Encyclopedia of Russian History
Page 127
CAROL GAYLE WILLIAM MOSKOFF
FREEMASONRY
Freemasonry came to Russia as part of the eighteenth-century expansion that made the craft a global phenomenon. Although at first it was one of several social institutions, including salons, societies, and clubs, that made their way to Russia in the course of Westernization, Freemasonry soon acquired considerable importance, evolving into a widespread, variegated, and much vilified social movement.
Despite the legends that attributed the origins of Russian Freemasonry to Peter the Great (who purportedly received his degree from Christopher Wren), the first reliable evidence places the beginnings of the craft in Russia in the 1730s and early 1740s. The movement expanded in the latter half of the eighteenth century, especially between 1770 and 1790, when more than a hundred lodges were created in St. Petersburg, Moscow, and the provinces.
Freemasonry was an important element of the Russian Enlightenment and played a central role in the evolution of Russia’s public sphere and civil society. The lodges were self-governed and open to free men (but not women) of almost every nationality, rank, and walk of life, with the notable exception of serfs. While many lodges were nothing but glorified social clubs, there were numerous brethren who saw themselves as on a mission to reform humankind and battle Russia’s perceived “barbarity” by means of charity and self-improvement. They regarded the lodges as havens of righteousness and nurseries of virtue in a depraved world.
The history of Russian Freemasonry followed a tortuous path. Most of the lodges, especially in the provinces, were short-lived, and Russian Freemasonry was very fragmented. Some lodges were subordinated to the Grand Lodge of England; others belonged to the Swedish Rite, the Strict Observance, or some other jurisdiction. Contemporaries made a distinction between Freemasonry proper and Martinism, a mystical strand in the movement that claimed the famous mystic Claude Saint-Martin as its founder. A group of Moscow Rosicrucians headed by Johann-Georg Schwarz and Nikolai Ivanovich Novikov were the most important Martinists. Often referred to as “Novikov’s circle,” they enjoyed close ties with the university, the government, and even the local diocese and initiated numerous educational and charitable initiatives, such as the Friendly Learned Society, the Typographical Company, and the Philological Seminary. Novikov’s circle was an important episode in the history of the Russian Enlightenment. Its activities, however, came to an end in 1792, when Novikov was arrested, interrogated, and sentenced to life in prison.
Many aspects of the so-called Novikov affair are still unclear. The government of Catherine II may have had political motives for arresting Novikov, given the Rosicrucians’ ties to foreign powers as well as to the future Emperor Paul I and his entourage. The affair may also, in large part, have been caused by the fear of occult secret societies and anti-Masonic sentiment that was spreading through Europe. Anti-Masonry later became an important political factor in imperial and post-Soviet Russia.
Russian Freemasonry enjoyed a brief period of relatively unhampered existence in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The craft counted among its members practically every politician, military leader, and intellectual of note, including Mikhail Kutuzov and Alexander Pushkin; many of the Decembrists belonged to the Astrea lodge in St. Petersburg. After 1822, when Alexander I imposed
521
FRENCH INFLUENCE IN RUSSIA
a ban on all secret societies, the situation changed. The ban, confirmed by Nicholas I in 1826, signified the official end of Freemasonry, although some clandestine lodges continued to operate, particularly during a brief revival on the eve of World War I. Freemasonry was again outlawed in Soviet Russia in the early 1920s. The ban ended in the 1990s, when the French National Grand Lodge established lodges in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Voronezh, and chapters of the Ancient and Accepted Scottish Rite were also organized. See also: CATHERINE II; ENLIGHTENMENT, IMPACT OF; NOVIKOV, NIKOLAI IVANOVICH; PAUL I
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Smith, Douglas. (1999). Working the Rough Stone: Freemasonry and Society in Eighteenth-Century Russia. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press.
OLGA TSAPINA
FRENCH INFLUENCE IN RUSSIA
The first real manifestations of the influence of France in Russia date from Russia’s first political opening toward Europe, undertaken by Peter the Great (r. 1682-1725) and further advanced by Catherine II (r. 1762-1796). In the first instance, this influence was cultural. The adoption of the French language as the language of conversation and correspondence by the nobility encouraged access to French literature. The nobility’s preference for French governesses and tutors contributed to the spread of French culture and educational methods among the aristocracy. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, the Russian nobility still preferred French to Russian for everyday use, and were familiar with French authors such as Jean de la Fontaine, George Sand, Eugene Sue, Victor Hugo, and Honor? de Balzac.
