The Last Prussian

by Messenger, Charles;

  But if Hitler was determined to bind the officer corps even more tightly to himself, he was also concerned about morale. By now the manpower barrel was being scraped dry. The final line of defence was the Volkssturm, which had been formed in October 1944 and drew on boys as young as 15 years-old and old men for home defence. Elements of these were now being forced into the Volksgrenadier divisions. Their main weapon was the Panzerfaust shoulder-fired anti-tank rocket launcher. Von Rundstedt later remarked that it was ‘a real crime to set young hardly-grown-up young men against the enemy’ with these weapons.19 There was a comb-out of convalescents and the medically downgraded. Units were formed from those with similar medical complaints; a ‘Stomach battalion’ fought against the British and Canadians in the Reichswald in February. With such low calibre troops as this, and in the light of both the failure of WACHT AM RHEIN, and the success of the Russian offensive over the Vistula (which was launched on 12 January and was across the German border before the end of the month) it is not surprising that morale had plummeted from the level it had been in early December. As von Rundstedt commented in early February, ‘the troops are pretty well fed up to the back teeth’.20 In order to encourage them, decorations were lavishly distributed and Hitler even suggested that von Rundstedt should present photographs of himself to deserving soldiers. He did go as far as exploring the views of his subordinate commanders to this, but their reactions were predictable and he did not pursue the matter further.21 There was also personal sadness for him at this time. His only nephew, and Joachim’s only child, was posted as missing on the Eastern Front.

  Having pushed the German forces back to their start line in the Ardennes by the end of January, the Western Allies could now turn their attention once more to their next major objective, closing up to the Rhine and crossing it. Eisenhower continued with his broad front policy. In the north, the Canadians were to clear the area south-east of Nijmegen and move up to the Lower Rhine (VERITABLE and BLOCKBUSTER). Simpson’s United States Ninth Army, which was under Montgomery, would then advance towards Düsseldorf and link up with the Canadians (GRENADE). As a preliminary to these operations, the British Second Army would clear the Roermond triangle (BLACKCOCK) and this began on 16 January. In the American sector, Omar Bradley’s 12th Army Group was to clear the Eifel and close to the Rhine between Cologne and Mannheim, while Jacob Devers’s 6th Army Group was responsible from south of Mannheim to the Swiss border.

  Von Rundstedt still believed that it would be better to conserve his forces and withdraw across the Rhine in order to hold the Allies on it. He also continued to believe that the Ruhr was the primary enemy objective. Hitler, however, would not countenance this, arguing that, given the destruction of the German communications system by the Allied bombing, the Rhine was vital for the movement of what raw materials Germany was still producing to the factories in the centre of the country. To this end, the West Wall had to be held at all costs. Von Rundstedt therefore continued to balance his strategy between his and Hitler’s wishes. Luckily, he still had some tough subordinates. In late January, Blaskowitz had been shifted sideways to take over Army Group H from Student, who now became his deputy. First Parachute Army, commanded by Alfred Schlemm, was to make the Canadians and British fight for every inch of the way to the Lower Rhine, especially in the Reichswald. In the centre, Model remained in command of Army Group B, with von Manteuffel and his fifth Panzer Army as the bulwark and sandwiched between the predominantly infantry armies of von Sangen (Fifteenth) and Brandenberger (Seventh). To Model’s south remained Army Group G, now commanded by veteran SS General Paul Hausser, with First Army (Förtsch) and Nineteenth Army (Wiese).

  VERITABLE opened on 8 February and, two days later, von Rundstedt was stressing to Blaskowitz the importance of holding well forward, especially around Cleve, in order to prevent a breakthrough to the Lower Rhine.21 Eugen Meindl’s II Parachute Corps carried this out to the letter and Montgomery’s drive to the Rhine became a bloodstained slog. Further south, the American Seventh and French First Armies had removed that thorn in the Allied side, the Colmar pocket, and Nineteenth Army had withdrawn across the Rhine, Hitler’s permission having been given. In the centre, Hodges’ First and Patton’s Third United States Armies remorselessly pushed Model’s forces back to the river, but as in the north, resistance was stiff.

  On 13 February, von Rundstedt issued another of his special orders. Addressed to the ‘Soldiers of the Western Front’ it told them that the Allies’ main objective was the Ruhr. With the Russians now having overrun Germany’s other industrial region, Upper Silesia, the loss of the Ruhr would mean that ‘the Wehrmacht would be without weapons, and the country without coal’. His soldiers were to ‘protect now your German homeland which has worked faithfully for you, for our wives and children in the face of the threat of foreign tyranny’. They were to keep the ‘menace’ off the backs of the armies on the Eastern Front so that they could ‘break the bolshevist onslaught and liberate again the German territory in the East’. He warned that the ‘coming battles’ would be ‘very hard’. ‘Through your perseverance the general attack of the enemy must be shattered. With unshakeable confidence we gather round the Führer to guard our people and our state from a destiny of horror.’23 Five days later, von Rundstedt received a signal from Hitler stating that he had awarded him the Swords to his Knight’s Cross.24 No doubt this was a gesture to demonstrate Hitler’s continued faith in C-in-C West and to further encourage him.

  None the less, von Rundstedt realised the impossibility of holding up the Allies for more than a very short period and was now concerned merely to buy time so that he could get his forces back across the Rhine with the minimum of casualties. He also had to prevent any lightning Allied thrust from seizing an intact bridge over the Rhine. This meant drawing up a carefully worked out programme of demolitions and keeping the minimum number of bridges open for his own troops to withdraw across. With the opening of GRENADE on 23 February and BLOCKBUSTER, the final Canadian drive to the Lower Rhine, three days later, the pressure increased significantly. But von Rundstedt was equally concerned about the threat further south, where Patton was clearing the area between the Rivers Moselle and Saar and Patch’s United States Seventh Army was driving north into the Saarland.

  The West Wall was now penetrated in several places and von Rundstedt began to thin out his forward troops. Hitler accepted this; on 28 February, Goebbels noted in his diary that the Allied press was commenting on von Rundstedt’s change of tactics and that he now seemed to be drawing the enemy forces on to defence lines further in the rear, which would be ‘highly disadvantageous to the attacking troops’.25 On 2 March, elements of Simpson’s Ninth United States Army reached the Rhine opposite Düsseldorf, but the bridge there had been blown. It was the same further south when Hodges’ First US Army reached the river at Cologne two days later. In the north, meanwhile, Schlemm was still conducting a stiff rearguard action and it would not be until 10 March that Montgomery’s forces were completely closed up to the river. Thus, there is no doubt that von Rundstedt’s plan was working, and working well. Indeed, Goebbels noted on 6 March: ‘Rundstedt is again getting high marks in the enemy press. The fact that our troops escaped more or less intact across the Rhine is attributed to him.’26 Next day, however, disaster struck.

  At noon on the the 7th, the leading elements of a task force from First United States Army arrived on the high ground overlooking Remagen, a small town on the Rhine and south of Bonn. To their amazement they saw that the Ludendorff railway bridge spanning the river here was intact. Fighting their way through the town, they reached the bridge some three hours later. The Germans now attempted to demolish it, but without success. Under cover of shell fire the Americans overcame the defenders on the west bank, but further charges were then detonated. These only partially damaged the bridge and the attackers were able to cross it, cutting all demolition cables as they did so. Thus, the Allies had achieved what von Rundstedt had been so desperately trying to pr
event, the capture of a bridge over the Rhine.

  The reverberations of this disaster quickly made themselves felt on the German side. Von Rundstedt immediately sent an order to Model: ‘Situation must be cleared up tonight and bridge destroyed. 11 Pz [Div] to be used. Bridge to be bombed from the air and naval special detachment [divers] to come from Army Group G. Investigate neglect of duty.’27 Hitler, when he heard the news, was furious and decided that a new C-in-C West was needed. He turned to Kesselring, who had recently returned to Italy after recovering from the effects of a car accident which took place the previous October. He received an order on 8 March to report to the Reich Chancellery on the following day. In the meantime the efforts to destroy the Ludendorff bridge failed and the Americans were able to reinforce their small bridgehead on the east bank.

