The Persian Empire

by Kia, Mehrdad;

  The execution of Bessus did not quash the anti-Macedonian sentiments, which resurfaced through the rebellion of the Sogdian general, Spitaman. In 329 BCE, Spitaman led a popular revolt against Alexander in Bactria and Sogdiana and laid siege to Maracanda (Samarqand). Alexander sent an army under the command of his general, Pharnuches, to suppress the rebellion, but Spitaman inflicted a humiliating defeat on the Macedonian force, which was dispersed after suffering heavy losses. When Alexander hurried to Maracanda to relieve the city, he discovered that Spitaman had already departed for Bactria. In 328 BCE Spitaman attacked Bactria, but the governor of the province, Artabazus, who had sworn loyalty to Alexander, managed to repulse him. Spitaman was finally defeated by Alexander’s general, Coenus. After this defeat Spitaman was betrayed by his Scythian allies, who murdered him and sent his head to Alexander. After seizing Maracanda, Alexander advanced to Cyropolis (the City of Cyrus), eventually reaching the Jaxartes (Syr Darya), the northeastern boundary of the Persian Empire. He fought several battles against the Scythian tribes, and it is claimed that he built a city, Alexandria Eschate (Alexandria the Farthest), on the site of modern-day Khojand in northern Tajikistan. Alexander remained in Sogdiana until the end of 328 BCE, defeating Oxyartes and those who continued to fight his army.

  Having pacified Sogdiana and Bactria, Alexander marched south toward India. In 326 he crossed the Indus River and seized Taxila. The ruler of Taxila, Taxiles, cooperated and provided Alexander with elephants and fighting men. In return for his generous support, Alexander promised military assistance for Taxiles in his conflict with Porus (Paurava), a rival and the ruler of another Indian kingdom in Punjab. In sharp contrast to Taxiles, Porus refused to submit to Alexander. When the two armies joined in battle, Porus was defeated. Porus’s son was killed on the battlefield, and Porus himself was wounded and captured by the Macedonians. Porus survived his defeat and was appointed the satrap (governor) of his own kingdom.

  After two years of fighting in India, Alexander’s exhausted troops mutinied and demanded an end to military operations. Alexander had no other choice but to turn back. In 325 BCE he began to march westward through the harsh and waterless region of Gedrosia (modern-day Baluchistan). This march proved disastrous. Thousands of men, women, and children perished as they traveled through the desert. After a long and arduous journey, Alexander finally arrived in Susa in southwestern Iran in the spring of 324. Back in the former winter capital of the Persian Empire, he organized a mass wedding. Alexander and 80 of his generals married Iranian wives. Alexander himself married Barsine, “Darius’ eldest daughter,” and Parysatis, the youngest daughter of Ochus (Artaxerxes III, who ruled from 359 to 338 BCE), thus linking himself with both branches of the Persian Achaemenid royal family (Arrian: 7.4). In this ceremony, the Macedonian general Seleucus married Apame (Apama), the daughter of the Sogdian commander Spitaman who had fought Alexander. The Seleucid dynasty was born from the marriage between the Iranian Sogdian Apame and the Macedonian Seleucus. The “marriage ceremonies were in the Persian fashion: chairs were set for the bridegrooms in order of precedence, and when healths had been drunk the brides entered and sat down by their bridegrooms, who took them by the hand and kissed them” (Arrian: 7.5). After the end of the ceremony, “all the men took their wives home, and for every one of them Alexander provided a dowry” (Arrian: 7.5). As with his policy of recruiting the members of the Persian nobility in his royal cavalry bodyguard, Alexander hoped that these marriages would create unity between the Macedonians and Iranians. His attempts to include these Persians in the power structure of the newly emerging empire, however, only ignited the resentment of his Macedonian generals, who viewed such policies as a threat to their privileged position. Alexander died on June 13, 323 BCE, after a long and prolonged banquet and drinking bout. At the time of his death, he was 33 years old and had ruled for 12 years and eight months. His body was eventually transported to Egypt by one of his generals, Ptolemy, who placed the body of the deceased king in a golden coffin in Alexandria. Alexander had not designated his successor. The empire he had created disintegrated shortly after his death as his generals fought to establish independent kingdoms of their own.

  See also: K&Q, Achaemenid: Darius III; K&Q, Seleucid: Apame/Apama; Seleucus I Nicator; Peoples: Seleucids

  Further Reading

  Arrian. The Campaigns of Alexander. Translated by Aubrey De Sélincourt. New York: Dorset, 1986.

