Encyclopedia of Russian History
Page 283
Appointed foreign minister in January 1996, Primakov was a realistic and cool professional. He was a strong defender of Russian national interests, as opposed to the pro-Western stance of his predecessor Andrei Kozyrev, and often manifested pro-Arab sympathies. Espousing a “multipolar” world, he nonetheless avoided direct confrontation with the West and bargained for a Russian presence at NATO as it was expanding eastward. Later he criticized the 1999 NATO bombing campaign against Yugoslavia but kept open a Russian role in the Kosovo settlement.
Following the August 1998 economic and political crisis, Primakov emerged as a compromise candidate for prime minister. Overwhelmingly confirmed by the Duma in September, he was the most popular politician in Russia. His model for eco Russian statesman Yevgeny Primakov served Boris Yeltsin as foreign minister, prime minister, and spy master. PHOTOGRAPH BY ALEXANDER ZEMLIANICHENKO. AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION. nomic stabilization was President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal in the United States.
As prime minister, Primakov soon aroused the jealousy of the ailing Yeltsin and alarmed the president’s family and cronies by investigating corruption. Yeltsin emerged from a long period of torpor and dismissed Primakov in May 1999 in favor of Interior Minister Sergei Stepashin. In reply, Primakov accepted the leadership of the “Fatherland-All Russia” bloc to oppose Yeltsin’s forces in the Duma elections of December 1999, and was a strong contender for the presidency in the elections due the following year. But in August Yeltsin replaced Prime Minister Stepashin with Vladimir Putin, who set up his own party, Unity, and capitalized on the war in Chechnya to forge ahead of Primakov’s people. Primakov withdrew as a presidential contender in order to run for speaker of the new Duma; however, Putin made a deal with the communists to keep Gennady Seleznyov as speaker
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and marginalize Primakov. Those maneuvers notwithstanding, in the March 2000 election Primakov endorsed Putin, who subsequently tapped him for occasional diplomatic missions. In 2001 Primakov retired from the presidency of Fatherland-All Russia as it was preparing to merge with Unity. See also: FATHERLAND-ALL RUSSIA; GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL SERGEYEVICH; YELTSIN, BORIS NIKOLAYEVICH
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Daniels, Robert V. (1999). “Evgenii Primakov: Contender by Chance.” Problems of Post-Communism 46(5): 27-36. Shevtsova, Lilia F. (1999). Yeltsin’s Russia: Myths and Reality. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Simes, Dmitri K. (1999). After the Collapse: Russia Seeks Its Place as a Great Power. New York: Simon amp; Schuster.
ROBERT V. DANIELS
PRIMARY CHRONICLE
The compilation of chronicle entries known as the Povst’ vremennykh lt (PVL) is a fundamental source for the historical study of the vast eastern European and Eurasian lands that include major parts of Ukraine and Belarus, as well as extensive parts of the Russian Federation and Poland. As the single most important source for the study of the early Rus principalities, it contains the bulk of existing written information about the area inhabited by the East Slavs from the ninth to the twelfth century, and has been the subject of many historical, literary, and linguistic analyses. The PVL in various versions appears at the beginning of most extant chronicles compiled from the fourteenth through seventeenth centuries
The PVL may have been compiled initially by Silvestr, the hegumen of St. Michael’s Monastery in Vydobichi, a village near Kiev, in 1116. The attribution to Silvestr is based on a colophon in copies of the so-called Laurentian branch where he declares, “I wrote down this chronicle,” and asks to be remembered in his readers’ prayers (286,1-286,7). It is possible that Silvestr merely copied or edited an already existing complete work by the Kiev Caves Monastery monk mentioned in the heading (i.e., “The Tale of Bygone Years of a monk of the Feodosy Pechersky Monastery [regarding] from where the Rus lands comes and who first in it began to rule and from where the Rus land became to be”), but it is also possible that this monk merely began the work that Silvestr finished. An interpolation in the title of the sixteenth-century Khleb-nikov copy has led to a popular notion that Nestor was the name of this monk and that he had completed a now-lost first redaction of the complete text. But that interpolation is not reliable evidence, since it may have been the result of a guess by the interpolator, in which case the name of the monk referred to in the title or when he compiled his text is not known. So the simplest explanation is that Silvestr used an earlier (perhaps unfinished) chronicle by an unknown monk of the Caves Monastery along with other sources to compile what is now known as the PVL. Silvestr’s holograph does not exist; the earliest copy dates to more than 260 years later. Therefore, researches have to try to reconstruct what Silvestr wrote on the basis of extant copies that are hundreds of years distant from its presumed date of composition.
