Armor and Blood

by Dennis E. Showalter

  39 General Konstantin K. Rokossovsky Rokossovsky’s career is summarized in Richard Wolff, “Rokossovsky,” in Stalin’s Generals, ed. Harold Shukman (New York: Grove Press, 1993), pp. 177–196, and presented in his autobiography, A Soldier’s Duty, trans. Vladimir Talmy, ed. Robert Daglish (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970).

  40 Nikolai Vatutin joined the Red Army For Vatutin, see David M. Glantz, “Vatutin,” in Stalin’s Generals, pp. 287–298. Valeriy Zamulin contributes a perceptive, positive assessment of Vatutin’s performance during Citadel in “The Battle of Kursk: New Findings,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 25 (2012): 409–417.

  41 His front would eventually commit For more on Voronezh Front resources, see Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, pp. 60–63, 306–320.

  42 Red Air Force had taken a brutal beating For background, see Von Hardesty and Ilya Grinberg, Red Phoenix Rising: The Soviet Air Force in World War II (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2012), especially pp. 223–234; Dmitriy Khazanov and Aleksander Medved, La-5/7 vs. FW 190: Eastern Front, 1942–45 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2011), is a useful introduction to technical and institutional details.

  43 “Night witches” See generally Reina Pennington, Wings, Women, & War: Soviet Airwomen in World War II Combat (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2001).

  44 Initially, German air offensives Christer Bergström, Kursk: The Air Battle, July 1943 (Hersham, UK: Classic Publications, 2008), pp. 18–25; and more generally, Hermann Plocher, The German Air Force Versus Russia, 1943 (New York: Arno Press, 1968).

  45 He escaped by “mere chance” Rokossovsky in Daglish, A Soldier’s Duty, p. 194.

  46 Fighter squadrons were the Luftwaffe’s elite See most recently Colin D. Heaton and Anne-Marie Heaton, The German Aces Speak: World War II Through the Eyes of Four of the Luftwaffe’s Most Important Commanders (Minneapolis: Zenith Press, 2011).

  47 Luftwaffe higher command for Citadel For details of organization and equipment, see Bergström, Kursk: The Air Battle, pp. 123–128.

  48 Air force possessed a counterpart to Zhukov John Erickson, “Novikov,” in Harold Shukman, ed. Stalin’s Generals, pp. 155–174.

  49 Shturmovik Yefim Gordon, Ilyushin Il2-Il10 (Hinckley, UK: Midland Publishing, 2010), is definitive on this famous but relatively unfamiliar aircraft.

  50 The Oberkommando der Wehrmacht For more on the OKW’s input, see Citino, The Wehrmacht Retreats, pp. 170–175, and Walter Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s Headquarters, 1939–45, trans. R. H. Barry (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1991), p. 333. For background, see Geoffrey P. Megargee, “Triumph of the Null: Structure and Conflict in the Command of German Land Forces, 1939–1945,” War in History 4, no. 1 (1997): 60–80.

  51 Zeitzler too was having second thoughts Healy, Zitadelle, p. 88.

  52 Model weighed in Peter von der Groeben, “Ninth Army and Second Panzer Army,” in Kursk: The German View, pp. 102–105; and Newton, Hitler’s Commander, pp. 219–223.

  53 On July 1, the Führer summoned the senior generals Manstein, Verlorene Siege, pp. 495–497.

  54 “The German Supreme Command could think of nothing better” Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, p. 217.

  55 By the time the preparations for Kursk were complete Frieser et al., Ostfront, pp. 95–97.

  CHAPTER III: STRIKE

  1 Central Front’s counterbarrage opened Rokossovsky, A Soldier’s Duty, p. 195.

  2 Agreed to delay the attack Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, pp. 85, 400.

  3 1st Air Division received a surprise Bergström, Kursk: The Air Battle, pp. 34–36.

