The Himalayan Arc

by Namita Gokhale

  The re-establishment of Chinese control in Tibet was marked by the Seventeen-point Treaty of 28 May 1951 wherein Tibet accepted the de jure authority of China over Tibet. Ironically, this was done at Indian urging. New Delhi consistently discouraged the Dalai Lama from raising the Tibetan issue at the United Nations (UN). Aware that it could do little to prevent the annexation of Tibet, India sought to promote Tibet’s autonomous status under Chinese sovereignty with a view of keeping the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) far from its borders. To show that it did not have any designs on Tibet, India not only formally recognized Tibet as a region of China under the Trade and Intercourse Treaty of 1954, it also surrendered its quasi-diplomatic status that it had obtained since British times.

  India was not only one of the first countries to recognize the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the legitimate government of China, but also championed the cause of giving the PRC the Chinese seat in the UN in place of Taiwan. India also remained neutral in the Korean War in 1950 when China was isolated. However, developments in Tibet, primarily the Tibetan rebellion of 1959 and the flight of the Dalai Lama to India, changed things. Indeed, Mao Zedong and his associates began to believe that New Delhi was part of an American-led effort to undermine their control over Tibet. This was a significant factor in triggering the Sino–Indian border war of 1962.

  China’s claim that Tibet has been part of the country since ancient times cannot be sustained by evidence. Sam van Schaik’s definitive book Tibet: A History shows how it was once a powerful and large kingdom which was first conquered by the Mongols. The Mongols also conquered China and established the Yuan dynasty, whose founder Kublai Khan established a patron–priest relationship with a leading Tibetan Lama, who was given administrative control over Tibet. This was largely the subsequent pattern of their relationship. In the 18th and 19th centuries, the Qing intervened militarily several times in Tibet, but never exercised administrative control. Ironically, just as the Qing was actually seeking to expand their administrative and military role in 1910, the dynasty itself collapsed.

  The British, eager to fend off the Russians, encouraged the notion of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. This was the basis for the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890 to fix the border of Sikkim and Tibet. The reality, however, was somewhat different. The Tibetans did not accept this status, and it is only when Britain wantonly invaded Tibet and crushed the Tibetan army that Lhasa was pushed into the arms of the Qing, an act confirmed by the 1904 Treaty of Lhasa and the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1906.

  The relationship between China, Tibet and the cis-Himalayan polities is a complex one. Some Chinese writing and commentary, down to even Mao Zedong in the 1930s, saw the correct boundaries of China as also including Burma, Bhutan, and Nepal.

  Prior to the Chinese decision to annex Tibet, a looser, more flexible order prevailed along the Himalayan frontier. Despite the extreme terrain, ideas, trade, and people moved freely. What changed things was the Chinese constructing a hard state where a soft one once existed. In response, India too moved to consolidate its presence in areas which it would otherwise have, in the British fashion, been content to leave alone as a kind of buffer region.

  It is difficult to categorize the relationships between the cis-Himalayan entities and China, because the Qing imperial policy was unique. It did not have the notions of sovereignty and control in the manner of, say, the British or the nineteenth-century European empires. We must enter a caveat here, too. Chinese claims of tributary relationships in their periphery were often made in the works of court historians and officials and do not always have corroboration from other sources. Just what was meant by a tributary relationship is not clear because in many cases this was a formal rather than a legal act and second, when tribute was paid to Lhasa, it was more of a religious offering.

  The border areas were inhospitable, high and remote, and were never accurately surveyed and mapped or demarcated. The boundary of Ladakh and Tibet was shaped by the interaction between the Mughals, the Sikhs, and the Chinese/Tibetans, and there was general acceptance as to where the border lay. The first peace treaty of 1684 spelt out the extent of the Ladakh kingdom; the second in 1842 between the Sikhs, the Chinese and the Tibetans reaffirmed the ‘ancient boundaries’ of Ladakh; a third in 1852 between Tibet and Kashmir again reaffirmed the Ladakh–Tibet boundary, though there was no clarity on the status of an area like Aksai Chin, where no one lived and which had little economic value.

  The British viewed Tibet as a buffer between China and India, but they also encouraged the notion of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet as a means of checking the expansion of the Russian Empire. In line with this, they made several attempts to delimit the Indo–Tibetan boundary. Their last effort was in 1899, through a letter to Beijing, suggesting the McCartney–McDonald alignment for the Ladakh–Tibet boundary. It was motivated by a desire to ensure that there were no grey areas in the border, which could be taken advantage of by third parties. In fact, their proposals in the west were generally favourable to the Chinese because they were motivated by a fear of Russian expansion. But eventually, Aksai Chin remained outside the pale and was never settled. In any case, there is no evidence that there was any Chinese presence south of the Kunlun range till the 1950s.

  The British sought to set the eastern boundary by convening a conference in Simla in 1913. They proposed the division of Tibet into an Inner Tibet under Chinese jurisdiction and an autonomous Outer Tibet under the religious authority of the lamas, but whose suzerainty would remain with the Chinese. As part of this, they sought to define the boundary between India and Tibet from Bhutan to northern Burma through what came to be known as the McMahon Line. The Chinese representative did not contest this boundary, but though he initialled the draft agreement, he did not sign it. Following this, Britain and Tibet signed the Simla Convention in 1914, in the presence of the Chinese representative, with an attached appendix of a map delimiting the boundary.

  The boundary, roughly constituting Arunachal Pradesh, has become the largest area of dispute between India and China. It was also the most inhospitable, with few roads and trails, inhabited by aboriginal people who had little cultural affinity to either India or China. However, there were a few people of Tibetan origin in pockets such as Tawang. The Indian claim of a boundary based on the McMahon Line works with the assumption that, at the time, Tibet was independent and capable of undertaking international obligations.

  Given this background, the Indian view has been that there is a traditional customary boundary between India and Tibet both in the east and the west along the high crest of the Himalayas, which is underscored by legal agreements such as the Simla Convention of 1914, the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890, the Anglo-Tibetan Convention of 1904 and in the west, the various agreements between the rulers of princely states and Tibet.

  Assuming the role of successor state to the British in the subcontinent, India signed treaties with Bhutan (1949), Nepal and Sikkim (1950). But these were equally motivated by a need to consolidate itself across the cis-Himalayan polities, in the wake of the Chinese decision to re-establish control over Tibet.

  Despite its ups and downs, the Indo–Nepal relationship has been unique. Nepalese personnel form a significant component of the Indian army and its nationals are able to cross the border without a visa. Nepalese nationals can work anywhere in India, except in specified government positions, without a work permit; they can own property and businesses like any Indian. To this day Indo–Nepal relations are governed by the Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1950. Successive Nepali leaders have wanted to rewrite what they say is an unequal treaty, but have never quite managed to do so. One reason is that the treaty actually is hugely beneficial for Nepal.

  In 1950, India played a significant role in restoring the primacy of the monarchy in Nepal by supporting King Tribhuvan over the Rana oligarchs. However, India also backed the Nepali Congress, many of whose members were educated in India or sheltered in Indian territory when forced
into exile by King Mahendra.

  King Mahendra was succeeded by Birendra, who never quite got along with India. The monarchy was rattled by India’s annexation of Sikkim in 1975. But the China factor was never far behind. In the late 1980s, spooked by the Indian airdrop over Jaffna, Sri Lanka, Nepal bought anti-aircraft weapons from China, violating the spirit, if not the letter, of the 1950 treaty. India retaliated through blockade. The train of events led to the rise of the movement for democracy with Nepal becoming a constitutional monarchy.

  The subsequent period witnessed the demise of the monarchy, the rise and fall of the Maoists and a somewhat chaotic democratic set-up in Nepal. Through all this, India and China vied for influence. Ties between Nepal and India worsened after the second blockade in 2015, which was occasioned or, as India charged, instituted by the Madhesi people of the Nepali plains protesting a flawed Constitution passed by the hill-dominated parties. The post-blockade period has seen Chinese aid equalling and sometimes exceeding Indian assistance and also the acceleration of linkages to bypass future Indian blockades. Nepal is seeking to develop pipelines, roads and fibre-optic linkages with China to avoid the Indian stranglehold. There is a question mark, however, over the extent to which it can defy geography.

  Indian ties with Sikkim were more straightforward, since the latter was a protectorate of the British Empire. Thanks to a 1950 treaty, India inherited the arrangements through which Sikkim’s external affairs, defence, diplomacy and communications would be controlled by India. The details of the treaty indicate that India was much more concerned about its security than in the case of the treaty with Bhutan. In some ways, the merger of Sikkim with India was an inevitable consequence of the geopolitics of the Himalayas. The instrumentality of Indian action was the Nepalese-dominated Sikkim National Congress, whose victory in the election of 1974 triggered the movement that led to the overthrowing of the monarchy in Sikkim. A subsequent referendum in April 1975 confirmed the decision. Whether or not India had a role in this is a matter of conjecture. Perhaps the Indian intelligence agencies pushed the issue a bit but, as the largely painless merger of Sikkim with India indicated, it was backed by most people of the state. China vehemently protested the union and recognized Sikkim’s accession to India only after some thirty years, that too, after India made the important shift of recognizing that the Tibet Autonomous Region was part of China, as distinct from its earlier formulation that Tibet was an autonomous region of China.

  In the case of Bhutan, New Delhi signed a treaty in 1949 through which India agreed not to interfere in its internal affairs, while Bhutan agreed ‘to be guided’ by the Government of India in its external relations. The outbreak of the Khampa rebellion in 1954-55 began to put pressure on Bhutan, since some of the activity was near the Bhutanese border. It was in this context that Jawaharlal Nehru visited the country in 1958, travelling through the Chumbi Valley adjacent to Bhutan, with the Chinese observing the full protocol of welcoming him and seeing him off at the frontier posts on both flanks of the Valley. In 1959, the Tibetan rebellion broke out and the Chinese took the opportunity of occupying eight Bhutanese enclaves in western Tibet. Subsequently, the Dalai Lama escaped from Lhasa via the Chumbi Valley.

  It was only after these developments that Bhutan agreed to a major road project to link central Bhutan with India and the Indian army assumed the responsibility of training its Bhutanese counterparts.

  The interaction between China and India must, of course, be seen in the context of domestic, regional, and world politics. These may not have intruded directly into the process, but they formed an important backdrop and there should be no doubt that they have played a role in the movement, forward or backward, of the Sino–Indian relationship.

  Between 1950–1959, the Chinese did not raise the issue of the border, nor did the Indians who felt that since it appeared to be a settled matter, there was no point in raising it. In retrospect, it could be said that the Chinese were biding their time. They needed Indian goodwill to consolidate themselves in Tibet and secure supplies which were more accessible through India. But once India had formally acknowledged that Tibet was, in fact, part of China, the Chinese position became more assertive. It was only in September 1959 that Zhou Enlai formally told Nehru that China’s border with India had never been formally delimited. It did not recognize any treaties between Tibet and India that did not have the approval of the Chinese imperial authorities. In line with this, China did not accept the 1842 treaty on Ladakh, neither did it recognize the Simla Convention. The friction between India and China led to a border war in 1962, followed by a series of clashes on the Sikkim border in 1967. Thereafter there was a long period in which the two sides did little on the border. The 1986-87 Sumdorong Chu crisis brought India and China face-to-face on the border once again. But this time India had the upper hand. The rapidity of the Indian deployment in the area which saw the opening battle of the 1962 war shocked the Chinese, as did the armoured deployments in Ladakh and northern Sikkim.

  In 1993, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao signed the Border Peace and Tranquillity Agreement of 1993 (BPTA), which was accompanied by another agreement in 1996. The essence of these two Confidence Building Measures (CBM) was that India agreed to normalize relations with China even while the boundary dispute remained unresolved. Both sides agreed to maintain peace and tranquillity along a Line of Actual Control (LAC), which is in itself a notional line. Both sides have their own understanding of where it lies. There are some sixteen places along this line where the boundary claim overlaps, and because both sides patrol the LAC to the extent of their claim, both accuse each other of transgressions.

  India proposed one key step, spelt out in Article 10 of the 1996 agreement – that the two sides would work out a common understanding of the alignment of the LAC to minimize the fallout from ‘transgressions’. But the Chinese have, since, baulked at working this out and so the key clauses of the agreements, which included a progressive demilitarization of the border, remain in limbo. The crux of the Sino–Indian problem remains their disputed border. As the BPTA experience showed, setting it aside is not an option. Today, India’s enhanced capacities ensure that it is in more frequent contact with China in the areas which they contest along the LAC. It takes just one minor incident to escalate into a crisis, as in the case of Depsang in 2013, Chumar in 2014, or Doklam in 2017.

  India and China need to resolve their long-running border dispute. Over the years, China has shifted goalposts on the border negotiations at periodic intervals and it is often unclear why. In the period between 1950-1958, little was said about the border and maps showing Arunachal Pradesh as part of China were said to be old maps. In 1959, they said that the entire border needed to be delimited and demarcated. In 1960 Zhou Enlai said that China could agree to live with India’s control of NEFA/Arunachal Pradesh if New Delhi was willing to accept China’s ownership of Aksai Chin. This was rejected by India because it appeared that China was, in effect, trading a chunk of Indian territory it had illegally occupied, with another part of Indian territory. The offer was repeated in 1980-81 by Deng Xiaoping. But the Indian side still did not accept it.

  The fourth shift came after the sixth round of talks in 1985 when China declared that the bigger problem of the Sino–Indian border was in the eastern sector and that in their concept of mutual accommodation and mutual understanding, India needed to make concessions in the east. In 1960, Zhou had said that the problem in the east was relatively minor and the bigger problem was in the west. Fully developed by 2017, the Chinese position now declares Arunachal Pradesh to be ‘Southern Tibet’ and says that India must at least concede the Tawang region to resolve the dispute. As for the Aksai Chin, the Chinese now pretend that it is not really a disputed area, since it is firmly under Chinese control.

  India has had its own share of missteps and mistakes in dealing with the border issue. But by and large, its position has been consistent. Beginning with a refusal to either negotiate on the border or swap claims, Indi
a came around to the idea of discussing mutual compromises. Eventually, through the 2005 agreement, it appeared to be ready to settle on the basis of a status quo, essentially a swap of claims. But the Chinese pulled the rug from under that effort as well.

  In 2003, the two sides decided to try and resolve their border dispute through a political bargain, appointing two Special Representatives to work out the process. After a path-breaking agreement in 2005 outlining the political parameters and guiding principles of a border settlement, the negotiation has hit a plateau.

  After twenty rounds of talks between the Special Representatives, the two sides have worked out all the technical issues that are needed to create a framework to delimit their boundary. Both know in their heart of hearts that there can be no settlement other than one confirming the status quo. The challenge is for Chinese and Indian leaders to generate enough political courage to clinch the issue.

  What if, in the coming decade, India, China, and Bhutan were able to resolve their border issues? Let’s assume that it will be on the basis of the status quo as it exists today. This would, no doubt, alter the geopolitics of the region. But it would also have a major impact not only on the border economies through the revival of old trade routes and connections, but their broader economic relations by the linking up of existing communication networks and expanding them to their true potential.