Encyclopedia of Russian History
Page 25
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Dukes, Paul. (1982). The Making of Russian Absolutism 1613-1801. London: Longman. Kamenskii, Aleksandr. (1997). The Russian Empire in the Eighteenth Century, tr. David Griffiths. London: Sharpe. Lincoln, W. Bruce. (1981). The Romanovs: Autocrats of all the Russias. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Longworth, Phillip. (1972). The Three Empresses: Catherine I, Anna, and Elizabeth of Russia. London: Constable. Raleigh, Donald, ed. (1996). The Emperors and Empresses of Russia: Rediscovering the Romanovs. London: Sharpe.
ZHAND P. SHAKIBI
ANTHONY KHRAPOVITSKY, METROPOLITAN
(1863-1936), metropolitan of Kiev, theologian, church reformer, and leader of the Russian Orthodox Church in exile after the Russian revolution.
Through early study of Dostoyevsky and Slavophilism, Anthony became convinced that faith and philosophy were closely intertwined. His Psychological Data in Favor of Free Will and Moral Responsibility (1887) extended this earlier insight, established his reputation as a theologian, and inspired many young men to become monastic missionaries so as to combat the rebellious ideas current in society and to relieve human suffering.
To build the Kingdom of God in society, Anthony believed, the church must be free from dependence on the state (although he always remained a staunch monarchist in politics). In August 1917 he advanced his ideas on church reform at a council (sobor) of the Russian church. He argued that the church should be governed at the top by a patriarch and a council of bishops, a structure favored by many bishops in attendance. For a time it looked as if the council would elect Anthony as patriarch. In the first round of balloting, he was the most popular of the three finalists for the patriarchal office. However, the final selection by drawing lots resulted in the selection of Tikhon (Bellavin).
In the confused political and religious turmoil in Ukraine during the last months of German occupation (World War I), Anthony became metropolitan of Kiev. During the civil war, he supported the losing side and was forced to leave Russia for a life of exile, first in Constantinople, then at SremANTHONY VADKOVSKY, METROPOLITAN ski Karlovci in Yugoslavia. In 1920, as senior among the bishops who had left Russia, he took the lead in creating a Higher Church Administration and a Synod of the Russian Church in Constantinople. The next year, he convened a council in Yugoslavia that declared the new Synod as the central church authority in emigration, expressed its desire to see a restoration of monarchy in Russia, and proclaimed Anthony as “Vice Regent of the All-Russian Patriarch.” The new organization declared unconditional loyalty to Patriarch Tikhon, but came to fear that the patriarch was acting on behalf of the Communist government in Russia. In the two years following Patriarch Tikhon’s death in 1925, Anthony broke off relations with the Moscow patriarchate and declared the Synodal church in Yugoslavia to be the sole heir of the historic Orthodox church in Russia. His followers expected him to be elected patriarch of this fully autonomous church that claimed jurisdiction over the entire Russian diaspora. Such a claim caused a rupture in relations with Metropolitan Evlogy, whom Patriarch Tikhon had placed in charge of the Russian parishes in western Europe. Eventually, in 1931, the ecumenical patriarch Vasilios III intervened and permitted Evlogy to place the exarchate of the Russian church in western Europe under Constantinople’s jurisdiction. Anthony’s influence in the Orthodox emigration diminished thereafter. See also: RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH; TIKHON, PATRIARCH
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Antic’, Oxana (1988). “The Russian Orthodox Church Abroad.” In Eastern Christianity and Politics in the Twentieth Century, ed. Pedro Ramet. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
ROBERT L. NICHOLS
ANTHONY VADKOVSKY, METROPOLITAN
(1846-1912), metropolitan of St. Petersburg, moderate church reformer.
Anthony began his career at the Kazan Theological Academy as a scholar and editor of the academy’s widely read journal Orthodox Interlocutor (Pravoslavny sobesednik). His scholarly life ended abruptly with the sudden illness and death of his wife and two children. He became a monk, thereby contributing to the notable revival in the 1880s of the “learned monasticism” that had characterized the church hierarchy in Russia before the Great Reforms of the 1860s.
