Live by the Sword

by Gus Russo

  To draft the remaining four members, Johnson thought it would help if he obtained the most respected person possible to chair the panel. In Johnson’s mind, that cut the list to one: The Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, Earl Warren. The problem was Earl Warren wouldn’t hear of it, feeling that it might breach the important principle of “separation of powers.”

  It was a constitutionally valid argument—a member of the Judiciary should not sit on an Executive branch panel. The imperial Johnson cared little for the subtleties of the Federalist Papers. He wanted, in fact needed, Earl Warren. Johnson implored the reluctant Chief Justice:

  You’d go and fight if you thought you could save one American life. . . Why, if Khrushchev moved on us, he could kill 39 million in an hour. . . I’m asking you something and you’re saying no to everybody when you could be speaking for 39 million people.

  Recalling Warren’s reaction, Johnson said that “tears came in his eyes. . . You never saw anything like it. He said, ‘I just can’t say no.’”

  Warren described Johnson’s arm-twisting thus: “The President told me he was greatly disturbed by the rumors that were going around the world about a conspiracy and so forth. He thought that, because it involved both Khrushchev and Castro, it might even catapult us into a nuclear war.”40

  In order to fulfill his simultaneous responsibilities to the Supreme Court and the Commission, Warren put in seven-day work weeks, rising at 4 a.m., and working until midnight. Some members of his family feared he wouldn’t survive the ordeal. “Physically, it almost killed him,” says grandson Jeffrey Warren. Earl Warren, Jr. said, “It was taking ten pints of blood a day from him.” His son Robert recalled that the work “did more to age him than anything I’ve ever seen.”41 Earl Warren would later look back on this period and call it “the worst nine months” of his life.42

  Although controversial, Warren was revered by liberals for the way he had handled some of the most controversial court cases in U.S. history, including Miranda, and Brown vs. Board of Education. (Eisenhower had called his appointment of Warren the “biggest damn fool mistake” of his presidency, for Warren turned out to be the liberal’s liberal.)

  Warren was also a good friend of John Kennedy. As shall be seen, it is thus a possibility that the chief inadequacy of the Warren Commission—the failure to search for Kennedy provocation of the assassin—stems in part from the fact that a trusted friend of the martyred President chaired the hearings. Kennedy friends and loyalists kept popping up in successive investigations that likewise failed to point the finger of guilt at Kennedy’s own programs.

  “Earl [Warren] and John Kennedy had a sort-of ‘love affair,’” says Warren’s grandson, Jeffrey Warren. “My grandfather saw JFK as the great hope of the court,” says Jeffrey Warren. “It was a mutual admiration society.”43 Warren’s son, Earl, Jr., later said that his father and Kennedy “were always tremendously cordial to each other.” The son pointed out that John Kennedy would “call [Warren] up in regard to certain judicial appointments, and asked his counsel and so forth.”44 Two days before the assassination, JFK feted Warren at a White House dinner in Warren’s honor. When he heard the tragic news from Dallas, tears came to his eyes. “It was like losing one of my own sons,” Warren remarked.45

  Warren’s relationship to the Kennedy family was so close that his appointment as head of the Commission was personally approved by family members.46 That friendship was so special that on the day after the assassination, Jackie Kennedy personally called Warren to ask him to deliver the eulogy for her husband, which he did two days later at the Rotunda. On that occasion, Warren called his friend “a believer in the dignity and equality of all human beings, a fighter for justice, an apostle of peace.” He added prophetically, “What moved some misguided wretch to do this horrible deed may never be known to us.”47

  Warren’s biographer concluded that the Chief Justice “placed very little pressure on the investigative agencies to cooperate with the Commission,” and that his principal function, as Warren saw it, was to “allay doubts.”48 Jeffrey Warren disputes this, saying “Earl would have checked everything. He was fond of using ‘back channels.’ That was his style. The fact that it doesn’t appear in the paper record means nothing.”49

  Johnson’s choices for the remainder of the Commission were so intentionally disparate as to render laughable any future discussion of panel collusion. The Commission already possessed a representative from the left—Warren—and Johnson’s second choice was so far to the right that the invitation was initially declined solely on the basis of Warren’s presence. Johnson’s old friend and mentor, Senator Richard Russell of Georgia, the feisty Democratic Chairman of the Armed Services Committee, responded to Johnson’s invitation with, “Well, now, Mr. President, I know I don’t have to tell you of my devotion to you, but I just can’t serve on that commission. . . I couldn’t serve there with Chief Justice Warren. I don’t like that man, and I don’t have any confidence in him.” And the feeling was mutual. Warren, for his part, would later ask rhetorically, “What possible set of circumstances could get Dick Russell and me to conspire on anything?”50

  But much as he had with Warren, the new President got Russell on the Commission by applying the screws, Johnson style:

  Johnson: “Well, this is not me, this is your country. You’re my man on that commission, and you’re going to do it, and don’t tell me what you can do and what you can’t, because I can’t arrest you, and I’m not going to put the FBI on you, but you’re goddamn sure going to serve, I’ll tell you that”

  Russell: “I’m at your command and I’ll do anything you say—”

  Johnson: “Well, you’re damned sure going to be at my command—you’re going to be at my command as long as I’m here.”51

  Rounding out the Commission were Democratic Congressman Hale Boggs of Louisiana (Democratic Majority Leader), and two Republicans, Senator John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky, and Congressman Gerald Ford of Michigan. These men, combined with two others from the intelligence establishment, held their first organizational meeting on December 5, 1963.

  Even before the Commission heard its first witness, Johnson hinted that he was about to dismantle the Kennedys’ anti-Castro initiatives. At a December 19, 1963 meeting between Johnson and the Army Chief of Staff, General Earle Wheeler, the new President “expressed reluctance” at continued sabotage in Cuba.52 Within weeks, the operations would come to a complete halt.

  RFK Stacks the Deck

  “As for the makeup of the rest of the Commission, I appointed the two men Bobby Kennedy asked me to put on it, Allen Dulles and John McCloy—immediately.”

  —President Lyndon Johnson53

  “Only Johnson, obviously, the Chief Justice [Warren], Allen Dulles, and Bobby Kennedy knew about the CIA plots against Castro. Its disclosure would have had very important implications. It might have allowed us to say something reasonably definitive about Oswald’s motive. It would have put a new dimension on his Cuban activities and opened up new areas of exploration.”

  —Judge Burt Griffin, Warren Commission staff lawyer54

  In a 1966 phone conversation with Abe Fortas, Johnson told his advisor how the other two members of the Commission were chosen. “We even asked the Attorney General to name the people he wanted,” said the President. “He named Allen Dulles and John McCloy.” When he spoke with the publisher of his memoirs at the LBJ ranch years later, Johnson confessed surprise at Bobby’s suggested nominees for the new commission. “I could never understand why Bobby tried to put some CIA people on the Warren Commission,” LBJ admitted to his publisher, Lord George Weidenfeld.55 “I had Dick Helms here not long ago and I asked him point blank, but he refused to be drawn [in],” Johnson said.

  Although Johnson, through his own sources, had known of the Mongoose and assassination plots, he may not have been privy to the long history shared by the Kennedys and CIA leaders such as John McCloy and Allen Dulles. LBJ was probably also unaware that Du
lles had authorized the initial J.C. King assassination proposals in 1959, and that two key staging areas for Bobby Kennedy’s secret war were Mexico City and New Orleans: cities that shared a history with Lee Oswald.

  John Kennedy once described John McCloy this way: “[He is a] diplomat and public servant, banker to the world, and Godfather to German freedom. . . He has brought cheerful wisdom and steady effectiveness to the tasks of war and peace.”56 In addition to being the Chairman of the World Bank, McCloy was a former diplomat, advisor to Presidents, Wall Street insider, and an early architect of the post-war U.S. intelligence community. Kennedy so admired McCloy that he had offered him his choice of Cabinet posts, all of which McCloy declined. The banker/diplomat eventually agreed to serve as Kennedy’s advisor on disarmament. McCloy also was Kennedy’s point man in crafting the details of the missile removal from Cuba during negotiations with Russia after the Cuban Missile Crisis.

