77 Delivered by phone Stadler, Offensive gegen Kursk, p. 103.
78 Solid prospects existed for a breakthrough Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, p. 209, speak of “cautious optimism.” Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, p. 353, stresses the shock effects of July 12 on Hoth and his staff.
79 Hoth’s final orders arrived “Durch FS um 20.45 Uhr.: An II-SS Pz.-Korps,” in Stadler, Offensivegegen Kursk, p. 103.
80 Corps intelligence summary “Feindlage 12.7.1943, Stand: 21.00 Uhr.,” in ibid., pp. 105–106.
81 Hausser responded to Hoth “Auftraege für 13.7.43” (the “14” in the text is an obvious misprint), in ibid., p. 105; “KTB II. SS-Panzerkorps an SS Divisionen ‘LSAH,’ ‘DR,’ und ‘T’ … Auftraege für 13.7.43,” National Archives, T-354, roll 605.
CHAPTER VII: CROSSOVERS
1 The Russians came to it Cf. Harrison, Russian Way of War, and the more comprehensive overview by Jacob Kipp, “The Tsarist and Soviet Operational Art, 1853–1991,” in Evolution of Operational Art, pp. 64–95.
2 Its rebirth was a two-year process “Rebirth” is the central theme of Glantz, Stumbling Colossus.
3 Preparations for Kutuzov Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, pp. 227–232; and Glantz, “Soviet Military Strategy,” Journal of Military History 60, no 1 (1996).
4 An inactive sector That description is relative. See Franz Kurowski, Deadlock Before Moscow: Army Group Center, 1942/1942, trans. Joseph G. Welsh (Atglen, PA: Schiffer Publishing, 1992).
5 Locus of a serious plot Peter Hoffmann, “Trecksow and Army Group Center,” in The History of the German Resistance, 1933–1945, trans. Richard Barry (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1977), pp. 264–289.
6 Confronted Operation Kutuzov For the final balance of forces, see Frieser et al., Ostfront, pp. 98–99.
7 Achieved almost complete surprise David M. Glantz, Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 160–193.
8 Launch time was determined For a general operational overview, see John Erickson, The Road to Berlin: Continuing the History of Stalin’s War with Germany (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983), p. 108. Major General Peter von der Groeben, “Ninth Army and Second Panzer Army,” in Kursk: The German View, pp. 108–112, gives a German staff officer’s perspective.
9 Airpower played a major role Bergström, Kursk: The Air Battle, pp. 82–84; Hardesty and Grinberg, Red Phoenix Rising, pp. 261–265.
10 Had his ups and downs Geoffrey Jukes, “Bagramyan,” in Harold Shukman, ed., Stalin’s Generals, pp. 26–27.
11 Bryansk Front found the going tougher Lothar Rendulic, “Die Schlacht von Orel, Juli 1943: Wahl und Bildung des Schwerpunktes,” Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift 1 (1963): 130–138.
12 Owed a good part of their success Bergström, Kursk: The Air Battle, pp. 85–86.
13 A rapidity … Newton, calls suspicious Newton, Hitler’s Commander, pp. 253–255.
14 The 12th Panzer had spent a week The division’s records are summarized in Antonius John, Kursk ’43: Szenen einer Entscheidungsschlacht (Bonn: H&H Konzept Verlag, 1993), pp. 106–118.
15 “The threshold to battle hell” Ibid., pp. 117, 120. The 5th Panzer Grenadier Regiment was part of 12th Panzer Division.
16 In a strategic … cleft stick Simon Ball, The Bitter Sea: The Struggle for Mastery in the Mediterranean, 1935–1949 (London: HarperPress, 2010), and Douglas Porch, The Path to Victory: The Mediterranean Theater in World War II (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 2004), are the best overviews from, respectively, a policy/strategy and a strategic/operational perspective. Citino, The Wehrmacht Retreats, brilliantly integrates the synergies of the Mediterranean theater and the Russian front.
17 Italy was a broken reed MacGregor Knox, Hitler’s Italian Allies: Royal Armed Forces, Fascist Regime, and the War of 1940–1943 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), is an analytical overview. Gerhard Schreiber, “Das Ende des nordafrikanischen Feldzugs und der Krieg in Italien 1943 bis 1945,” in Frieser et al., Ostfront, pp. 1100–1114, summarizes the German perspective of the Axis endgame.
18 But where? Citino, The Wehrmacht Retreats, pp. 172–175, presents the options.
19 His reputation for optimism Albert Kesselring, Kesselring: A Soldier’s Record, trans. Lynton Hudson (New York: William Morrow, 1954), pp. 196–198; Schreiber, “Ende des nordafrikanischen Feldzugs,” in Frieser et al., Ostfront, p. 1113.
