Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini
The Fuhrer’s Headquarters, May 31, 1940.
Duce:
The information which you have just imparted to me in your letter has moved me most profoundly. If there could still be anything which could strengthen my unshakable belief in the victorious outcome of this war, it was your statement. Our two regimes will not only set the pat tern of the new Europe, but above all they will together be strong enough to safeguard and preserve the results of their struggle for a long time to come.
You wish me, Duce, to give you my views on the intended date for your entry into the war and whether its postponement for a few days might be in our common interest.
In this connection I should first of all like to give you a conclusive picture of the state of the operations at the moment.
The battle against the British Expeditionary Force and the remnants of the French 1st, 9th, and 7th Armies will be over today, tomorrow, or the day after tomorrow at the latest. Apart from the Dutch and Belgian Armies at least 52 French and English divisions have been hit by the catastrophe. Of the English Expeditionary Force one division was not in this zone at all; but had been installed with small detachments north of Saarbrucken along the Maginot Line. It had been withdrawn from there and is now probably the only British division in France which is anywhere near complete. Part of a British armored division which was in Flanders has escaped and is at present also south of the Aisne or the Somme. Everything else which England sent to the Continent has been defeated and destroyed. For some days they have been attempting to save what men can be saved with every conceivable kind of ship.
Of the French divisions in this zone some part may perhaps have escaped right at the beginning of the fighting. But all in all by far the bulk of all active French divisions can be regarded as completely wiped out, and the same applies to a large number of reserve divisions.
It is not possible at present to form any idea of the numbers of prisoners or the extent of the captured war material. It may give you some idea, Duce, when you hear that five complete infantry divisions had to be detailed by us to move this immense mass of prisoners.
There is no need for me to assure you, Duce, that further operations will follow in the shortest possible time, but in view of the vast area covered several days will be required for organization.
If, Duce, you can postpone your date for three days at the most, this would have the following advantages: Our Luftwaffe has now reconnoitered new operational airfields of the French Air Force pretty accurately and ascertained the strength of these forces. In conjunction with other measures they will again attack these French air bases during the next few days and if possible, utterly smash them. If, as a result of action already embarked upon by Italy or for fear of such action being imminent, France should transfer her Air Force at the last minute, then this might nullify our operation while you, Duce, would not be able to obtain immediate information about the new operational air fields to which some of the remnants of the French Air Force are certainly still being transferred. Otherwise I am hoping at any rate to be able to put the French Air Force out of action once and for all in the course of next week. But once they had fled it requires days of searching to find out their new hiding places.
These are the reasons why I would request you to consider whether it might be possible to postpone your entry into the war until about the end of next week, say until June sixth or eight. The seventh would of course do as well, but it is a Friday and may perhaps be regarded by many—at any rate there are such among the German people—as an unlucky day on which to begin. But, Duce, no matter which way you decide, even the mere fact of your, entering the war is an element calculated to deal the front of our enemies a staggering blow.
In this connection I should like to assure you that I am happy that you yourself are assuming supreme command of your armed forces. On the basis of my own large experience I regard this as an important prerequisite for success.
Didn’t Want Balkan Conflict
Similarly, I fully endorse your view that it cannot but be desirable for us to keep the Danube Basin and the Balkans out of the conflict, if this is at all possible. I am likewise of the opinion that such a declaration by you, Duce, will remove this element of danger. The crushing defeat of France—and this seems to me to be the most decisive factor of all—is of necessity bound to secure for you, Duce, and for your country political hegemony as a power in the Mediterranean—a hegemony which already exists by force of geography.
Please inform me, Duce, of the final date you have chosen and which I will keep as a strict secret known to only a few. I can then give my General Staff instructions at once—apart from sending the Luftwaffe into action—to take further steps and establish liaison with your officers immediately.
I should however point out to you once more, Duce, that if for any particular reason—say the keeping of the date secret, ect.—you think you would prefer to go into action on the fifth, this date too will, of course, be acceptable to me.
Should you, Duce, find it necessary or even expedient for you, yourself, to see me and speak to me personally at any time, I am, of course, prepared to arrange a meeting with you immediately.
I now greet you, Duce, in loyal comradeship secure in the consciousness of great joint success.
Yours,
(Signed) Hitler
Hitler’s troops had done the bloody work of battle, but Mussolini wanted to make sure his unsoiled soldiers would share in the glory. So his letter announcing when Italy would declare war and begin hostilities also carried a request that Hitler include “a representative contingent of the Italian army” in the goose-stepping victory parade through France.
Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler
Rome-Berlin, June 2, 1940
Message from the Duce:
I thank you most sincerely for the message which you sent me in answer to mine, which was delivered by Ambassador Alfieri. The victorious conclusion of the first phase of the war in Flanders has … ignited the enthusiasm of the whole Italian people. Regarding the date of Italy’s entry into the war I fully appreciate the advantage of delay which allows your Luftwaffe to identify and destroy the French Air Force. This brief delay permits me … to take still better defensive precautions and … in all spheres. My program is as follows: On Monday, June tenth, declaration of war and on the morning of June eleventh the commencement of hostilities. Regarding a meeting, I thank you for having proposed one, but I think it would be better for it to take place after Italy’s entrance into the war. In the speech which I shall make a few hours after the declaration of war, I shall say that true to her policy Italy does not intend to extend the theatre of war; and I shall name the Danube and Balkan countries including Greece and Turkey. Now I will express to you my wish to see at least a representative contingent of the Italian Army fighting side by side with your soldiers, in order to demonstrate in the field the affinity of arms and the comradeship between our revolutions. If you accept my offer I will send you a few regiments … consisting of courageous soldiers capable of offering resistance. Meanwhile I send you my most heartfelt greetings and best wishes for the success of our armed forces.
(Signed) Mussolini
Hitler, of course, replied that he would welcome a few Italian regiments. And he proposed that Mussolini accept a like number of German regiments “as a token of our comradeship in arms.”
But his offer was not made out of generosity or friendship for Il Duce. Hitler had nothing but contempt, for Italy’s fighting forces. He didn’t trust them and wanted to make sure Mussolini’s troops had German reinforcements to keep them in line when the Italians moved against France.
For this tricky maneuver, Hitler chose crack Alpine troops who could fight alone if necessary. It was his war, and he was taking no chances on Mussolini losing it for him.
Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini
The Fuhrer’s Headquarters, June 9, 1940
Duce:
I would now like to thank you by this means for your last communication. I have already had you informed of my approval of everything you proposed. Today, in addition to a brief report on the situation I must tell you how glad I am to have the opportunity of welcoming Italian comrades on our front. I know that those regiments of Bersaglieri are extremely good soldiers. Now, I should also like to give you, Duce, a few German regiments as a token of our comradeship in arms, and for this I actually had in mind Alpine troops, provided you can employ them on your front against France. Some have already distinguished themselves in Norway, others are fighting on the western front. There they have proved their mettle also. I should therefore be glad, Duce, if you thought it possible to employ them on your Alpine front, and would accept this as a token of our comradeship.
Since I did not know whether it would be possible for you further to postpone your operations for military reasons, I endeavored to bring ours forward by a few days. This we succeeded in doing. The air attacks on the big airfields in the Paris area and on the aircraft awaiting completion in the factories were a very great success. The French Air Force is now scarcely in evidence (apart from a few aircraft at night).
Hope For Quick Victory
The big attack, which was designed first of all to bring up a concentration of French reserves, fulfilled its purpose. We succeeded in exploiting our initial successes to such an extent that I was able to supplement these operations by giving orders for another and even bigger attack. Fighting has been going on since this morning on a front of about 300 km. While writing this letter I have so far no reports on the results of today’s attack, but our pressure is so strong that the whole of the French front will collapse in a few days’ time. This is already the case in the first sector of the battle.
Meanwhile operations seem finally to have come to an end in Norway. The King of Norway and his Government have left the country. It is not known where they have gone. The Commander in Chief of the Norwegian forces in the Narvik area has asked for a truce and has ordered his units to stop fighting. For the last two days my little band of heroes up there have themselves been making attacks again and despite their numerical and other inferiority have driven back the enemy. The Luftwaffe has again damaged a cruiser. Part of the fleet penetrated to the Lofotens and closed in on the English aircraft carrier Glorious. It was sunk together with a destroyer, a submarine-chaser, a 22,000 ton transport and a 9,500 ton tanker and a few smaller vessels.
When this fighting around Narvik is finished, a small band of the bravest men under the leadership of a heroic officers whom I have known for many years will have achieved something rare in military history. Their personal efforts were just as great as their conquest of hardship, hunger, frost, and all the sufferings connected with this. At times, this detachment was almost 1,000 km. away from the nearest main body of German troops. The only means of communication with them was by air. While I am writing this, the spearhead of the operational troops, advancing in snowstorms over terrain which can only be negotiated with difficulty by a few mountaineers, is now barely 100 km. from Narvik as the crow flies. It is indeed only spirit and will power, Duce, which make men and which at the same time are their strongest weapon.
I greet you in comradeship.
(Signed) Adolf Hitler
On June 10, Mussolini shoved Italy over the brink of war, as he had promised pal Adolf he would do. Hitler sent a telegram of congratulations, delivered while crowds in the streets of Rome were still cheering Mussolini’s declaration.
Stirring as the roll of drums, the crash of cannon, the roaring flight of fighting planes were the words in which Hitler gave his solemn pledge:
Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini
Telegram
The Fuhrer’s Headquarters, June 10, 1940—9:40 p.m.
Duce:
The historic decision which you announced today has moved me most profoundly. The whole German people is thinking of you and your country at this moment. The German Wehrmacht is glad to be able to stand at the side of its Italian comrades in battle.
