However much, Duce, I appreciated your offer—of making a substantial number of Italian divisions available for the attack on England—as an act of comradeship and kindness—at the same time we must give consideration to everything that is likely to secure a successful outcome for this bold decision. With my advisers I have also gone fully into your further offers, Duce, to provide ships or aircraft. Here it will probably be easier to find a possibility for cooperation between our units. However, Duce, the decisive point seems to be this: We are confronted with a foe who still represents an enormous World Power.
I have made to Britain so many offers of agreement, even of cooperation, and have been treated so shabbily that I am even now convinced that any new appeal to reason would meet with a similar rejection. For in that country at present it is not reason that rules, but probably the smallest portion of wisdom in history. I believe, however, that for this reason we must all the more put our struggle on the broadest possible basis and neglect nothing in any way likely to hurt this powerful adversary and help in our cause.
It therefore does not matter in the least, Duce, where these various blows fall. They all will help to shake that State, remove that unscrupulous gang of warmongers and finally make the country ready for peace. Count Ciano has informed me that Italy is getting ready for an attack on Egypt and the Suez Canal. Any such strike, Duce, is an enormous gain.
Praises Italian Attacks
I was therefore delighted to hear that your navy has succeeded in holding firm with such distinction and was especially glad of the attacks of your air force on British convoys and warships.
Permit me to tell you therefore that I follow your own struggle with an ardent heart and ardent wishes. I shall do my best to assist, in order to share your burden as soon as this is in any way possible. In this I wage an eternal struggle against time, which is unfortunately needed to prepare the operations which one would prefer to launch this every moment.
With cordial and comradely greetings,
(Signed) Adolf Hitler
Though disappointed by Hitler’s refusal to allow him to participate directly in the planned assault on Britain, Mussolini offers grandiose plans for a largescale attack on Egypt. Though cast in a second-class role, Il Duce writes as though he were a full-fledged partner.
Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler
Rome, July 17, 1940
Fuhrer!
Permit me first of all to thank you for the mobile antiaircraft guns which you kindly presented to me. This is an attention on your part which testifies to comradely courtesy and whose full significance I know how to value. As soon as time permits I shall visit the battery and have it put into action.
I fully understand your response to my offer of Italian units for the landing in England. As I see it, this should mainly be of symbolic value, that is, express in visible for our comradeship in arms. I understand perfectly what you have told me, and will not insist further—all the less since our aim is the same, even though we fight on different sectors. If you see a possibility for direct intervention by the Italian Air Force please tell me. We now possess units of new, very fast and efficient machines. The preparation for a largescale attack on Egypt is not completed. … I hope I can begin the offensive at the same time as your attack on England.
On the ninth, tenth, eleventh and twelfth the English fleet in the Mediterranean was very badly hit. The denials of the English Admiralty are grotesque. I need not tell you that Italian Army reports tell the truth, even when this does not seem entirely necessary.
Your Ambassador in Rome will have informed you of my complete agreement with your letter to King Carol. If he is wise he will not miss this opportunity of reaching a compromise which Teleki himself desires.
French policy, which is not clear, is being followed here with much attention, especially in the colonial possessions.
But the most important thing is to strike the decisive blow at Great Britain.
No doubt whatsoever bothers me: the Revolution will be victorious!
Please accept, Fuhrer, my always friendly and comradely greetings,
(Signed) Adolf Hitler
Mussolini, determined to enter into Hitler’s grand strategy, despite the fact that his offer of troops has been politely refused, offers his analysis of the unfolding battle for the world. Here he astutely sizes up the possibility of American entry into the war.
Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler
Il Duce del Fascismo-Capo del Governo,
Rome, August 24, 1940
Fuhrer:
We have not had an opportunity for an exchange of ideas since our discussion of June 18.
I consider it opportune to tell you what I think of the situation at this moment. To begin with, as regards the Danube Basin and the Balkans, which is to keep that zone outside the conflict. The measures of a military character at the Greek and Yugoslav borders are simply of a precautionary character, prompted by the fact that both countries are deeply hostile to the Axis and ready to stab it in the back if a favorable occasion should offer itself.
The Italian police have discovered in the environs of Trieste no less than five large arms caches, hidden by Serbian partisans. It is not unknown to you, furthermore, that both Greece and Yugoslavia have almost completely mobilized their armed forces, and there can be no doubt concerning the effective, continuous, and verified complicity of Greece with Great Britain. All Greek ports are bases against us. But for all of that, and barring unforeseen developments, it is not in this direction but toward Egypt that I intend to direct the Italian efforts within the near future. The preparations are now completed and we are approaching a season more favorable for combat and for the march across the desert.
Blasts the French
Marshal Graziani has already received the order to attack on the same day when your Army attacks Great Britain. Despite the difficulties of terrain and climate, I believe we will defeat the English forces as well as the Egyptian forces if—as seems likely—they should Join the English, And now permit me tour d’horizon.