  On 9 March Goebbels recorded in his diary Hitler’s intention ‘possibly’ to replace von Rundstedt with Kesselring, but that he needed to speak with him first. As for von Rundstedt, ‘he has become too old and works too much on First World War ideas to master a situation such as is developing in the West’ – a marked contrast to Goebbels’ crowing of a few days earlier. Kesselring duly had his interview and Hitler explained to him that a ‘younger more active commander’ was needed in the West. Von Rundstedt’s name was not mentioned and Hitler made no disparaging allusions to him.28 Hitler then telephoned von Rundstedt and told him that he was to be relieved forthwith. Von Rundstedt later recalled:

  ‘Hitler had simply had enough of me and was tired of me. As a camouflage, he said on the telephone that he wanted to save me the annoyance of flying courts martial, which could issue summary death penalties for cowardice, desertion etc, being active in my area. He said that he knew that I did not want to participate in such a bloodbath.’29

  As it happened, Hitler had, that same day, ordered the setting up of Special Flying Tribunal West under SS Gruppenführer Rudolf Hübner to root out the Remagen culprits and deal with them. Next day, Kesselring arrived at HQ C-in-C West, still at Schloss Ziegenberg, apparently greeting the staff with the announcement: ‘Well, Gentlemen, I am the new V.3.’30 Von Rundstedt, who had been transferred to the Führer Reserve with effect from the previous day, now took his leave, driving away with Hans Gerd, his driver Irtel, and Amos, his batman.

  The Field Marshal was unable to go directly to Bila, much as he wanted to, for he had been summoned to Berlin for a final audience with Hitler. Goebbels wrote on the 11th that Hitler was to see von Rundstedt that evening. ‘Rundstedt is of course a highly respected officer who has done us great service, particularly in the liquidation of 20 July. The Führer therefore wants – I impressed this on him forcibly – Rundstedt’s relief to be carried out in a decorous manner.’ But he also complained that the Field Marshal came ‘from a school that is unsuited to modern warfare’ and that Model had been ‘unable to operate properly’ under him. Indeed, if Model had been C-in-C West ‘his army group would not be in the state it actually is.’ Ten days later he was writing that von Rundstedt’s leadership was ‘definitely bad’ and that if Kesselring had not had his car accident he would have replaced von Rundstedt months earlier. On the other hand, he wrote that Hitler did not see Model as a candidate for the command, sharing von Rundstedt’s view that he was ‘too impetuous and impulsive’. Goebbels concurred with this view,31 thereby displaying a complete volte face from his previous diary entry. This was perhaps indicative of the growing confusion in Berlin as the world in the Führerbunker under the Chancellery, in which Hitler was spending increasing amounts of time, took on an increasingly unreal hue.

  Von Rundstedt duly had his interview with Hitler, whom he told Liddell Hart after the war looked very ill, with bent back and shaking hands.32 Hitler presented him with the Swords and thanked him for his loyalty.33 That concluded the last meeting between the two.

  Irtel now drove von Rundstedt, his son, and batman to Kassel to see Bila. Von Rundstedt decided, however, not to remain there for what were clearly the last weeks of the war. The reason for this was probably the Allied bombing. There had been a major raid on the city on the night 8/9 March, the first since October 1943, and the Field Marshal perhaps feared that the Allies intended to destroy it. The party, with Bila among them, therefore went to Solz, a village lying some 25 miles south-east of Kassel. Here Bila’s relations, the von Trotts, offered them accommodation on their estate. They remained here for some two weeks, while Hans Gerd went off to Austria to see Ditha and his children. When Hans Gerd met his parents again, on 3 April, they had moved on. Perhaps von Rundstedt did not wish to be beholden to the von Trotts, or he found it difficult to live with the fact that Adam von Trott, the July 1944 bomb plotter, had been executed. There is no clear reason.

  The von Rundstedt’s next stopping place was Weimar, where they hired a suite of rooms in the Hotel Elefant. This, of course, was further east and it may have been the fact that the British and Americans were now breaking out of their bridgeheads across the Rhine which prompted this move. Even so, they stayed in Weimar for little more than a week before motoring north-west to the Harz Mountains. The impending Russian offensive across the Oder and on to Berlin, which was to open on 16 April, probably drove them to this. They stayed in the little village of Tinne and Hans Gerd wrote to Ditha from here: ‘This refugee status is new to us. It has the advantage that we see parts of Germany which I would otherwise never see.’ Their sojourn here was again for little more than a week. Now the threat was from the West once more. On 4 April, American troops had entered Kassel and were now driving east towards the Elbe. To the north, Montgomery’s advance was also making rapid progress and only the extreme southeast of Germany was not under immediate threat. So it was here that the party headed, like a ball in a pinball machine, and probably only just avoided the American thrust through Gotha, Erfurt and Jena, which reached the River Mulde south of Leipzig on the 13th. Bayreuth was their next port of call. Kesselring’s headquarters happened to be here and von Rundstedt paid a call on his successor,34 probably to obtain his estimate of the Allied intentions in southern Germany. The Field Marshal’s stop was only brief in view of Patton’s advance from the north and he and his party left Bayreuth before it fell on the 15th. Before they did so, Hans Gerd wrote to Ditha: ‘I hope that we can travel to Upper Bavaria very soon and that I can find something for Mother and Father where they can settle.’35