There are five main witnesses to the original version of the PVL. The term “main witness,” refers only to those copies that have independent authority to testify about what was in the archetype. Since most copies of the PVL (e.g., those found in the Nikon Chronicle, Voskresenskii Chronicle, etc.) are secondary (i.e., derivative) from the main witnesses, they provide no primary readings in relation to the archetype. The five main witnesses are: 1. Laurentian (RNB, F.IV.2), dated to 1377; 2. Radziwill (BAN, 34. 5. 30), datable to the 1490s; 3. Academy (RGB, MDA 5/182), dated to the 15th century; 4. Hypatian (BAN, 16. 4. 4), dated to c. 1425; 5. Khlebnikov (RNB, F.IV.230), dated to 16th century. In addition, in a few places, the Pogodin Chronicle fills in lacunae in the Khlebnikov copy: 6. Pogodin (RNB, Pogodin 1401), dated to early 17th century.
One can also draw textual evidence from the corresponding passages in the later version of the Novgorod I Chronicle. To date, there are no lithographs or photographic facsimilies of any manuscript of the Novgorod I Chronicle. The three copies of the published version of Novg. I are: 1. Commission (SPb IRI, Arkh. kom. 240), dated to 1450s; 2. Academy (BAN 17.8.36), dated to 1450s;
1.
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Figure 1.
3. Tolstoi (RNB, Tolstovoi F.IV.223), dated to 1820s.
One can also utilize certain textual readings from the corresponding passages of Priselkov’s reconstruction of the non-extant Trinity Chronicle.
The stemma, or family tree, shows the genealogical relationship of the manuscript copies.
Although various theories have been proposed for the stages of compilation of the PVL, little agreement has been reached. The sources that the com-piler(s) utilized, however, are generally recognized. The main source to 842 is the Chronicle of Georgius Hamartolu and to 948 the Continuation of Symeon the Logothete. Accounts of the ecumenical councils could have been drawn from at least three possible sources: (1) a Bulgarian collection, which served as the basis for the Izbornik of 1073; (2) the Chronicle of Hamartolus; and (3) the Letter of Patriarch Photius to Boris, Prince of Bulgaria. Copies of treaties between Byzantium and Rus appear under entries for 907, 912, 945, and 971. The Creed of Michael Syncellus was the source of the Cree d taught to Volodimir I in 988. Metropolitan Hilarion’s Sermon on Law and Grace is drawn upon for Biblical quotations regarding the conversion of Volodimir I. There are also excerpts from the Memoir and Eulogy of Volodimir that are attributed to the monk James. The Life of Boris and Gleb appears in the PVL but in a redaction different from the independent work written by Nestor. Quotations in the PVL attributed to John Chrysostom seem to be drawn from the Zlatoustruiu (anthology of his writings). Subsequently two references are made in the PVL to the Revelations of Pseudo-Methodius of Patara. Various parts of the PVL draw on the Paleia (a synopsis of Old Testament history with interpretations).
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In the entries for 1097 to 1100, there is a narrative of a certain Vasily who claims to have been an eyewitness and participant in the events being described. Volodimir Monomakh’s Testament and Letter to Oleg appear toward the end of the text of the chronicle. Finally, oral traditions a
nd legends seem to be the basis for a number of other accounts, including the coming of the Rus’.
Although the text of the PVL has been published a number of times including as part of the publication of later chronicles, only recently has a critical edition based on a stemma codicum been completed. See also: BOOK OF DEGREES; CHRONICLES; KIEVAN RUS; RURIKID DYNASTY
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Cross, Samuel H., and Sherbowitz-Wetzor, Olgerd P. (1953). The Russian Primary Chronicle: Laurentian Text. Cambridge, MA: Mediaeval Academy of Sciences. released from their regular work if their cell included more than 150 Party members. Although the PPO may seem insignificant in comparison to the higher organs of the CPSU, it performed crucial political and economic functions, such as admitting new members; carrying out agitation and propaganda work (e.g., educating Party members in the principles of Marxism-Leninism), and ensuring that Party discipline was maintained. Finally, PPOs were vital to the fulfillment of Party objectives (e.g., meeting planned quotas and production targets). See also: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Hill, Ronald J., and Frank, Peter. (1981). The Soviet Communist Party. London: George Allen amp; Unwin.
