Encyclopedia of Russian History
Page 60
Farther south, the conquest took more time. Early Russian forays into Central Asia took place in the sixteenth century, when Muscovy traders established contacts with the Emirate of Bukhara and the Khanate of Khiva. However, relations were minimal for the next two centuries. It was not until the 1800s that tensions along the southern border prompted Russian military units to step up their activities. On one hand, the regional khanates were accused of kidnapping Russian settlers farther north and selling them into slavery. More significantly, Russia found itself in competition with the British Empire over control of the larger region between their empires south of Russia and north of India.
Consequently, Russian military units methodically captured one city after another in the 1850s and 1860s, with the fall of Tashkent and Bukhara in 1865 and 1868, respectively, being key events. By the 1870s, the region was either under direct Russian rule or controlled by two Russian protectorates-Bukhara and Khiva. While there were periodic anti-Russian revolts, none were significant enough to threaten stability in the region. Central Asia was important to Russia for several reasons. First, it became a core supplier of raw materials. Not only were food and livestock important commodities in the region, but so were exportable industrial products. Minerals, coal, and timber from the northern parts of the region and cotton from the central and southern parts were integrated into the Russian economy. In particular, the shortage of cotton on the international market caused by the U.S. Civil War (1861-1865) prompted Russian officials to expand cotton production in Central Asia for domestic use and for international trade purposes.
Second, Central Asia was strategically important. As noted, Russia found it was competing with Great Britain over South Asian possessions in what was often dubbed “the Great Game.” As Russia expanded its control over the steppes of Kazakhstan and into the settled regions of Turkestan, attention was directed southward. It was not until the negotiated border agreement of 1895 that Russia and Great Britain came to terms with their respective holdings in Asia-Russian territory being what is today “Central Asia,” and British territory being the regions of Pakistan and India. Afghanistan was seen as a “neutral buffer state,” albeit under British influence.
Within the Russian-controlled region of Central Asia, major settlements in the north included the strategic Orenburg, Pavlodar, and Semi-palatinsk. Further south, the cities of Vernyy, Pish-pek, and Tashkent were critical. Some of these cities, such as Tashkent, Bukhara, Samarkand, and Khiva, were ancient cities with large indigenous populations. Others were Russian-dominated settlements. Railway lines connected all of these cities by the early twentieth century, making it easier for Russians to travel through the region.
The Bolshevik Revolution and Civil War were periods of great turmoil in Central Asia. It was not until 1922 that the Red Army forces under General Frunze were able to quell all significant opposition to the regime-both “White Army” forces and nationalist movements representing indigenous groups. The last “Basmachi” incursion into Central Asia took place in 1936, by which time the region was firmly in Soviet hands.
Throughout the Soviet period, Central Asia remained a source of raw materials. A more sinister usage of Central Asia for the Soviet state was the creation of detention camps within the Gulag system. Located in the western regions of Kazakhstan,
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Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan-around the Aral Sea-these camps held thousands of political prisoners through the 1980s. In addition, Central Asia remained a “destination of exile” for other political dissidents who were forced to move from Russia proper. Indeed, this “tradition” predated the Soviet era. Under Josef Stalin, entire ethnic groups were deported to Central Asia, especially in the 1940s. Chechens, Crimean Tatars, Volga German, and others were sent to Central Asia as they were suspected of being Nazi sympathizers during World War II. Koreans that traditionally lived in the Soviet Union near the Korean peninsula were also deported to Central Asia in the 1950s. It was not until the 1980s that many of these peoples were able to return to their native lands.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the independent states of Central Asia have remained important to Russia. For much of the 1990s, indeed, Russian leaders considered it part of their “Near Abroad.” Even in the early twenty-first century, there is a sense that Central Asia is part of the Russian national security interest region. Trade relations, although decreasing since the Soviet era, remain significant. Energy transfer routes often pass through Russia and many communication links are still northward. There is also a cultural link that is somewhat important to Russia. Several million Russians continue to live in Central Asia, particularly in Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic. While this was often deemed a source of potential conflict, it is more the case that Russians living in Central Asia will become less attached to Russia proper as time passes.
