Encyclopedia of Russian History

by James Millar

  However, with the social revolution that started in 1929, the policy of korenizatsya got into a conflict that some researchers consider to have caused its end. The forced industrialization promoted centralization and Russification. The modernization demand of the Bolsheviks collided with the promise of korenizatsya to respect local customs. The women’s policy in Central Asia is an example of this conflict. Collectivization was even more strongly perceived as an attack on the nationalities. National autonomy, which could have provided a framework for organized resistance to collectivization, was revoked by the Stalinist state power and increasingly relegated to formal elements. National communists were eliminated. Many of the indigenous elites produced by the ko-renizatsya program frequently did not survive the purges of 1937 and 1938. However, they were replaced by new, compliant cadres of the same ethnic group.

  Especially when viewed against the background of the rigid Russification policy of tsarist Russia, the korenizatsya policy can be considered to represent significant progress in the treatment of the nationalities. In the cultural area the achievements of korenizatsya still continue to have an effect up to the present day. They provided an important foundation for the relatively smooth emergence of independent national states after the breakup of the USSR in 1991. Of course, it should be noted that the federal structure of the Soviet State had a centrally organized Communist Party opposite it, which, together with the state security organs, was always in a position to limit national autonomy, or, if the party required it, even to eliminate it

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  KORMCHAYA KNIGA

  entirely. Thus, in the time after 1935, the blossoming of the nationalities was purely a propaganda backdrop, in front of which the Father of Nations (that is, Stalin) staged his increasingly Great Russia-oriented policy. See also: KOMI; NATIONALISM IN THE SOVIET UNION; NATIONALITIES POLICIES, SOVIET; SAKHA AND YAKUTS; TURKMENISTAN AND TURKMEN; UKRAINE AND UKRAINIANS vised version, which, although severely criticized by the Old Believers, remained the official code. The Holy Synod reprinted Nikon’s version in 1787 and reissued it in 1804, 1810, 1816, and 1834. In 1889 Patriarch Joseph’s Kormchaya was reprinted and used by a sect of Old Believers. It was reprinted again in St. Petersburg in 1912 and 1913. See also: NIKON, PATRIARCH; OLD BELIEVERS; PATRIARCHY; ORTHODOXY; RUSSIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH

  BIBLIOGRAPHY

  Martin, Terry. (2001). The Affirmative Action Empire. Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. Simon, Gerhard. (1991). Nationalism and Policy toward the Nationalities in the Soviet Union: From Totalitarian Dictatorship to Post-Stalinist Society. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Smith, Jeremy. (1999). The Bolsheviks and the National Question, 1917-1923. New York: St. Martin’s Press.

  ROBERT MAIER

  KORMCHAYA KNIGA

  The Kormchaya Kniga, also known as the Navigator’s Chart (Map) or The Pilot’s Book, is the Slavic version of the Greek laws known as the Nomocanon. The first Slavic translation of the Greek Nomocanon was probably made by St. Methodius in the second half of the ninth century. It included the canons found in the “Syntagma of Fifty Titles” and the first Slavic manual of laws called the “Court Law of the People” (Zakon sudny lyudem). The Ko-rmchaya usually contained information such as Apostolic canons, decrees of the first four Ecumenical Councils, resolutions of local synods, instructions of the Church Fathers, and imperial edicts on church issues. It became the guide for ecclesiastical courts and church affairs in Rus. Before the seventeenth century, no single copy of the Ko-rmchaya served as the official code of the Russian Church. A copy assumed local authority when a bishop made it the law of his eparchy. Consequently, by the beginning of the seventeenth century, the diversity of materials in the many existing copies created confusion. Around 1649 Patriarch Joseph, concerned by this ambiguity, arranged for a correct version of church laws to be published. In 1650, the first printed Kormchaya appeared, but three years later Patriarch Nikon published a reBIBLIOGRAPHY Dewey, H. W., and Kleimola, Ann M., tr. (1977). “Za-kon sudnyi liudem.” Michigan Slavic Studies 14. Zuzek, Ivan. (1964). Kormcaja kniga: Studies on the Chief Code of Russian Canon Law. Rome: Pont. Institutum Orientalium Studiorum.

  MARTIN DIMNIK

  KORMLENIE

  Old Russian term that describes a specific system of remunerating state officials.

  Loosely translated as “feeding,” Kormlenieu meant that princes awarded their servitors lands from which tribute could be extracted. Part of what was taken would be passed on to the prince, and the remainder would be kept.

  In a situation of general poverty, where there was insufficient money to pay for needed troops, it may have seemed rational to offer kormlenie, but as that system came to form the basis for financing an emerging state bureaucracy, its serious drawbacks became apparent.

  One problem was the lack of effective controls over how much was extracted; another, that the subjects would be drawn into complex patterns of personalized relations, where all distinctions between public and private were eroded. Above all, kormlenieu constituted a serious obstacle to the introduction of a money economy.

  Under Tsar Peter the Great an attempt was made to replace kormleniei by the payment of wages, but under his successors persistent shortages of money caused a reversal to the old policies of allowing officials to live off the land.

  Even in the Soviet era, one might well interpret the positions of local party bosses as similar to those of the holders of old kormlenie, who were alKORNILOV AFFAIR lowed to help themselves to whatever they felt that their fiefdoms could offer. See also: ECONOMY, TSARIST

  BIBLIOGRAPHY

  Pipes, Richard. (1974). Russia Under the Old Regime. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.

  STEFAN HEDLUND

  Following the democratic revolution in Hungary, Kornai argued for fiscal restraint, particularly in the payment of pensions, so that Hungary could invest more for growth. See also: ECONOMIC GROWTH, SOVIET

  MARTIN C. SPECHLER

  KORMOVYE KNIGI See FEAST BOOKS.

  KORNAI, JANOS

  (b. 1928), economist.

  Janos Kornai was educated in Budapest and became professor of economics in the Institute of Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 1967 and at Harvard University in 1986.

  In Overcentralization in Economic Administration (1957) Kornai was one of the first in the Soviet bloc to show the defects of central planning and argue for more decentralization and use of financial and market methods in guiding the socialist economy. His Mathematical Planning of Structural Decisions (1967; second edition 1975) developed the idea of two-level planning.

  Kornai attempted to apply organizational and information theory, as well as management science, to analyze the advanced socialist economy in his Anti-Equilibrium (1971). He employed non-equilibrium concepts to replace the Walrasian market-clearing of standard neoclassical theory. Along these lines, his Economics of Shortage (2 vols., 1980) pictured an economy, like Hungary’s or Soviet Russia’s, with chronic excess demand and limited price flexibility. Supply would be allocated to meet excess demand by nonprice, quantitative methods. Tautness would show up as queues for consumer goods, indicating inefficiency and underutilization of resources.

  During this period, Kornai developed his famous concept of the “soft budget constraint.” Socialized enterprises were not required to cover costs, as ad hoc subsidies and credits would invariably be made available by state institutions so that the firm would not have to close. Loss-making enterprises were a cause of excess demand in the economy.

  KORNILOV AFFAIR

  The Kornilov Affair was the main counterrevolutionary episode of the Russian Revolution of February 1917. It grew out the general political and socioeconomic crises of the summer, including the failure of the military offensive, government instability, economic disintegration, and, in particular, the emergence in July and August of a more assertive political right demanding a “restoration of order.” Attention increasingly centered on Gener
al Lavr Kornilov, who emerged as the potential Napoleon of the Russian Revolution.

  After the summer 1917 offensive failed, Ko-rnilov vigorously advocated using harsh measures to restore discipline in the army. This drew the attention of a wide range of people interested in restoration of order, mostly conservatives and liberals but also some socialists, who found him more acceptable than most generals (he had a reputation for being more “democratic” because of his modest background and good relations with his troops). They pressured Alexander Kerensky, now head of government, to appoint Kornilov supreme commander-in-chief of the army, which Kerensky did on July 31. The problems that lay ahead were signaled by Kornilov’s remarkable acceptance conditions, especially that he would be “responsible only to [his] own conscience and to the whole people,” and his insistence on a free hand to restore military discipline. Kerensky did not really trust Kornilov, but hoped to use him both to appease the right and to counterbalance the left. Kornilov in turn disdained the Petrograd politicians. Intermediaries, especially Boris Savinkov, a former Socialist Revolutionary terrorist who was now the assistant minister of war, tried to convince Kerensky and Ko-rnilov that the salvation of the country rested on their cooperation.