20 Hitler should have come forward Manstein, Verlorene Siege, p. 501.
21 “Under the sun-ray lamp” Stahlberg, Bounden Duty, p. 307.
22 Hitler’s presentation Manstein, Verlorene Siege, pp. 501–503; Frieser et al., Ostfront, pp. 141–142.
23 Too late in the day Stahlberg, Bounden Duty, pp. 309–310.
24 An increasing number of similar ones Dennis E. Showalter, “Conscience, Honor, and Expediency: The German Army’s Resistance to Hitler,” in Confront!: Resistance in Nazi Germany, ed. John J. Michalczyk (New York: Peter Lang, 2004), pp. 62–79.
25 To define his own place in history Melvin’s excellent biography may be complemented by Benoît Lemay, Erich von Manstein: Hitler’s Master Strategist (Havertown, PA: Casemate, 2010), and Marcel Stein, Field Marshal von Manstein: The Janus Head—A Portrait, ed. Gwyneth Fairbank, trans. Marcel Stein (Solihull, UK: Helion & Co., 2007).
26 Vatutin’s headquarters had been doing the same thing Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, p. 208; Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 426, 460–461.
27 Vatutin requested reinforcements Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 456–457.
28 Stated purpose of the meeting Ibid., pp. 457, 470–471.
29 Lack of specialized recovery vehicles Ibid., pp. 447–449. Gary A. Dickson, “Tank Repair and the Red Army in World War II,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies 25 (2012): 381–392, is an overview of Red Army maintenance methods.
30 Quiet in the SS sector Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 366–371.
31 “I couldn’t deal with it” Agte, Jochen Peiper, pp. 176–179.
32 On Totenkopf’s front Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 460–466; Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 378–382.
33 Taken at all costs Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, p. 382.
34 Soviet attacks began Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 469–473; Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 372–374.
35 Fourth Panzer Army’s daily report “KTB 4. Panzerarmee, Chefnotizen für 13.7.1943,” National Archives, T-313, roll 369.
36 Suggested an opportunity At least to Manstein. Manstein, Verlorene Siege, p. 501.
37 Dazed and mechanical Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, p. 226; Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, p. 210; cf. “Darstellung der Ereignisse XLVIII Panzer-Korps am 13.7.1943,” National Archives, T-314, roll 1170; and Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 384–388.
38 Nowhere near in any of its divisional sectors Lodieu, III. Pz. Korps, pp. 121–126; Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 474–480.
39 A revised plan Manstein, Verlorene Siege, pp. 500–501; Melvin, Manstein, p. 376; Frieser et al., Ostfront, pp. 141–144.
40 Strained to its limits Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, p. 382.
41 It was Grossdeutschland’s turn Ibid., pp. 412–413; Spaeter, Grossdeutschland, pp. 131–132; Mellenthin, Panzer Battles, pp. 228–229; Bergström, Kursk: The Air Battle, pp. 99–100.
42 First Tank Army … had done its job Armstrong, Red Army Tank Commanders, p. 63.
43 “The stubborn defense of its current lines” Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 513–514.
44 Rhetoric of attack was challenged Ibid., pp. 486–487.
45 Breith was on his own Ibid., pp. 495–496; Lodieu, III. Pz. Korps, pp. 126–140; Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 409–411.
46 “Behaving splendidly” Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, p. 489.
47 Vatutin responded Ibid., pp. 503–504.
48 Withdrawal to a new defensive line Ibid., pp. 504–512.
49 Das Reich’s panzer grenadiers Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp.
398–405; Lodier, III. Pz. Korps, p. 139.
50 Further refined and reconceptualized Cf. the summaries in Frieser et al., Ostfront, p. 145, and Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 413, 417–418, with “Vorschlag für Operation Roland am 16.7.1943, KTB Panzerarmeeoberkommando 4 an Heeresgruppe Süd,” National Archives, T-313, roll 382.
51 Stavka’s planned offensive David M. Glantz, From the Don to the Dnepr: Soviet Offensive Operations, December 1942-August 1943 (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1991), pp. 229–252.
52 Unlikely to encourage a narrow focus Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, p. 445, revising his earlier judgment in Decision in the Ukraine: German Panzer Operations on the Eastern Front, Summer 1943 (Winnipeg: J. J. Fedorowicz, 1996), pp. 55–56, 67.