CHRISTOPHER WILLIAMS
Ostrowski, Donald. (2003). The Povest’ vremennykh let: An Interlinear Collation and Paradosis, 3 vols., assoc. ed. David J. Birnbaum (Harvard Library of Early Ukrainian Literature, vol. 10, parts 1-3). Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
DONALD OSTROWSKI
PRIMARY PARTY ORGANIZATION
Primary Party Organization (PPO) was the official name for the lowest-level organization in the structure of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. PPOs were set up wherever there were at least three Party members, and every member of the Party was required to belong to one. PPOs existed in urban and rural areas, usually at Party members’ places of work, such as factories, state and collective farms, army units, offices, schools, and universities. The highest organ of a PPO was the Party meeting, which was convened at least once per month and elected delegates to the Party conference at the raion or city level. In the larger PPOs, a bureau was elected for a term of up to one year to conduct day-to-day Party business. But if a PPO had fewer than fifteen members, they elected a secretary and deputy secretary rather than a bureau. Occupants of the post of PPO secretary or PPO bureau head had to have been Party members for at least a year. PPO secretaries were usually paid or
PRIME MINISTER
The prime minister (or premier) was the chief executive officer of the Soviet government. The position was formally known as the chairman of the Council of Ministers (also known as the Sov-narkom, 1917-1946, and the Cabinet of Ministers, 1990-1991). The prime minister led sessions of the Council of Ministers and the more exclusive and secretive Presidium of the Council of Ministers. The prime minister was charged with overall responsibility for managing the centrally planned command economy and overseeing the extensive public administration apparatus.
Representing one of the most powerful positions in the Soviet leadership hierarchy, the post of prime minister carried automatic full membership in the Politburo, the top executive body in the political system. The prime minister’s seat was frequently the object of intense intra-party factional conflicts to control the economic policy agenda.
The Soviet Union’s first prime minister was Bolshevik Party leader Vladimir Lenin, who chaired the Sovnarkom, the principal executive governing body at that time. Lenin, who was not fond of extended debates, began the practice of policy making through an inner circle of ministers. Following Lenin’s death in 1924, the positions of government head and Party leader were formally separated from one another.
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Alexei Rykov, an intellectual with economic expertise, was appointed prime minister, overseeing the administration of the mixed-market New Economic Policy (NEP). In the late 1920s, as party sentiment turned against the NEP, leadership contender Josef Stalin maneuvered to dislodge Rykov from this post. Next, Prime Minister Vyacheslav Molotov, a staunch ally of Stalin, presided over and spurred on the ambitious and tumultuous state-led industrialization and collectivization campaigns of the 1930s. In 1939, with war looming, Molotov was dispatched to the foreign ministry, and Stalin claimed the position, accumulating even greater personal power.
When Stalin died in 1953, it was deemed necessary once again to separate the posts of Party and government leadership. Georgy Malenkov, who had managed the wartime economy as de facto premier, was officially promoted to prime minister. Malenkov attempted the diversion of resources away from military industry to the consumer sector, but was forced to resign by political rivals. The prime minister’s post was occupied next by Nikolai Bulganin, whose expertise lay in military matters. In 1958 Communist Party leader Nikita Khrushchev appointed himself prime minister, in violation of Party rules.
Following Khrushchev’s removal in 1964, the prime minister’s position became more routinized within the leadership hierarchy, though the Politburo had the last say on economic policy. As industry developed and the economy grew more complex, the responsibilities of the prime minister became increasingly technocratic, requiring greater command of economic issues and firsthand managerial experience. Prime ministers in the late Soviet period struggled unsuccessfully with the challenge of devising economic strategies to regenerate growth from the declining command economy.
Individuals holding the post of prime minister included: Vladimir Lenin (1917-1924), Alexei Rykov (1924-1929), Vyacheslav Molotov (1930-1939), Josef Stalin (1939-1953), Georgy Malenkov (1953-1955), Nikolai Bulganin (1955-1958), Nikita Khrushchev (1958-1964), Alexei Kosygin (1964-1980), Nikolai Tikhonov (1980-1985), Nikolai Ryzhkov (1985-1990), and Valentin Pavlov (1990-1991). See also: COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION; COUNCIL OF MINISTERS, SOVIET; POLITBURO; SOV-NARKOM
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Hough, Jerry, and Fainsod, Merle. (1979). How the Soviet Union is Governed, rev. ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Rigby, T. H. Lenin’s Government: Sovnarkom, 1917-1922. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
GERALD M. EASTER
PRIMITIVE SOCIALIST ACCUMULATION
Primitive Socialist Accumulation was a concept developed by the Soviet economist Yevgeny Preo-brazhensky to analyze the New Economic Policy (NEP) of the 1920s.
