Philosophy of the Unconscious

by Eduard Von Hartmann

  If we dwell a moment more upon the atomic forces of matter, and inquire respecting the medium whereby individuation in this sphere becomes possible, respecting the so-called “principium individuationis,” undoubtedly the combination of space and time can alone be so characterised; for we saw that the atomic forces A and B, equal in thought, are only distinguished by the different space relations of their effects, improperly and briefly expressed by their places, and only omitted at the time to add to “their effects:” “at the same point of time.” This addendum is, however, necessary, for completeness’ sake, because indeed with the time the place of an atom may change. The phrase principium individuationis is not, however, well chosen. It should be medium individuationis; for the authorship or origin of individuation, just as that of space and time, belongs solely to the Unconscious, namely, the ideal difference and singleness of the atoms to the idea, their reality however to the will.

  It might now appear, on superficial consideration, that here only the same thing is said as by Schopenhauer, who also claims space and time as the principium individuationis. However, between his and my conception there exists the fundamental difference, that with Schopenhauer space and time are only forms of subjective cerebral perception, with which the (speculative) transcendent reality has nothing at all to do; that for him, therefore, all individuation is a mere subjective appearance, to which corresponds no reality outside the cerebral consciousness.

  According to my conception, on the other hand, space and time are just as much forms of outward reality as of the subjective cerebral perception; certainly not forms of the (metaphysical-) transcendent SUBSTANTIAL BEING, but only of its activity, so that individuation has not merely an apparent reality for consciousness, but a reality apart from all consciousness, without thereby curtailing plurality of substance.

  Here is the salient point for understanding the conception of objective appearance in opposition to the mere subjective appearance of Kant, Fichte, and Schopenhauer. The possibility of a plurality and individuation independent of the conscious subject perceiving it depends on the condition, that the principium or medium individuationis is a datum independent of the perception of the conscious subject, i.e., that space and time are not merely forms of intuition, but also forms of existence of the of itself existing (i. e., independent of the representation of the conscious subject). Whoever denies this must necessarily also deny that another plurality and individuation than that posited by the conscious idea exist—must then deny that his wife and himself are two individuals, independent of his mental picture. But now the essence of matter is only will and idea, and moreover one as the essence of all being; plurality only lies in action, and is real plurality only so far as at the same time a collision of will-acts takes place (one atom would be no atom). It is herewith, however, at the same time implied that plurality and individuation (thus also reality, presence, and existence) reside only in the manifestation of metaphysical force (comp. above, pp. 242–243), only in the action of substance, only in the manifestation of the hidden ground, only in the objectification of the will, only in the appearance of the one Essential Being. Plurality is therefore, on the one hand, not mere subjective appearance (of being in the abstract); on the other hand, however, still mere appearance of the one essence, therefore we call it objective appearance. In like manner we call space and time as principle of individuation of the plurality of the objective appearances, objective forms of phenomena.

  Had not Schopenhauer unfortunately leant too much on Kant, he must of necessity have enounced the true view; whereas, as it is, he persists in the statement that the whole diversity of the world only acquires existence through the first animal consciousness and in its perception. Only thus much truth lies in this, that objective manifestation also, in order to be real, i. e., to emerge from the unconsciously ideal composure into external reality, needed an opposition between different acts of will; error creeps in only when the union of one of the affected will-acts with a conscious subject is required as condition. If we eliminate this unwarranted requirement, the simple truth remains that the objective phenomenon which rests on the individuation of the one into the many, is also only possible in this plurality without self-contradiction.

  Moreover, there lies in Schopenhauer’s assertion that the world of individuation comes into existence only with the first conscious subject perceiving it an incorrect assumption, as if the subjective appearance which the intellect spontaneously constructs out of the material processes in the objective appearance of its brain were the immediate and true appearance of the Essential Being, whilst it is, in fact, very unlike, nay, in many points perfectly heterogeneous to, the objective phenomenon (i.e., the sum of natural individuals as they are, independently of being perceived). Only the objective phenomenon is the true and direct manifestation of the Essential Being; the subjective phenomenon, however, is a subjectively coloured and distorted copy of the objective phenomenon. To gain an adequate thought-picture of the objective appearance by eliminating that which merely appertains to subjectivity, and by the scientific investigation of the objective causes of the particular given affection of the subject, is the endeavour and problem of Natural Science (Physics in the widest sense), whilst Metaphysics endeavours to cognise the Essential Being according to its attributes and its mode of revelation, which underlies the objective appearance (natural things). Thus, e.g., matter as subjective phenomenon is matter with its palpable sense-qualities; as objective phenomenon, a definitely extended complex of punctual atoms; as essence, that which underlies this phenomenon, the All-one Unconscious with the attributes will and idea. The first is the sensuous, the second the physical, the third the metaphysical definition of matter.

  The second point wherein I depart from Schopenhauer is this, that he knows no atoms at all, wherefore, properly speaking, he cannot think anything by “individuation of matter,” because he cannot say what are individuals of mere inorganic matter. The third is, lastly, that he naively regards organic individuals as just as much direct objectifications of the will as I the atomic forces, whilst I, following physical science, suppose the same to arise by the composition of atomic individuals.

  With Schopenhauer, therefore, space and time are for organic individuals principium individuationis in the same sense as for atoms, whilst for the individuals of higher order I can only admit as direct principium individuationis those individuals of lower order of which the former are compounded, if also space and time, of course in the last resort, always remain indirect principium individuationis, since indeed the whole material world is built up out of atomic forces. Only his subjective idealism, to which matter, as also the organic body, must be a merely subjective appearance without corresponding reality beyond consciousness, could lead Schopenhauer to explain the body as a direct objectification of the individual will—an assertion which, in presence of the facts of the extremely defective control of the will over the body and of the change of matter, which is the first condition of all organic life, can by no means be upheld. Experience teaches us, in the first place, that the matter which constitutes our body is something foreign and in different to us; that it is being continually thrown off and replaced by other matter; secondly, that the matter of our body, in contrast with the mind, forms in the same way as the will of other persons a quite real power, with which one must reckon in order to be able to control it so far as is practically necessary, to which one, however, immediately succumbs as soon as one either thinks to be able to neglect it, or makes demands upon it to the enforcement of which the psychical power is unequal. Experience, in a word, teaches that matter behaves as an already pre-existing, to a certain extent indifferent, crude building material, which the plastic individual soul attracts to and repels from itself according to its needs, whose laws it must, however, respect, and dare not attempt to infringe with impunity.

  Bearing in mind the results of Chap. ix. C., according to which the Unconscious realises life wherever the possibility of life offers
itself, and considering that organic life is only conceivable under the organic form and requires matter for its realisation, it is evident that these are the conditions determining the individuation of organic life; for it must for its realisation make use of a complex of atoms enclosed within certain limits of extension, and put these into their appropriate situations and groups, so as to render possible the organic interchange of matter; the atoms employed, however, are individuals, i.e., each of them is single, consequently the organically constituted complex of these atoms, and the activity of the Unconscious exclusively directed to it, which together make up the higher individual, must be single.

  Thus, as already above suggested, the lower order of individuals turns out to be medium individuationis for the higher.—There would be no special gain for the purpose of this inquiry in going deeper into evolution, and showing in detail how, for the many-celled individuals, the cells are just as much a power whose laws must be respected as the matter for the cells, for in the body a change of cells just as much takes place as a change of matter, if also much more slowly, &c. The essential thing is, that the individuation of organic life takes place only in and through matter, but the individuation of the atoms in and through space and time. In all higher individuals the general form requires a content or matter in order to become concrete; what was matter for the individuals of higher order becomes for those of the lower order form. Only with pure matter is the last term of this series reached; only here does the typical form become of itself concrete,—become as it were itself matter through the simple artifice of fixation at the extended point, through the device that here the directions of force all intersect at one and the same point. Since the atomic forces have no matter lying outside them whereby they may be individualised, but only their place, they are also discriminated (apart from the difference between body and ether atoms) only by their place, which is just their sole medium individuationis; higher individuals, on the other hand, which have matter for their medium individuationis, find also, besides the difference of the occupied place, in the matter taken into possession by them, a rich field for individual differences.

  With this is first given in the case of individuals of lower order the possibility of an individual character, and to this we must pay some attention, for it meets us at all stages of organic life, from the individual character of the simplest cell to that of the foundations of the human mind, as a phenomenon at first perplexing for monistic principles.

  2. Individual Character .—Concerning human character there are two extreme opinions. The one (Rousseau, Helvetius, &c.) asserts that all men are at birth equal, i.e., devoid of an individual character; that their mind is just as much a tabula rasa as regards character as regards ideas, and that it only acquires the one as the other by external impressions, and the character in particular by education and circumstances.

  The other view (Schopenhauer) asserts that character is unalterable; that it manifests itself indeed, as is natural, differently through different external opportunities, e.g., at different periods of life, but in its essence it is at once the man’s inalienable and unchangeable nature and foundation, consequently remains the same from birth to death.

  Each of these two views explains a part of the facts very well, is closed, however, to another part of the facts. If we ask, which of the two views appears metaphysically more acceptable, the remarkable case occurs that nothing can be objected to the view of the French naturalists on the metaphysical side, while, on the other hand, that of the metaphysician Schopenhauer, who assumes the establishment of character by a resolution taken once for all out of time, can hardly stand the test of criticism derived from his own principles.

