entered by the British 11 th Armoured Division on 4 September, with Brussels being liberated the previous day, but von Zangen still held both banks of the Scheldt and hence the port could not be used. Since the Allies were still relying on Cherbourg for their supplies, it meant that their lines of communication were now overstretched. This had its effect on the momentum of their advance, which now began to slow dramatically, thus giving von Rundstedt a vital breathing space to restore some cohesion. The British Second and United States First Armies managed to get across the Albert Canal and, on 11 September, patrols from the latter crossed the German border for the first time. During the next four days, the Americans tried to punch through the West Wall at Aachen, but with only partial success. Further south, Patton’s Third United States Army, suffering from increasing fuel shortages, closed up to the Moselle and managed to cross it opposite Nancy, but in the face of ever stiffening opposition. Montgomery, however, had managed to persuade Eisenhower to allow him to mount a daring airborne operation designed to turn von Rundstedt’s northern flank.
Von Rundstedt’s own appreciation of the situation on reassuming command was that the main Allied thrust line would be Aachen – Ruhr – Berlin and that the enemy would concentrate his forces in the north in order to achieve this.8 At the time, his main concern was the mouth of the River Moselle at Trier, close to the Luxembourg border – the closest to the German border that the Allies had reached. Tanks from Courtney Hodges’ First United States Army entered the city of Luxembourg on 10 September and the following evening reconnaissance patrols had actually penetrated into Germany. Westphal recalled accompanying von Rundstedt on a visit to the Trier area at this time and that they narrowly escaped capture by American tanks.9 On 14 September, a more serious threat developed north of Trier. Elements of the US 5th Armored Division began to break through the West Wall at Wallendorf. This happened to be on the boundary between Army Groups B and G and there were few German defenders in the area. A major breakthrough appeared imminent. Next day, von Rundstedt issued a special order of the day: ‘The fight for German soil must increase fanaticism. Every pill-box, every village must be defended until the Allies bleed to death. It is no longer a question of operations on a grand scale. The only task is to hold our positions until we are annihilated.’10 A week’s desperate fighting followed, after which the Americans withdrew across the River Sauer. The apparent success was partially achieved by stripping the front to the south in order to deploy reserves to the threatened sector and by constantly keeping the Americans off balance with counter-attacks. The main reason, however, was that Hodges could no longer sustain his offensive because Eisenhower had switched the priority for logistics to Montgomery for his attempt to outflank the Germans in the north.
On 17 September Montgomery launched Operation MARKET-GARDEN with the aim of getting over the Lower Rhine in one quick step. The story of what happened is well known and needs to no retelling here. It is significant, however, that von Rundstedt, in his report on the operation, admitted that Montgomery did achieve initial surprise, but in turn was surprised by the presence of II SS Panzer Corps in the Arnhem area. He also considered that the main Allied mistake was to spread the airborne landings over three days.11 The failure to secure the bridge at Arnhem really marked the last chance of the Allies ending the war in 1944 and was to be the prelude to an autumn’s grim fighting.
During MARKET-GARDEN, von Rundstedt was also concerned about the situation on the Moselle itself. Hitler had demanded that Patton’s bridgeheads should be eliminated and it was this task that Balck faced on assuming as C-in-C Army Group G. Balck himself had had a meteoric rise. He had first distinguished himself as a regimental commander in Rommel’s 7th Panzer Division in France 1940, but had thereafter fought on the Eastern Front as a divisional, corps and then army commander. According to Balck’s chief of staff, Friedrich von Mellenthin, von Rundstedt had initial reservations over Balck’s appointment on the grounds that he had no experience of fighting against the Western Allies, which has echoes of Rommel’s view on the commanders in the West prior to the invasion. Von Mellenthin, however, had known von Rundstedt from before the war and regarded him as ‘a man one could honour and respect’. He also knew Westphal well and this perhaps helped to quickly develop ‘extremely cordial’ relations between the two headquarters.12 Attempts to eradicate the Nancy bridgehead had begun on 19 September with the committal of a Panzer brigade. Next day, another Panzer brigade joined the fray, but Allied air supremacy quickly proved decisive and both brigades were virtually destroyed. After further demands from Hitler, the counterattacks were resumed on the 22nd, but the result was the same. Von Rundstedt realised that to continue was merely to waste troops, but Hitler refused to listen to him. A further effort was made on the 25th, which initially had some success, thanks to poor weather which kept Allied aircraft grounded. When they did reappear on the 29th, the result was the same as in the previous attacks. Balck said that he would need three fresh divisions if he was to continue, but there were no reserves and hence von Rundstedt ordered him to halt and remain on the defensive. As it happened, in view of the critical resupply situation, Eisenhower had ordered that Patton should halt all offensive operations until the Scheldt was cleared. Hence, there was now a pause, which was invaluable to the hard pressed German forces.
In the meantime, von Rundstedt turned his attention to Aachen, where the Americans were making renewed efforts to break through the West Wall. The fighting between Courtney Hodges’ First United States Army and Student’s First Para
chute Army and Fifth Panzer Army, which von Rundstedt switched to this area on 14 October, especially in the Hürtgen Forest, was to be particularly bloody over the next two months.
In the midst of these operational crises von Rundstedt was called upon by Hitler to perform another task. On 14 October, Generals Burgdorf and Maisel visited Erwin Rommel at his home at Herrlingen, where he had been convalescing from the wounds he received in Normandy. They brought him a message from Hitler. Either he committed suicide or faced trial for his involvement with the July 1944 plotters, in which case his wife and son would have to face the consequences. Rommel chose the former. It meant that he would be given a state funeral, thus ensuring that his reputation officially remained intact and that his family would be protected. It was, of course, what Hitler wanted him to do since to bring him to trial would not rest easily with the propaganda image of him that Goebbels had so assiduously built up over the past few years. The funeral itself took place in Ulm on 18 October. According to von Mellenthin, von Rundstedt called into Balck’s headquarters to say the Keitel had telephone him to tell him that Hitler had asked him to represent him at the funeral and to read the eulogy.13 This he did and Ruge, who was present, noted that ‘although curiously impersonal and somewhat restrained, it was a good speech to those who did not know what was being played out. Just how much von Rundstedt knew I never found out.’14 Speidel, who was unable to attend since he was now in the hands of the Gestapo, was more forthright: ‘Here destiny gave him the unique chance of playing Mark Anthony. The moment found him still impassive.’ But, he also commented: ‘the old soldier appeared to onlookers to be broken and distracted.’ Further, Speidel wrote that von Rundstedt did not any take part in the cremation and did not accompany the other mourners to the Rommel house.15 In his defence, von Rundstedt was emphatic after the war that he knew nothing of the true circumstances of Rommel’s death. As he wrote to Liddell Hart: ‘I can swear on oath that I knew nothing of the true case of Rommel’s death. If I had I would have never taken part in the memorial ceremony!!’[sic]16 He was supported in this by von Mellenthin, who also said that, like von Rundstedt, he only learnt of the facts after the war was over.17 According to Ditha, when her father-in-law received Hitler’s request he asked ‘Why me? Keitel would have been much more suitable.’ The reply was: ‘Hitler sets great store by you especially, Herr Feldmarschall, performing at the state ceremony.’ Von Rundstedt was ‘deeply affected’ by Rommel’s death and acquiesced. As for the funeral oration, the script had been placed on the lectern and von Rundstedt had no opportunity to read it through before delivering it, which would explain Ruge’s and Speidel’s comments.18 The Field Marshal had been ‘used’ once more by Hitler to cloak his actions with respectability.
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