  During August, tensions surrounding Kor-nilov’s presumed intentions grew. Leftist newspapers and orators warned that he was a potential

  KOROLENKO, VLADIMIR GALAKTIONOVICH

  counterrevolutionary military dictator, while conservative newspapers and speakers hailed him as the prospective savior of Russia. People looking to break the power of the soviets and change the political structure began to organize around him. The degree of his knowledge and approval of these efforts remains unclear, but he clearly saw himself as a key figure in the regeneration of Russia and the reconstruction of Russian politics, perhaps by force.

  By September political tensions in Petrograd were high. Kerensky and Kornilov groped toward some sort of agreement, despite mutual distrust. An exchange of messages, mostly through intermediaries (Kornilov was at military front headquarters), explored restructuring the government and discussed the respective roles of the two men. These also revealed their suspicions of each other. Kerensky became convinced that the general planned a coup and, on September 9, he suddenly dismissed Kornilov. Outraged, Kornilov denounced Kerensky and launched army units toward Petro-grad. This quickly collapsed as delegates from the Petrograd Soviet convinced the soldiers that they were being used for counterrevolution. By September 12 the Kornilov revolt had foundered, and Kornilov and some other generals were arrested.

  The Kornilov Affair had enormous repercussions. Kerensky, the moderate socialists, and the liberals were discredited because of their earlier support of Kornilov. The Bolsheviks and radical left, in contrast, had warned against the danger of a military coup and now seemed vindicated. Their political stock soared, and they soon took over the Petrograd and other soviets, preparing the way for the October Revolution. See also: FEBRUARY REVOLUTION; KERENSKY, ALEXANDER FYODOROVICH; OCTOBER REVOLUTION; PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

  BIBLIOGRAPHY

  Ascher, Abraham. (1953). “The Kornilov Affair.” Russian Review 12:235-352. Asher, Harvey. (1970). “The Kornilov Affair: A History and Interpretation.” Russian Review 29:286-300. Munck, J. L. (1987). The Kornilov Revolt: A Critical Examination of the Sources and Research. Aarhus, Denmark: Aarhus University Press. White, James D. (1968-1969). “The Kornilov Affair: A Study in Counter Revolution.” Soviet Studies 20: 187-205.

  REX A. WADE

  KOROLENKO, VLADIMIR GALAKTIONOVICH

  (1853-1921), noted Russian short-story writer, publicist, and political activist. When Korolenko was arrested in 1879 for alleged populist activities and exiled to Siberia, he used the time to write many lyrical tales, exceptional for their descriptions of human sadness and desolate nature. His existential sufferings in Yakutsk, during which he often contemplated suicide, find expression in his writings.

  One of Korolenko’s famous short stories, “Makar’s Dream” (1885), is also set in Siberia. In it, Makar, a poor little peasant who has become half-savage by his association with the Yakutsk people, dreams of a better future. Normally he has no time for dreaming; his days are consumed by hard physical labor-chopping, ploughing, sowing, and grinding. He only dreams when he is drunk. One Christmas Eve, Makar drifts off in a drunken sleep and dreams that the god of the woods, Tayon, has judged him harshly for his former deeds and has decided to transform him into a post-horse. Makar ends up convincing Tayon of his innate goodness.

  In another famous story, “The Blind Musician” (1886), a blind youth overcomes his painful self-pity to become a sensitive violinist whose music takes on universal resonance. As his uncle watches the captivated audience, he thinks about his nephew. “He understands suffering. He has had his share, and that is why he can change it into music for this happy audience.” Korolenko’s talent thus lies in his expressions of the emotional and sentimental dimensions of life, his compassion for the downtrodden, as well as his masterful depictions of nature, which have much in common with Turgenev’s.

