Encyclopedia of Russian History

by James Millar

  The Russian Far East has the potential to become part of the emerging Northeast Asian region, drawing together China, Japan, South Korea, and eventually North Korea. First, it would need to resolve tensions between the ten regional administrations, which pressed local agendas during the 1990s, and Moscow, which made efforts at recen-tralization. While there was a brief fear of the local

  481

  FATHERLAND-ALL RUSSIA

  governments banding together to restore the Far Eastern Republic of the early 1920s and gain substantial autonomy, the pendulum tilted toward Moscow; a presidential representative resided in Khabarovsk. Second, territorial disputes with China and Japan must be further resolved, stabilizing tensions over the border. Third, Russia must become confident of the balance of power in the region, overcoming fear that China or another country will dominate. Finally, plans for economic development need firm backing in Moscow, which must recognize that only by opening its eastern border to the outside world can it secure its future as a country facing both the developed European Union and the dynamic Asia-Pacific. See also: BAIKAL-AMUR MAGISTRAL RAILWAY; CHINA, RELATIONS WITH; GEOGRAPHY; TRANS-SIBERIAN RAILWAY

  BIBLIOGRAPHY

  Bradshaw, Michael J., ed. (2001). The Russian Far East and Pacific Asia: Unfulfilled Potential. Richmond, UK: Curzon. Minakir, Pavel A., and Freeze, Gregory L., eds. (1994). The Russian Far East: An Economic Handbook. Ar-monk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. Stephan, John J. (1994). The Russian Far East: A History. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

  GILBERT ROZMAN

  FATHERLAND-ALL RUSSIA

  “Fatherland-All Russia” (Otechestvo-Vsya Rossiya, or OVR) was an alternative “ruling party,” a bloc formed in the summer of 1999 in order to seize power from the weakening Kremlin. The first step towards organization was the formation of the bloc called Fatherland, a political structure created by Moscow mayor Yuri Luzhkov, who had presidential ambitions. Established and registered on December 19, 1998, a full year before Duma elections, Fatherland brought together a number of organizations that appealed to patriotism or paternalism. These included the Congress of Russian Communities (which later left it) and the “Power” movement, as well as the political wing of the reformist trade unions (profsoyuzy), “Union of Labor” and Women of Russia. It also included a handful of influential heads of Luzhkov-oriented regions: Karelia, Komi, Mordvinia, Udmurtia, and the Arkhangelsk, Moscow, Murmansk, Nizhegorod, Novosibirsk, and Yaroslavl oblasts. Prospective politicians, often the mayors of centers, headed the ubiquitous regional branches. This often led to conflict, when two or three local organizations simultaneously claimed to be the area’s regional branch. The material base of “Fatherland” was provided by a powerful consortium of of financial and industrial groups known as the “Moscow clan.”

  Established three months later, the “All Russia” bloc became an alternative gubernatorial political project. The bloc included another dozen influential regional heads, including the leaders of Tatar-stan, Bashkortostan, Petersburg, Irkutsk oblast, among others, as well as a few regional speakers. The mayor of St. Petersburg, Vladimir Yakovlev, became chair of the bloc. Four and a half months before the elections, despite the opposition of the Kremlin, the two powerful gubernatorial blocs were able to unite, advancing the recently retired prime minister, Yevgeny Primakov, as their leader. Soon after their formation, they were joined by a large contingent of the Agrarian Party of Russia, which did not see a future in continuing its association with Zyuganov’s Communist Party.

  Fatherland-All Russia, united not so much by ideology as by a foretaste of full assumption of power, announced an eclectic program. Its main slogan, “Trust only deeds,” drew the voter’s attention to powerful politicians united under the bloc’s banners and to authoritarian governors. The overall agenda of the bloc, including the continuity of ruling power, social peace, and rejection of revolutionary shocks, were combined with concrete programmatic elaborations concerning key questions of economy, politics, and social development. These elaborations went through a series of discussions and were summarized in the form “Notices for the president.” At the core of OVR’s propaganda campaign was the juxtaposition of its candidates with the ruling Kremlin command, along with criticism of Yeltsin and his entourage, an identification of the “family” as the locus of corruption, and allegations of the government’s secrecy and incompetence.