  Astin, A. E., F. W. Walbank, M. W. Frederiksen, and R. M. Ogilvie. The Cambridge Ancient History, Vol. 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.

  Bickerman, E. “The Seleucid Period.” In The Cambridge History of Iran, Vol. 3(I), edited by Ehsan Yarshater, 3–20. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.

  Quintus Curtius Rufus. The History of Alexander. Translated by John Yardley. London: Penguin, 2004.

  Ariobarzanes

  A Persian commander in the army of Darius III (r. 336–330 BCE), the last Achaemenid king. Ariobarzanes was present at the Battle of Gaugamela (Arbela), which was fought between Darius III and Alexander the Macedon in present-day northern Iraq in October 331 BCE. As the governor (satrap) of Parsa (Persis) in present-day southern Iran, Ariobarzanes fought Alexander in January 330 BCE in the Battle of the Persian Gates in a last-ditch effort to prevent the invading Macedonians from reaching the Achaemenid ceremonial capital of Persepolis.

  In the Battle of Gaugamela, Ariobarzanes served as the co-commander of a unit of Persian, Mardian, and Sogdian forces, sharing this command with Oronotobates (Quintus Curtius Rufus: 4.12.7). The “supreme command” of the unit “rested with Orsines,” who was descended from one of the Persian officers who had supported Darius I when he seized the Persian throne in 522 BCE and “also traced his line back to the renowned King Cyrus” (Quintus Curtius Rufus: 4.12.8). According to Arrian, in the Battle of Gaugamela, Ariobarzanes and Oronotobates were commanders of the “contingents from the neighborhood of the Persian Gulf” (Arrian: 3.8.5). After he was defeated, Darius III fled to Hagmatana/Ecbatana (modern-day Hamedan) accompanied by a group of his generals. With their king in flight and in the absence of any centralized authority that could organize an empire-wide resistance, each governor became responsible for the defense and security of his own province. Left to their own means and without any support from the Achaemenid central government, many Persian satraps surrendered to Alexander and accepted his suzerainty. Initially, Alexander accepted the surrender of these satraps and preserved them in their posts.

  Meanwhile, after his victory at Gaugamela, Alexander moved south and seized Babylon and Susa. He then marched against the province of Parsa (Persis) and Persepolis, the ceremonial capital of the Achaemenid Empire. Alexander split his forces. His general, Parmenio, “was given orders to proceed by the main road into Persia,” while Alexander himself, “at the head of a force consisting of the Macedonian infantry, the Companion cavalry, the Agrianes, the archers, and advanced scouts, set off with all speed through the hills” (Arrian: 3.18.2). The Persian satrap of Parsa (Persis), Ariobarzanes, tried to slow down Alexander’s march to Persepolis on a mountainous track called the Persian Gates (Arrian: 3.18.2; Strabo: 15.3.6). According to Arrian, Ariobarzanes fled to the mountains with a band of horsemen (Arrian: 3.18.9).

  At the Persian Gates northeast of modern Yasuj, the capital of the present-day Iranian province of Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad, the Macedonian units under the command of Alexander “encountered Ariobarzanes,” who “had already built defenses across the pass” and with his force “had taken up a position there to prevent Alexander from getting through” (Arrian: 3.18.2). Curtius claimed that Ariobarzanes had occupied the pass “with 25,000 infantry,” while Arrian stated that Ariobarzanes commanded an infantry force of 40,000 supported by 700 cavalrymen (Arrian: 3.18.6). These numbers are not only grossly exaggerated but are also laughable. Such embellished numbers were used as a means of portraying the Achaemenid state as a military giant with unlimited resources and manpower and converting Alexander i
nto a military genius who fought and defeated armies many times larger than the size of his own. If they admitted that a small force of desperate but determined Persians inflicted a humiliating defeat on a much larger Macedonian army led by Alexander, who was forced to retreat, then one could not glamorize the Macedonian victory over a disintegrating polity as a unique moment in human history.

