Goebbels: A Biography

by Peter Longerich

  299. TB, 19 February 1938. “Mercedes. 200 hp. I’ll buy it. Terrific sports convertible from Horch. Something for connoisseurs.” On the plan to buy the Horch, see TB, 3 May 1938.

  300. TB, 19 April and 22 June 1939.

  301. TB, 18 August 1939.

  302. See the corresponding entries for 1936/37: on 10 July, 21 and 26 August, 4, 9, 16, and 30 September, 4, 23, and 29 October, 23 November and 29 December 1936, 10 February, 26 March, 6 April, 17 June, 24, 27, and 28 August, 16 September, 5 and 18 October, 20 November 1937.

  303. TB, 4 September 1936 and 18 October 1937: “If I don’t have any work to do I become depressed.”

  17. “DON’T LOOK AROUND, KEEP MARCHING ON!”

  1. TB, 27 September 1937. On the actual visit, see the reports in the VB (B), 25–29 September 1937.

  2. VB (B), 29 September 1937, “Dr. Goebbels meldet den Aufmarsch von drei Millionen Menschen.”

  3. SOPADE 9/1937, 1219, Report from Berlin.

  4. VB (B), 29 September 1939, “Ein geschichtliches Ereignis. Die Völkerkundgebung der 115 Millionen.”

  5. TB, 29 September 1937.

  6. TB, 2 August 1937, and 1 August 1937; VB (B), 2 August 1937, “Überwältigende Manifestation des deutschen Volkstums. 30,000 Auslandsdeutsche marschieren am Führer vorbei—nie erlebte Stürme der Begeisterung” (headline).

  7. TB, 10 September 1937; PA 1937, no. 2219 (9 September). Goebbels’s belligerent speech attacking the “threat from ‘Jewish Bolshevism’ was published in the VB (B) on 10 September 1937: “Dr. Goebbels enthüllt die dunklen Pläne des Bolschewismus—Nürnberg warnt Europa.”

  8. TB, 19 October 1937, and 20, 22, 24, 27, and 29 October 1937. On the event that provided the pretext, see Smelser, Das Sudetenproblem und das Dritte Reich (1933–1938), 183, and Helmuth K. G. Rönnefarth, Die Sudetenkrise in der internationalen Politik. Entstehung, Verlauf, Auswirkung, 171ff.; on the press campaign, see Schwarzenbeck, Nationalsozialistische Pressepolitik und die Sudetenkrise 1938, 239f., and PA 1937, nos. 2502, 2506, 2512, 2523, 2530 (18–21 October).

  9. TB, 4 November 1937: “Henlein requests us to moderate our campaign against Prague a bit, otherwise he won’t be able to control his people properly. Also he doesn’t know what he wants. But that’s fine!” When the German envoy in Prague made the same request of him the day before, Goebbels had been much less willing to moderate the campaign (ibid., 3 November 1937, and then ending with the provisional conclusion of the press attacks 6 November 1937). On the halt to the campaign, see ADAP D II, no. 11, Aufzeichnung Mackensen, 3 November; PA 1937, nos. 2687 and 2702 (5 November).

  10. Schwarzenbeck, Pressepolitik, 247ff. ADAP D II, no. 12, Bericht des deutschen Gesandten in Prag, Eisenlohr, über Gespräch mit Außenminister Krofta, 4 March 1938; no. 15, Bericht Eisenlohrs vom 9. November 1937 über Gespräch mit Staatspräsident Beneš; II 18, long version of this report 10 and 11 November 1937; no. 16, Aufzeichnung Leiter Presseabteilung des AA über Gespräch mit tschechischem Gesandten, 9 November 1937; no. 17, Aufzeichnung Staatssekretär über Gespräch mit tschechischem Gesandten, 9 November 1937.

  11. TB, 6 November 1937.

  12. Nuremberg document PS-386, published in IMT, vol. 25, 402–13. On the history of the document, see Bussmann, “Zur Entstehung und Überlieferung der Hoßbach-Niederschrift”; Smith, “Die Überlieferung der Hoßbach-Niederschrift im Lichte neuer Quellen.” TB, 6 November 1937.