  A crucial moment in the campaign, and the beginning of the end of OVR as a “party of future power,” was a series of explosions in residential areas of Moscow and other cities, and the beginning of a new war in the northern Caucasus. People no longer wanted the economic and social improveFEBRUARY REVOLUTION ments promised by OVR; instead, they wanted the safety and protection provided by a strong government. Although the complex and clumsy propaganda machine of OVR continued to attack Yeltsin, a social question based on new principles took hold and was answered in large part by the new prime minister, Vladimir Putin. The extremely strong public relations campaign of the Kremlin against OVR played its part as well.

  In the end, OVR received 13.3 percent of the votes (third place), losing by nearly half to the KPRF and to the Unity Party that had been created shortly before the elections and had campaigned as a party of regional power. Moreover, nearly half the OVR votes came from four regions whose elites remained loyal to the bloc: Moscow, Moscow oblast, Tatarstan, and Bashkiria. In these regions, the bloc brought forth most of its candidates in districts where they already enjoyed a distinct majority. In the Duma, OVR formed the OVR faction (which delegates from Fatherland joined) and the delegate group called “Regions of Russia,” which opposed the Kremlin for a while. In the absence of ideology and the disagreements associated with it, this factionalism could not continue for long. Beginning in mid-2000, a long process of unification took place, and in December 2000, Unity, Fatherland, and All Russia officially merged into the party “Unity and Fatherland” (“United Russia”) with three co-chairs: Sergei Shoygu, Yuri Luzhkov, and Mintimir Shaymiev. Two weeks later, the new party was registered with the Ministry of Justice. See also: LUZHKOV, YURI MIKHAILOVICH; PRIMAKOV, YEVGENY MAXIMOVICH; UNITY (MEDVED PARTY); WOMEN OF RUSSIA BLOC

  BIBLIOGRAPHY

  McFaul, Michael. (2001). Russia’s Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. McFaul, Michael, and Markov, Sergei. (1993). The Troubled Birth of Russian Democracy: Parties, Personalities, and Programs. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press. McFaul, Michael; Petrov, Nikolai; and Ryabov, Andrei, eds. (1999). Primer on Russia’s 1999 Duma Elections. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Reddaway, Peter, and Glinski, Dmitri. (2001). The Tragedy of Russia’s Reforms: Market Bolshevism against Democracy. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press.

  NIKOLAI PETROV

  FEAST BOOKS

  Special paraliturgical books that register the annual commemorative meals in a monastic community throughout the calendar year.

  Formally the Feast books are similar to Western late medieval anniversary books in parishes and brotherhoods. The Russian term for “feast book” is kormovye kniga, literally “feeding book.” Kormy, “feedings,” in memory of the deceased, correspond functionally and genetically to anniversary meals in Byzantine monasteries as well as in Western communities. The Russian term reflects the idea that by means of the donation, on the basis of which the meal is established, the monks become guests of the donor. “Feeding” the monks equals alms to the poor, in return for which the monks offer their liturgical services. Kormy were the most representative and most expensive form of commemoration in Muscovite Russia. Regular kormy usually took place on the anniversary of death or on the name day of the deceased. In earlier times, the dates of kormy were registered within the Us-tav, the liturgical Rule. Probably as early as the beginning of the sixteenth century, monasteries began to register the dates separately in special Feast Books, but the preserved manuscripts derive only from the last third of that century and from the se
venteenth century. The entries range from brief notation of date and name of the commemorated person to elaborate detail concerning donor and donation, the food to be served, and the burial place within the monastery. Some Feast Books additionally specify the menu throughout the year and contain instructions concerning discipline of the brethren, services, distribution of alms, and related matters. See also: DONATION BOOKS; SOROKOUST

  BIBLIOGRAPHY

  Steindorff, Ludwig. (1995). “Commemoration and Administrative Techniques in Muscovite Monasteries.” Russian History/Histoire Russe 22:433-454.