France. I feel sure that you cannot have failed to not the extraordinary psychological phenomenon, so typical for the indomitable pride of the French, that France does not consider herself conquered. Vichy-France is counting on English resistance and American intervention. What is happening in North Africa indicates the intentions of the French Government. It is therefore necessary to watch and impose such peace as will render it innocuous for several generations at least.
United States. Barring a complete reversal—always possible in a country of such genuine hysterics as are the American politicians—the possibility of American intervention ought to be calculated as a reality, especially if Roosevelt is reelected, as seems probable. Roosevelt will be unable to make a contribution in men but he will give greater material assistance, especially aircraft. This is happening already and so even that possibility cannot prevent Great Britain’s defeat.
Pressure on U.S.A.
Japan. I have not yet seen the results of the new “course” of Japan’s police. The Japanese, although they are most clear in their aims, are very slow and mysterious in their methods. I think that the policy of the Axis in Tokyo ought to be to “ease tension” in Russo-Japanese relations and on the other hand to “increase tension” to the maximum between the United States and Japan.
Returning again to military matters, it is superfluous for me to tell you with what joy Italian sailors and aviators are preparing themselves to act, alongside their German comrades, against Great Britain.
Accept, Fuhrer, my always cordial and comradely greetings.
(Signed) Adolf Hitler
P.S. As regards the harvest in Italy: the harvest has yielded 700,000 tons less bread grain, but was extraordinarily good in regard to corn, rice, potatoes, beans, sugar beets, fruit and green fodder. We are therefore not unduly concerned about our food supply.
Mus.
Hitler’s greatest disappointment is shown in this letter of Septe
mber 17, 1940, where the real reason why the Nazis didn’t invade England is revealed.
It is actually the turning point of Der Fuehrer’s career, though it was to be some time later before the Nazis leader was to realize it.
Adolf Hitler to Benito Mussolini
September 17, 1940
Duce!
In the first place please accept my most cordial thanks for your last letter. I read it with great interest and can only endorse your general views on the situation.
The fact that a relatively long interval lies between my last letter and today’s is due not only to the tremendous amount of preparatory work but also to the uncertainty of a situation that makes it difficult to prognosticate even for the very near future. …
The attack on England, upon which all our work and preparations are centered, has suffered the worst kind of delay so far owing to the weather; our meteorologists are at a loss to explain this or find parallels for it. For a month and a half we have been waiting for a few clear days in the west, for we absolutely must have that much time to justify the really largescale commitment of our Luftwaffe. Since we unfortunately do not possess supremacy at sea, the absolute mastery of the air is the most decisive prerequisite for the success of the invasion operation.
For weeks now we have been carrying on aggressive warfare of progressive intensity with our air forces against the British Island. The character of these attacks, however, is still one of more or less severe reprisal raids. Unfortunately we have not had the weather needed for the really largescale attacks. Nevertheless we have certainly already had notable successes even with our present attacks.
As in Norway, our pilots are fighting under the most unfavorable conditions imaginable with really admirable heroism. And so extraordinary progress has been made in attrition of the British Air Force that, to the extent of the radius of our fighter planes, we can already talk of real control of the air. I am waiting, as I did last year, for weather that will make it possible for me to have the final, annihilating blows dealt, and with me—I can assure you of this, Duce—is waiting the entire German Wehrmacht!
I have observed your own successes with great pleasure, Duce; the successful attacks in North Africa. The German people are with you in these battles, and every success which you achieve, Duce, whether on land or sea or in the air, is felt here exactly as if it were our own.
Since circumstances do not allow us to foresee when hostilities will cease, we are, I believe, forced to act farsightedly in making all possible preparations so that no matter what is still possible this fall we can in any case continue to prosecute the war successfully in the winter. I am, therefore, convinced that it can be important to make it possible for Spain to enter the war. The Spanish Government has applied in this sense to Germany with a number of military and economic requests. The military requests can be filled very easily, for they involve in the main only the detachment of some artillery and a number of special, troops.
France as such is finished. There is still danger of a secession movement in her northern colonies. There is no assurance that such secession might not even occur in secret agreement with the French Government. If, however—whether with or without the knowledge or desire of the Vichy Government—North Africa should join up with the British, this might give new impetus to the British cause, at least for a certain period. But as soon as there is a reliable bridge to North Africa via Spain I would no longer consider this danger to be very great. For Spain, too, a clear decision in this direction means increased security. This is one point.
Plots to Keep US Out of War
The other point is our relations with Japan. My Foreign Minister will give you the reports, Duce, that we have received regarding the possibility of a new development in the east. I believe in principle that in spite of all other misgivings a close cooperation with Japan is the best way either to keep America entirely out of the picture or to render her entry into the war ineffective.
If you should consider it advisable, Duce, for us to confer once again, I would gladly come either to the border or to a North Italian city so as to return in this way your last visit, which I recall so vividly.
Moreover, my Foreign Minister is familiar with everything and can speak with you on all problems, Duce.