53 Limited prospects for Manstein’s projected revision of Citadel Nipe, Blood, Steel, and Myth, pp. 421–422.
54 Citadel’s file of might-have-beens Weidinger, Division Das Reich, pp. 213, 216.
55 Stalin and Stavka were anxious Zhukov, Reminiscences and Reflections, p. 194.
56 Southern Front attacked the Sixth Army Major Dr. Martin Francke, “Sixth Army Defends the Mius River Line,” in Kursk: The German View, pp. 306–324.
57 Finally recognized the obvious Frieser et al., Ostfront, pp. 191–193; Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, pp. 244–246.
58 Out of touch with reality Newton, Hitler’s Commander, pp. 256–262; Frieser et al., Ostfront, pp. 185–190; Bergström, Kursk: The Air Battle, pp. 90–95; Hardesty and Grinberg, Red Phoenix Rising, pp. 262–267.
59 To change the Führer’s mind Glantz and House, Battle of Kursk, p. 238.
60 Position in the Mediterranean was steadily eroding Citino, The Wehrmacht Retreats, pp. 238–254, reconstructs and contextualizes admirably the quandary facing the German high command at this period. For a staff officer’s on-the-ground perspective of the situation in Italy, see Siegfried Westphal, Heer in Fesseln: Aus den Papieren des Stabschefs von Rommel, Kesselring und Rundstedt (Bonn: Athenäum Verlag, 1952), pp. 214–226.
61 Grew increasingly tenuous For details and background, see Josef Schröder, Italiens Kriegsaustritt 1943: Die deutschen Gegenmassnahmen im italienischen Raum: Fall “Alarich” und “Achse” (Göttingen: Musterschmidt-Verlag, 1969).
62 He summoned Kluge Frieser et al., Ostfront, pp. 219–220.
63 No pressure was applied for close pursuit Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 458–459, 515.
64 Germany’s ultimate assets Manstein, Verlorene Siege, pp. 516–517.
65 Fighting Manstein’s war For the German perspective, cf. Frieser et al., Ostfront, pp. 193–200, and Melvin, Manstein, pp. 382–387. The Russian side is predictably well and exhaustively presented in Glantz, Don to the Dnepr, pp. 251–365.
66 “A blizzard of red arrows” Citino, The Wehrmacht Retreats, p. 232.
67 Zeitzler paid an unannounced visit Manstein, Verlorene Siege, pp. 518–519.
68 Hitler flew to Vinnitsa Ibid., pp. 522–529; Melvin, Manstein, pp. 387–388, 391–394.
69 Demanded a private meeting with the Führer Manstein, Verlorene Siege, pp. 529–530.
70 No dictator can accept such a challenge Melvin, Manstein, pp. 394–395.
71 Close to throwing the Salerno landing into the sea Angus Konstam, Salerno 1943: The Allied Invasion of Italy (Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Military, 2007), is an economical overview.
72 Gersdorff … had gone so far His version of the following events is in Rudolf-Christof Gersdorff, Soldat im Untergang (Frankfurt: Ullstein, 1977), pp. 134–136; cf. Hoffmann, German Resistance, p. 290.
73 “One-sided actionism” Isabel V. Hull, Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), p. 170.
74 Is an oath one-sided? Robert B. Kane, Disobedience and Conspiracy in the German Army, 1918–1945 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co., 2002), analyzes and contextualizes this morally complex question.
75 They scorched the earth For Manstein’s definition and description, see Manstein, Verlorene Siege, pp. 539–540. Broader analyses include Bernd Wegner, “Die Aporie des Krieges,” in Frieser et al., Ostfront, pp. 256–269; and from a unit perspective, Christoph Rass, “Menschenmaterial”: Deutsche Soldaten an der Ostfront: Innenansichten einer Infanteriedivision, 1939–1945 (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2003), pp. 365–385.
76 “Field of rubble” Cited in Stephen G. Fritz, Ostkrieg: Hitler’s War of Extermination in the East (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2011), p. 372.
77 “Burning our bread” Quoted in David M. Glantz and Jonathan House, When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), p. 172.
78 By the time Army Group South reached the Dnieper Frieser et al., Ostfront, pp. 360–367 and 301–308, discusses the situation of Army Groups South and Center.
CONCLUSION: WATERSHEDS
1 First come statistics Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, pp. 530–546; Frieser et al., Ostfront, pp. 150–159; Zetterling and Frankson, Kursk 1943, pp. 111–131.
2 “Platoon technology” Dennis E. Showalter, “More than Nuts and Bolts: Technology and the German Army, 1870–1945,” Historian 65, no. 1 (2002): 139–142.
3 Signposts of the Red Army’s tactical progress Frieser et al., Ostfront, pp. 301–490, is the best analysis; Rolf Hinze, Crucible of Combat: Germany’s Defensive Battles in the Ukraine, 1943–1944, trans. and ed. Frederick P. Steinhardt (Solihull, UK: Helion & Co., 2009), is the most detailed account in English.
4 Russian accounts stress a system Glantz and House, When Titans Clashed, pp. 196–201; Karl-Heinz Frieser, “Der Zusammenbruch im Osten,” in Frieser et al., Ostfront, pp. 493ff. passim. Useful as well are Gerd Niepold, Battle for White Russia: The Destruction of Army Group Centre June 1944, trans. Richard Simpkin (London: Brassey’s, 1987), and Walter S. Dunn Jr., Soviet Blitzkrieg: The Battle for White Russia, 1944 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000).
5 Three taproots Cf. David M. Glantz, The Military Strategy of the Soviet Union: A History (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1992).
6 Armored force in particular moved to an advanced stage Porter, Soviet Tank Units, is a useful introduction to a subject bidding fair to eclipse its German counterpart in specialized literature and on websites.
7 Altered the rifle units’ makeup David Glantz, “Soviet Use of ‘Substandard’ Manpower in the Red Army, 1941–1945,” in Scraping the Barrel: The Military Use of Substandard Manpower, 1860–1960, ed. Sanders Marble (New York: Fordham University Press, 2012), pp. 151–178.
8 “They know absolutely nothing” Quoted in Max Hastings, Armageddon: The Battle for Germany, 1944–1945 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), p. 124.
9 A culture of accommodation See particularly Martin van Creveld, The Culture of War (New York: Presidio Press/Ballantine Books, 2008).
10 “Quiver like a mouse” Cited in Zamulin, Demolishing the Myth, p. 450.
11 Asked each man to give his age Lehmann, Leibstandarte, p. 230.
12 “A just and patriotic war” Reese, Why Stalin’s Soldiers Fought, pp. 176–200; Merridale, Ivan’s War, p. 282 passim.
13 Defending Western civilization David K. Yelton, Hitler’s Volkssturm: The Nazi Militia and the Fall of Germany, 1944–1945 (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002), and Robert S. Rush, “A Different Perspective: Cohesion, Morale, and Operational Effectiveness in the German Army, Fall 1944,” Armed Forces & Society 25, no. 3 (1999): 477–508, combine to depict a reality much more nuanced and far less exalted. The matrix of Nazi Germany’s endgame of “war to the knife” is exhaustively presented in Ralf Blank et al., Germany and the Second World War, vol. 9/1, German Wartime Society, 1939–1945: Politicization, Disintegration, and the Struggle for Survival, trans. Derry Cook-Radmore (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
ALSO BY DENNIS E. SHOWALTER
Hitler’s Panzers: The Lightning Attacks That Revolutionized Warfare
Railroads and Rifles: Soldiers, Tec
hnology, and the Unification of Germany
Patton and Rommel: Men of War in the Twentieth Century
The Wars of German Unification
Tannenberg: Clash of Empires
The Wars of Frederick the Great
German Military History Since 1648: A Critical Bibliography
Little Man, What Now?: Der Stürmer in the Weimar Republic
Soldiers’ Lives Through History: The Early Modern World (with William J. Astore)
Hindenburg: Icon of German Militarism (with William J. Astore)
Voices from the Third Reich: An Oral History (with Johannes Steinhoff and Peter Pechel)
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
DENNIS E. SHOWALTER has taught history at Colorado College since 1969 and is joint editor of the journal War in History. He was president of the Society for Military History from 1997 to 2001. In addition, Showalter has taught at the United States Air Force Academy, the United States Military Academy, and the Marine Corps University. He has written extensively on the wars of Frederick the Great, the German Wars of Unification, World War I, and World War II. Tannenberg: Clash of Empires won the American Historical Association’s Paul Birdsall Prize for best new book of 1992.
LIST OF MAPS
Eastern Front: Beginning of March 1943
Kursk Sector: July 4
The Citadel: Soviet Defenses and the Kursk Salient
German Assault on the Northern Sector of the Kursk Salient
Manstein’s Sector: July 5–17
Alternative: Prokhorovka
Vatutin’s Projected Counterattack: July 12
Army Detachment Kempf at the Close of July 12
Prokhorovka: July 12
Operation Kutusov: July 13
To the Dnieper: July–September 1943
Advance praise for Armor and Blood
“The size and the brutality of the vast tank battle at Kursk appalls, this struggle that gives an especially dark meaning to that shopworn phrase ‘last full measure.’ Prepare yourself for a wild and feverish ride over the steppes of Russia. You can have no better guide than Dennis E. Showalter, who speaks with an authority equaled by few military historians.”
Armor and Blood Page 34