1 That in turn required shuffling Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, p. 139.
2 Fifth Guards Tank was a high card David Porter, Fifth Guards Tank Army at Kursk: 12 July 1943 (London: Amber Books, 2011), is a detailed overview of Fifth Guards Tank Army’s genesis and structure, a companion volume to his earlier-cited work on Das Reich.
3 Hoth too was testing the wind Healy, Zitadelle, p. 288; KTB, 4, Panzerarmee, Chefnotizen für, 9.7.1943, National Archives T-313, roll 369.
4 No aircraft could be spared The improving performance of the Soviet air force also drew off German planes. Cf. Hardesty and Grinberg, Red Phoenix Rising, pp. 254–255; Bergström, Kursk: The Air Battle, pp. 67–69.
5 Hoth’s original concept Fangohr, “Fourth Panzer Army,” in Kursk: The German View, pp. 77–80.
6 Order No. 4 … was ambiguous “Panzerarmeebefehl Nr. 4, 20.20 Uhr., 8.7.1943,” in Stadler, Offensive gegen Kursk, pp. 69–70.
7 Breith had to clear his own sector Lodieu, III. Pz. Korps, pp. 58–73; Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 211–212.
8 Knobelsdorff initially responded Spaeter, Grossdeutschland, pp. 125–127; Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, pp. 142–144; Healy, Zitadelle, pp. 290–291; Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 216–219.
9 Hausser’s orders “Korps-Befehl für den Angriff am 9.7.1943,” in Stadler, Offensive gegen Kursk, p. 71.
10 Leibstandarte advanced Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 192–211, is exhaustive; Healy, Zitadelle, pp. 294–296, is a more economical overview.
11 Confirming major armor movements “Feindlage 9.7.1943, Stand 19.00 Uhr.,” in Stadler, Offensive gegen Kursk, pp. 79–80.
12 July 9 was a long day Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, pp. 138–140.
13 2nd Tank Corps Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 185–186.
14 Fourth Panzer Army had received a maximum effort Bergström, Kursk: The Air Battle, pp. 67–69; Hardesty and Grinberg, Red Phoenix Rising, pp. 247–248, 251–253.
15 Time had come to throw the switch The most detailed analysis of this issue is Newton, “Hoth, von Manstein, and Prokhorovka,” in Kursk: The German View, pp. 358–369.
16 Sometime between noon and 1:30 Ibid., pp. 368, 452.
17 Army Order No. 5 “Panzerarmeebefehl Nr. 5, 20:30, 9.7.1943,” in Stadler, Offensive gegen Kursk, p. 79.
18 Loss/recovery/repair figures Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, pp. 351–352; Frieser et al., Ostfront, pp. 117–118.
19 Citadel’s outcome depended on using XXIV Panzer Corps Manstein, Verlorene Siege, p. 501.
20 Came closest to enabling a meaningful breakout Cf. particularly Newton, Kursk: The German View, p. 369.
21 Avoid a simple battle of attrition Robert Forczyk, Sevastopol 1942: Von Manstein’s Triumph (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2008), is a solid, brief, accessible overview.
22 Hoth’s trump card Spaeter, Grossdeutschland, pp. 127–128; Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, pp. 153–157; Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 270–275.
23 Visible through binoculars Carell, Scorched Earth, p. 72.
24 The 11th Panzer Division spent July 11 Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 301–303.
25 Guderian … had been recalled See Guderian, Panzer Leader, p. 303, and his July 17, 1943, “Report on the Operations of Panzer-Regiment (Panther) von Lauchert,” in Jentz, Panzertruppen, vol. 2, pp. 98–99.
26 Material reason for optimism Guderian, “Operations of PanzerRegiment (Panther) von Lauchert,” p. 99; Zetterling and Frankson, Kursk 1943, p. 123.
27 He did some serious thinking Given the absence of a general written plan, Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 258–263, is the clearest reconstruction of Voronezh Front’s decision-making processes at this juncture.
28 Citadel in reverse Citino, The Wehrmacht Retreats, p. 212, and the comprehensive bibliographic analysis on pp. 345–346. For strategic context and operational concept, see Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, pp. 227–234.
29 If the Germans broke into Voronezh Front’s rear areas Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, p. 262.
30 Necessary to inform Stavka Ibid., pp. 263–268; Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, pp. 159–161.
31 Rotmistrov’s Guardsmen were the key English-language versions of Rotmistrov’s account of the meeting are in Armstrong, Red Army Tank Commanders, pp. 247–348, and Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 268–269.