Anthony soon became rector of the St. Petersburg Theological Academy and bishop of Vyborg, vicar to the metropolitan of St. Petersburg. Some of Anthony’s favorite students at the academy subsequently became prominent churchmen: Sergei Stragorodsky, the future leader of the Russian church during the communist era, and Anthony Khrapovitsky, Sergei’s rival and leader of the Russian church in exile after 1920. While promoting monasticism, Anthony also sought to reform the monasteries, particularly those whose economic activities harmed the material welfare of the parish clergy. The parish clergy, he felt, must be accorded a more secure livelihood if they were to rescue the church’s failing parishes. Anthony used his influence as bishop to advance these reforms. In 1892 Anthony became the archbishop of a newly created Finnish diocese aimed at encouraging Russian patriotic feeling and devotion to the Russian Orthodox Church among the Finnish Orthodox population.
When the revolutionary disturbances in 1905 generated a new law on religious toleration, Anthony, as ranking member of the Holy Synod, entered the broader struggle for church reform. He argued that the new law put the church at a disadvantage because other religious faiths were freed from state interference in their internal affairs in a way not permitted to Orthodoxy. These sentiments, transmitted to Nicholas II by Sergei Witte, chairman of the Council of Ministers, decisively advanced the popular reform movement that culminated in an all-Russian council (sobor) of the church and reestablishment of the patriarchate after the fall of the Russian monarchy in 1917. At the same time, fearing that the church might be swept into a political maelstrom, he warned against clerical participation in the newly forming political parties of post-1905 Russia. During these years, Anthony courageously, if ultimately unsuccessfully, resisted the harmful influence of Rasputin in church affairs, and there is some evidence to suggest that he tried to intervene personally with Nicholas II in order to quell Rasputin’s potential influence on the Tsare-vich Alexis. Following Anthony’s death in 1912, Rasputin’s influence in the Holy Synod grew rapidly. See also: HOLY SYNOD; RASPUTIN, GRIGORY YEFIMOVICH; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH
ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Cunningham, James W. (1981). A Vanquished Hope: The Movement for Church Renewal in Russia, 1905-1906. Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press. Curtiss, John S. (1965 [1940]). Church and State in Russia: The Last Years of Empire, 1900-1917. New York: Octagon Books. Meyendorff, Fr. John. (1978). “Russian Bishops and Church Reform in 1905.” In Russian Orthodoxy under the Old Regime, eds. Robert L. Nichols and Theo-fanis G. Stavrou. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
ROBERT L. NICHOLS
ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY
The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (usually referred to as “the ABM Treaty”) was signed by U.S. president Richard Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev in Moscow on May 26, 1972. It entered into force on October 3, 1972. Under its terms, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to limit sharply both development and deployment of ballistic missile defenses in order to constrain the arms race in strategic nuclear weapons and to enhance the stability of the strategic balance. The ABM Treaty was the principal achievement of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), which also produced an Interim Agreement limiting strategic offensive missiles, pending negotiation of a more comprehensive treaty limiting such weapons. The ABM Treaty was of indefinite duration, although it could be amended by mutual agreement and either party could withdraw at any time on six months’ notice.
The ABM Treaty was the centerpiece of the Nixon-Brezhnev Moscow summit of 1972, and the SALT negotiation was seen as the icebreaker for a broader political d?tente, as well as a stabilizing element in strategic arms control. Strategic arms control and the ABM Treaty enjoyed wide support for most of the next two decades. This was true
despite the prolonged and ultimately inconclusive efforts to reach agreement on a SALT II treaty on offensive arms.
By the time Ronald Reagan became president in 1981, American concerns over the strategic balance had risen. In 1983 President Reagan announced a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) to develop strategic antiballistic missile defense systems. Deployment, and even testing and development, of such a system would have required radical revision or abrogation of the ABM Treaty. In 1985 the Reagan administration announced a unilateral revised interpretation of the ABM Treaty loosening restrictions on testing new ABM technologies. This revised “broad interpretation” of the ABM Treaty was highly controversial and was never applied to actual testing; in 1994 it was officially repudiated by the Clinton administration. The SDI program greatly increased expenditures on U.S. ballistic missile defense research and development, but it did not lead to a deployable system.