  13. Smelser, Sudetenproblem, 184f.; Henlein to Hitler, 19 November 1937, in ADAP D II, no. 23.

  14. TB, 24 November, 14 December 1937.

  15. ADAP D II, no. 29, Vermerk Leiter der Politischen Abteilung, v. Weizsäcker, über entsprechende Zusagen des tschechoslowakischen Gesandten, 10 December 1937; at the beginning of 1938 the German envoy in Prague reported that the authorities were beginning to “restrict or ban the émigré press” (ibid., ADAP D II, no. 47, 12 January 1938). On the “press peace,” see Schwarzenbeck, Pressepolitik, 247ff.

  16. See p. 369.

  17. PA 1938, no. 159 (18 January); VB (B), 19 January 1938, German-Yugoslav press agreement.

  18. TB, 9 and 22 April 1938.

  19. TB, 21 December 1937.

  20. TB, 9 and 10 November 1937; VB (B), 9 November 1937, “Eröffnung der Ausstellung ‘Der ewige Jude.’ ”

  21. TB, 26 November 1937.

  22. TB, 30 November 1937.

  23. TB, 3 December 1937; on the drafting of the law, see 2 December 1937.

  24. TB, 30 and 31 December 1937, numerous entries in January and through mid-February. On the Goga government, see Heinen, Die Legion “Erzengel Michael” in Rumänien, 357ff.

  25. TB, 13 February 1937, and 14 February.

  26. TB, 12 February 1937.

  27. TB, 15 October 1937.

  28. Examples in Stephan, Goebbels, 95ff.

  29. TB, 17 March 1937.

  30. TB, 5 May 1937; PA 1937, no. 1640 (1 July).

  31. Michael (book version). The quotation is also in TB, 2 February, 13 August 1924.

  32. The “Schacht crisis” had been going on since March 1937. See TB, 19 March 1937 as well as 21 March 1937, 12 and 14 August, 5, 9, and 10 September, 27 October 1937; Kopper, Schacht, 312ff.

  33. TB, 29 October 1937; see also 2 November 1937, conversation with Hitler about the same subject and 3 November 1937, conversation with Funk, 4 November 1937 about further negotiations. 6 November 1937: “Hitler wants to delay Schacht’s dismissal until 11/9.”

  34. TB, 26 November 1937.

  35. TB, 27 November 1937; also 28 November 1936 about Dietrich’s and Hanke’s visits on taking up their positions.

  36. TB, 2, 4, 7, 9, 18 December 1937; on Naumann, see 8, 9, 12, and 31 December 1937.

  37. BK, 182; TB, 24 February 1938, on Hinkel’s impending appointment. He had already been doing the same job but in a special capacity.

  38. TB, 18 February, 2 March 1938.

  39. TB, 5 February 1938; and 2 March 1938; PA 1938, no. 585 (26 March), information about the creation of a foreign press department. While the newspaper academic, Professor Karl Bömer, took over the foreign section, the previous head of the department, Alfred-Ingemar Berndt (the experienced Nazi journalist had replaced Jahncke in 1936) was now responsible for domestic issues; however, at the turn of the year 1938/39 he was already being replaced by the radio journalist, Hans Fritzsche, and took over the ministry’s literature department founded in 1934. On Berndt, see BK, 75ff., on Bömer, see BK, 69ff.; on Fritsche, see TB, 20 January 1939; Bonacker, Goebbels’ Mann beim Radio, 47; on the literature department, see BAB, R 55/432, Nachrichtenblatt des Promi, 5 September 1934.

  40. TB, 20 January 1937.

  41. TB, 25 August 1937; on the administration, see BK, 60f.; there are personal files for Ott and Müller: R 55/30326 and 30122.

  42. TB, 30 March, 5 April, 21 and 25 August, 19 October, 21 November 1935.

  43. It was initially unclear whether Esser was to become a departmental head, general inspector, Reich commissar or state secretary. Goebbels tried to make Esser’s position as insignificant as possible: 16 December 1937, 20 and 22 January, 11 and 25 February, 4, 19, and 22 March, 3 June 1938, 20, 28, and 29 January 1939, 17 February, 21 June 1939.

  44. TB, 5 February 1938.

  45. TB, 13 January 1938. Blomberg had “blushingly” confessed the forthcoming marriage to him in December: TB, 15 December 1937.