32 Met with Rotmistrov’s corps commanders Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 269–270.
33 Nearly blitzkrieg-level standard Ibid., pp. 270–278.
34 Hausser’s final orders “Aufträge an die Divisionen für 10.7.1943,” in Stadler, Offensive gegen Kursk, pp. 81–82.
35 Leibstandarte’s attack Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 254–291; Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 183–187, 192.
36 Checked by a Guards heavy tank regiment Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 192–193.
37 Orders were to force a crossing “Auftraege an die Divisionen für 10.7.1943,” in Stadler, Offensive gegen Kursk, p. 83.
38 The weather and the Russians Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 263–268; Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 187–189.
39 “Bitter fighting” “18.00 Uhr. von Div. ‘Totenkopf,’” in Stadler, Offensive gegen Kursk, p. 88.
40 Holding its positions as ordered Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 260–262.
41 Hausser reported to Hoth “19.25 Uhr. Tagesmeldung an Armee,” in Stadler, Offensive gegen Kursk, pp. 88–89.
42 Seems to have encouraged Hoth “20:30 Uhr. Tagesmeldung der Armee,” in ibid., pp. 89–90; Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, p. 281.
43 A five-hundred-yard mudflat Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 292–293.
44 Leibstandarte was on its own Ibid., pp. 281–285.
45 Russian situation brightened around dawn Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, pp. 167–168.
46 His real message Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 208–209.
47 Leibstandarte had to provide its own flank security Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 285–290; Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 214–226.
48 Prokhorovka remained just out of German reach Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 235–241.
49 Leibstandarte blamed what it called limited success “16.40 bis 17.00 Uhr. Tagesmeldungen der Divisionen Leibstandarte” and “Auftrag des II. SS-Pz.-Korps für 12.7,” in Stadler, Offensive gegen Kursk, pp. 95, 97–98.
50 A long, hard day in the mud Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 292–297.
51 Das Reich spent most of July 11 “16.40 bis 17.00 Uhr. Tagesmeldungen der Divisionen. Das Reich” and “17.30 Uhr. Tagesmeldung an der Armee,” in Stadler, Offensive gegen Kursk, pp. 96, 97–98.
52 The Russians were explaining defeat Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 231–234.
53 Rotmistrov’s counterattack Rotmistrov’s account in his memoirs is translated in Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, pp. 175–176.
54 Revised the details of their tactical plan Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 278–279.
CHAPTER VI: HARD POUNDING
1 Klotzen, nicht kleckern “Auftrag II.SS-Pz.-Korps für 12.7,” in Stadler, Offensive gegen Kursk, pp. 97–98; Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 314–316; Rudolf Lehmann, The Leibstandarte, vol. III, trans. Nick Olcott (Winnipeg: J. J. Fedorowicz, 1990), p. 233.
2 Three panzer divisions’ worth of shovels Lodieu, III. Pz. Korps, pp. 74–81; Healy, Zitadelle, pp. 308–309; Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 250–252.
3 Manstein … met with Hoth and Kempf General of Infantry Theodor Busse, “Operation Citadel Overview,” in Kursk: The German View , pp. 22–23; Raus, Panzer Operations , pp. 207–208; Manstein, Verlorene Siege, p. 500.
4 Rapid intervention of III Panzer Corps Lodieu, III. Pz. Korps, pp. 92–103; Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 252–255.
5 Citadel’s forgotten divisions Lodieu, III. Pz. Korps, pp. 87–88, 90–91, 96–100.
6 Immer bereit, still zu verbluten im feldgrauen Kleid “Ihr Musstet Marschieren,”
Frank Rennicke’s tribute to Germany’s World War II infantry, is one of the signature songs of Germany’s contemporary Far Right. That does not diminish the occasionally powerful effect of its images.
7 “Asians” The “Description of Combat Operations of the 19th Panzer Division Between 5 July and 18 July 1943” is cited in Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, p. 252.
8 Rolled into Olkhovatka Lodieu, III. Pz. Korps, p. 96.
9 The commanding general … concurred Manstein, Verlorene Siege, p. 500; Melvin, Manstein, p. 376.
10 According to Hoth’s chief of staff Fangohr, “Fourth Panzer Army,” in Kursk: The German View, pp. 89–90.
11 Sixty-ninth Army had managed Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, p. 163.
12 A high-risk, high-gain nighttime operation Described eloquently in Carell, Scorched Earth, pp. 84–86 passim, and more soberly in Franz Kurowski, Panzer Aces: Battle Stories of German Tank Commanders of WWII, trans. David Johnston (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2004), pp. 52–54. The Russian side of the story is told in Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 402–407.