In the 1990s and afterward, following the end of the Cold War and agreed reductions in U.S. and Soviet strategic offensive arms, the United States renewed its pursuit of ballistic missile defense. On December 15, 2001, President George W. Bush officially gave notice that the United States was withdrawing from the ABM Treaty in six months. Discussions had been held with the Russians on possible amendments to the treaty, but the United States decided that it wished an open slate for development and deployment decisions and opted to withdraw.
The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty thus had a thirty-year life. The ABM Treaty alone had been unable to restrain a buildup in strategic offensive arms in the 1970s and 1980s, and it was less needed in the post-Cold War world, although many in the United States (and the Western allies, Russia, and China) had urged its retention. In any event, the ABM Treaty did contribute to greater certainty of mutual nuclear deterrence for nearly two decades of the Cold War, and even the fact of its successful negotiation had borne witness to the ability of the nuclear superpowers, even as adversaries, to agree on such a measure to reduce the dangers of the nuclear confrontation. See also: ARMS CONTROL; COLD WAR; STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TREATIES; STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE; UNITED STATES, RELATIONS WITH
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Garthoff, Raymond L. (1994). D?tente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, rev. edition. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution. Newhouse, John. (1973). Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
ANTI-PARTY GROUP
Smith, Gerard. (1980). Double Talk: The Story of SALT I. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF
cided not to assist its ally in the Anti-Comintern Pact and eventually attacked the United States instead of the USSR. See also: COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL; GERMANY, RELATIONS WITH; NAZI-SOVIET PACT OF 1939; WORLD WAR II
ANTI-COMINTERN PACT
The Anti-Comintern Pact was signed by Germany and Japan on November 25, 1936, and joined by Italy on November 6, 1937. Disguised as an effort to combat the influence of the Communist International (Comintern), the treaty was intended to serve as a military alliance aimed at the Soviet Union. In reality, the treaty did not result in any coordinated German-Japanese military action, but instead became the foundation for growing distrust and betrayal between the two fascist allies themselves.
The text of the treaty was brief and to the point. It asserted that the Communist International was a threat to world peace and that the signatories planned to “keep each other informed concerning the activities” of the Comintern and cooperate in their mutual defense, and invited other nations to join their efforts. A Supplementary Protocol empowered Germany and Japan to “take stringent measures against those who at home or abroad work” for the Comintern, authorizing repressive measures against members of the Communist Party in Germany, Japan, or countries under their influence. Finally, both promised not to sign a separate agreement with the Soviet Union without the other being informed. Viscount Kintomo Mushakoji, the Japanese ambassador to Germany, and Joachim von Ribbentrop, German ambassador to London, signed the treaty. It went into force immediately and was valid for five years.
The Anti-Comintern Pact threatened the USSR and seemed to be one more aspect of Germany’s aggressive policy. Nevertheless, the German and Japanese military staffs did not coordinate their actions, and each country pursued its own interests irrespective of the Anti-Comintern Pact.
In 1939, while the Soviet army was defeating the Japanese military in Manchuria along the Mongolian border, Ribbentrop traveled to Moscow and negotiated the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, leaving the Japanese out of these deliberations. Japan could not trust Hitler. In 1941, again without notice, Germany invaded the USSR. Japan deBIBLIOGRAPHY Department of State. (1943). Foreign Relations of the United States: Japan, 1931-1941, Vol. II.Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. Haslam, Jonathan. (1992). The Soviet Union and the Threat from the East, 1933-41: Moscow, Tokyo, and the Prelude to the Pacific War. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
HAROLD J. GOLDBERG
ANTI-PARTY GROUP
The Anti-Party Group, so called by Nikita Khrushchev, whom it tried to oust from power in June 1957, was neither opposed to the Communist Party nor really a group. Rather, it consisted of three of Khrushchev’s main rivals in the party leadership, Georgy Malenkov, Vyacheslav Molotov, and Lazar Kaganovich, themselves hardly united except in their wish to oust Khrushchev, plus a diverse set of allies who supported them at the last minute: titular head of state Klimenty Voroshilov; chairman of the Council of Ministers Nikolai Bulganin; central economic administrators Mikhail Pervukhin and Maxim Saburov; and Dmitry Shepilov, Khrushchev’s prot?g? whom had he had recently promoted to foreign minister.