  Confident of his ability to score an easy victory against the small Persian force that blocked his path to Persepolis, Alexander attacked Ariobarzanes with a force of 10,000 men (Arrian: 3.18.1). Holding a commanding position over the narrow pass, Ariobarzanes and his small Persian force fought back. The Persians rolled “massive rocks down the mountain slopes” (Quintus Curtius Rufus: 5.3.16). “Stones, shot from slings, and arrows were also showered” on the Macedonians (Quintus Curtius Rufus: 5.3.19). The Macedonians “suffered severely from missiles hurled or catapulted from above,” and Alexander was forced to retreat (Arrian: 3.18.3). At this critical juncture, a native who knew the various passes in the region led Alexander and his commanders under the cover of darkness through roundabouts to the rear of the Persian position. At dawn Alexander attacked the Persian force under the command of Ariobarzanes, while his general, Craterus, assaulted the gate from the front. Surrounded, the Persians put up “a memorable fight. … Unarmed men grappled with men who were armed, dragging them to the ground by virtue of their bodily weight and stabbing many with their own weapons” (Quintus Curtius Rufus: 5.4.31–2; Arrian: 3.18.3–8). The Persian defenders were mostly killed. According to Curtius, Ariobarzanes “broke through the center of the Macedonian line” and “hurried to occupy the regional capital, the city of Persepolis,” but he was shut out from there by the city garrison (Quintus Curtius Rufus: 5.4.33–34). Left with no other alternative, Ariobarzanes renewed the battle and died fighting together with all those who had fled with him (Quintus Curtius Rufus: 5.4.34). The valor, audacity, selflessness, and heroism of Ariobarzanes, who sacrificed his life in defense of Persia, has been celebrated by numerous Iranian writers of the 20th century. Today, a statue of the Persian commander welcomes visitors to the city of Yasuj, the capital of the province of Kohgiluyeh and Boyer-Ahmad, located in the Zagros Mountains of southwestern Iran.

  See also: Ancient Cities: Persepolis; K&Q, Achaemenid: Darius III; Peoples: Alexander of Macedon (the Great)

  Further Reading

  Arrian. The Campaigns of Alexander. Translated by Aubrey De Sélincourt. New York: Dorset, 1986.

  Briant, Pierre. From Cyrus to Alexander: A History of the Persian Empire. Translated by P. T. Daniels. Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 2002.

  Cook, J. M. The Persian Empire. New York: Schocken Books, 1983.

  Dandamayev, M. A. “Artabazus.” Encyclopaedia Iranica, 1986, http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/artabazus-gk.

  Diodorus Siculus. Translated by C. H. Oldfather. London: William Heinemann, 1933.

  Quintus Curtius Rufus. The History of Alexander. London: Penguin, 2004.

  Shahbazi, A. Sh. “Ariobarzanes.” Encyclopaedia Iranica, 1986, http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/ariobarzanes-greek-form-of-old-iranian-proper-name-arya-brzana.

  Strabo. The Geography of Strabo. Translated by Horace Leonard Jones. London: William Heinemann, 1930.

  Arsacid Army

  Originally a Scythian group from Central Asia, the Arsacids, known in the Greek and Roman accounts as the Parthians, founded a powerful empire that at its zenith ruled a vast territory stretching from Central Asia to Syria and from Armenia to the Persian Gulf. The armies of the Arsacid (Parthian) Empire (r. 247/238 BCE–224 CE) were some of the most accomplished, efficient, and feared of all military forces of antiquity. Raised from a young age to the arts of horsemanship and archery, Parthian soldiers enjoyed a reputation that still echoes today in the modern Persian term pahlavan, meaning “champion” or “warrior” (Shahbazi: “Army I”). Parthian military tactics and sharpshooting are renowned in military history. Because of the geographical location of their empire, the Parthians were forced to fight frequently against various nomadic groups invading from Central Asia as well as against Roman legions attacking through Armenia or Mesopotamia. To neutralize these threats to the security of their empire, the Parthians were forced to develop a highly flexible and elastic military force that could employ exceptional mobility and effectiveness.

  Our information about the Arsacid army is extremely scanty. We do not know the exact size, internal organization, and social composition of Arsacid armies. Lack of adequate sources has forced scholars to rely almost exclusively on Roman and Greek accounts, which are characterized by hostility and disdain toward these eastern neighbors of Rome, denouncing the Arsacids as treacherous and arrogant barbarians with strange and repugnant customs and practices. This negative image was manufactured and promoted by the Romans, who were skilled political propagandists against enemies who stymied Rome’s expansionist policies. The deep hostility and resentment expressed toward the Arsacids originated from the failure of Rome to subdue these uncanny Iranians who refused to be intimidated and submit to the might of Roman legions and had repeatedly displayed an exceptional talent and brilliance in defeating Roman armies. As Emperor Julian wrote, “tell me why, after a war of more than three hundred years, you Romans have never conquered a small province beyond the Tigris which is still governed by the Parthians? Shall I tell you why? It was the arrows of the Persians that checked you. Ask Antony to give you an account of them, since he was trained for war by you” (Julian: 387).