One interesting trend that has taken place since the early 1990s is the change in nomenclature in the region. In Turkmenistan, for example, the city of Krasnovodsk has been renamed Turkmenbashi (after the current Turkmen president). In Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and the Kyrgyz Republic, there have been some changes of names for mountains (Pik Somoni instead of Pik Kommunizm in Tajikistan) and regions (“wiloyat” instead of “oblast”). One finds the most significant name changes in Kazakhstan. Semipalatinsk has been renamed Se-mei, Alma-Ata has been renamed Almaty, and Ak-mola has been renamed Astana, to name a few. This sort of “cosmetic change” is important in the development of regional identities and is expected to continue. In addition, the use of Russian language and the Cyrillic alphabet are decreasing, further noting a cultural distancing from Russia. Ultimately, Central Asia remains important to Russia, but in a limited way. Central Asian countries have increased their ties to other countries, such as China, Turkey, and the United States. In addition, as energy exports from Central Asia increase, Russia will find itself sharing influence in the region. See also: BASMACHIS; COLONIAL EXPANSION; GULAG; KAZAKHSTAN AND KAZAKHS; ISLAM; KYRGYZSTAN AND KYRGYZ; NEAR ABROAD; TAJIKISTAN AND TAJIKS; TURKENISTAN AND TURKMEN; UZBEKISTAN AND UZBEKS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Allison, Roy and Johnson, Lena, eds. (2001). Central Asian Security: The New International Context. London: RIIA. Allworth, Edward, ed. (1994). Central Asia: 130 Years of Russia Dominance, A Historical Overview. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Bennigsen, Alexandre, and Wimbush, S. Enders. (1985). Muslims of the Soviet Empire: A Guide. London: C. Hurst and Company. Grousset, Rene. (1970). The Empire of the Steppes: A History of Central Asia, tr. Naomi Walford. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press. Hopkirk, Peter. (1994). The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia. New York: Kodansha International. Khalid, Adeeb. (1998). The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia. Berkeley: The University of California Press. Olcott, Martha Brill. (1996). Central Asia’s New States: Independence, Foreign Policy, and Regional Security. Washington, DC: USIP Press. Oliker, Olga, and Szayana, Thomas S., eds. (2003). Fault-lines of Conflict in Central Asia and the South Caucasus: Implications for the U.S. Army. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation. Roi, Yaacov, ed. (1995). Muslim Eurasia: Conflicting Legacies. London: Frank Cass. Roy, Olivier. (2000). The New Central Asia: The Creation of Nations. New York: NYU Press.
ROGER KANGAS
CENTRAL BANK OF RUSSIA
The Central Bank of Russia (CBR) is the highest monetary authority in the Russian Federation. It sets
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
and carries out Russian monetary policy, supervises the commercial banking system, and maintains the payments system. In addition, it holds majority ownership in Vneshtorgbank (Russia’s state-controlled foreign trade bank) and Sberbank (the state savings bank). The Russian Constitution (ratified in December 1993) and the “Revised Law on the Central Bank” (passed in April 1995, modifying the 1990 Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic “Law on the Central Bank”) jointly provide the legal basis for its activities. Both the constitution and t
he revised law grant the CBR a high degree of formal independence from the government. While scholars disagree over the extent of the CBR’s actual political independence during the post-communist transition, all concur that its policies played a pivotal role in Russian economic development.
The Russian Republic founded the CBR in July 1990, and Georgy Matyukhin, an academic, became its first director. This occurred in the context of a fierce sovereignty battle between the Soviet central government led by Mikhail Gorbachev and the Russian republic government led by Boris Yeltsin. Russian authorities transformed a branch of the State Bank of the USSR (Gosbank) into the CBR in an attempt to gain local control over Russian monetary and banking affairs. Both the Soviet and Russian governments subsequently took numerous steps to increase the influence of their respective central banks, and this so-called “war of the banks” represented one of the first efforts by a republic-level institution to pull away from the center. The struggle ended with the dissolution of the USSR in December 1991. On January 1, 1992, the CBR took over the rest of Gosbank’s resources in Russia, and Gosbank officially ceased to exist.
In April 1992, the CBR leadership passed from Matyukhin to former Gosbank director Viktor Gerashchenko. Numerous controversial incidents characterized Gerashchenko’s first tenure as CBR head (1992-1994), such as the July 1992 decision to wipe out mutually accrued debt among Russian enterprises, thereby formally ending Russia’s flirtation with “shock therapy”; the surprise introduction of a new Russian currency in July 1993; and Gerashchenko’s support for the Russian parliament after Yeltsin’s September 1993 decision to disband it. Gerashchenko lost his job in November 1994 as a consequence of the ruble’s exchange rate collapse on “Black Tuesday” (October 11). His deputy Tatiana Paramonova served as acting CBR director until November 1995, when the Russian Duma confirmed former acting finance minister and commercial banker Sergei Dubinin as CBR head. Dubinin was forced out after the massive Russian financial crisis of August 1998, which many blamed on CBR policy. Gerashchenko replaced Dubinin and enjoyed a second stormy tenure at the CBR until his resignation in March 2002. The Duma confirmed Russia’s deputy finance minister, Sergei Ignatiev, as the new director shortly thereafter. See also: BANKING SYSTEM, SOVIET; GOSBANK; SBERBANK.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Central Bank of Russia. (2003). Available from «www .cbr.ru». Johnson, Juliet. (2000). A Fistful of Rubles: The Rise and Fall of the Russian Banking System. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Knight, Malcolm; Arne Petersen; and Robert Price. (1999). Transforming Financial Systems in the Baltics, Russia, and Other Countries of the Former Soviet Union. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. Tompson, William. (1998). “The Politics of Central Bank Independence in Russia.” Europe-Asia Studies 50(7): 1157-1182.
JULIET JOHNSON
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
The Central Committee was one of the central institutions in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), along with the Politburo, Secretariat, party congress, Central Auditing Commission, and Party Control Committee. Given the political system’s centralist, monolithic aspirations, these central institutions bore heavy responsibilities. One of the Central Committee’s main functions was to elect all Party leaders, including members of the Politburo and Secretaries of the Central Committee. The Committee-whose members included powerful people in the Communist Party-met every six months in plenary session to approve decisions by the top levels of the party.
The Central Committee was also considered to be the highest organ of the party between congresses (the period known as the sozyv). According
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to the party rules (Ustav), the Central Committee was supposed to “direct all the activities of the party and the local party organs, carry out the recruitment and the assignment of leading cadres, direct the work of the central governmental and social organizations of the workers, create various organs, institutions, and enterprises of the party and supervise their activities, name the editorial staff of central newspapers and journals working under its auspices, disburse funds of the party budget and verify their accounting.”
However, the Central Committee was large; in 1989, for example, it consisted of more than three hundred members. In actuality then, there were two Central Committees. One of them was the body of elected representatives of the Communist Party. The other was the name used in documents produced for and by any number of smaller Central Committee bodies, from the Politburo to the temporary commissions. Thus, the decrees of the Central Committee were seldom prepared by that body. Instead, the Politburo often initiated, discussed, and finalized them. See also: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION; COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION; POLITBURO; SECRETARIAT
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Hough, Jerry F., and Fainsod, Merle. (1979). How the Soviet Union Is Governed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. McAuley, Mary. (1977). Politics and the Soviet Union. New York: Penguin Books. Schapiro, Leonard Bertram. (1960). The Communist Party of the Soviet Union. New York: Random House.