Adam Smith and other classical economists referred to “previous” or “primitive” accumulation of capital to explain the rise of specialization of production and the division of labor. Specialized production required the prior accumulation of capital to support specialized workers until their products were ready for sale. Previous accumulation occurred though saving, and the return to capital represented the reward for saving. Karl Marx parodied this self-congratulatory thesis, arguing instead that primitive capitalist accumulation represented no more than “divorcing the producer [i.e., labor] from the means of production.” It was the process of creating the necessary capitalist institutions: private monopoly ownership of the means of production and wage labor.
Preobrazhensky sought to develop a comparable concept for capital accumulation in the Soviet Union of the 1920s. The NEP meant that private small-scale capitalist enterprises, including peasant farms, coexisted with the state’s control of the “commanding heights” of the economy. To attain socialism the socialized sector had to grow more rapidly than the private sector. Preobrazhensky therefore set about to determine what institutional relations were necessary to attain this end. Primitive socialist accumulation was his answer.
As for capitalist accumulation, force would need to be the agent of primitive socialist accumulation, and it was to be applied by the. revolutionary socialist state in the form of tax, price, and financial policies to expropriate the surplus value created in the private sector and transfer it to the socialist sector, thereby guaranteeing its differential growth. Under what he called “premature socialist conditions” that characterized the USSR,
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PRISONS
Preobrazhensky recommended nonequivalent exchange, that is, the turning of the terms of trade against the peasantry and other private enterprises, as the main means to collect and transfer the surplus. During the transition, workers in socialist enterprises would experience “self-exploitation.” Over time, therefore, primitive socialist accumulation would eliminate the private sector.
Although the concept appears to be consistent with Marx’s use of it in the analysis of capitalism, Preobrazhensky’s theory was roundly criticized by Nikolai Bukharin and other Bolshevik theorists, probably because he used the term “exploitation” in prescribing a socialist economic policy. See also: MARXISM; NEW ECONOMIC POLICY; PREO-BRAZHENSKY, YEVGENY ALEXEYEVICH; SOCIALISM
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Erlich, Alexander. (1960). The Soviet Industrialization Debate, 1921-1928. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Millar, James R. (1978). “A Note on Primitive Accumulation in Marx and Preobrazhensky.” Soviet Studies 30(3):384-393. Preobrazhensky, E. (1965). The New Economics, tr. Brian Pearce. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
JAMES R. MILLAR
PRISONS
Up to the beginning of the nineteenth century monasteries and fortresses often served as prisons (tyurma from German turm = tower). The Russian prisons in about 1850 were mostly overcrowded wood buildings that had not been built for the purpose of the accommodation of prisoners, many of whom left the prisons with destroyed health. Russian authorities were more likely to use other forms of punishment, such as whipping and other corporal punishment for small offences and hard labor and exile to Siberia for serious crimes. As early as the eighteenth century there were fruitless attempts at prison reform. In 1845 the tsar compiled a new Code of Punishments that featured a hierarchy of incarcerations including prelim-inerary prisons, strait houses, correctional prisons, and punitive prisons. According to the model of the Pentonville Prison in England, the isolation of the prisoner was viewed as a condition for his improvement. There was no uniform prison management. Supervision was exercised by the ministry of the interior (MVD), the Department of Justice, and the respective governors. The public prosecutor’s office was responsible for the well being of the prisoners. The prison question became topical by the penal reform of April 17, 1863: Corporal punishment was deemed antiquated and prison sentences became more typical. Now for smaller offenses the punishment was up to seven days of custody. This reform led, therefore, to a quick increase of the prison population and chaos in management. In the 1860s and 1870s various committees dealt with reform of the prison system. In 1877 a newly formed committee called Grot petitioned for a new hierarchy of punishment with seven steps, from fines up to the death penalty. The prisoners were to be separated except for work details. It was suggested a Main Prison Administration (GTU) should be established within the Ministry of the Interior, to be The towers of a makeshift mosque and Russian Orthodox chapel are visible behind inmates at a prison colony in Udarny, Russia, 2001. PHOTOGRAPH BY MAXIM MARMUR/ASSOCIATED PRESS. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION.