Encyclopedia of Russian History

by James Millar

  TELEVISION AND RADIO

  TV6 anchors Andrei Norkin (right) and Vladimir Kara-Murza (left) speak to the media on January 11, 2002, after judges ordered the closure of the last independent channel on Russian national television. PHOTOGRAPH BY IVAN SEKRETKAREV/ASSOCIATED PRESS. REPRODUCED BY

  PERMISSION.

  of Marxist-Leninist ideas, and the mobilization of the working class. Major investments in technical infrastructure followed and by the end of the decade Moscow neighborhood Ostankino became home to the national broadcasting organization. It provided the Soviet population with two television and four radio programs. Later accessibility was enhanced, and further television programs were added. Until the late 1980s the Soviet Union boasted a uniform information sphere designed to reach most of its 285 million inhabitants. Television was broadcast in forty-five union languages, and radio in seventy-one. The programs were centrally produced in Moscow and transmitted to the far reaches of the Soviet world. They incessantly stressed the political meaning of each news item. As there was no other medium of information, and no access to foreign news sources, the audience was inescapably exposed to propaganda through mass media.

  BROADCAST PROGRAMMING AND AUTONOMY

  In Soviet times the majority of television and radio programming was dedicated to broadcasts of party sessions and statements by government officials. Next in importance was news from the economic sector. Educational and cultural programs followed. The only television news show, Vremya, contained coverage of international events. All programming was subject to austere censorship and depended on one sole information source, the government. The fact that people’s values and their image of the world were given a one-sided direction through mass indoctrination enhanced the impact of the new freedom the media experienced when Soviet society started to unravel.

  From 1986 to 1993 the media won a hitherto unknown autonomy owing to their role in the perENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

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  TELEVISION AND RADIO

  estroika reforms, and the dissolution of political structures that rigidly controlled mass communication. While Mikhail Gorbachev encouraged the investigation and discussion of state problems, new leaders fought against old bureaucrats and economic obstructions; first the press, then television and radio, gained momentum. The Russian society broke into a fragmented mass of people hungry for Western achievements and individual liberties, and the media made use of the vacuum created by the loss of a uniform ideology and morals. Most did not aim to serve democratic ideals but looked for financial profits. Not many of the exceptions to this rule have survived the struggles. Independent broadcasters, NTV Television, and TV6, formerly controlled by oligarchs, were recently restrained by court orders referring to their financial situation. Radio Echo Moskvy, founded in August 1991, has retained its independence, although still harrassed by occasional interferences by the authorities.

  PROBLEMS OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL

  Privatizations of media outlets during the first years of the newly founded Russian Federation created opportunities not only for the staffs of media organizations. State-controlled plants and the new business elite soon profited from the hardships imposed on the media by repeated financial crises. Even in the early twenty-first century, most television and radio stations were dependent either on state subventions or on financing by oligarchs. Their influence relates to formalities such as licensing and provision of technical equipment, as well as to media content. Reporting often reflects only two positions, that of the government and the ruling businessmen. The media may convey oppositional messages, but not on behalf of society. This is even more pronounced in the vast regions of the Russian Federation, where local governors and plant owners exercise arbitrary power over the struggling local media industry.

  This competition has led to media wars between businessmen like Boris Berezovsky, Vladimir Gusinsky, and Vladimir Potanin, who during President Boris Yeltsin’s quest for voting consensus acquired liberties through behind-the-scenes arrangements. In Yeltsin’s 1996 campaign, television was recognized as effective to influence voters. Other major players who contributed to the broadcasting media being used as instruments of power were at times Prime Minister Viktor

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  Chernomyrdin, Deputy Prime Ministers Anatoly Chubais and Boris Nemtsov, and Moscow’s mayor Yuri Luzhkov. After President Vladimir Putin’s concerted actions to reinstate central power over opinion-leading mass media, private competitors retreated to the print sector and own minor stakes in broadcasting. Nevertheless, the ownership structures in the media industry have been characteristically intransparent. It remains difficult to discern the origin of financial and ruling power over a great number of media outlets.

  In Soviet times the usurpation of the right to intervene in daily media business was based on the well-oiled censorship apparatus. Journalists had to be party members and follow guiding principles that adhered to government interests. Russian journalism bears some of these traits into the twenty-first century. On the one hand, many of the Soviet journalists have remained in their profession. On the other hand, many journalists are young, have put the historical past behind them, and aspire to meet modern professional standards. They, too, have to make amends to the kind of censorship imposed on them by the special interests of the owners of the media organization. The positive coverage of state or oligarch activities, or the rumor-based reporting on competitors’ faults, are also often ordered and paid for, not selected by journalistic processes.

  MODERN MEDIA POLICIES

  Until 1990 there were no specific laws concerning the mass media. More than thirty laws and dozens of decrees have been passed since then. Under the Soviet regime, two constitutions (1936 and 1977) alluded to the freedom of expression, which had to be in accordance with interests to develop the socialist system. Such ideological baggage was discarded by the constitution of the Russian Federation adopted in 1993, and the Supreme Soviet had in 1990 already passed a law to lift censorship from the media.

  In 1991 the Russian Federation adopted the Law on Media of Mass Information, which allowed for fundamental freedoms of the media. It was revised in 1995 and significantly limited the media’s choice of diversity for the portrayal of political parties. Such undemocratic hindrances, along with the lack of a law conceding to the specific needs of broadcasting media, continue to the present day. Other laws are On Procedure of Media Coverage of State

  ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

  TEMPORARY REGULATIONS

  Authorities by State Media (1994); On the Defense of Morality in Television and Radio Broadcasting (1999); On Licensing of Certain Activities (2001); and the Doctrine of the Information Security of the Russian Federation (2000), which links media autonomy with national security. Nerone, John C, and McChesney, Robert Waterman eds. (1995). Last Rights: Revisiting Four Theories of the Press. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

  LUCIE HRIBAL

  See also: PERESTROIKA

  BIBLIOGRAPHY

  Aumente, Jerome, et al., eds. (1999). Eastern European Journalism: Before, during, and after Communism. Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press. Belin, Laura. (1997). “Politicization and Self-Censorship in the Russian Media.” «http://www.rferl.org/nca/ special/rumediapaper». Casmir, Fred L., ed. (1995). Communication in Eastern Europe: The Role of History, Culture, and Media in Contemporary Conflicts. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum. De Smaele, Hedwig. (1999). “The Applicability of Western Media Models on the Russian Media System.” European Journal of Communication 14:173-89. Dewhirst, Martin (2002). “Censorship in Russia, 1991 and 2001.” The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 18(1):21-34. European Audiovisual Observatory. (2003). “Television in the Russian Federation: Organisational Structure, Programme Production and Audience.” «http://www .obs.coe.int/online_publication/reports/internews .pdf». Jakubowicz, Karol. (1999). “The Genie Is Out of the Bottle. Measuring Media Change in Central and Eastern Europe.” Media Studies Journal 13(3):52-59. Krasnoboka, Na
talya. (2003). “The Russian Media Landscape.” European Journalism Centre. «http://www .ejc.nl/jr/emland/russia.html». McCormack, Gillian, ed. (1999). Media in the CIS-A Study of the Political, Legislative and Socio-Economic Framework, 2nd ed. D?sseldorf: The European Institute for the Media. McNair, Brian. (1991). Glasnost, Perestroika, and the Soviet Media. London: Routledge. Michel, Lutz P., and Jankovski, Jaromir. (2000). “Russia.” In Radio and Television Systems in Europe, ed. European Audiovisual Observatory. Strasbourg. Mickiecz, Ellen, and Richter, Andrei. (1996). “Television, Campaigning and Elections in the Soviet Union and Post-Soviet Russia.” In Politics, Media, and Modern Democracy. An International Study of Innovations in Electoral Campaigning and Their Consequences, eds. David L. Swanson and Paolo Mancini. Westport, CT: Praeger.

  TEMPORARY REGULATIONS

  In response to the assassination of Tsar Alexander II, Tsar Alexander III enacted a statute enabling the government to crack down on the political opposition by imposing emergency regulations more extensive than any that had previously been enforced. Although the statute was initially enacted as a temporary measure, it remained on the books until 1917 and has been regarded by historians as the real constitution of the country. Its implementation demonstrated, perhaps more than anything else, that Russia was not a state based on law.

  The statute provided for two kinds of special measures, Reinforced Security (Usilennaya okhrana) and Extraordinary Security (Chrezvychaynaya okhrana). The first could be imposed by the Minister of Internal Affairs or a governor-general acting with the minister’s approval. The second could be imposed only with the approval of the tsar. Vague concerning what conditions could justify placing a region in a state of emergency, the statute gave the authorities in St. Petersburg and the provinces considerable leeway in applying it.

  The arbitrary powers invested in local officials (governors-general, governors, and city governors) under the exceptional measures of 1881 were enormous. Under Reinforced Security, officials could keep citizens in prison for up to three months, impose fines, prohibit public gatherings, exile alleged offenders, transfer blocks of judicial cases from criminal to military courts, and dismiss zemstvo (regional assembly) employees. Under Extraordinary Security, a region was placed under the authority of a commander in chief, who could dismiss elected zemstvo deputies, suspend periodicals, and close universities and other centers of advanced study for up to one month. Implementation of the exceptional measures depended largely on the inclinations of local officials: in some provinces they acted with restraint, whereas in others they used their powers to the utmost. At times up to 69 percent of the provinces and regions of the Russian Empire were either completely or partially subjected to one of the various emergency codes.

  ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

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  TEREM

  See also: ALEXANDER III; AUTOCRACY; CENSORSHIP; NICHOLAS II; ZEMSTVO

  BIBLIOGRAPHY

  Daly, Jonathan W. (1998). Autocracy under Siege: Security Police and Opposition in Russia, 1866-1905. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press. Zuckerman, Frederic S. (1996). The Tsarist Secret Police in Russian Society, 1880-1917. London: Macmillan.

  ABRAHAM ASCHER

  TEREM

  The separate living quarters of women in Muscovite Russia; also, the upper story of a palace, often with a pitched roof, as in the Terem Palace in the Moscow Kremlin.

  Historians have generally used the word terem to denote the room or rooms to which Muscovite royal and boyar women were confined to separate them from men, both to underpin the custom of arranging marriages without the couple meeting in advance and to preserve women’s chastity before and after marriage. The Mongols are said to have introduced the terem between the thirteenth and fifteenth centuries, but this theory is questionable: The practice of female seclusion reached its height in the seventeenth century, long after the Mongol occupation of Russia ended. Recent reassessments also argue that the terem in the sense of apartments where women were imprisoned like slaves is partly a construct of foreign travelers, who were unlikely ever to have seen or entered one. It matched foreign expectations concerning Muscovite orientalism and servitude. Revisionist historians perceive the royal terem not as a sign of women’s helplessness and marginalization, but rather as the physical representation of a separate sphere of influence or power base, with its own extensive staff, finances and administrative structure. From within it, royal women dispensed charity, did business, dealt with petitions, and arranged marriages. These arrangements were replicated on a smaller scale in boyar households.

  This does not mean that Muscovite elite women were not subjected to restrictions when compared with their Western counterparts. With the exception of weddings and funerals, they took no part in major court ceremonies and receptions, which were all-male affairs. Balls, masques, and other

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  mixed-sex entertainments were out of the question, and the Muscovite court knew no official cult of beauty. Women used curtained recesses in church, traveled in carriages shielded by curtains, and wore concealing clothing. Married women always covered their hair. Girls were not to be seen by their fianc?s until their wedding. The taboos extended to portraits from life. Portraits of Muscovite men are rare, but those of women almost nonexistent. In the Kremlin the sense of exclusiveness and mystery cultivated by the tsar naturally extended to the women, whose quarters were out of bounds to all except designated noblewomen, priests, and family members. Attached to the terem, the Golden Hall of the Tsaritsy, decorated with frescoes featuring women rulers from Biblical and Byzantine history, provided a space for female receptions. Outside the Kremlin, in the few surviving boyars’ mansions, it is difficult to identify rooms specifically designated as a terem, but noblewomen were expected to behave modestly. Lower down the social scale segregation was impractical, but at all levels marriages were arranged by parents.