  4 Landser soon found the going heavy Healy, Zitadelle, pp. 220–222.

  5 [Ferdinands] began life as a competitor to the Tigers For this unfortunate AFV, later renamed Elefant, see Walter J. Spielberger, “Panzerjaeger Tiger (p) Elefant,” no. 20 in Armour in Profile, ed. Stevenson Pugh (Letterhead, UK: Profile Publications, 1968).

  6 Remote-controlled wire-guided mine-clearing vehicle Healy, Zitadelle, pp. 222–226.

  7 Ninth Army’s initial Schwerpunkt Ibid., pp. 226–229; Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, pp. 86–91; and, more closely focused, Christopher W. Wilbeck, Sledgehammers: Strengths and Flaws of Tiger Tank Battalions in World War II (Bedford, PA: Aberjona Press, 2004), pp. 69–71.

  8 Red Air Force was becoming a presence Hardesty and Grinberg, Red Phoenix Rising, pp. 241–243.

  9 Model was anything but a rear-echelon commando Newton, Hitler’s Commander, pp. 228–234, reconstructs and analyzes Model’s command behaviors on July 5, 6, and 7 on the basis of a barely legible penciled “Notz für Kriegstagebuch” (“Notes for the War Diary”) that survived the nearly total loss of Ninth Army’s relevant records later in the war. The document can be found in captured German records, National Archives, T-312, roll 322.

  10 Rudenko quickly proposed mass attacks Bergström, Kursk: The Air Battle, pp. 40–43.

  11 The only way out was through Newton, Hitler’s Commander, pp. 233–244, and Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, pp. 91–93, present the headquarters’ perspectives. The excerpts from the war diary of Panzer Battalion 21 in 20th Panzer Division (Jentz, Panzertruppen, vol. 2, pp. 75, 83–84) convey some of the sense of the seesaw fighting that characterized July 6 in Model’s sector.

  12 Luftwaffe threw in every flyable plane Bergström, Kursk: The Air Battle, pp. 43–49.

  13 The 6th Infantry Division Figures from Newton, Kursk: The German View, p. 409.

  14 Rokossovsky handled his reserves effectively Rokossovsky, A Soldier’s Duty, pp. 197–201.

  15 Model phoned Army Group Center Newton, Hitler’s Commander, pp. 237–239.

  16 Committed to a mental hospital It is worth noting that a year later, Schmidt was briefly considered as a candidate for chief of the general staff! Hürter, Hitlers Heerführer, pp. 602–603.

  17 Ninth Army was running out of infantry Ibid., p. 243.

  18 Ponyri as the key to Central Front’s position Frieser et al., Ostfront, pp. 109–110; Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, pp. 115–117.

  19 Model’s intended Schwerpunkt for July 7 Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, pp. 117–120; Newton, Hitler’s Commander, pp. 239–245.

  20 Intended to work with the tanks Matthew Hughes and Chris Mann, Fighting Techniques of a Panzergrenadier: 1941–1945 (Osceola, WI: MBI Publishing Company, 2000), is a useful introduction.

  21 Ninth Army had taken more than thirteen thousand casualties Niklas Zetterling and Anders Frankson, Kursk 1943: A Statistical Analysis (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), pp. 113, 120–121.

  22 Fourth Panzer Army already had the heaviest hammer Ibid., p. 18; Frieser et al., Ostfront, pp. 90–93.

  23 On May 10, Manstein met with Hoth Melvin, Manstein, pp. 360–361.

  24 Ein alter Hase Hoth’s reservations are discussed by his chief of staff; see General of Infantry Friedrich Fangohr, “Fourth Panzer Army,” in Kursk: The German View, pp. 77–79.

  25 Manstein understood the problem Manstein, Verlorene Siege, p. 494; Melvin, Manstein, p. 362.

  26 Manstein’s May 10–11 visit Fifth Panzer Army’s war diary, May 11, 1944, in National Archives, T-313, reel 65. The most detailed analysis of the genesis of the “Hoth variant” is Steven H. Newton, “Hoth, von Manstein, and Prokhorovka: A Revision in Need of Revising,” in Kursk: The German View, pp. 357–363.