  On December 6, 1963, JFK was to have presented McCloy with the nation’s highest civilian honor, the Freedom Medal.57 Given JFK’s admiration for McCloy, Robert Kennedy’s choice of him for the Warren Commission comes as no great surprise.

  His other choice, Allen Dulles, was also no surprise, at least to those in the Kennedy inner-circle. But selecting Dulles served a purpose far more important to Bobby Kennedy. It would guarantee that Kennedy interests were served on the panel. And that meant a coverup. Robert Kennedy would later tell “Track One” representative, William Attwood, that a heavy lid must be kept on the investigation “for reasons of national security.”58

  The Warren Commission and the Dulles Connection

  “I am personally shocked and feel betrayed that such coverup activities have occurred. I still believe that the Commission, with the possible exception of Allen Dulles, did not participate in any coverup.”

  —Judge Burt Griffin, Warren Commission staff attorney, 197659

  “The CIA withheld from the Commission information which might have been relevant. . . in light of the allegations of conspiratorial contact between Oswald and agents of the Cuban government.”

  —David Belin, Warren Commission staff attorney, 197560

  “I was outraged to learn [in 1975] of the CIA/Mafia plots. Certainly it [the Warren Commission investigation] would have bulked larger [in] the conspiracy area [had this been known in 1963-64].”

  —J. Lee Rankin, Warren Commission Chief Counsel, 197861

  The appointment of Allen Dulles to the Warren Commission can be pointed to as the single most important occurrence in the history of the Kennedy assassination whitewash. For it was Dulles, alone among the Commissioners, who knew of a potential Cuban motive to encourage Oswald. He knew of White House plans to kill Fidel Castro and he kept it from the other investigators. Hiding the Cuban intrigue was not the first major favor Dulles had performed for his friends in the Kennedy family. His new exercise of discretion recalls the manner in which he dealt with the explosive Arvad file at the time of JFK’s 1960 election. In 1963-64, Dulles once again would keep the family’s darkest secrets from seeing the light of day.

  Of course, Dulles could have had a dual motivation. In addition to his closeness with the Kennedys, the former CIA director might have harbored the same fears as LBJ: a full disclosure of the U.S.’s anti-Castro intrigue could have resulted in a nuclear war.

  Dulles’ contributions to the Warren Commission are best considered for what he didn’t add, rather than for what he did. When asked, Dulles assured the Warren Commissioners that the CIA had submitted all pertinent information to the Commission. Paradoxically, Dulles admitted that he felt obliged to tell the truth only to the President—and only if asked for it. Speaking with a colleague on a later occasion, he widened the circle by one: “I’ll fudge the truth to the oversight committee. But I’ll tell the chairman the truth—that is, if he wants to know.”62

  Dulles even admitted to his fellow Commissioners that a CIA man, under certain circumstances, “ought not tell [the truth] under oath.”63 Dulles elaborated, “I would tell the President of the United States anything, yes, I am under his control. He is my boss, [but I] wouldn’t necessarily tell anybody else, unless the President authorized me to do it.”64 On a different occasion, Dulles added, “I have always felt that the [CIA] Director should naturally assume full responsibility. . . and whenever he could shield or protect the President, he should do it.”65

  Dulles’ philosophy mirrors that of another key CIA player in the Cuba Project—Deputy Director of Plans, Richard Helms. When convicted of perjury for concealing information about CIA operations in Chile, he stated, “I wear this conviction as a badge of honor. . . I don’t feel disgraced at all. I think if I had done anything else, I would have been disgraced.”66

  Helms was also the recipient of an internal CIA memo which seems to demonstrate the Agency’s resolve to stall the Warren Commission. Helms directed James Angleton’s Counterintelligence Division to function as liaison with the Warren Commission. When weighing how much of the CIA’s Mexico City operation to divulge to the Commission, Helms was advised, “Unless you feel otherwise, Jim [Angleton] would prefer to wait out the Commission on the matter.”67 That is exactly what the CIA did. The Commission knew next to nothing of the CIA’s counter-intelligence activities in Mexico City, and nothing of the CIA’s Castro plotting for the Kennedy brothers.