  It seems that the last weeks on the road had affected von Rundstedt’s health and an arthritic leg was now playing him up badly. Hence the sanatorium at Bad Tölz was to be the party’s final destination. Here they waited for the inevitable. It was to come on the evening of 1 May in the shape of the 36th Texas Division, part of Patch’s United States Seventh Army. Defending Bad Tölz were a battle group and students of the SS Officer Cadet School based in the town. Both were under command of 17th SS Panzer Grenadier Division. By late evening on 1 May, the Americans had driven off the defenders and entered the town. Among the leading troops were 1st Battalion 141st Infantry Regiment. A patrol from Company A, led by 2nd Lieutenant Joseph E Burke from St Petersburg, Florida, ascertained from a prisoner that von Rundstedt was in the sanatorium and he set out to apprehend him. He entered the sanatorium and there were von Rundstedt, his wife and son seated in front of a fire. They got up from their seats and, after the Field Marshal had expressed surprise, having not expected the Americans to arrive until the following morning, he said to Burke: ‘It is a most disgraceful situation for a soldier to give himself up without resistance.’ Then, he limped away into captivity, the Texas Division’s 30,000th prisoner during the campaign in North-West Europe.36

  13

  Prisoner of War

  THE UNITED States Armed Forces’ newspaper The Stars and Stripes heralded von Rundstedt’s capture as ‘the Allies’ biggest catch of the war’.1 This was echoed by the London Evening Standard.2 As such, he was an immediate object of intense curiosity and his captors allowed American journalists to interview him. They noted that he appeared frail, but aggre
ssive in manner. Above all, he continued to feel the disgrace of surrendering without offering any resistance. The New York Times noted that he had said that if he had not been in hospital recovering from a ‘heart attack’ [sic] he would not have surrendered without a fight and to do so was ‘shameful and despicable’. He also asserted that he would have defeated the Allied invasion of Normandy on the beaches if it had not been for the overwhelming Allied air supremacy and his own shortage of fuel.3

  In the meantime, there was the question of von Rundstedt’s disposal to be tackled. On 2 May SHAEF had signalled the British Foreign Office and informed them that G-2 (Intelligence) Branch were organising a special detention camp at Dunkirk for prominent prisoners recently captured, including Admiral Horthy, the former dictator of Hungary, and Field Marshals von Leeb, List and von Rundstedt.4 The fact that the German garrison of Dunkirk had still not surrendered probably brought about an immediate change of mind over the location of this camp. On that same day, 2 May, SHAEF ordered Seventh Army to send Horthy and von Rundstedt as soon as possible to Spa. Seventh Army reported on the 11th that Horthy was on his way,5 but there is no indication that they ever sent von Rundstedt. In any event, by the time they despatched Horthy the location of the camp had changed yet again, this time to the Palace Hotel, Mondors Les Bains, which lies 20 kilometres south-east of Luxembourg. To this camp, euphemistically codenamed ASHCAN, were taken in due course top surviving leaders of the Third Reich who had fallen into the hands of the Western Allies. (Another centre, DUSTBIN, held captured technical experts). The inmates of ASHCAN would be held there until the decision was made as to which individuals were to be tried by the International Military Tribunal (IMT), which was to be set up at Nuremberg. Von Rundstedt himself, Hans Gerd, Dr Hertz, who had been treating him at Bad Tölz, and Irtel seem to have been taken as far as Headquarters United States Seventh Army at Augsburg and then returned to Bad Tölz, where Bila and von Rundstedt’s batman, Amos, had remained. The Field Marshal and his son then left Bad Tölz for the American detention centre at Wiesbaden on the 27 May. He would not see Bila again for over two and a half years.6