The Last Prussian

by Messenger, Charles;

  The Foreign Office’s next step was to convene another medical board, this time, after Cabinet agreement, to be run by the Home Office.36 This had been prompted by Shawcross writing to ‘Mannie’ Shinwell about the War Office medical board findings. While he accepted that all save von Manstein were not fit to stand trial, he feared a possible public outcry if they were released and therefore recommended an ‘independent medical board’.37 The Board carried out its examinations on 25 March. The report on von Rundstedt was very different to that of the Army medical board of two months before. He presented himself without sticks and said that his previous dizziness, headaches and pains in the chest no longer troubled him. Indeed he only complained of occasional pain in his right hip joint and leg and some pain in his lower back. He showed signs of physical senility, but nothing abnormal for a man of his age. His mental state was not so good. He told the Board that he was ‘sick of life and wanted to be finished with it all, as it no longer held any interest for him’. He never read, listened to the radio or attended any camp entertainments. He was, without doubt, reacting to Hans Gerd’s death and was probably desperately frustrated by his powerlessness to give any help to Bila, his widowed daugher-in-law and grandchildren. Not that he did not try. Shortly after von Rundstedt’s return from Hannover, Captain Lees’s wife, perhaps feeling sorry for him, made up a food parcel and gave it to him. In his letter of thanks von Rundstedt wrote that he hoped to be allowed to send two tins of food from it to his grandchildren.38 Notwithstanding this, the medical board concluded that he was fit to stand trial, but that he should be regarded as a ‘potentially suicidal person’, a comment which was later to have unfortunate repercussions for all four. Both von Manstein and Strauss were also found fit and only von Brauchitsch was considered too ill.39

  Before the Government had had the time to consider the full implications of the Home Office medical board findings, another complication arose. On 10 April, Telford Taylor signalled the Judge Advocate General’s (JAG) department, via the American Embassy in London, with a request for von Brauchitsch, von Manstein and von Rundstedt to appear at Nuremberg as witnesses for the defence in the forthcoming American High Command trial. He asked for confirmation that the three were medically fit to travel and suggested that they should not be told the contents of the telegram.40 Not the least problem was that the timing of this request was unfortunate. On 12 April the Overseas Reconstruction Committee (ORC), the Government’s policy making body for overcoming the ravages of war in Europe and elsewhere, decided that war crimes trials would not pursued after 1 September 1948. This was in recognition of the fact that the Western Allied zones of occupation in Germany would have to be given a significant degree of self-government as a means of self-help to get them back on their feet. It would, however, be difficult to achieve this if an atmosphere of rancour persisted. The JAG’s department passed the matter over to the Foreign Office on the following day. Two weeks later, Basil Marsden-Smedley of the German Section wrote to the Deputy Judge Advocate General, Brigadier Shapcott. The main drift of his letter was that no answer could be given to the Americans until the Cabinet had decided the future of the Field Marshals and Strauss. The Cabinet could not do this until the JAG’s department had produced a paper giving all the factors, something which they had been tasked to do after the Home Office medical board. The JAG’s recommendation of repatriation no longer held since, as a result of the recent Russian extradition demand, Robertson had asked that they should not be returned to Germany. Furthermore, if they did testify at Nuremberg it could not be held that they were medically unfit to stand trial themselves and the Russians might well demand their extradition from the Americans. The only way that the Americans could refuse this was to say that they were merely on loan from the British, and ‘this will imply that the British wish to try them themselves’. He therefore urged Shapcott to complete his paper as soon as possible.41