When Josef Stalin died in March 1953, Malenkov seemed the heir apparent, but Molotov also appeared to be a contender for supreme power. Khrushchev joined with both of them to bring down secret police chief Lavrenty Beria, who was arrested in June 1953 and executed in December. Khrushchev turned next against Malenkov, who was demoted from prime minister to minister of electrification in February 1955, and then against Molotov, who was soon dropped as foreign minister. However, both Malenkov and Molotov were allowed to remain full members of the Party Presidium, leaving them in position to seek revenge against Khrushchev.
ANTONOV UPRISING
The logic of power in the Kremlin, in which there was no formalized procedure for determining leadership succession, largely accounted for this struggle. So did certain policy differences: Molotov, Kaganovich, and Voroshilov were particularly dismayed by Khrushchev’s “secret speech” attacking Stalin at the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956, as well as by the de-Stalinization process he began in domestic and foreign policy. Malenkov had seemed more open to reform during his stint as prime minister, but although his and Khrushchev’s skills could have complemented each other, personal animosity drove them apart. Despite choosing Bulganin to replace Malenkov as prime minister, Khrushchev disdained Bulganin. Per-vukhin and Saburov felt threatened by Khrushchev’s proposed reorganization of economic administration, which jeopardized their jobs. Shepilov probably betrayed his patron because he thought Khrushchev was bound to lose.
Including seven full members of the Presidium, the plotters constituted a majority. When they moved against Khrushchev on June 18, 1957, they counted on the Presidium’s practice of appointing its own leader, leaving the Party Central Committee to rubber-stamp the result. Instead, however, Khrushchev insisted that Central Committee itself, in which his supporters dominated, decide the issue. While Khrushchev and his enemies quarreled, the KGB (Committee on State Security) and the military ferried Central Committee members to Moscow for a plenum that took place from June 22 to 28.
Khrushchev’s opponents had no chance once the plenum began. Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich were subjected to a barrage of charges about their complicity in Stalin’s terror, including details about Stalinist crimes that were not fully publicized until the late 1980s. Following the plenum, Molotov was exiled to Outer Mongolia as Sov
iet ambassador, Malenkov to northern Kazakhstan to direct a hydroelectric station, Kaganovich to a potash works in Perm Province, and Shepilov to head the Kyrgyz Institute of Economics. So as not to reveal how many had opposed him, Khrushchev delayed his punishment of the rest of the Anti-Party Group: Bulganin remained prime minister until 1958; Voroshilov was not deposed as head of state until 1960. After the Twenty-second Party Congress in October 1961, in which Khrushchev intensified his all-out attack on Stalin and Stalinism, Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich were expelled from the Communist Party. See also: KHRUSHCHEV, NIKITA SERGEYEVICH; MALENKOV, GEORGY MAXIMILYANOVICH; MOLOTOV VYACHESLAV MIKHAILOVICH
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Linden, Carl A. (1966). Khrushchev and the Soviet Leadership. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Micunovic, Veljko. (1980). Moscow Diary, tr. David Floyd. New York: Doubleday. Resis, Albert, ed. (1993). Molotov Remembers: Inside Kremlin Politics: Conversations with Felix Chuev. Chicago: I. R. Dee. Taubman, William. (2003). Khrushchev: The Man and His Era. New York: Norton.
WILLIAM TAUBMAN
ANTONOV UPRISING
The Antonov Uprising (1920-1921) was a large, well-organized peasant revolt in the Tambov province of Central Russia. Part of the Green Movement, the uprising threatened Communist power in 1921 and was a major reason for the abandonment of War Communism.
Alexander Antonov (1889-1922) was a Socialist Revolutionary (SR) whom the February Revolution rescued from a long prison sentence for robbing railroad station ticket offices. He returned to Tambov province in 1917 to become a district police official under the Provisional Government. He left this post in April 1918 and went underground, organizing an armed guerrilla group to resist the new Communist government.