  46. TB, 26 and 27 January 1938.

  47. TB, 27 January 1938. On the Blomberg-Fritsch affair, see Müller et al. (eds.), Organisation und Mobilisierung des deuschen Machtbereichs, 255ff.; Janssen and Tobias, Der Sturz der Generäle.

  48. TB, 27 January 1938.

  49. TB, 28 and 31 January on Gestapo investigations.

  50. TB, 26, 28, and 30 January 1938.

  51. TB, 29 January 1938; see also 30 January 1938.

  52. TB, 1 January 1938.

  53. On 27 January 1938, according to TB, 28 January 1938.

  54. TB, 3–5 February 1938.

  55. TB, 5 Febuary 1938.r />
  56. TB, 1 February 1938.

  57. See Janssen and Tobias, Sturz, 148ff.; TB, 5 and 6 February 1938; PA 1938, no. 359, Sonderpressekonferenz (4 February); no. 361, (5 February, Statement by Berndt).

  58. TB, 6 February 1938. Regierung Hitler, vol. 5, no. 35, notes the address without adding further details. The communiqué that was issued that evening concerning the session is in BAB, R 43 II/1477.

  59. TB, 23 February, 2 March 1938.

  60. Janssen and Tobias, Sturz, 173ff.

  61. TB, 18 March 1938.

  62. On the “Anschluß” with Austria, see Heinz Arnberger et al. (eds.), “Anschluß” 1938; Anschluß 1938. Protokoll des Symposiums in Wien am 14. und 15. März 1978; Botz, Die Eingliederung Österreichs in das Deutsche Reich; Schausberger, Griff nach Österreich; Stourzh and Zaar (eds.), Österreich, Deutschland und die Mächte.

  63. TB, 13 July 1937; PA 1937, no. 1729 (13 July), announcement of the text of the agreement.

  64. TB, 15 December 1937.

  65. ADAP D I, nos. 294 and 295, Protokoll über die Besprechung vom 12. Februar (including draft); Schausberger, Griff, 519ff.

  66. TB, 16 February 1938, and 17 February 1938; 18 February 1938: “The Führer speaks with Seyss-Inquart, who’s briefly in Berlin. I shall only hear more today.”

  67. TB, 21 February 1938.

  68. TB, 17 February 1938.

  69. TB, 18, 19, and 20 February 1938; PA 1938, no. 444 (16 February), detailed instruction concerning the reporting of changes to the Austrian government. See Koerner, So haben sie es damals gemacht, 68ff.

  70. Domarus I, 792ff., quotations 802, 803; see also TB, 21 February 1938.

  71. TB, 26 February 1938.

  72. TB, 1 March 1938, and 2 and 4 March 1938; Schausberger, Griff, 542f.

  73. PA 1939, no. 557 (24 February), no. 564 (25 February); no. 618 (1 March 1938): “restraint” and “care”; TB, 1 March 1938; Koerner, So haben sie es, 75ff.

  74. Schausberger, Griff, 552f.

  75. TB, 10 March 1938.

  76. TB, 11 March 1938; PA 1938, no. 724 and 727 (11 March). VB (B), 11 March 1938, “Schuschniggs ‘Volksentscheid.’ ” (editorial); DAZ, 11 March 1938 (E), “Feuerüberfall auf Linzer Nationalsozialisten” (headline); Koerner, So haben sie es, 78f.

  77. Correct spelling: Seyß-Inquart.

  78. TB, 12 March 1938; Schausberger, Griff, 556ff.

  79. TB, 13 March 1938; Text in: Domarus I, 815ff. On this and on the further propaganda handling of this action, see PA 1938, nos. 728f. and 733f. (12 March); VB (B), 12 March 1938, “Deutsch-Österreich aus dem Chaos gerettet. Provisorische Wiener Regierung Seyß-Inquart bittet den Führer um Entsendung reichsdeutscher Truppen” (headline); DAZ, 12 March 1938 (M), “Nationalsozialismus Österreichs an der Macht.”

  80. TB, 14, 15, and 16 March (there still Reichspropagandahauptamt) and 17, 19, and 20 March 1938.

  81. TB, 14 March 1938.

  82. Domarus I, 824f.; TB, 16 March 1938.

  83. TB, 16 March 1938.

  84. VB (B), 16 March 1938, “Heute Freudentag in Berlin” (headline) and Goebbels’s announcement.

  85. TB, 17 March 1938; VB (B), 17 March 1938, “Triumphaler Einzug des Führers in die Hauptstadt des Großdeutschen Reiches. 2,5 Millionen dankten jubelnd ihrem Führer.”