The influence of France was equally strong in the area of social and political ideas. Catherine II’s interest in the writings of the philosophers of the Enlightenment-Baron Montesquieu, Jean Le Rond d’Alembert, Voltaire, and Denis Diderot- contributed to the spread of their ideas in Russia during the eighteenth century. The empress conducted regular correspondence with Voltaire, and received Diderot at her court. Convinced that it was her duty to civilize Russia, she encouraged the growth of a critical outlook and, as an extension of this, of thought regarding Russian society and a repudiation of serfdom, which had consequences following her own reign.
The support of Catherine II for the spirit of the Enlightenment was nonetheless shaken by the French Revolution of 1789. It ceased entirely with the execution of King Louis XVI (January 1793). The empress was unable to accept such a radical challenge to the very foundations of autocratic rule. From the close of her reign onward, restrictions on foreign travel increased, and contacts were severely curtailed. Despite this change, however, liberal ideas that had spread during the eighteenth century continued to circulate throughout Russia during the nineteenth, and the French Revolution continued to have a persistent influence on the political ideas of Russians. When travel resumed under Alexander I (ruled 1801-1825), Russians once again began to travel abroad for pleasure or study. This stimulated liberal ideas that pervaded progressive and radical political thought in Russia during the nineteenth century. The welcome that France extended to political exiles strengthened its image as a land of liberty and of revolution.
During the nineteenth century, travel in France was considered a form of cultural and intellectual apprenticeship. Study travel abroad by Russians, as well as trips to Russia by the French, shared a common cultural space, encouraging exchanges most notably in the areas of fine arts, sciences, and teaching. Because they shared geopolitical interests vis ? vis Germany and Austria-Hungary, France and Russia were drawn together diplomatically and economically after 1887. This resulted, in December 1893, in the ratification of a defensive alliance, the French-Russian military pact. At the same time, French investment capital helped finance the modernization of the Russian economy. Between 1890 and 1914, numerous French industrial and banking houses established themselves in Russia. French and Belgian capital supplied the larger part of the flow of investment funds, the largest share of which went into mining, metallurgy, chemicals, and especially railroads. The largest French banks, notably the Cr?dit Lyonnais, made loans to or invested in Russian companies. Public borrowing by the Russian state, totaling between eleven and twelve billion gold francs, was six times greater than direct investment on the part of the French.
On the eve of 1914, there were twelve thousand French nationals in Russia. Forty consuls were in the country looking out for French interests. French newspapers had permanent correspondents
FRENCH WAR OF 1812
in St. Petersburg. In 1911, l’Institut Fran?ais (a French institute) was created there to help spread French culture in Russia. In fact, from the 1890s onward, France’s cultural presence in Russia was consisten
tly viewed as an adjunct to its policy of industrial and commercial implantation.
Following the close of the nineteenth century, the role of France as a land that welcomed political exiles and refugees had a reciprocal influence on the countries from which they came. When they returned to Russia, some of these individuals brought back ideas as well as social, pedagogical, and political experiences. For example, the experience acquired by Maxim Kovalevsky (1851-1916), professor of law and sociology, as the head of the Ecole sup?rieure russe des sciences sociales de Paris (the Russian Advanced School for Social Sciences in Paris), founded in 1901, served to organize the Uni-versit? populaire Shanyavsky in Moscow (the Shanyavsky People’s University), founded in 1908.
After the October Revolution of 1917, Paris, along with Berlin and Prague, was one of the three principal cities of Russian emigration in Europe. A hub of intellectual activity from the 1920s onward, the French capital was among the leading centers abroad for publishing Russian newspapers and books, of which a portion subsequently made its way into Russia, thereby helping to bind the emigrant population with Soviet Russians back home. The suspension of scientific and cultural relations between the USSR and the rest of the world, starting in the mid-1930s, put an end to this exchange.
The cultural influence of France did not disappear, however. Beginning in 1954, new attempts were made to bring France and the USSR closer together, beginning with cultural exchanges. During that year the Com?die fran?aise made a triumphant tour of the Soviet Union. Later, the trip by General Charles de Gaulle, in June of 1966, marked the beginning of a time of privileged relations between the two countries. A joint commission was created to foster exchange, and numerous cultural agreements were signed, some of which remained in effect during the early twenty-first century. French teaching assistants were appointed in Soviet universities, the teaching of French was expanded at the secondary school level, and agreements were signed for the distribution of French films in the USSR.