  The Arsacid monarchs ruled a highly decentralized empire. When an Arsacid king had to raise an army, he asked the local kings, vassals, governors, regional magnates, and tribal chiefs under his suzerainty to mobilize their forces, which included their families, dependents, servants, and slaves, and lead them to a designated meeting place. Depending on the movement of enemy forces, the king divided these units into a number of smaller armies, each responsible for confronting the enemy as it entered Parthian territory. The cavalry constituted the backbone of the Arsacid army. According to Justin, the Arsacids refused to engage their enemy in hand-to-hand combat, and they avoided “close fight” at all costs (Justin: XLI.2.2–3). They always fought “on horseback, sometimes advancing, and sometimes turning back upon their enemies” (Justin: XLI.2.2–3). The Parthians were “armed like the Scythians” from whom they had “descended” (Justin: XLI.2.2–3). A section of the Arsacid cavalry was armed with bows and arrows, while other units, namely the cataphracts, were heavily armed with lance, knife, and bow, with both horse and cavalryman armored and protected by coats of chain mail. When the Arsacid commander Surena (Suren) defeated the Roman army under the command of Crassus in the Battle of Carrhae in 53 BCE, his army was composed of 10,000 cavalry. In the confrontation with Mark Antony in 36 BCE, the Arsacid cavalry was estimated at 50,000, with 400 members of the nobility constituting the core of the cavalry forces (Justin: XLI.2.2–3). The Arsacid nobility constituted the highest echelon of the Parthian military forces, which also included their dependents, servants, retainers, serfs, and at times foreign mercenaries. According to Justin, the Arsacids did not have an army composed “wholly of free men,” but the majority consisted “of slaves” whom they brought up “with as much care as their children, and [they] teach them with great industry, both riding and shooting” (Justin: XLI.2.2–3). Justin erroneously equated the Parthian nobles known as āzāt with “free-men” and the large army of their dependents with “slaves.” Arsacid units included infantry divisions as well, but these numbers were small, and their role and impact on the battlefield were negligible.

  The Arsacid elite dressed like the Medes, with a garment translucently thin and fluent (Justin: XLI.2.2–3). The Arsacid cavalry wore helmets and breastplates of rawhide or steel, which according to Roman observers blazed like fire under the sun. Their horses were likewise described as wearing plates of bronze and steel (Justin: XLI.2.2–3). Parthian fighters painted their faces and gathered their hair “in a mass upon their foreheads af
ter the Scythian mode” (Plutarch: 1.814). They attacked the enemy with long spears, lances, and pikes or from a distance by shooting extremely swift arrows with their strong bows. To the shock of their enemies, the barbed arrowheads pierced through hard and soft armor, inflicting severe damage on veins and muscles. The Parthian cavalry was known for the unique and exceptional ability of its horsemen to shoot arrows as they fled, an old and extremely difficult technique known as the “Parthian shot.”

  The Parthian strategy was to fight with patience, astuteness, and minimum hand-to-hand contact with the foe, demoralizing the enemy instead with random unpredictable and shocking moves, such as appearing and disappearing, hitting and escaping, and retreating and encouraging pursuit but then suddenly turning back and attacking with a shower of arrows. Parthian archers had at their disposal a large number of camels loaded with arrows and standing on the fringes of the battlefield to deliver new supplies of ammunition (Plutarch: 1.815). The Parthians did not use war chariots. Instead of using horns or trumpets to sound the attack, the Parthian armies used hollow drums of animal hide to which they had attached bronze bells. The beating of these drums all at once across different parts of the battlefield produced a most eerie and terrifying sound, which according to Roman sources sounded like the roaring of wild animals accompanied by claps of thunder (Plutarch: 1.814; Justin: XLI.2.2–3). Parthian armies also resorted to psychological warfare as well as negotiations to deceive the enemy and force its leadership to surrender. Even after defeating a formidable foe, they did not make any attempt to continue pursuit at night, preferring to finish the job at dawn the following day (Plutarch: 1.819).