  Like many Russian writers, Korolenko felt that literature should play a leading role in advancing human progress; that a writer should not stand idly by in the face of injustice. He sought to create works that would unite realism and romanticism. In one historical story about the revolt of the Jews against the Romans (“A Tale about Florus, Agrippa, and Menachem, the Son of Jehudah”), Korolenko rebuts Tolstoy’s doctrine of nonviolent resistance to evil. In works such as “The Day of Atonement” (first entitled “Iom-Kipur,” 1890) and later in “House Number 13,” Korolenko also took issue with anti-Semitism. Korolenko condemned the Bolshevik regime and the Red Terror he witnessed in

  KORYAKS

  indignant letters that he wrote to Anatoly Lu-nacharsky, the People’s Commissar for Education. See also: INTELLIGENTSIA; SIBERIA

  BIBLIOGRAPHY

  Korolenko, Vladimir Galaktionovich. (1972). The History of My Contemporary. New York: Oxford University Press. Korolenko, Vladimir Galaktionovich. (1971). Makar’s Dream, and Other Stories. Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press. Korolenko, Vladimir Galaktionovich, and Antony Lambton. (1986). Bad Company and Other Stories. London: Quartet.

  JOHANNA GRANVILLE

  KORSH THEATER

  Founded in 1882 by entrepreneur F. A. Korsh (1852-1923), this was the first successful private, commercial theater established after the repeal of the government’s monopoly on theaters in the two capitals, Moscow and St. Petersburg. Built in the heart of Moscow’s bustling theater district, the Ko-rsh Theater was designed to meet four professional objectives: to respond to audiences’ changing aesthetic demands; to increase performance opportunities for provincial actors; to present productions of new plays, which led to special Friday night performances of experimental works; and to make both the Russian and the international dramaturgy available to students, which Korsh accomplished by offering free Sunday morning performances. The playwrights whose works played in Russia first at the Korsh included Hermann Sudermann, Edmond Rostand, Henrik Ibsen, August Strindberg, George Bernard Shaw, and, perhaps most significantly, Anton Chekhov. Performers who advanced their careers here included comedian Vladimir Davydov, heartthrob Alexander Lensky, and light opera celebrities Lidia Yavorskaya and Maria Blyumen-tal-Tamarina. The theater itself, designed by nationalist architect M. N. Chichagov, was the first to use electric lighting.

  Korsh could afford his artistic innovations because of the extent to which he catered to the crowd, exemplifying the “dictatorship of the box office.” The most popular, and prolific, playwright in his employ was I. I. Myasnitsky (Baryshev), who kept Korsh supplied with farces, comedies of topical issues with protagonists from all social backgrounds, such as “The Old Woman Makes a Fool of Herself.” The theater’s most famously popular production was the 1892 staging of Victorien Sardou’s comedy about Napoleon’s ex-washer woman, Madame Sans-Gene, translated by Korsh himself, and featuring the latest fashions directly from
Paris.

  Until its incorporation by the Soviet government in 1925, the Korsh Theater offered a central locale where new ideas about Russian culture were contested, reshaped, sometimes vulgarized, but always celebrated. See also: CHEKHOV, ANTON PAVLOVICH; THEATER

  BIBLIOGRAPHY

  McReynolds, Louise.(2003). Russia at Play: Leisure Activities at the End of the Tsarist Era. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

  LOUISE MCREYNOLDS

  KORYAKS

  The Koryaks (Koryaki) are an indigenous Paleo-Asi-atic people living in northeast Siberia, on the northern part of the Kamchatka Peninsula and on the adjoining mainland from the Taigonos Peninsula to the Bering Sea (a total of 152,000 square miles, or 393,680 square kilometers). The traditional roaming area of the nomadic Koryaks has been west of the Kamchatka Central Range, up to the Itelmen settlements. In addition to Koryaks, Itelmens, Chukchi, and Evenki have also lived on this territory for centuries. Administratively the Koryaks live in the Koryak Autonomous Region (okrug), a territory approximately the size of Arizona and which is one of the ten autonomous regions recognized in the Russian Constitution of 1993.

  The Koryak Autonomous Region is just one part of the larger Kamchatka Peninsula, which includes the Karaginsky and Komandorsky islands in the Bering Sea. With an area of about 490,425 square miles, the countries England, Portugal, Belgium, and Luxembourg together could be placed on the territory of Kamchatka. The peninsula contains many volcanoes, some of them active. The Koryak territory is mostly forest tundra, as well as tundra in the subarctic climate belt. The highest temperature in the summer is 34° centigrade and the lowest in the winter (in the central and northern parts of the peninsula) falls to about -49° centigrade.