  27 Manstein was horsey Stahlberg, Bounden Duty, pp. 299–301.

  28 The train he adopted as his mobile headquarters Manstein, Verlorene Siege, p. 498.

  29 Army Group South’s attack Helmuth Spaeter, The History of the Panzerkorps Grossdeutschland, vol. 2, trans. David Johnston (Winnipeg: J. J. Fedorowicz, 1995), pp. 113–115.

  30 XLVIII Panzer Corps’s sector “KTB, 4. Panzerarmee, 4.7.1943,” National Archives, T-313, roll 396; Spaeter, Grossdeutschland, vol. 2, pp. 116–120; Healy, Zitadelle, pp. 201–207. For the Russian side, see Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, pp. 94–99.

  31 The Stukas and medium bombers Bergström, Kursk: The Air Batt
le, pp. 26–34; Hardesty and Grinberg, Red Phoenix Rising, pp. 239–240, 250–251.

  32 Hoth’s decision to attack “KTB, 4. Panzerarmee, 27.6.1943,” National Archives, T-313, reel 365; and Steven H. Newton, “Army Group South’s Initial Assault: Analysis and Critique,” in Kursk: The German View, pp. 382–385.

  33 Major General Friedrich Fangohr Fangohr, “Fourth Panzer Army,” in Kursk: The German View, pp. 77–79.

  34 Panthers had reached Army Group South on July 1 Jentz, Panzertruppen, vol. 2, pp. 96–100, excerpts reports describing technical and tactical issues in detail.

  35 Hoth’s final attack orders Silvester Stadler, Die Offensive gegen Kursk 1943: II.SS-Panzerkorps als Stosskeil im Grosskampf (Osnabrück: Munin-Verlag, 1980), pp. 23–27.

  36 Constructed around its panzer divisions Showalter, Hitler’s Panzers, pp. 242–252 passim, is a bare-bones overview. Among the massive body of literature on the Waffen SS, the best overview remains Bernd Wegner, The Waffen SS: Organization, Ideology, and Function, trans. Ronald Webster (London: Blackwell Publishing, 1990). It is supplemented and developed by René Rohrkamp, “Weltanschaulich gefestigte Kämpfer”: Die Soldaten der Waffen-SS 1933–1945 (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2010). For details of organization and equipment during Citadel, David Porter, Das Reich at Kursk: 12 July 1943 (London: Amber Books, 2011), is excellent and generally applicable to Leibstandarte and Totenkopf as well.

  37 Mass and fighting spirit George M. Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth: The II. SS-Panzer-Korps and the Road to Prochorowka, July 1943 (Stamford, CT: RZM Publishing, 2012), p. 65–84, is detailed, clearly presented, and generally eschews SS mythmaking. Valeriy Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth: The Tank Battle at Prokhorovka, Kursk, July 1943: An Operational Narrative, trans. and ed. Stuart Britton (Solihull, UK: Helion & Co., 2011), pp. 92–102, presents the Russian perspective.

  38 Third German trump card was the Luftwaffe Bergström, Kursk: The Air Battle, p. 30.

  39 Army Detachment Kempf Cf. Colonel General Ehrhard Raus, “Armeeabteilung Kempf,” in Kursk: The German View, pp. 47–53, for a command perspective; Didier Lodieu, III. Pz. Korps at Kursk, trans. Alan Mackay (Paris: Histoire and Collections, 2007), for a tactical overview based heavily on unit war diaries; and Franz-Wilhelm Lochmann et al., The Combat History of German Tiger Tank Battalion 503 in World War II, trans. Fred Steinhardt (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2008), pp. 107–108, for the role of the Tigers.

  CHAPTER IV: GRAPPLE

  1 Katukov, working in his undershirt “Katukov,” in Armstrong, Red Army Tank Commanders, pp. 58–59.

  2 Vatutin’s high-risk decision Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 104–110; Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, pp. 101–103.

  3 “Flying light” Bergström, Kursk: The Air Battle, pp. 56–57.

  4 A strongpoint in itself Spaeter, Grossdeutschland, pp. 120–123; Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, pp. 55–56.

  5 To the Pena River Traditionsverband der Ehemaligen 3. Panzer-Division, Geschichte der 3: Panzer Division Berlin-Brandenburg, 1935–1945 (Berlin: Buchhandlung G. Richter, 1967), p. 375; Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, p. 116.

  6 Infantryman who did not expect miracles Healy, Zitadelle, p. 236.

  7 A network of fortified heights Cf. the day’s combat reports in Stadler, Offensive gegen Kursk, pp. 49–53, and the narrative in Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 114–141, and Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 114–133.

  8 “Tough and determined resistance” “18:00 Uhr., Tagesmeldung ‘LSSAH,’” in Stadler, Offensive gegen Kursk, p. 43.

  9 Hoth’s orders for the next day “Panzerarmeebefehl Nr. 2,” in ibid., pp. 52–53.

  10 “A complete success” KTB, 4, Panzerarmee, Chefnotizen für 6.7.1943, National Archives T-313, roll 369.

  11 Zeitzler refused Melvin, Manstein, p. 373.

  12 Easier stated than achieved Lodieu, III. Pz. Korps, pp. 30–46.

  13 Arguing with his superiors Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, pp. 113–115.

  14 “Pick up the pace!” “Panzerarmeebefehl Nr. 2,” in Stadler, Offensive gegen Kursk, p. 53.

  15 Stukas were overhead Bergström, Kursk: The Air Battle, p. 59.

  16 Grossdeutschland was stopped in its tracks Spaeter, Grossdeutschland, pp. 121–122; Jentz, Panzertruppen, vol. 2, p. 96; Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, pp. 126–129.

  17 Success won by finesse and maneuver Spaeter, Grossdeutschland, p. 123.

  18 Tigers at the apex Nile, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 169–175; Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 134–137.

  19 “Excellent Luftwaffe support” “18.00 Uhr.: Div. ‘Das Reich’ Tagesmeldung,” in Stadler, Offensive gegen Kursk, p. 60.

  20 Corridor the Russians were determined to shut Ibid., p. 57.

  21 Naked from shirttail to boots Otto Weidinger, Division Das Reich (Osnabrück: Munin-Verlag, 1969), pp. 177–178.

  22 Hausser submitted his report to Hoth “22.40 Uhr.: Tagesmeldung an die Armee,” in Stadler, Offensive gegen Kursk, p. 61.

  23 Fourth Panzer Army must be stopped Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, pp. 113–114; Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 138–139.

  24 One of the hardest days in the Battle of Kursk Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 95–96.

  25 “Larger units” and “heavier tanks” Armstrong, Red Army Tank Commanders, pp. 58–59.

  26 Crews could often repair track damage themselves Zetterling and Frankson, Kursk 1943, pp. 120–123; Healy, Zitadelle, p. 258.

  27 The Russians had other ideas Cf. Lodieu, III. Pz. Korps, pp. 46–57, and Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 175–182.

  28 “Keep a few for interrogation” Erhard Raus, Panzer Operations: The Eastern Front Memoir of General Raus, 1941–1945, comp. and trans. Steven H. Newton (New York: Da Capo Press, 2003), p. 203.

  29 A disconcerting image Manstein, Verlorene Siege, p. 499; Melvin, Manstein, pp. 373–374.

  30 The image of a tar baby “Panzerarmeebefehl Nr. 3,” in Stadler, Offensive gegen Kursk, pp. 57–58.

  31 Transferred the bulk of their respective mobile forces Healy, Zitadelle, p. 271; Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 216–217.