  What Dulles Knew

  “I don’t know of any member of the Commission, other than Dulles, that knew that the CIA had been involved [in the plots against Castro], and I have specifically discussed this with some of the living members.”

  —David Belin, Warren Commission Assistant Counsel, 197568

  “At no time did the CIA disclose to the Warren Commission any facts which pertained to alleged assassination plots to kill Fidel Castro. . . which might have been relevant. . . in light of the allegations of conspiratorial contact between Oswald and agents of the Cuban government.”

  —David Belin, Warren Commission Counsel

  “As far as I know, all phases of this [Castro assassination] operation were approved by Allen Dulles and President Eisenhower. Well, you know, Dulles was a member of the Warren Commission and I don’t remember hearing him say anything about it. And I don’t remember Eisenhower coming forward either. So what was I supposed to think? Maybe President Johnson wanted to keep the lid on.”

  —Johnny Rosselli, 196669

  At a meeting of the National Security Council on August 18, 1960, President Eisenhower angrily ordered his intelligence agencies to “dispose of” Patrice Lumumba of the Congo, and CIA Director Dulles became personally involved in planning the assassination. Lumumba had frightened Washington with his cozy new relationship with the Soviets. The Church Committee would take testimony from a number of those present at NSC meetings that summer of 1960. Many were convinced that Eisenhower had given the go-ahead to murder Lumumba.70 One NSC staffer, Robert Johnson, told the Committee that not only did he hear Eisenhower order the assassination, but Eisenhower was “looking right toward the Director of Central Intelligence [Dulles]” when making the statement.71 Johnson recently reaffirmed this contention, adding that he was anything but naive, but nonetheless was surprised to learn assassination was an instrument of U.S. policy.72 Writer Darrell Garwood summarized:

  The record showed that immediately after the meeting in which Eisenhower uttered the words “dispose of,” Dulles authorized $100,000 for a full-scale assassination attempt against Lumumba. . . Dulles. . . told Station Chief Lawrence Devlin that “we wish to give you every possible support in eliminating Lumumba from any possibility of resuming governmental position.”73

  Likewise, scholars are virtually unanimous in their belief that Allen Dulles knew about the plots against Castro, even those that continued after his term as CIA director. It has already been seen that Dulles approved J.C. King’s memo suggesting the “elimination” of both Fidel and Raul Castro. In addition, CIA officers Richard Bissell and Sheffield Edwards indicated in testimony that Dull
es knew of the 1961 CIA/Mafia plots.74 Edwards later testified, “The plan was approved by Allen W. Dulles. . . I personally briefed him.”75 When once asked what the CIA would do if U.S. national security were threatened by a foreign agent, Dulles himself answered, “We’d kill him.”76

  After hearing from numerous associates of the by-then deceased Dulles, the 1975 Church Committee concluded it likely that “Dulles knew about and authorized the actual plots that occurred during his tenure.”77 That committee’s predecessor, the Rockefeller Commission, was told by the CIA’s Inspector General, Donald Chamberlain, “As far as we can tell from all the materials at our disposition, no one discussed with the Warren Commission any alleged plan to assassinate Castro.”78

  Dulles’ biographer, Peter Grose, wrote of Dulles’ performance on the Warren Commission:

  Allen systematically used his influence to keep the commission safely within bounds, the importance of which only he could appreciate. . . . And from the start, before any evidence was reviewed, he pressed for the final verdict that Oswald had been a crazed lone gunman, not the agent of a national or international conspiracy.79

  In another passage, Grose wrote, “Allen’s top priority throughout the ten months of the commission’s study was to press for endorsement of the FBI’s conclusion that Kennedy was murdered by a lone assassin; a finding of any international or domestic conspiracy might compromise all of America foreign policy.”80

  After the assassination, Secretary of State Dean Rusk summoned Dulles to the State Department and asked the question outright: Was the CIA aware of any foreign government that might have had a motive to kill Kennedy? Dulles said they had no such information. Rusk later said of the Dulles lie, “I find that unforgivable.”81 There can be little doubt that the Kennedy family felt otherwise.

  The CIA and the FBI: On the Warren Commission