  On 4 May 1948, von Rundstedt and Strauss left Island Farm, their home for nearly two and half years, on transfer to No 231 Prisoner of War Hospital at Redgrave Hall, near Diss in Norfolk. Before he left Bridgend, Charles Clements and the officers of the camp staff gave a dinner in von Rundstedt’s honour. This was in contrast to a lunch given by the Liddell Harts, who were passing through Bridgend, a few weeks earlier. They entertained six Island Farm inmates, but von Rundstedt was not permitted to join them because of his frozen category. Knowing von Rundstedt’s regard for him, the previous commandant, Denis Topham, was also invited to the farewell dinner. Von Rundstedt did not forget the kindness shown to the prisoners by the local Welsh community. He presented a silver crucifix to St Mary’s Church in the local village of Norton, where many of the Generals had worshipped. He also wrote to the Bishop of Llandaff: ‘We shall never forget the solemn and edifying hours we were allowed to spend in attending divine services at St Mary’s, never the manifold proves [sic] of love and understanding we experienced in your diocese, especially amongst the congregation of St Mary and their dear rector, Dean Gravell.’ In addition, he gave his walking sticks to local inhabitants as keepsakes.42

  The reason for the transfer to Redgrave Hall was not just on medical grounds. The whole population of No 11 PW Camp was leaving, but, apart from von Rundstedt and Strauss, for Germany and freedom. Yet, as von Senger and Etterlin later recorded, it was not without trepidation. They had to make a major adjustment and ‘it was hardly to be expected that the German people would receive their generals back with open arms. They would more likely (and rightly) reproach us for not realising the situation and for doing nothing to put an end to the war.’43

  At Redgrave Hall, von Rundstedt and Strauss were reunited with von Brauchitsch and von Manstein. Their situation did not seem good. ‘Our future is very gloomy and uncertain and I feel very bad with my damned leg’, as von Rundstedt wrote to Liddell Hart shortly after his arrival at Redgrave Hall.44 In reply, Liddell Hart tried to reassure him by writing that the prolongation of his stay might well ‘turn out to be in your best interests. I cannot say any more for the moment but what I have heard seemed to be reassuring, though for obvious reasons nothing definite can be said’.45 Bearing in mind all that Liddell Hart had already done for von Rundstedt, it is probable that this letter did give him and the others some comfort. Also, the régime at Redgrave Hall was sympathetic. The owner of the Hall, who had been invalided from the Army after fighting in Burma, managed to persuade the Commandant to bring von Rundstedt to dinner. The owner’s son recalls that his father was impressed by von Rundstedt’s good command of English and his interesting conversation. His father noted that von Rundstedt ‘still had the air and bearing of a General about him, despite being in civilian clothes, but he also had the air of a bitter and disillusioned man’.46

  On 2 June, the Americans, having accepted that von Brauchitsch was not fit to appear at Nuremberg, reiterated their request for von Rundstedt and von Manstein to attend, as defence witnesses for Generals von Roques and Wöhler.47 On the 10th, the London Times got hold of the story, and also said that the United States legal authorities had been making efforts to secure the arraignment of the three Field Marshals. The British Government, which appeared to have been playing for time, was being gradually forced to reach a final decision on their disposal. On 5 July the Cabinet considered this and the American request. Shinwell said that von Brauchitsch was clearly medically unfit and he did not consider it worthwhile to bring the others to trial. It would need a ‘special executive’ to collect the evidence and it was doubtful whether the Poles and Russians would assist. There was the cost and, furthermore, it was obviously impossible to complete them by 1 September, the agreed date for ending war crimes trials. He therefore proposed that von Rundstedt and von Manstein be allowed to testify at Nuremberg on the understanding that they were returned to Britain immediately afterwards. All four would then be released on 1 September and returned to Germany, where they would be subject to denazification. He was supported by Jowitt, who stressed the formidable task of collecting
the evidence, the possibility that at the end of it all they might be found innocent and that public opinion ‘would regard the trial of these elderly and infirm officers as an act of vengeance rather than of justice’. Both Shawcross and Bevin saw matters differently. There was a prima facie case, the Polish and Soviet governments had been given the impression that the British would deal with them, and, bearing in mind that some of their subordinates had been tried and executed, the Government ‘could be accused of bad faith if the generals were not put on trial’. Besides, although the ORC had set a 1 September deadline, ‘these few and exceptional cases’, said Bevin, ‘could if necessary be completed after that date’. The Cabinet eventually agreed that the trials would take place, and in Germany, and that von Rundstedt and von Manstein would be allowed to appear at Nuremberg.48 On 9 July, the War Office signalled Eastern Command, under whose military jurisdiction Redgrave Hall came, giving warning of what was in store for the four. They were not, however, to be told, and ‘all necessary precautions will be taken against suicide and privilege of unescorted walks will be withdrawn’. The War Office also informed Headquarters British Army of the Rhine (BAOR), stressing that ‘special precautions’ were required to prevent suicide, especially in von Rundstedt’s case. Four days later, Shapcott wrote to the United States authorities in Nuremberg, giving a similar warning. ‘It is considered probable that Field Marshal von Rundstedt will commit suicide.’49 The sudden harding of their treatment boded ill for the four, but it was still some weeks before they were formally notified of the decision to try them as war criminals.