  32 Syrzevo itself held out Spaeter, Grossdeutschland, pp. 123–124; Healy, Zitadelle, pp. 271–272.

  33 Mistakes are in the nature of war Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, p. 233.

  34 Division ordered the battle group to hold its ground Spaeter, Grossdeutschland, p. 124; Healy, Zitadelle, pp. 272–274; Bergström, Kursk: The Air Battle, pp. 62–64.

  35 No fewer than twelve attacks Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, p. 135.

  36 Warriors for the working day Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 216–219.

  37 For July 8, Hausser proposed “Aufträge für die 8.7,” in Stadler, Offensive gegen Kursk, p. 62.

  38 Pushed forward in stops and starts Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 194–202.

  39 An immediate counterattack Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, p. 133; Weidinger, Division Das Reich, p. 182.

  40 One of Das Reich’s panzer grenadier regiments Weidinger, Division Das Reich, p. 181.

  41 Front orders issued at 11:00 P.M. Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, p. 134; Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 139–142.

  42 Most spectacular initial results of Vatutin’s counterattack Martin Pegg, Hs 129 Panzerjäger! (Burgess Hill, UK: Classic Publications, 1997), pp. 145–149; Weidinger, Division Das Reich, pp. 182–184; and from the targets’ perspective, Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 143–147.

  43 “Good cooperation with the Luftwaffe” Stadler, Offensive gegen Kursk, p. 63.

  44 New, potentially decisive surge Lodieu, III. Pz. Korps, pp. 58–73, provides tactical details for the panzers; Erhard Raus, “Armeeabteilung Kempf,” in Kursk: The German View, p. 54, refers to leading the counterattack—not exactly a normal job for a corps commander, though Raus presents it as all in a day’s work on the Russian front.

  45 Army group commander consulted Zeitzler Melvin, Manstein, p. 373.

  46 The bottom of Cen
tral Front’s barrel Rokossovsky, A Soldier’s Duty, pp. 200–201.

  47 Luftwaffe radio intelligence scored the first points Bergström, Kursk: The Air Battle, pp. 53–54.

  48 Red Army riflemen in possession of part of Ponyri Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, pp. 120–121.

  49 A modest operation Paul Carell, Scorched Earth: Hitler’s War on Russia, vol. 2, trans. Ewald Osers (London: G. G. Harrap, 1970).

  50 Shuttled from place to place Excerpt in Jentz, Panzertruppen, vol. 2, p. 84.

  51 The 4th Panzer Division’s prospects Carell, Scorched Earth, p. 47; Healy, Zitadelle, pp. 281–285; Piekalkiewicz, Operation Citadel, pp. 159–161; Newton, Hitler’s Commander, pp. 249–250.

  52 Model’s first reaction to another futile day Newton, Hitler’s Commander, pp. 250–251.

  53 Everywhere except around Ponyri Healy, Zitadelle, p. 286.

  54 Senior officers’ conference Newton, Hitler’s Commander, pp. 252–253. The phrase rollenden Materialabnützungsschlacht also appears in the Ninth Army’s war diary for September 7, 1943 (Frieser et al., Ostfront, p. 110).

  55 No sign of a smoke screen Bergström, Kursk: The Air Battle, p. 71.

  56 Model replicated Lemelsen’s action Healy, Zitadelle, p. 287; Newton, Hitler’s Commander, p. 253; Rokossovsky, A Soldier’s Duty, p. 201.

  57 A series of counterattacks Klink, Gesetz des Handelns, p. 261.

  58 “Chain dogs” Literally Kettenhünde: Wehrmacht slang for “military police.”

  59 Fighters were defensively minded Bergström, Kursk: The Air Battle, p. 73.

  60 Model responded with a revised plan Frieser et al., Ostfront, p. 111; Zins, Operation Zitadelle, pp. 58–59.

  61 Strength figures for the Central Front Zetterling and Frankson, Kursk 1943, p. 118.

  62 Forced him to commit reserves Rokossovsky, A Soldier’s Duty, pp. 200–201.

  63 Offensive in the Orel sector was ripe for launching Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, p. 233.

  CHAPTER V: DECISIONS