  LUDWIG STEINDORFF

  FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

  The February Revolution (which, according to New Style dates, actually took place in March) developed out of a wave of industrial strikes in Petrograd from

  FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

  January to March 1917. It gathered force when workers at Russia’s largest factory were locked out on March 7 and when women workers at a few factories, angered by the food shortages, marched out from their factories on March 8 demanding bread. Men at nearby factories joined them, and over the next two days antigovernment demonstrations grew to include most of the industrial work force. By March 10 they were joined by students and broad sections of the urban lower and middle classes. Soldiers who were called out to help break up demonstrations acted with reluctance. The government’s ordering of troops to fire into the crowds on March 11 broke the fragile bonds of discipline among the soldiers, who were mostly recent draftees with the same grievances as the demonstrators. A revolt by one detachment of the Volyn-sky Guard Regiment the morning of March 12 (February 27 O.S.) quickly spread to other regiments. By midday the government lost control of the means of armed coercion and collapsed.

  To this point the revolution had been mainly a popular revolt, with little leadership. What there was came from socialist activists at the factory level and from individuals who emerged as organizers of factory demonstrations and leaders in attacks on police stations and other symbols of authority. The revolutionary parties, whose main leaders were in exile, played few leadership roles before March 12. But leadership was necessary to consolidate the revolution that had taken place in the streets. Two groups stepped forward on March 12. One was a group of Duma leaders who had watched the events of the preceding days, concerned about their implications for the war effort but also realizing that this might offer the long-sought opportunity to force Tsar Nicholas II to reform the government. That evening they formed a “Temporary Committee of the State Duma,” which would take governmental responsibility in Petrograd. They opened negotiations with the army high command to secure its support in forcing Nicholas to make concessions. The involvement of these respected public figures proved vital in the following days.

  At the same time, a multiparty group of socialist intellectuals met at the Duma building and led workers and soldiers in the formation of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies. This was a more avowedly revolutionary body, committed to making the street revolt into a sweeping social and economic as well as political revolution. The Duma Committee and the Petrograd Soviet leaders immediately, if warily, began to cooperate to consolidate the February Revolution and to form a new government. On March 15 they announced formation of a Provisional Government that would govern Russia until a new governmental system could be created by a Constituent Assembly, which was to be elected by universal franchise. The same day Nicholas II gave way to the reality of events and the pressures from his army commanders, and abdicated. News of the revolution in Petrograd sparked mostly peaceful revolutions in the cities and towns of Russia. New city governments, drawn primarily from liberal circles of educated society, replaced the old government authorities, while alongside them local soviets of workers and soldiers deputies sprang up.

  The new government was drawn primarily from the liberal political leadership of the country. Its head, the minister-president, was Prince G. E. Lvov, a well-known liberal. The socialist Petrograd Soviet leaders promised to support the new government insofar as it pursued policies of which they approved. This political situation, however, was very unstable. The existence of the Petrograd Soviet alongside the Provisional Government robbed the latter of much of its actual authority, giving rise to what quickly was dubbed “dual-authority” (dvoyevlastie). The government had the generally recognized official authority and responsibility but not the effective power, while the Soviet had the actual power but not responsibility for governing. This situation emerged because the Soviet commanded the primary loyalty of the industrial workers and garrison soldiers, the main bases of power in Petrograd, and could call on this support in a conflict with the government.

  The February Revolution resulted not merely in the overthrow of the monarchy and creation of a new government, but in an unleashing of popular self-assertion and the formation of thousands of organizations dedicated to expressing popular aspirations. Factory committees, soldiers’ committees, trade and professional unions, cultural clubs, minority nationalist organizations, feminist groups, householders’ associations, and other organizations were created to safeguard and advance the interests and hopes of the population in its varied identities. These became a major force in the later unfolding of the revolution as they asserted themselves and as political parties and leaders struggled to articulate their demands and win their allegiance. Gaining control over popular activism became one of the key tasks of the political elites and would-be leaders of the revolution.

  FEBRUARY REVOLUTION

  As the new political system was unstable, it took some time for the main contours of power to become clear. While political parties remained important, three broad political blocs quickly emerged: liberals, moderate socialists, and radical left socialists. The liberals, represented especially by the Cadet Party (Constitutional Democrats), dominated the first Provisional Government and then shared it in coalition with the moderate socialists from May to October. The moderate socialists-the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries (SRs) pre-dominantly-were the main force in the Petrograd and most other soviets around the country. The radical left-Bolsheviks, left-wing Mensheviks, and SRs, anarchists-were at first a small minority voice, but soon grew as the alternative to the “coalition” of liberals and moderate socialists when the Provisional Government failed to satisfy popular aspirations. Socialism was the overwhelming political position in 1917, and therefore the conflict between the moderate and radical socialists determined the main course of politics in 1917.

  The moderate socialists, primarily Mensheviks and SRs, took form first. A key development here was the return of a group of socialist exiles from Siberia in March. Under the leadership of Irakli Tsereteli, a Georgian Menshevik, they established the policy of Revolutionary Defensism as the basic policy of the Petrograd Soviet (and, in fact, for most soviets in the country). Revolutionary Defensism spoke to the desire of the populace for an end to the war by calling for a general negotiated peace based on the principle of self-determination of nations and without annexations or indemnities. At the same time it addressed still strong patriotism by calling for continued defense of the country until this peace could be achieved. The Revolutionary Defensists also were willing to cooperate with the liberals in the Provisional Government, and beginning in May some of their leaders entered the government in what was called “coalition” governments-that is, ones with liberals and socialists, after massive antiwar demonstrations underscored the weakness of the government and strength of the Soviet.

  A radical left opposition to these policies existed from the beginning, but received a major reinforcement by the return of political exiles from Western Europe. The most important of these proved to be Vladimir Lenin, who electrified politics on his return in April by denouncing not only the government, but also the policy of the dominant Revolutionary Defensists. This made the Bolsheviks relatively impotent in the optimistic mood of the spring of 1917, but positioned them to receive the support of the dissatisfied sections of the popul
ation in the summer and fall as the policies of the Revolutionary Defensists and the Provisional Government failed to find a way out of the war or to solve domestic problems.

  The Provisional Government initiated important and far-reaching reforms, especially in areas of civil rights and individual and group freedoms. However, the new leadership faced almost unsolv-able problems. The desire for peace was immense, and failure to make progress on ending the war undermined both the Provisional Government and the Revolutionary Defensist leaders of the Petrograd Soviet. This problem was compounded by an enormously unpopular, and unsuccessful, military offensive in the summer, which drove the soldiers and many others leftward politically. The government also failed to move swiftly to meet the peasantry’s expectations for land reform. During the summer and early fall the economy deteriorated rapidly, food and other goods became ever scarcer, crime rose, and other social and economic problems multiplied, along with rising social tensions. Demands for autonomy or even separatism grew among some of the national minorities. The cumulative problems gave rise by June to a call for “All Power to the Soviets,” a call for a more radical, soviet-based, government that would act more vigorously to end the war and solve the many problems. This resulted in massive street demonstrations in favor of soviet power in July (the “July Days”). This in turn was followed by an attack on the government from the right on September 9-13, the unsuccessful putsch by General Lavr Kornilov. Meanwhile, the Provisional Government was unstable, undergoing fundamental restructuring (accompanied by violence and major crises) in May, July, and September. During one of these Alexander Kerensky, a moderate socialist, became head of the government on July 21.