13 They mistook the Germans for Russians Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, p. 419; Bergström, Kursk: The Air Battle, p. 79. The truck carrying the air liaison officer had broken down during the advance, breaking the division’s air–ground link as well.
14 “Where was everybody else?” “KTB. Tagesmeldung III. Panzer-korps am 12.7.1943,” National Archives, T-314, roll 197; Klink, Gesetz des Handelns, pp. 243–244; Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 314–315; Lodieu, III. Pz. Korps, pp. 103–109 passim; Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 407–426 passim; Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, pp. 202–204.
15 Unexpectedly successful advance Lodieu, III. Pz. Korps, pp. 115–116; Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, p. 406.
16 Stalin … issued orders to Steppe Front Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 409–410.
17 About two hundred tanks Ibid., p. 410.
18 Dispatch a strong force Ibid., p. 413.
19 Trufanov’s fire brigade arrived in increments Ibid., pp. 419–423.
20 “Introduce the strictest discipline” Ibid., pp. 425, 486–487. An English translation of the “Order for the National Commissar for the Defense of the Soviet Union, July 28, 1942” is accessible on the Internet at http://www.stalingrad-info.com and independently under “Order 227.”
21 Vasilevsky informed Stalin Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, p. 426.
22 Providing the muscle for the straight right-hand punch Ibid., pp. 204–205.
23 Grossdeutschland’s sideways shuffle For the confusing events of July 12 in this sector, cf. “KTB: Darstellung der Erignsse XLVIII Panzer-Korps am 12.7.1943,” National Archives, T-314, roll 1170; “XLVIII Panzerkorps Tagesmeldungen an Pz.AOK, 12.7.1943,” National Archives, T-314, roll 1171; the published material in Spaeter, Grossdeutschland, pp. 129–130; Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, 224; Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, pp. 202–208; and Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 351–353.
24 The corps commander failed Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 430–431.
25 “Temporarily compelled … to withdraw” Spaeter, Grossdeutschland, p. 130; Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 432–434.
26 He could no longer advance Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 430, 434.
27 More cobbler than blacksmith Cf. Armstrong, Red Army Tank Commanders, pp. 94–95.
28 Shifting to a defensive posture Spaeter, Grossdeutschland, p. 130.
29 Manstein appeared at corps headquarters Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, p. 353.
30 Knobelsdorff’s eventual orders Ibid., p. 353; Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, pp. 126–128.
31 Swan song of the panzers Ivan S. Konev, Aufzeichnungen eines Frontoberbefehlshabers 1943/44, trans. Irmgard Zeisler, 2nd ed. (Berlin: Militärverlag der DDR, 1983), p. 43.
32 Leibstandarte and Das Reich were kept awake Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 315–317.
33 Rotmistrov’s tankers were no less nervous Cf. the accounts in Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, p. 298, and Lloyd Clark, The Battle of the Tanks: Kursk, 1943 (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2011), pp. 314–315. Porter, Fifth Guards Tank Army, p. 56, refers to the hatch problem.
34 Not all the Russian tankers … were men Anna Krylova, Soviet Women in Combat: A History of Violence on the Eastern Front (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), brilliantly contextualizes the general subject.
35 Rotmistrov arrived at the command post Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, p. 299.
36 Caught in their blankets Ribbentrop’s narrative begins in Kurowski, Panzer Aces, pp. 174–178.
37 Only seven tanks that morning “KTB 4th Panzerarmee, Chefnotizen für 12.7.1943,” National Archives T-313, reel 369.
38 Soviet barrage was falling short Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 284–385, 301–306.
39 Fifth Guards Tank Army’s first battle Ibid., pp. 306–307.
40 “Steel! Steel! Steel!” Ibid., pp. 308–309. Though Zamulin deftly corrects the details of Rotmistrov’s colorful, frequently cited account of the jump-off, its ambience remains.
41 A massive air attack Bergström, Kursk: The Air Battle, pp. 79–81.
42 None was better than Hans-Ulrich Rudel Hans-Ulrich Rudel, Stuka Pilot, trans. Lynton Hudson (New York: Ballantine Books, 1958), pp. 85–86. Bergström, Kursk: The Air Battle, p. 79, establishes July 12, rather than the more generally cited July 5, as the most likely date for this.
43 “The first flight flies behind me” Rudel, Stuka Pilot, p. 85.
44 “It was like a giant had grabbed” Interview quoted in Clark, Battle of the Tanks, p. 345.
45 Russians were advancing almost blindly An easily accessible overview of the technical and operational capacities of the T-34/76 at this period is Robert K. Forczyk, Panther vs T-34: Ukraine 1943 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing, 2007).
46 Puts 234 tanks in the first attack wave Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 309–310.
47 “The field … sprang to life” Ibid., p. 321.
48 “Alone at Prokhorovka” His actual title is “Born Again at Prokhorowka.” Kurowski, Panzer Aces, pp. 178–180.
49 No knowledge of its presence Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 327–328.
50 “Inferno of fire, smoke, burning T-34s” Kurowski, Panzer Aces, p. 181.
51 Command and control eroded Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 319–320.
52 Some of Citadel’s fiercest fighting Ibid., pp. 315–328 passim.
53 Personally took out a T-34 Patrick Agte, Jochen Peiper: Commander, Panzerregiment Leibstandarte, trans. Robert Dohrenwend (Winnipeg: J. J. Fedorowicz, 1999), p. 176.
54 Situational awareness and a cool head Patrick Agte, Michael Wittmann and the Waffen SS Tiger Commanders of the Leibstandarte in WWII, vol. 1. (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2006), specifically pp. 85–132 passim, contextualizes Wittmann’s Citadel experience with a minimum of the Waffen-SS-flavored heroic pathos common in this genre. T-shirts celebrating Wittmann are nevertheless available at a number of commercial and commemorative Internet sites.
55 Halt at an angle Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, p. 330.
56 Citadel’s defining incident Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 352–353; Kurowski, Panzer Aces, p. 205.
57 The still-desperate melee Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, p. 332; Agte, Jochen Peiper, p. 176.
58 Ran full tilt into Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 332–334; Lehmann, Leibstandarte, pp. 234–235.
59 A veteran of the 10th Tank Corps … wrote Quoted in Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, p. 335.
60 Ramming a German AFV Ibid., p. 333.
61 The relationship of myth and reality was closer Ibid., pp. 364–370; Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 340–343.
62 Improvised company of captured T-34s Weidinger, Das Reich, pp. 199–200.
63 Rotmistrov arrived Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 377–378, 456–457.
64 Heavily contingent on Totenkopf’s performance Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 343–349, 381–398.
65 Not all the comrades were valiant Ibid., pp. 356, 389–90. Paul Wanke, Russian/Soviet Military Psychiatry, 1904–1945 (London: Routledge, 2012), surveys the USSR’s approach to psychiatric casualties.
66 As of 10:45 P.M. Totenkopf’s report of 22.45 in Stadler, Offensive gegen Kursk, p. 105; Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 349–350.
67 Spent time in a mental hospital Charles W. Sydnor, Jr., Soldiers of Destruction: The SS Death’s Head Division, 1933–1945 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 8.
68 The original, Soviet version Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 516–543, covers Russian mythology; Frieser et al., Ostfront, pp. 129–135, is the German counterpoint. Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 326–327, focuses on the number of tanks directly involved.
69 Noted only one for July 12 Ralf Tiemann, Chronicle of the 7. Panzer-Kompanie I. SS-Panzer Division “Leibstandarte,” trans. Allen Brandt (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing, 2004), p. 60.
70 Demanding to know what had happened Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, p. 428, fn. 31; Frieser et al., Ostfront, pp. 132–133; Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 441, 507.
71 Rotmistrov shaking from the stress Armstrong, Red Army Tank Commanders, pp. 320–322. In the course of World War II, over 250 Russian generals were executed or sent to penal units. Christopher N. Donnelly, “The Soviet Attitude Toward Stress in Battle,” in Contemporary Studies in Combat Psychiatry, ed. Gregory Belenky (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1987), p. 233.
72 Stalin remained sufficiently disturbed Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, p. 457; Zhukov, Reminiscences and Reflections, p. 190.
73 Manstein “thanked and praised” “Generalkommando II. SS. Pz.-Korps, 22.00 Uhr.,” in Stadler, Offensive gegen Kursk, p. 104.
74 Hoth was edgy “KTB 4th Panzerarmee, Chefnotizen für 21.7.1943,” National Archives, T-314, roll 1170.
75 “Nothing mattered to me any more” Lochmann et al., Tiger Tank Battalion 503, pp. 116–117. Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, p. 363, summarizes the state of the SS; conditions were no better in the army formations.
76 Ideological racism and cultural arrogance Cf. Neitzel and Welzer, Soldaten, p. 317–343.
Armor and Blood Page 33