  On 16 July, von Brauchitsch and Strauss left Redgrave Hall and were taken by hospital ship to Germany. On arrival they were taken to the camp at Munsterlager, some 75 km south of Hamburg. Since this was the camp from which German prisoners-of-war were released into the outside world, it was understandable that they thought that this was about to happen to them. Six days later, von Rundstedt and von Manstein also left Redgrave Hall. Dressed in dark brown tunics, with two Ukrainians to carry their bags, they were taken by ambulance to the railway station at Diss, where they waited in the Stationmaster’s office until their train to London arrived. After thanking their escort officer for the kindly treatment they had received at Redgrave Hall, they boarded a first class carriage and began their journey to Nuremberg.50 After spending the night at the London Cage they were handed over to an American military escort and flown to Nuremberg. On arrival there, they were, as von Manstein wrote to Liddell Hart:

  ‘… lodged in the Military Hospital. The housing, food and medical treatment were good. But we were strictly isolated from everyone, always a guard (a negro) in the room of each of us. Although I have never been an adherent of the silly theory of “Herrenrasse” [race], this method of putting a negro as guard at one’s bedside seems to me a perverseness of taste.’51

  Shapcott, however, had sent a letter care of the escort officer to the Secretary-General of United States Military Tribunal No 5 at Nuremberg warning of the suicide danger, especially in von Rundstedt’s case.52 It is thus hardly surprising that the two were subjected to such tight custody.

  According to Telford Taylor, the British Government had asked the Americans not to tell von Rundstedt and von Manstein that their indictment was even under consideration. The Americans, however, were firmly opposed to them taking the witness stand in ignorance of this fact.53 It is not clear from the records exactly what von Rundstedt and von Manstein were told. Von Manstein in his letter to Liddell Hart said that they were told nothing and that he was especially disappointed since he wanted to check the chief prosecution witness, who was a Gestapo man. Lorna Newton of the Foreign Office considered that it ‘completely mispresents the position on this point’. She stated that ‘the court made an order to the effect that as persons of peril they were not required to give evidence, and they in fact elected not to’.54 This was so, but it was not the British Government which warned the Americans of the firm intention to try them for war crimes. On 26 July the Presiding Judge, John C Young, issued a court order which stated: ‘The Court has been informed by the Public Press [author’s italics] that von Rundstedt and von Manstein, who were summoned as defence witnesses for certain defendants, are likely to soon be tried by the British.’ The defendants were to be warned of this and be given 24 hours to decide whether they were prepared to testify or not. The court would hear their decision on the 28th.55 The two Field Marshals declared that they would not testify and on that same day, 28 July, were taken to join von Brauchitsch and Strauss at No 6 PW Hospital, Munsterlager.56 It would seem that von Rundstedt and von Manstein travelled separately, possibly because of the enmity between them. En route, von Rundstedt, but apparently not von Manstein, was put up for the night at the Officers Mess of the Field Investigation Section of the War Crimes Investigation Group (North West Europe) at Bad Oeynhausen, which was also the location of Headquarters BAOR. The Officer-in-Charge of the Section, R A Nightingale, ignorant of the intention to charge von Rundstedt as a war criminal, and his officers entertained him to dinner. Nightingale recalled that they had a discussion on the Ardennes campaign and that von Rundstedt was very affable. ‘It was a full-dress affair. A person of his calibre deserved the honour and he was very touched.’57