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were elected as its first members. There was also a network of subordinate local control commissions. During 1921-1922, the Commission was harshly criticized for its part in suppressing factions within the party. On Vladimir Lenin’s initiative, the Twelfth Party Congress in April 1923 expanded the Commission and unified it with the corresponding state control agency Rabkrin (People’s Commissariat of the Workers’ And Peasants’ Inspection). V. V. Kuibyshev, a loyal supporter of General Secretary Josef Stalin, was appointed to head the new joint institution. Meeting in Joint Plenums with the Party’s Central Committee, the Commission henceforth played a major role in formulating policy both on internal party organization and general governmental affairs. In 1927 Grigory K. Ordzho-nikidze took over leadership of the unified control agency. The Commission proved a highly effective tool in Stalin’s consolidation of power, gathering information on support for rival leaders among the party’s membership and later conducting disciplinary proceedings and extensive purges to root out oppositionists. Together with Rabkrin, it also played a major role in initiating and supervising economic policy during industrialization. In November 1930, A. A. Andreyev succeeded as head of the party-state control agency. In October 1931 he was replaced by J. E. Rudzutak. Both agencies were dissolved by the Seventeenth Party Congress (January-February 1934), which created a new Commission of Party Control, subordinated to the Central Committee. See also: CENTRAL COMMITTEE; COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION; RABKRIN
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Rees, E. A. (1987). State Control in Soviet Russia. The Rise and Fall of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate, 1920-1934. Basingstoke, UK: Macmillan.
NICK BARON
CENTRAL CONTROL COMMISSION
The Central Control Commission was the agency of the All-Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) responsible for supervising party administration and discipline between 1920 and 1934.
The Ninth Party Congress established the Commission in September 1920 to oversee the party’s organization and membership, in particular to act against the growth of bureaucratism. F. E. Dz-erzhinskii, E. A. Preobrazhinskii and M. K. Muralov
CENTRAL STATISTICAL AGENCY
The Central Statistical Agency of the Soviet Union and now Russia has had many different names. The latest is Goskomstat Rossiiskovo Federatsii (State Statistical Committee of the Russian Federation). The origins of the institution date from July 25, 1918, when the Council of People’s Commissars decreed the creation of an integrated entity called the
CHAADAYEV, PETER YAKOVLEVICH
Central Statistical Agency (Tsentralnoe statistich-eskoe upravlenie [TsSU]) under its jurisdiction. The first director was Pavel Ilich Popov. Late in the 1920s TsSU operated as an independent people’s commissariat, but was abolished at the beginning of 1930. Its functions were transferred to the state planning agency (Gosplan), operating under the name TsUNKhU. Later, on August 10, 1
948, TsSU was separated from Gosplan, once again becoming a fully independent organ, this time attached to the USSR Council of Ministers. The journal Vestnik sta-tistiki was inaugurated at this time, and TsSU began publishing its documents through Gossta-tizdat. Goskomstat RF’s Economic and Statistical Research Institute was created in 1963 under the name Research Institute for Computer Based Forecasting. The main computing center started soon thereafter in 1967. TsSU was transformed into the Gosudarstvennii Komitet SSSR po statistik (Goskom-stat SSSR) in 1987.
The quality and reliability of Goskomstat’s work has always been controversial among economists East and West. A consensus arose during the Cold War that the statistics were sufficiently accurate to support valid judgments about growth and international comparisons, but this appraisal later appeared misguided. Goskomstat’s data showed Soviet GDP and per capita consumption growth exceeding that of the United States through 1988, a claim inconsistent with the USSR’s internal collapse. See also: ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET; GOSPLAN; POPOV, PAVEL ILICH
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Becker, Abraham. (1969). Soviet National Income 1958- 1964. Berkeley: University of California Press. Bergson, Abram. (1953). “Reliability and Usability of Soviet Statistics: A Summary Appraisal.” American Statistician 7(5):13-16. Bergson, Abram. (1961). The Real National Income of Soviet Russia since 1928. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Central Intelligence Agency. (1982). USSR: Measures of Economic Growth and Development, 1950-80. Washington, DC: Joint Economic Committee of Congress. Goskomstat RF «www.gks.ru». Rosefielde, Steven. (2003). “The Riddle of Post-War Russian Economic Growth: Statistics Lied and Were Misconstrued.” Europe-Asia Studies 55(3):469-481.