  Schopenhauer himself wishes to be an absolute monist; if, then, the will of the world is in its essence one; if, further, the character likewise, according to his own assertion, is nothing but the peculiarity of the individual will, the individuality of the character can manifestly only be conceived as possible in an individualised activity of the universal will, but not as directly based on the essential nature of the universal will, since this always remains universal. How, however, the activity of the will which produces character is to be thought as extra-temporal, of that I can form no idea. I can only imagine a being, but not its activity, as out of time, since activity at once supposes time, unless one also assumes as possible an activity in zero-time, in which case it is in the moment also again extinguished. The character, however, that is to live through the life-period of the individual manifestly requires also an activity of the universal will, which lasts just as long. Otherwise expressed, the doctrine of the intelligible individual character is a contradiction to the monistic principle a contradiction also to the transcendent ideality of space and time. For in the intelligible the principium individuationis is wanting, consequently also plurality and individuality, consequently also the many individual characters. The individual character pre-supposes the individual, or rather individuals, thus plurality, individuality; in short, the world of appearances: like this, it only becomes possible through time, through the temporal activity of the Universal Intelligible Being.

  If this is now the state of the case, it is, in the first place, not at once obvious why, if the characters are in fact so different among one another, each individual should during the duration of life, i.e., the whole time in which this particular activity of the individual will exists, remain the same, and not rather continually change.

  Much more plausible, metaphysically, is the hypothesis of the French rationalists, that only typical generic characters, but not individual characters, are innate; that, however, through alteration of the character in different ways, the individual characters are gradually fashioned. On this assumption we come to terms much more easily with the all-unity of the Universal Being, for the individual variation of the originally similar generic character might then be referred to different brain impressions, each of which leaves behind a permanent change in the brain, which brings it about that thenceforward a molecular movement in the same sense as that called forth by those impressions more easily arises than one of a totally different kind (vol. i. pp. 33–34). This is the way in which altogether habit becomes a power in special application to character. The first action of a particular kind is purely decided by motives, on the assumption of a still undetermined character; in what mode and strength these come to the man depends on external circumstances. If, however, the first action turns out in a particular way, for the next similar case the motives which act in the direction of the same decision as before have attained a certain imperceptible advantage over the opposite motives, which is heightened in every decision resulting in the same way.

  In this way it comes about that in the case of any particular individual certain motives exert a greater, others a less effect, than on the average typical generic character, and the sum of all these tendencies is the individual character.

  According to this view, consequently, the individual character arises especially by an individual constitution of the brain, which is produced by former impressions conditioned by external circumstances; for habit can exercise a direct influence only on the organ of consciousness, not on the Unconscious. Nevertheless, with the constitution of the brain the kind of activity also changes which the Unconscious directs upon the same; for this changes with every change of the organism, and the brain is one of the most important parts of it. The Unconscious usually always calls forth as a motive in the brain the reaction which is the easiest; only where particularly important, especially general interests are at stake in an action, may we suppose that it takes upon itself the trouble of answering with another than this easiest reaction on the stimulus of the motive, a case which occurs in all action according to unconscious purposes, when the reaction which otherwise would directly respond to the motive fails to take place, or is outbidden by another, exclusively conditioned by unconscious intermediate terms.

  In all cases, however, where the Unconscious has no such co
nsiderable interest that it would reward it to replace the reaction most easily occurring by another, will also a customary change of this easiest cerebral reaction have as its consequence a change of the activity of the Unconscious. The mode of this activity is, however, the character itself,—as we said before (B. Chap. iv.), man’s inmost being. It is no contradiction that this character lies in the Unconscious, and yet its nature is conditioned by the brain, the special organ of consciousness; for the organ of consciousness, together with all its molecular relations, which must be regarded as latent dispositions to certain vibrations of this or that kind, lies itself so much beyond all consciousness, that between its material function and the conscious idea the whole complex of those unconscious psychical functions is interposed with which we have been hitherto occupied. At the same time, however, we must here call attention to the circumstance that the latent dispositions of the brain are by no means the sole and sufficient cause, but only one of the co-operating conditions for the determination of the idea entering into consciousness, or of the will to act; for they alone would never attain any psychical effect, but the spontaneity of the Unconscious borrows only from them a determining direction for the manner of the unfolding of its activity, to which it is not so far bound as not spontaneously to modify it for higher purposes.

  From this consideration it follows that a man, even if he were born without individual character, would have acquired as adult an individual character deviating more or less from the typical generic character. If this man now, however, begets children, we know that, according to the law of inheritance, the peculiar dispositions of his brain, deviating from the typical human brain, pass on to some of his children more or less completely. Then is such child born with these latent dispositions, which condition the individual character, and as soon as it comes into circumstances where these dispositions are active, its innate character comes to the front. The phenomena of reversion in the paternal and the maternal line, and the blending of such qualities handed on from different sides, make the inquiry very difficult in the individual case whence the different qualities of an innate character arise; yet is the undeniable fact of the innate character only thus to be explained. Whether the first man had an individual character is an altogether idle question; his general character was indeed his individual character, since as the first individual of his species he completely represented the same. According to the theory of descent expounded in the last chapter, where the conception of kind was found to be a somewhat fluent one, every organic individual (accordingly also the first man) occupies a place in a series of organic developments, within which it receives from its immediate ancestors a whole treasury of ethological peculiarities as its inheritance, which on its part it again bequeaths, modified by the impressions of its life (before procreation), to its descendants.