Last September the rulers of Britain and France declared war on the German Reich without any reason. They turned down every offer of a peaceful settlement. Your proposal for mediation, Duce, was also received at the time with a brusque “No.” While we have always been very closely linked together ideologically by our two revolutions and politically by treaties, the increasing disregard shown by the rulers in London and Paris for Italy’s vital national rights struggle for the freedom and future of our peoples.
Duce of Fascist Italy, accept the assurance of the indestructible community of arms between the German and the Italian peoples.
I myself send you as always in loyal comradeship my greetings.
Yours,
(Signed) Adolf Hitler
THE SECRET LETTERS BETWEEN HITLER AND MUSSOLINI
Part III
HOW ENGLAND ESCAPED
THE TERROR OF NAZI INVASION!
The Police Gazette is the first publication ever to present the most important and dramatic letters in history—the personal correspondence between Hitler and Mussolini.
In this third installment of their letters the two dictators reveal in their own words their hopes and plans for conquering the world, and their deep respect for the fighting spirit of England. Driven back across the Channel, Britain alone in the Summer of 1940 faced the victorious Nazi armies and grimly awaited the cross-Channel invasion which the world expected Hitler would start at any moment.
In midsummer of 1940, with the Allied armies on the continent defeated and German troops in Paris, an eager Mussolini was more than anxious to participate in Hitler’s victories. He wanted to share in the spoils and offered Italian troops to aid in the assault on England.
Benito Mussolini to Adolph Hitler
Rome, June 26, 1940
Fuhrer:
Now that the problem is to conquer Great Britain, I remind you of what I said to you at Munich about the direct participation of Italy in the assault on the Island. I am ready to contribute ground forces and air forces and you know how much I desire to do so.
I ask you to answer me in such a way that will be possible for me to pass to the phase of execution.
In this expectation I send you the most comradely greetings.
(Signed) Adolf Hitler
Hitler cleverly dodges Mussolini’s offer of troops and sets forth his reasons in detail in the letter of July 13, 1940.
It offers remarkable insight into Hitler’s devious thoughts and the way he went about putting them into action.
Adolph Hitler to Benito Mussolini
Fuhrer’s Headquarters, July 13, 1940
Duce!
After your departure from Munich I received report that your train was held up by an air-raid alarm. I became conscious of the fact how greatly your life, too, is endangered. I should like therefore to ask you kindly to accept two railroad cars with antiaircraft equipment as a personal gift from me. … Field Marshal Goering’s train, when attacked, promptly shot down an English plane with those four-barreled antiaircraft guns. To a height of at least 1500–2000 meters their effectiveness is excellent.
Mussolini and Hitler during conference on how to invade England. Their masterminding backfired.
Please regard this gift simply as a token of concern from a friend.
At the moment I am in the midst of the preparations for the second phase of the struggle. These preparations are very extensive.
A landing by German troops in England is an undertaking whose success appears certain only if all the preparations are made with the most painstaking care. Such thorough preparation is also in full accord with the character of my General Staff. It requires so precise a coordination among command, troops, material, transport facilities, supply services, etc., that the success of the first assault is assured only if it is possible to calculate exclusively with known factors. That applies not only to the troops and to material but also—as already stressed�
��to the command.
Next there is the special fitness of the commanders to be selected for the tasks assigned to them. We have learned extraordinary lessons in Norway and have seen there, just as during the first strikes in the West, how much success of such very hold undertakings depends on the fitness of individuals. Even within the ranks of our own Wehrmacht mistakes did occur and had unfortunate consequences. Thus, for example, the task force dispatched to take hold of the Maastricht bridges failed, while on the other hand the task force to which had been assigned the more difficult objectives of taking Fort Eben-Emael and the canal bridges near Maastricht was able to carry out its assignments splendidly. Yet, Duce, these assignments had been previously practiced on models almost four months, and tested on objectives in similar locations again and again.
The attack on England has now also been discussed and studied in all its numerous details by the units in question or by the commanders. Contrary to the methods of the World War the principle of it is attaining a maximum of effect with a minimum of men.
Hitler Tells Invasion Plans
This can be achieved only by the most intense study of the task and equipping of men, after thorough deliberations, with the only suitable weapons. My responsible advisers are convinced that it would no longer be possible today to replace any of the units intended for those first assaults even with another German unit, without giving the latter another four to six months time for preparation. But there is also another factor, namely that at the landing operation, which is extremely dangerous, a certain percentage of material losses must be expected. For replacement purposes it is therefore important to use uniform weapons and ammunition as for as possible. …
Beyond that there are numerous other reasons—especially those connected purely with the exercise of command—that make it seem impossible to operate with two different armies in a theatre which is anyhow so limited. At least in the first stage that seems out of the question. Only after a firm foothold has been permanently established and the area of operations secured could this question be taken up again.
Hitler Is Alive! Page 30