Once more, please accept my thanks for your last letter, and my cordial regards,
In loyal comradeship. …
(Signed) Adolf Hitler
HITLER–MUSSOLINI LETTERS REVEAL THE REAL REASON HITLER LOST THE WAR
Hitler warmly greeted Franco in October 1940 while German staff officer looked on. Franco was friendly but he planned a double-cross.
A gamble that failed … this was one of the most decisive factors in the history of World War II.
The time was October 1940. Two men bestrode the world. Hitler and Mussolini, arrogant, swaggering, cocksure.
The gamble they made—and how their trump card turned out to be a dud—is revealed for the first time in these secret letters between them.
They were outwitted by a third dictator, a wily little man named Franco. Upon the greedy bargaining of the Spanish Claudillo the history of the free world turned.
The German Naval Staff was urging Hitler to concentrate his attack on Gibraltar and the Suez Canal. To do this Hitler was advised to woo Franco and bring Spain into the war on the Axis side without delay.
But this letter from Mussolini to Hitler shows that the Duce regarded Franco as a trump card to be played when they were ready.
Benito Mussolini to Adolf Hitler,
Rome, October 19, 1940
Fuhrer:
I should now like to say a word with respect to Spain. The taking over of the conduct of foreign affairs by Suner affords us assurances that the tendencies hostile to the Axis are eliminated or at least neutralized. On the other hand I do not feel that the internal economic situation has improved.
Again, I express my conviction that Spanish non-belligerence is more advantageous to us than her intervention. We ought to keep intervention as a reserve: it is a card that we ought to play at the most opportune moment in accordance with the given circumstances, such as prolongation of the war through 1941 or an overt intervention of the United States.
Meantime Spain will have the time necessary to prepare herself.
The Duce couldn’t have been more wrong. Sitting on the fence, Franco was becoming less and less certain that the Axis powers were going to win the war—and more and more determined to stay out of it.
Hitler, against the warnings of his advisors, was planning to attack Russia rather than strike a killing blow at the British by going through Spain to take Gibraltar from the rear. Both Admiral Raeder and Goering were for the Spanish campaign.
If Gibraltar and Suez were taken Raeder said “it is doubtful whether an advance against Russia in the north will be necessary.”
A Shock for Hitler
Two months later, when Hitler decided to bring Spain into the war and to provide a small German force to help Franco take Gibraltar, it was too late. Franco stalled and finally refused flatly to attack the British stronghold.
At this show of “ingratitude,” Hitler wailed miserably in a letter to Mussolini dated December 31, 1940.
Here is an extract of his comments on Spain:
Spain, under the impression of what Franco considers to be the changed situation, has for the time being refused to cooperate with the two Axis powers. I fear that Franco is committing here the greatest mistake of his life. I consider the idea of his receiving grain and other raw materials from the democracies as thanks for his aloofness to be unrealistic naiveté. They will put him off with promises until the last kilogram of grain in the country has been used up, and then the fight of the democratic powers against him personally will start. I regret this, for we had made all the preparations for crossing the Spanish border on January 10 and attacking Gibraltar at the beginning of February.
In my opinion that attack would have led to success in a rela
tively short time. The troops for this were excellently selected and trained, and the weapons were especially designed and readied for the purpose.
From the moment in which the Strait of Gibraltar was in our hands the danger of any kind of untoward behavior on behalf of French North and West Africa would have been eliminated. For this reason I am very sad about this decision of Franco’s, which does not take account of the help which we—you, Duce, and I—once gave him in his hour of need.
I have only a faint hope left that possibly at the last minute he will become aware of the catastrophic nature of his own actions and he will after all—even though late—find his way to the camp of the front whose victory will also decide his own fate.
Even Hitler’s personal magnetism, his bombastic role of “world historical genius” and master of Europe, failed to impress Franco.
When they met the crafty Spanish dictator skillfully avoided every attempt to lure him into the war and he left the arrogant Fuhrer almost bursting with suppressed rage.
Meanwhile, Hitler was still going ahead with operation Barbarossa—his wild plan to invade Russia. But he revealed nothing of this in that letter of December 31 to the Duce. He was apparently still on friendly terms with the Soviet Union.
Wrote Hitler:
I do not believe in any Russian step in our disfavor as long as Stalin lives and no very special crisis occurs on our side … However, it is the soldier’s function to anticipate the unexpected in wartime and take it into account. Therefore, Duce, I consider as a prerequisite for any sure conclusion of this war the existence of a German Wehrmacht that is strong enough to oppose any conceivable eastern eventuality. The more obviously strong this power is, the smaller will be the probability that it will have to come forward for such unanticipated contingencies.
Soviet Friendship
I wish to state at the same time that the present relationship with the Soviet Union is very good, that we are on the point of concluding a trade agreement satisfactory to both parties and that therefore the hope is justified that the difficult points still open can also be solved in a reasonable manner. Really it is only the questions of Finland and Constantinople that are separating us.
Hitler Is Alive! Page 31