In the end, in the perception of the Russian people, France has remained the country of the Revolution of 1789 and the homeland of the Rights of Man. From the 1960s onward, French intellectuals outside of Russia strengthened this image by supporting the cause of Soviet dissidents. It is again in the name of human rights that France has attempted, since 1994, to soften the position of the Russian government with regard to Chechnya. See also: CATHERINE II; ENLIGHTENMENT, IMPACT OF; FRANCE, RELATIONS WITH
BIBLIOGRAPHY
De Madariaga, Isabel. (1998). Politics and Culture in Eighteenth-Century Russia. London: Longman. Kaufman, Peter H. (1994). The Solidarity of a Philosophe: Diderot, Russia, and the Soviet Union. New York: P. Lang. Raeff, Marc. (1994). Political Ideas and Institutions in Imperial Russia. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Riasanovsky, Nicholas. (1999). A History of Russia, 6th ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Shlapentokh, Dmitry. (1996). The French Revolution in Russian Intellectual Life, 1865-1905. Westport, CT: Praeger. Voltaire. (1974). Voltaire and Catherine the Great: Selected Correspondence. Cambridge, MA: Oriental Research Partners. Wesling, Molly W. (2001). Napoleon in Russian Cultural Mythology. New York: P. Lang.
MARTINE MESPOULET
FRENCH WAR OF 1812
The French war of 1812 was one of the most decisive conflicts of modern times. Napoleon crossed the Russian frontier on June 24, 1812, with more than 650,000 troops, and just a few months later recrossed the frontier, defeated, with less than one-tenth of that number. Although winter played a role in the deaths of tens of thousands of French soldiers during the retreat, Russia won the campaign through a skillful withdrawal and the careful selection of battlefields. Napoleon contributed to his own disaster by failing to provide adequately for an extended campaign in terms both of supplies and of reinforcements.
Originally Russia had contemplated an invasion of French-held Poland, but the Russian commander, Mikhail B. Barclay de Tolly, quickly changed the plan. When Napoleon crossed the frontier, Barclay de Tolly intended to have his First Army withdraw to a fortified camp at Drissa, luring
FRENCH WAR OF 1812
Napoleon’s main body behind it. While Napoleon attacked the camp, Peter I. Bagration’s Second Army was to fall on the French rear, destroying the invading army. The plan was abandoned and the retreat began when the Russians realized that Napoleon’s force was more than twice as large as they had believed.
The Russian armies had been drawn up with a considerable gap between them, and Napoleon drove right through it, intending to keep them separated. Barclay de Tolly and Bagration naturally wished to link up before they accepted battle, but were unable to do so before reaching Smolensk in mid-August. Facing ever-increasing pressure from Tsar Alexander to fight, Barclay de Tolly prepared to accept battle supported by Smolensk’s impressive walls. Napoleon, however, attempted to envelop the Russian position rather than attack head-on. As Barclay de Tolly became aware of this movement, he decided once again that discretion was the better part of valor and withdrew from Smolensk rather than risk losing his army.
Frustrated by this continued retreating and also by the bickering between Barclay de Tolly and Bagration, neither of whom was prepared to take orders from the other, Alexander appointed Mikhail I. Kutuzov as overall commander of what was now effectively an army group comprising two armies marching together. Despite Alexander’s continued prodding, Kutuzov continued the retreat. As he neared Moscow, he recognized that he would have to give battle before abandoning Russia’s ancient capital, and so he selected the field near Borodino, which he prepared with field fortifications.
Napoleon, chastened by his experience at Smolensk and desperate for a decisive battle, refused the advice of his subordinates to envelop the Russian position at Borodino and on September 7 launched a bloody frontal assault instead. The Russian army held, and Kutuzov mustered it to continue its retreat that night. Barely pausing in Moscow, Kutuzov withdrew to the south in order to prevent Napoleon from marching into the rich fields of Ukraine to replenish his supplies, and also to protect Russian reinforcements coming from those regions. Napoleon occupied Moscow on September 14 and remained in the city for more than a month before abandoning it on October 18. During the French occupation, the city was destroyed almost completely in an enormous fire, although the exact cause of the blaze remains unclear and controversial to this day. Having decided to leave Moscow when Alexander refused to make any move toward peace, Napoleon tried to march southward but found Ku-tuzov’s army arrayed against him at Maloyaroslavets. The bloody battle there on October 24-25 forced Napoleon back to the Warsaw-Moscow highway along which he had originally invaded, and he began the long retreat by the way he had come.
Napoleon’s retreating forces suffered horribly. They had eaten most of the supplies along the road on their inward march, and the Russians had deliberately pursued a scorched-earth policy to destroy the remaining supplies. The burning of Moscow had also deprived Napoleon of valuable supplies, and when Kutuzov cut him off from Ukraine, the fate of the Grande Arm?e was sealed. All the way back to the Russian border, peasants, Cossacks, and Russian regular troops harried the French, who died in droves. The Russians attempted to cut off the French retreat altogether at the Battle of the Berezina on November 27-28. Although Napoleon managed to batter his way through, his casualties were staggering. When the remnants of the French army struggled across the Russian frontier, one of the most powerful armies ever assembled to that point in history had been virtually wiped out.
It is customary to credit the Russian winter with the destruction of the French army, but this notion is greatly exaggerated. The most critical events in the campaign-Napoleon’s initial operations, the maneuver at Smolensk, the Battle of Borodino, the seizure of Moscow, and even the Battle of Maloyaroslavets-were fought before hard cold and snow set in. The Russian army was forced to confront the vast French force on its own without climatological aids for four months, and literally hundreds of thousands of French soldiers perished in that time. The hard winter that followed merely added
to the misery and completed the destruction of a French force that had already been defeated by Russian arms.
The invasion of Russia set the stage for the collapse of Napoleon’s hegemony in Europe. In the wake of Napoleon’s flight, the Prussian auxiliary corps he had forced to advance into the Baltic States made peace with the Russia on its own accord and committed Prussia to fight against France. As Russian forces crossed their own frontier and marched westward, Austria, Britain, and Sweden were persuaded to join the now-victorious Russian army,
FRUNZE, MIKHAIL VASILIEVICH
and the final coalition against Napoleon was born. By catalyzing this last great and victorious coalition, the War of 1812 marked a profound turning point in European history and also in Russian history. Pursuing the French back to France, Russian troops found themselves in Paris itself. Alexander committed himself absolutely to a prominent role in the affairs of the entire European continent. Russian soldiers who had the unique chance to see the French capital, on the other hand, would ultimately become so frustrated with Alexander’s conservative regime as to stage the Decembrist Rebellion in 1825. The costs of this greatest of Russian victories were, in every respect, staggering. See also: BORODINO, BATTLE OF; DECEMBRIST MOVEMENT AND REBELLION; FRANCE, RELATIONS WITH; HOLY ALLIANCE; KUTUZOV, MIKHAIL ILARIONOVICH; QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE AND QUINTUPLE ALLIANCE
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Duffy, Christopher. (1973). Borodino and the War of 1812. New York: Scribner. Tarle, Evgeny Viktorovich. (1942). Napoleon’s Invasion of Russia, 1812. New York: Oxford University Press.
FREDERICK W. KAGAN
station several thousand troops along the Bank Line (Bereg), an especially vulnerable 250-kilometer (155.3-mile) stretch of the Oka between Kolomna and Kaluga, every spring and summer. By century’s end the Abatis Line (Zasechnaya cherta), an additional network of forest abatis and fortifications almost 1,000 kilometers (620 miles) in span, had arisen another 100 kilometers (62 miles) farther south; the field army was restationed along it, providing central Muscovy with greater defense in depth and also encouraging military colonization of the forest-steppe zone. From 1637 to 1658 a new Belgorod Line was built along most of the southern edge of the forest-steppe, from Akhtyrka in northeastern Ukraine to Chelnavsk; it consisted of earthen fortifications built in the new Dutch manner, as well as abatis, and linked twenty-five garrison towns. From 1646 it became the new line of deployment for the corps of the southern field army as well as a place d’armes for aggressive operations down the Don (against the Crimean Khanate and the Ottoman fortress of Azov) and in Ukraine (against the Commonwealth during the Thirteen Years War). In 1679-1680 most of the steppe along the Northern Donets and Oskol rivers was enclosed behind yet another new line, the Izyuma Line, another 160 kilometers (99.42 miles) southeast of the Belgorod Line.