  86. Domarus I, 826ff.; TB, 18 and 19 March 1938.

  87. TB, 20 March 1938.

  88. TB, 18 March 1938.

  89. TB, 19 March 1938.

  90. TB, 20 March 1938.

  91. TB, 31 March 1938; VB (B), 30 March, “Festlicher Empfang des Reichsministers Dr. Goebbels in Wien”; 31 March 1939 (headline), “Kundgebung der Hunderttausend in Wien”; PA 1938, no. 955 and nos. 956 and 958 (29 March), no. 965 (30 March).

  92. TB, 10 April 1938; Heiber (ed.), Goebbels Reden, no. 33.

  93. Heiber (ed.), Goebbels Reden, 299.

  94. Domarus I, 848ff.; TB, 10 April 1938.

  95. TB, 11 April 1938.

  96. Jung, Plebiszit, 109ff.

  97. TB, 26 April 1938.

  98. TB, 20 March 1938. See also 7 March 1938, when Hitler told Goebbels that the ČSR would “one day be destroyed.”

  99. TB, quotations 21 and 28 March 1938; see also the corresponding entries of 25 and 30 March 1938.

  100. ADAP D II, no. 107, Vortragsnotiz über meine Besprechung mit dem Führer der Sudetendeutschen Partei, Konrad Henlein, und seinem Stellvertreter Karl Hermann Frank; see Smelser, Sudetenproblem, 193f.; Rönnefarth, Sudetenkrise, 218f.

  101. TB, 25 April 1938. See also Henlein’s note after his conversation with Hitler (previous note): “In other words we must always demand so much that we can never be satisfied.”

  102. Smelser, Sudetenproblem, 198; see PA 1937, no. 1197 (25 April), ordering the German press to continue to exercise restraint. On the speech, see TB, 25 April 1938.

  103. PA 1938, nos. 1272 (2 May), 1311 (7 May), 1340 and 1366 (11 May), 1425 and 1433 (18 May).

  104. TB, 4–11 May 1938; VB, 4–11 May 1938.

  105. TB, 7 May 1938. The “liquidation” of Austria and the promise of Italy not to intervene in the event of a conflict between Germany and Czechoslovakia were in fact the main results of the visit: ADAP D I, no. 761, Ribbentrop’s circulars to embassies, and no. 762, Aufzeichnung Weizsäckers, 12 May 1938.

  106. TB, 6 May 1938.

  107. TB, 20 May 1938.

  108. PA 1938, no. 1435 (19 May). On the continuation of the campaign, see PA 1938, no. 1445 (20 May 1938). For the implementation of these instructions see, for example, the reports in the DAZ, which, as ordered, changed the approach with the evening edition of 19 May, launching a series of attacks; the FZ followed suit by publishing an editorial on the 19th about the economic discrimination being allegedly practiced against the Sudeten Germans and on 21 May began to report “incidents.” The VB’s anti-Czech campaign was launched in a big way on 21 May. On this change, of course, see Schwarzenbeck, Pressepolitik, 293ff.

  109. PA 1938, no. 1440 (20 May).

  110. TB, 23 May 1938.

  111. TB, 22 May 1938; see DAZ, FZ, and VB of 21 May 1938.

  112. PA 1938, no. 1467 (23 May).

  113. On the weekend crisis, see Rönnefarth, Sudetenkrise, 277ff.; Scheil, Churchill, Hitler und der Antisemitismus, 193ff. It is still unclear where the false reports came from. See also Lukes, “The Czechoslovak Partial Mobilization in May 1938,” which rather unconvincingly attributes it to Soviet intelligence. On the German propaganda, see DAZ, 22–25 May 1938; FZ, 22–27 May 1938; VB, 22–26 May 1938. See PA 1938, no. 1467 (23 May), nos. 1476, (24 May), 1487 and 1488 (25 May), no. 1504 (27 May).

  114. PA 1938, no. 1510 (28 May); in its editorial of 30 May 1938, the FZ saw “signs of an easing of tension”; in their editions of 26–31 May (DAZ), and 29 and 30 May (VB) both papers dispensed with big spreads about alleged border violations.

  115. TB, 23 (Pussyfooter quotation), 25, 26, and 27 May 1938; 29 May 1938. Goebbels hurried to include these instructions in a speech he gave in Dessau on 30 May, after Hitler had thoroughly vetted the text (TB, 30 May 1938). On the speech, see VB (B), 30 May 1938, “Scharfe Abrechnung mit den Friedensstörern.”

  116. ADAP D II, no. 221, 30 May 1938, Anlage: Führerweisung betr. Aufmarsch Grün; Rönnefarth, Sudetenkrise, 310; Smelser, Sudetenproblem, 201.

  117. TB, 1, 2, and 3 June 1938. PA 1938, no. 1551 (2 June), no. 1565 (3 June); VB (B), 3 June 1938; MNN, 2 and 3 June 1938; DAZ, 2 June (M and E): Schwarzenbeck, Pressepolitik, 313f. His Königsberg speech of 17 June represented a particularly strong attack. TB, 17 and 18 June 1938, FZ, 19 June 1938, “Reichsminister Goebbels in Königsberg.”

  118. In his diary entries for 4, 5, and 8–12 June, Goebbels boasted of having continued to mobilize the press against Prague. However, this is not reflected in his instructions to the press and only partially in the reporting of the press; PA 1938, no. 1601, no. 1613, no. 1620. The FZ carried an editorial on 3 June 1938 dealing with the “problem of Czechoslovakia”; in the same edition and on 7 June t
here were articles about “incidents.” Up until 11 June the DAZ reported such events regularly on its front page, the VB (B) carried headlines on the issue from 2–9 and 11–13 June and on 18 June. There are entries on propaganda against Czechoslovakia in the TB for 15 and 21 June, 1 and 2 July 1938. During the second half of the month attacks by the VB and the FZ against Prague once again declined, as did those of the DAZ between 18 and 29 June. See also Schwarzenbeck, Pressepolitik, 314ff.

  119. TB, 17 July 1938.

  120. TB, 19 July 1938.

  121. PA 1939, no. 1974 (18 July), nos. 1981 and 1988 (19 July), no. 2008 (22 July). On the reduced continuation of the campaign in July, see DAZ, FZ, VB.

  122. On the start of the persecution of the Jews in Austria, see Gerhard Botz, Nationalsozialismus in Wien, 93ff.; Longerich, Politik der Vernichtung, 162ff.; Rosenkranz, Verfolgung und Selbstbehauptung, 20ff.

  123. Adam, Judenpolitik, 172ff.; Barkai, Vom Boykott zur “Entjudung,” 233ff.; Friedländer, Das Dritte Reich, vol. 1, 262ff.; Longerich, Politik der Vernichtung, 155ff.

  124. TB, 25 May 1938.

  125. OA Moskau, 500-1-603, Wolf Gruner (ed.), “ ‘Lesen brauchen sie nicht zu können.’ ”

  126. TB, 21 April 1938.

  127. TB, 25 May (Helldorf), 30 May (Hitler’s agreement), 31 May 1938 (Helldorf).

  128. TB, 2, 3, and 4 June 1938.

  129. TB, 11 June 1938.

  130. Longerich, Politik der Vernichtung, 178ff.

  131. TB, 21 June 1938.

  132. TB, 22 June 1938.

  133. TB, 24 June; see also 26 June 1938.

  134. Longerich, Davon, 114; TB, 9 July 1938 (on Stuttgart).

  135. TB, 1 and 27 July, 31 August 1938.

  136. Longerich, Davon, 114.

  137. TB, 25 July 1938.

  138. On the Runciman mission, see Rönnefarth, Sudetenkrise, 407ff.; Vysny, The Runciman Mission to Czechoslovakia; TB, 28 July 1938: They were adopting a “neutral stance” toward the mission. This corresponded to the attitude adopted by the AA in the press conference: PA 1938, no 2031 (26 July); no. 2039 (26/27 July), no. 2067 (30 July).

  139. On the reporting of the Runciman mission, see, for example, VB (B), 4, 6, and 21 August (editorial) and DAZ: 2 August (E), 10 August (M); 11 August (M); 14 August (M) and 17–19 August 1938.