  Peter I (r. 1682-1725) is credited with abolishing the terem, to the extent that he forced women to socialize and dance with men, take part in public ceremonies, and adopt Western fashions. Even so, as elsewhere in Europe, Russian royal palaces preserved the equivalents of the king’s and queen’s apartments, while in the provinces older traditions of female modesty survived. See also: MUSCOVY; PETER I, WESTERNIZERS

  BIBLIOGRAPHY

  Boskovska, Nada. (2000). “Muscovite Women during the 17th Century.” Forschungen zur osteurop?ische Geschichte 56:47-62. Kollmann, Nancy S. (1983). “The Seclusion of Elite Muscovite Women.” Russian History 10(2):170-187. Thyret, Isolde. (2001). Between God and Tsar: Religious Symbolism and the Royal Women of Muscovite Russia. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press.

  LINDSEY HUGHES

  TER-PETROSSIAN, LEVON

  (b. 1945), Armenian philologist and statesman.

  The first president of the second independent republic of Armenia (1991-1998), Levon TerENCYCLOPEDIA OF RUSSIAN HISTORY

  TERRITORIAL-ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS

  Petrossian was born in Aleppo, Syria, and migrated to Soviet Armenia with his family in 1946. Ter-Petrossian graduated from Yerevan State University and received his doctorate in philology from Leningrad University. Until 1988 he was an academic researcher in Yerevan.

  In 1988 he joined and became a leader of the Karabakh Committee that led the movement in support of the rights of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh-the Armenian-populated enclave in Azerbaijan-and eventually in support of Armenia’s independence. In 1989, having spent six months in prison in Moscow, he was elected member, and in 1990 president, of the Supreme Soviet of the Armenian SSR. Having successfully managed the peaceful transition of power from the Communists, in 1991 he was elected president of Armenia and reelected in 1996. He resigned in February 1998 and currently lives as a private citizen in Yerevan.

  Ter-Petrossian has received honorary doctorates from a number of academic institutions, including the universities of Sorbonne and Strasbourg, in recognition of his scholarly research in ancient and medieval philology and history, as w
ell as his contribution to modern Armenian statehood.

  The dominant figure in Armenia’s history from 1988 to 1998, Ter-Petrossian initiated fundamental institutional, political, and economic reforms, including a radical land privatization program. He guided the drafting and adoption of a constitution in 1995 that has proven effective in resolving major political crises.

  In foreign policy Ter-Petrossian advocated the speedy integration of Armenia in international institutions and processes, and the normalization of relations with all neighbors-including Turkey-as the best guarantee for Armenia’s long-term security and prosperity. In the process, Ter-Petrossian’s pursuit of a special relationship with Russia led to the 1997 comprehensive Treaty of Cooperation and Friendship, which, among other provisions, formalized and regulated the presence of the Russian military base in Armenia.

  Ter-Petrossian led the Nagorno-Karabakh war to a successful conclusion with a cease-fire agreement in 1994. He also considered peace with Azerbaijan a necessary precondition for the economic and social development of Armenia. The absence of a final solution to the status problem, which he pursued aggressively, stymied political and economic transformation; it also prevented the normalization of relations with Azerbaijan and Turkey.

  Ter-Petrossian’s pragmatic policies invited the opposition of extremist forces. After 1995, criticisms of his administration, including charges of corruption, abuse of power by some ministries, and tampering with elections, increased. His acceptance in 1997 of a compromise solution to the Karabakh problem, opposed by some of his closest associates in the executive branch, led to his resignation. See also: ARMENIA AND ARMENIANS; AZERBAIJAN AND AZERIS; NAGORNO-KARABAKH; NATIONALISM IN THE SOVIET UNION; TURKEY, RELATIONS WITH

  BIBLIOGRAPHY

  Curtis, Glenn E. (1994). Armenia., Azerbaijan, and Georgia. Washington, DC: Library of Congress. Herzig, Edmond. (1998). The New Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs. Libaridian, Gerard J. (1999). The Challenge of Statehood: Armenian Political Thinking Since Independence. Wa-tertown, MA: Blue Crane Books.