The Pembrokeshire Murders: Catching the Bullseye Killer

by Steve Wilkins

  At this stage the most frustrating news was that Richard Thomas’s Rover car was missing and no one knew where it was or what had happened to it; or rather no-one was admitting to disposing of it. For years it had been parked up at the back of Milford Haven Police station covered in bird droppings, disappearing under a layer of moss with a small tree growing out of its front windscreen. The order had been given to get shot of it and it had probably now been recycled into baked bean tins. The loss was not the car but rather the locks and ignition. We had keys, recovered from Cooper’s cesspit, which may have fitted it. Only a mechanical forensic fit would do because back then a Rover or Leyland key would probably have started a number of cars, such was the crude nature of the locks and ignition. Hindsight is a wonderful thing but the decision to get rid of the car was a great source of frustration to the team.

  A Leap of Faith

  BY MARCH 1997 WE WERE more than twelve months into the review and by now numerous exhibits and relevant material had been forensically recovered, recorded and forwarded to LGC Forensics for examination. For the team it was a waiting game while the initial assessments were completed. Indications, from the lead scientist Maggie Boyce, were that we would receive the first news by April 2007, but in truth I felt this was a little optimistic. Whatever the timescale it was clear to me that with the circumstantial case starting to build up, together with the changes to the provisions of Bad Character Evidence, we needed at some stage to put the allegations to Cooper. There was also the question of linking the offences, which I had not formally done for good reason. Following discussions with Des James, my SIO advisor, I decided to employ the services of Neil Traynor a geographical profiler and Paul Lobbe a behavioural profiler, both on the books of the National Policing Improvement Agency, NPIA. I had worked with Neil before and he was a very knowledgeable individual. I wanted them to look at the Ottawa offences and use their findings in my linking process.

  Surprisingly, we did not have a full DNA profile of all of the murder victims and it was important that we had them for identification and elimination purposes. LGC was tasked with raising such profiles for all of our victims, and after a considerable amount of time and effort this was finally achieved. During the post-mortem examination of Richard Thomas anal swabs indicated evidence of semen, but due to the limited development of DNA all the scientists could do was provide a blood group. The theory that Richard Thomas might have had a murderous gay lover was born and became a major line of inquiry. After thousands of hours spent trying to unlock a potential motive or suspect there was not a shred of credible evidence that Richard Thomas was involved in such a relationship or had a secret life. Back then this caused DCS Davies many sleepless nights and it was clear that he too had his doubts over the value of this lead.

  After more than twenty years, developments in forensic science had given us another opportunity to investigate the theory. There was one semen slide left, together with the original swabs and container. Previous SIOs had been reluctant to open the slide because it was sealed and they had been advised that the process of separating the glass might well be destructive. I was quite clear that we had to open it and unlock any potential evidence as I had already been told that that it was unlikely that there would be any advances in DNA science for at least five years, which would justify delaying the procedure. The results were conclusive and silenced any rumours; the swab, container and slide revealed a full DNA profile and it belonged to Richard Thomas himself: the semen was his own. Many theories were then put forward for this, including the suggestion that a natural reaction for a man who has been shot is to ejaculate: we never found an expert to confirm this. I was of the belief that while Richard Thomas was lying on his back during the post-mortem, semen had drained through his severely burned lower abdomen tissue and into his anus, which had then been swabbed during the examination; it was clearly a contamination issue. This was significant because it explained the lack of evidence at the time to support the suggestion that a gay lover had murdered Richard. This result again focused the team on the belief that Helen had been the victim of a bungled robbery and Richard had returned to the house and confronted the intruder, resulting in a struggle and eventually their murders.

  I wanted to get the best advice in relation to any future interviews with Cooper. We had to ensure that we had the best and most appropriate interviewers and a clear strategy of engagement given the previous experience of the Huntsman team. Gary Shaw was the National Interview Advisor and had been involved in developing best practice. He would give me tactical advice on how to build a plan. On top of that I needed to know Cooper the man: who was he, how did he think and how might he react to situations and people? I had access to a number of assessments that had been carried out on Cooper while he was in prison and they were fascinating. He was a man who wanted control; he always had to have the final say, would lie but convince himself that he was telling the truth, and would justify the means to an end however unreasonable his actions.

  The assessments revealed an interesting contradiction to how he behaved at his previous interviews. Here was a man who enjoyed talking about himself and painting a picture of a superman who was everyone’s friend. In reality he was a very unpopular man who was given a wide berth by anyone who came into contact with him. His working life had been a series of failed ventures built on poor planning, usually his. When challenged he tended to take the questioner on a journey that gave him time to assess and respond with another lie. It was this type of insight that we needed and it would prove to be critical in our preparation.

  Dr Adrian West is a prominent and highly respected forensic criminal psychologist who has worked with some of the significant and dangerous criminals in British jails. I wanted to engage Dr West at an early stage and get his view on how to approach Cooper. They were old acquaintances because Dr West had been involved in the Huntsman investigation and had been very interested in Cooper’s profile. Des James arranged a meeting with him at Fishguard Port Office. I liked Dr West immensely, he is quietly spoken and his gentle Merseyside accent always reminded me of home.

  We sat for hours in the television room talking about how to approach Cooper. I needed to get him talking while not giving him a chance to take the interviewer off on a tangent, as he had done in Huntsman. This would need careful planning and special interviewers. They needed to be physically and mentally robust, able to focus, retain information and have bags of courage. Their knowledge of Cooper needed to be extensive, detailed and accurate. They needed to know more about Cooper than he did himself. Unfortunately we did not have a shred of forensic evidence and the interview would be solely based on circumstantial evidence and bad character. After discussion with Dr West I wanted to use a male/female combination, because of the response it might provoke from Cooper. Most of his offending had involved extreme violence against women. We both agreed that it could be a masterstroke or a disaster stroke. Whatever the outcome I wanted to have the option available and a clear strategy of when and when not to use it.

  As we were finishing for the day I asked Dr West a simple question. “Adrian, how would you best describe Cooper as an offender?” He thought for a few seconds then replied, “There are two people who I have come across in my professional career, who if I awoke in the middle of the night to find them in my bedroom I know I would have to kill them to survive, one is Donald Neilson, the so called Black Panther, and the other is John William Cooper.” This simple but explosive response made the hairs on the back of my neck stand up; it underlined the enormity and importance of the task the Ottawa team was facing. I knew that even if we came to a point where we did not have any forensic evidence I needed to interview Cooper. Although my forensic review was not targeted at any one suspect, the Cooper element troubled me greatly. Whatever the outcome, in my mind, I needed to be in a defensible position if Cooper came out of prison and killed again. I had to be able to explain that we had done everything possible. Dr West’s words would give me many sleepless ni
ghts.

  Deputy Chief Constable Andy Edwards had already chaired a number of ‘Gold’ oversight groups and made it clear that Operation Ottawa was not an investigation to be resourced from the Pembrokeshire Division alone; it was a Force responsibility, a priority investigation, and its key players would be drawn from throughout the Force area. The interview team would need to come together early and start to absorb the masses of information and data held in the incident room. I needed people who would not be intimidated, who could remain calm and cool under pressure and not be side-tracked by Cooper. After careful consideration a team was selected: DS Colin Clarke as interview advisor, DS Gareth (Rambo) Rees, DC Nigel Jones and DC Louise Harries. All were experienced and I knew that they would be more than a match for Cooper. Colin was an excellent interview advisor and able to produce detailed interview strategies. Gareth and Nigel, both famous for their superhuman feats of eating, were larger than life figures that would not be intimidated, while Louise was developing an excellent reputation and gave me the option of having a female in the mix.

  The disclosure of evidence was another key issue that I needed to consider. It is the responsibility of the investigating authority to disclose to the defence issues and material that might assist them, or undermine the prosecution case; this is done in conjunction with the Crown via the Crown Prosecution Service, or CPS. The first stage is for the police to review all material and to schedule it into different categories and then to reveal it to the CPS, who then consider its relevance and make a decision as to whether or not to disclose it. It’s a massive responsibility and has been the graveyard of many good and high profile investigations. It was clear that with all of the material involved, disclosure would be a huge piece of work. At the start of Ottawa we had 80,000 documents with some containing hundreds of pages, and by its conclusion the investigation had amassed some two million pieces of paper.

  The problem we faced was quite simple; disclosure would normally take place post charge. At this stage we had not even interviewed Cooper and the forensic review might well throw up another suspect. We had consulted with another team in West Yorkshire who had carried out a high profile cold case review of the murder of a young girl called Lesley Molseed. In this case the SIO had started the disclosure process post charge and had to employ a team of over twenty officers for six months. We just did not have the resources to do this in our case; instead we needed to start the disclosure process now, fully understanding the risks of reviewing material without knowing the significance of the evidence and what was relevant.

  By this stage Andy John had moved on to another post. It was a decision which weighed heavy on him, but the correct one for his career. Andy is an excellent officer and a very good friend, and I have no doubt he will go far. His contribution to Operation Ottawa at the start was significant and planted the seeds of success. Together with Lynne Harries and Glyn Johnson I considered the disclosure conundrum and after many hours of lively debate we agreed a way forward which included bringing a small team of officers together to start the process. Many of the problems with disclosure relate to the quality of schedules. They should contain enough information to make a clear assessment of their relevance. Some are far too brief, allowing vital documents to slip through unnoticed, only to resurface again, to ambush the Crown’s case during a trial. I wanted to avoid this at all costs. The disclosure team for Ottawa would pay particular attention to the quality of the schedules and ensure they contained enough detail to allow us to review them post charge and re-assess the material, if we ever got to this stage. The downside was that it might be a totally unnecessary exercise if we did not charge. There was, however, another advantage to this approach in that the disclosure team would develop a detailed knowledge of the case and any pitfalls, while possibly identifying new evidence for the investigation team.

  Dyfed Powys is a small Force, in which everyone knows everyone else. I believe being a ‘family force’ with strong community links is a strength which has helped it keep us at the top of the performance table for many years. The flip side is, of course, that it’s impossible to have secrets, and keeping Ottawa under wraps would be a significant challenge. We needed to have an internal communication strategy in place and this job was given to our press office. I was even more concerned about any interest from the media, which was something I wanted to avoid at this stage. I knew that eventually I would want to go public, but at a time of my choosing to maximise any tactical advantage; in essence if Cooper was my main suspect then I needed to make sure that during any news coverage I could monitor his response. This was my strategy, but then out of the blue I received a telephone call from ITV I didn’t want.

  In the spring of 2007 Jonathan Hill, a journalist and presenter of ITV Wales’s nightly news programme, contacted the Force. For the last ten years he had fronted a series called Crime Secrets, which told the stories behind some of Wales’ most notorious murder investigations. For many years the Force had refused to take part in any filming but Jonathan still wanted to meet me. The producers were interested in running a piece on the murder of Welsh backpacker Kirsty Jones in Thailand in 2000; it was a case in which I was closely involved. It’s fair to say that the Force had at times had a difficult relationship with another journalist at ITV Wales and I knew my bosses would be nervous about getting involved. Their current affairs series had accused a former Head of CID of being less than competent in investigating a major crime, at the same time pointing to the Pembrokeshire murders as another example of poor detective work. This issue was still reverberating around the ACPO corridors and I did not want this to derail my plans. I decided to make some of my own enquiries with detectives at other Welsh forces who had worked with Mr Hill. Their response was positive but it was time for me to make up my own mind. I have always had a good relationship with the press because I respect what they do and in my experience most of the time they do a pretty good job; yes, there are some who abuse their position. But I have also worked with police officers guilty of the same charge. I was curious to know more about what Mr Hill wanted from us, so we arranged for him to come to Headquarters in Carmarthen.

  Over a coffee we talked about the Kirsty Jones case and we decided to do it. After seven years the case needed some publicity and his interest seemed genuine. I agreed that a colleague and I would do some interviews and we would liaise with Kirsty’s family to get their consent. Job done! Then came the bombshell. Mr Hill was also very keen to make a programme about the Pembrokeshire Coastal Path murders and the killings at Scoveston. Totally unaware of Ottawa and how the operation was developing, Jonathan intimated that the researchers already had enough material to make a story and they would like us to take part, but it was not essential; the programme would go ahead with or without our help. He also revealed they had extensive archive footage of the crimes from the time. We were in a tricky situation and I had to make a leap of faith. If the programme went ahead it could compromise much of the good work that had been done and it would alert Cooper before we were ready for him. I closed the door and fixed Jonathan with a stare. I paused and then said, “Your programme would make it very difficult for us.” He looked puzzled as I continued, “I am going to trust you, and if you break that trust then I will have nothing more to do with you.” It was a thinly veiled threat. Jonathan believed that the murders were cold cases but I was about to cut him into the Ottawa secret. “The murders of Helen and Richard Thomas and Peter and Gwenda Dixon are not a cold case but very much active.” He looked stunned as he realised he might have stumbled across one of the biggest stories of his career. I told him that I wanted to strike a deal. If they abandoned plans to cover the Pembrokeshire murders in the forthcoming series of Crime Secrets, then I would give him first bite when I was ready to go public. I paused and the full implication of what I had just said sunk in. It was a calculated risk on my part but I had few options. After some careful consideration Jonathan agreed to drop the story for now. I explained that we would have to take it on
e step at a time and if he kept his side of the bargain I would keep mine. We shook hands and he headed back to Cardiff. I hoped my faith in him would not be misplaced.

  Going Public

  By the spring of 2007 the team had become so familiar with the exhibits that I could mention any one of them and they would in an instant respond with the police reference number and its full history. In particular Lynne Harries and Glyn Johnson were becoming exhibit number anoraks. Lynne had also developed an uncanny knowledge of all things to do with shotgun cartridges and started to speak a language that none of us understood. Mid conversation, and without warning, he would introduce words such as Eley, Maionchi and Martignoni and any other manufacturer he could think of. It provided many humorous interludes and alleviated some of the intense pressure we were all under.

  Certain exhibits jumped out as priorities and were quickly submitted for examination, some even fast tracked. We then had to find expert witnesses via the NPIA. There were also many exhibits such as fibre and body tapings, together with the record of their examination, which were still located in the Forensic Science Service. Crucially, they had never left the custody of the FSS. The examinations fell under the following categories: