Goebbels: A Biography

by Peter Longerich

  At the beginning of May German propaganda began to produce anti-Polish polemics, albeit kept low-key for the time being.193 The idea was to reinforce the message contained in Hitler’s speech about a break with Poland.194 At the heart of the campaign were two articles by Goebbels in the Völkischer Beobachter complaining about alleged anti-German tendencies in Poland: Elsewhere, in an explanation directed at the rest of the press, the Propaganda Ministry spoke of a “trial shot.”195 The press was enjoined to publish a steady stream of reports about border incidents, although still in a restrained manner.196

  The announcement of the military alliance between Germany and Italy on May 8 was what Goebbels called another “body blow”—a clear signal to the western powers, who were committing themselves more and more to the support of Poland.197 Two weeks later Galeazzo Ciano came to Berlin for the formal signing of the pact.198 Disappointment was mixed with triumph, however: Japan was not prepared to join the signatories.199

  THE ATTACK TURNS ON BRITAIN

  In May the regime received clear signals that the British intended to stand by their commitment to Poland.200 This prompted Goebbels to start another anti-British campaign, continuing into July, under the banner of “inciting hatred for England.”201 On May 20 he published an attack on the “encirclers”:202 “Take a good look at them as they squat together in their clubs, Freemasons’ lodges, and Jewish banks hatching new mischief to afflict Europe.”203

  The key term encirclers, referring to the “encircling” of Germany by coalition forces led by a grasping Great Britain, was meant to recall the situation in 1914, when Germany alleged that the Entente Powers had hemmed the country in. Goebbels was trying to provoke new fears of a threat to the Reich and to shift the blame in advance for any possible outbreak of war. The shrill tone of his propaganda warned the German population unequivocally that war was inevitable to ensure the survival of the nation. But there was no mood of pro-war enthusiasm comparable with that of summer 1914.

  The focus of Goebbels’s attacks varied. At some points he homed in on Britain’s interference in German-Polish negotiations, said to have handed the Poles a “blank check” allowing them to decide on war or peace;204 at other times he stressed that Germany did not want to number perennially among the “have-nots”;205 or he moved the Danzig question into the foreground in order to test “the international atmosphere” on this point.206

  While Hitler remained convinced that the British were bluffing,207 Goebbels increasingly turned his attention to the demand for access to resources and enlargement of Lebensraum (“living-space”). In his speech at the Solstice Festival in the Berlin Stadium, he declared that a “nation of 80 million could not be excluded from the riches of the earth”: As long as this remained the case, “any peace program was just empty words.”208 Two days later, in the Völkischer Beobachter, he ventured to predict that “in a war with Germany Great Britain would lose its empire.”209

  In the Völkischer Beobachter in July Goebbels attacked the British politician and writer Stephen King-Hall, who had sent a leaflet addressed to Germans; however, the article did not appear until it had been thoroughly redacted by Hitler.210

  BAD GASTEIN—BAYREUTH—SALZBURG—VENICE

  On July 2 Goebbels went to Salzburg to check on preparations for the Festival. He had first visited the Festival the year before and had not been impressed by the building (“must be torn down”) or by the productions: “beneath contempt in terms of singing, scenery, and decor. […] This is real Viennese kitsch. But I’ll get rid of it all.”211

  He used the journey to make a slight detour to meet up with his family in Bad Gastein, where Magda had been undergoing spa treatment since the end of June.212 It was in the Austrian resort that she confessed to him her affair with Hanke, who thus stood unmasked for Goebbels as a “first-class rogue”—but had a touch of respect crept in there?213

  From Bad Gastein they traveled together to Bayreuth. In the intermissions between the opera performances, the usual social obligations, and the hours of conversation with Hitler, Goebbels tried to put an end to the relationship between Magda and Hanke. He had the head of personnel at the Propaganda Ministry working on Hanke in Berlin on his behalf, while he talked for hours with Magda, who was “very disturbed and upset,” frequently fainting; the confrontation placed him, too, under “the greatest nervous strain.”214 Eventually he discovered that Magda had changed the complexion of the matter by putting it to Hitler, as she always did when her marriage was at stake.215 Hitler followed the same line as he had in the Baarová case; the couple must remain together under all circumstances. There followed a headlong departure from the town of Richard Wagner.216

  Back in Berlin, the first thing he did was to send Hanke off on vacation. With the beginning of war he would go into the army; there could be no question of letting him return to the Propaganda Ministry.217 Goebbels, the deceived husband, found himself in a “severe state of shock.” It was “terrible to lose all faith in your fellow man.” But perhaps this was “necessary and useful for the future”; you were then “free of illusions and can face life in a more open, freer and more mature way. You don’t have friends anymore, just acquaintances and colleagues.”218

  After spending the first two weeks of August at the Salzburg Festival,219 he went with a delegation from the Propaganda Ministry and numerous representatives of the German press to the Biennale in Venice, where he had talks with his Italian counterpart, Dino Alfieri, about further cooperation in various areas of propaganda but also found time to simply lounge around on the beach or in cafés.220 On August 15 he flew back to Berlin, surely aware that with the “anti-Polish campaign” Hitler had signaled the beginning of the “final sprint.”221

  Following Hitler’s lead, in the second half of August the press adopted an anti-Polish stance of almost unparalleled aggressiveness. The pressure on that country was to be stepped up, and at the same time the home population was to be attuned to the inevitability of a war.222 On August 19 Goebbels received a call from the Obersalzberg: In two days the propaganda effort was to reach a “full crescendo. After that, we’re off.”223

  Goebbels had concluded that the war “was anticipated with a certain fatalism. It would almost take a miracle to stop it. If it has become necessary, then the sooner the better.”224 The propaganda was framed accordingly. In the last prewar phase it concentrated on blaming the war on the attitude of Poland and the western powers. There was still no mention of enthusiasm for war, either from Goebbels or in the pronouncements of his propaganda machine.

  NON-AGGRESSION PACT WITH THE SOVIET UNION AND THE BEGINNING OF THE WAR

  On August 21 there was further “news from the Obersalzberg”: “Non-aggression pact with Moscow completed. Ribbentrop in Moscow on Wednesday.” Once again the decision-making process had entirely bypassed the propaganda minister, as he was only informed post facto of highly significant developments.225 On the day Goebbels received this message, he struggled to put this “global sensation” into words: “The whole scene of power in Europe has been transformed. London and Paris bewildered. […] The Führer has pulled off a brilliant chess move.”

  At Hitler’s request, he made his way early next morning to Berchtesgaden.226 During the following two weeks he was to stay in close daily contact with Hitler, and although Goebbels was not involved in the actual decision-making process that was eventually to unleash the Second World War, his diary entries for this critical period contain extremely interesting insights into the individual steps and the motives of the German leadership.

  A letter from Chamberlain delivered to Hitler by Ambassador Nevile Henderson reinforced the message of Britain’s resolve in the event of an attack on Poland. Hitler replied to the letter with an equally clear counterthreat.227 As Goebbels’s notes have it, the Führer’s general assessment of the situation is as follows: The situation of Poland was “desperate. We will attack them at the first opportunity. The Polish state must be smashed, just like the Czech.” This woul
d not be too difficult, but the question of whether the West would intervene was more complicated: It was not certain. “Italy is not enthusiastic, but will have to go along with us. It hardly has any choice.”

  Hitler then informed Goebbels of the details of the way the pact with Stalin had come about and its consequences: “Eastern Europe will be divided between Berlin and Moscow.” Naturally, a surprise treaty with the Soviet arch-enemy was a risky business. But Goebbels noted: “Beggars can’t be choosers.”

  Finally, at two in the morning, the long-awaited communiqué from Moscow arrived, sealing the alliance with Stalin: “Non-aggression and consultative pact for 10 years. […] A world-historical event with vast implications.”228 The treaty, and a Secret Supplementary Protocol signed at the same time, did indeed provide for the division of Poland and the Baltic states into German and Soviet spheres of influence, respectively: Hitler now had the necessary rear cover for his planned war on Poland.229

  The next day Hitler and his propaganda minister left Berchtesgaden for Berlin.230 Here preparations were begun immediately for the invasion of Poland, scheduled for the night of August 25–26. At midday on August 25, Goebbels saw Hitler, who instructed him to draw up two proclamations, one to the German people and one to the Party. “Clarification of the need for an armed conflict with Poland, adjustment of the whole nation to war, if necessary for months and years.”231

  Later in the same day Hitler met the British and French ambassadors. He declared plainly to Henderson that “the German-Polish problem must be resolved and could be resolved.” If Britain declared war because of a military move by Germany against Poland, then Germany would accept this challenge.232 On the other hand, Hitler promised Britain extensive cooperation once “the resolution of this problem had been achieved.” However, this step did not seem very promising even to Goebbels: “England will no longer believe we mean it.” The encounter with the French ambassador did not offer the prospect of peace, either: Robert Coulondre assured Hitler “on his word of honor as an officer” that if Germany attacked Poland, France would be obliged to act.233

  But events then took a turn that upset all of Hitler’s calculations. Early in the evening Ambassador Attolico appeared in the Reich Chancellery with a surprising message: “He delivers Mussolini’s declaration that Italy cannot participate in a war at present. Serves us right. It’s what I’ve always feared and have really known all the time since Venice: Italy won’t go along with us.” In fact, Mussolini complained to Hitler that “in their encounters […] war was envisaged for 1942,” and in accordance with this understanding he would of course be ready by that juncture “on land, at sea, and in the air,” but at the present moment he was insufficiently prepared for armed conflict with the western powers. Hitler immediately drew his conclusion: Mobilization was to continue, but the attack planned for that night was called off.234

  What to do? “The Führer broods and ponders. It’s a heavy blow for him.” Goebbels was confident that Hitler would “find a way out, even from this damned situation.” But all Hitler came up with was to go to war without his assiduously cultivated ally.235

  The next day Ambassador Coulondre handed over a letter from Daladier,236 the content of which, according to Goebbels’s report of Hitler’s reaction, was of no consequence, obviously serving the purpose of avoiding “possible war-guilt.”237 Although the French were promised confidentiality, two days later the German side broadcast the letter and Hitler’s answer “in every language”; Goebbels thought this was “the best possible propaganda for us.”238

  When he met Hitler the following day, August 27, the leader was “in fine form and full of confidence.” He had no intention of giving up his minimum demands regarding Danzig and Poland. That evening, Henderson brought the British note replying to Hitler’s proposals of August 25. The British government took cognizance of Hitler’s offer of extensive cooperation but stressed that the outstanding differences between Germany and Poland must be settled first—on the basis of Hitler’s speech to the Reichstag of April 28. Attention was clearly drawn once more to the existing commitments of Great Britain to Poland.239

  In addition, the Swedish industrialist Birger Dahlerus, whom Hitler had requested a few days earlier to present his ideas about a resolution of the crisis directly to the British government, brought a message from London. Goebbels noted: “England might possibly agree to ceding of Danzig and a corridor in the Corridor. But guarantee of Polish border in return. Later also to discuss question of colonies. Long peace with England. […] Everything still hangs in the balance.”240

  The German reaction the next day was to describe the prospects for any further negotiations with Poland as no longer encouraging, but nonetheless the German side was ready to receive a Polish representative in Berlin for discussions, provided he arrived by the next day, meaning August 30.241 On the morning of August 30 Goebbels summarized the thinking behind this reply: “The Führer wants a plebiscite in the Corridor under international control. That way, he still hopes to pry London loose from Warsaw and find an excuse for striking. London’s attitude is not as rigid as previously.”

  It was clear that any negotiations would be a sham. The real aim was, on the one hand, to weaken the British guarantee to Warsaw and on the other to create a pretext for military action against Poland.

  The extremely tight deadline set for a Polish representative to be sent to Berlin made a resumption of negotiations appear quite improbable. But if, against the odds, Beck should come to Berlin, Goebbels was worried above all that the unexpected chance of peace could lead to an “unstoppable wave of optimism here,” which would “ruin our whole position.”242 Evidently, Goebbels was still assuming that the nation was not exactly enraptured by the prospect of war. Meanwhile, the press was instructed “to play up reports of Polish atrocities.”243

  Around midnight on August 30 Ribbentrop received the British ambassador to inform him that the German side had formulated some proposals to resolve the Polish issues. These had lapsed, however, since contrary to German wishes no Polish plenipotentiary had presented himself to the Reich government. Ribbentrop went on to read out the proposals to Henderson at top speed, without handing him a copy of the document. It was quite clear that the German side no longer had any interest whatsoever in negotiating.244

  At about the same time, Hitler summoned Goebbels to tell him about the details of the “negotiating proposal” and the background of this tactic: “The Führer thinks there’ll be war.” Hitler had composed a memorandum which, among other things, stipulated the incorporation of Danzig into the Reich and a plebiscite in the Corridor. Hitler proposed to “launch this document into the global public sphere at the most favorable opportunity.” He himself was making it apparent that the sixteen-point catalogue he had drawn up was never intended as the basis for negotiations but simply to demonstrate to the world the “good will” of his regime—for the time after the now inevitable war had begun.

  “England’s reply,” added Goebbels in his account of the conversation with Hitler, “is playing for time. But also disrespectful and provocative. They think Germany is weak. They are deceiving themselves.” These words of the dictator’s to his propaganda minister were all part of the charade Hitler was acting out: Neither the Poles nor the British were going to be given any chance of reacting to the proposals.

  When the Polish ambassador called on Ribbentrop the next day to present his government’s response to the British proposal that direct talks should be arranged with Germany, Ribbentrop made an excuse to cut the conversation short. Soon afterward the German Foreign Office handed the German “proposals” to the ambassadors of Britain, France, Japan, the United States, and the USSR, declaring that the Polish side had not availed themselves of the chance to negotiate.245 This communication and the sixteen-point document were announced on German radio at around nine o’clock.246

  On the German side, the decision had been made long before: At midday on August 31 Hitler had given orders for t
he invasion of Poland to begin that night. Hitler did not believe that Britain would intervene, but whether this prediction would turn out to be accurate, wrote Goebbels, “nobody can say at the moment.”247

  * * *

  * Translators’ note: A quotation from Goethe’s Faust.

  1939–1945

  WAR—TOTAL WAR—TOTAL DEFEAT

  CHAPTER 19

  “War Is the Father of All Things”

  The First Months of the War

  Credit 19.1

  The government front bench in the Kroll Opera House during Hitler’s speech after the attack on Poland, September 1, 1939. Goebbels’s reaction to the outbreak of war was far from enthusiastic.

  The Nazi regime represented the opening of hostilities on September 1, 1939, as a response to alleged provocation by the Poles on the frontier. Border incidents faked by the SS, especially the alleged “raid” on the Gleiwitz radio transmitter, were to supply the pretext for the German assault. The corresponding entry in Goebbels’s diary reads: “The SS given special orders for the night,” and a few paragraphs later comes the phrase “Polish attack on the Gleiwitz transmitter.”1 For him, the carefully contrived lie had transformed itself, all unawares, into a real event. The fiction was maintained by Hitler’s speech in the Reichstag on the morning of September 1: “Fire has been returned since 5:45 A.M.!”2—although in fact the attack had begun an hour earlier. Hitler also announced the ratification of the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact and declared that he had no interest in changing Germany’s western borders, the perfect lifeline for London and Paris, decided Goebbels, who was present in the Reichstag for the speech.3