The Perfect King

by Ian Mortimer

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  Edward in 1334 was fully adult, a proven leader, favoured by God, and a dazzling king of a magnificent court. His family was fine, and growing; his marriage was a good one. And to cap it all, he had the two things which most men who have reached a pinnacle of achievement lack: health and youth. But he also had problems. In his very victory, in his chivalry and public religiosity, in his encouragement of overseas diplomatic links through marriage, and in his refusal to compromise over the Agenais, Edward had established a culture of triumphant belligerence which neither Scotland nor France could ignore. In particular, he had failed completely to reverse the tide of Scottish patriotism, and had failed to press home his advantage after Halidon Hill.

  In terms of conquering Scotland, Edward had been rather short-sighted. In his determination to confront the Scottish army he had concentrated wholly and exclusively on one big battle. Although he had proved his leadership qualities during that battle, he had ignored the wider aspects of subduing a country, expecting that it would capitulate. He was not far wrong - only five castles continued to hold out against his rule - yet he did not attempt to subdue these last few rebels. Instead he let Balliol take responsibility for putting down all opposition. Edward concentrated instead on exerting his maximum gains from Balliol, in terms of grants of land. The ease with which he could control his client king fooled him into thinking that he had power over Scotland. In reality, Edward provided insufficient men to keep the northern kingdom subdued, and this, coupled with Balliol's own shortage of men, allowed the Scottish rebels to regroup. Most of all, Edward let slip through his fingers the one man he should have secured above all others, his brother-in-law, King David II.

  The landing of David II and Queen Joan in France in May 1334 merely confirmed what Edward had hitherto only suspected: France would continue to support his enemy. While Edward took part in yet more extravagant jousts at Burstwick, including gunpowder demonstrations, the Scottish rebels were covertly winning over many of the leaders who had ostensibly acknowledged Edward's overlordship. France too was shifting towards a position of war. The newly installed archbishop of Canterbury, John Stratford, was deep in negotiations with the French king. At the begining of July Stratford returned with the news that Philip was prepared to bargain over the Agenais but he demanded to know why Edward continued openly to support Balliol against his own brother-in-law, whom Philip regarded as the rightful king. Why had Edward again received Balliol’s homage as King of Scots? This greatly complicated the discussions over the Agenais and put negotiations about the French throne beyond the reaches of diplomacy. Significantly it ensured that any refugees from English administration north of the border had a safe refuge south of the Channel, where they could regroup and plan.

  Edward did not doubt the seriousness of this resumption of the alliance against him. After Stratford's return to England, Edward attended one more tournament at Nottingham, but this was probably die last for some years. He sent messengers back to Philip to discuss a possible meeting between the two men about the crusade, as if this was a carrot with which to tempt Philip into sacrificing David II. But although Philip might have been prepared to do almost anything to be able to lead his expedition to the Holy Land, he could not acquiesce to Edward's demands. He had to maintain his opposition to this young English lion, and hope that by encouraging others to oppose him, Edward would receive such a setback that he would learn some humility. If Edward were to receive a bloody nose in Scotland, for example, the way would be left free for Philip to lead his crusade without Edward, and without having to share the glory.

  What Philip probably could not have appreciated was how much the tentative eighteen-year-old he had met in 1331 had grown in confidence. Edward had already decided on his course of action, and it was straightforward. He was not going to compromise with Philip de Valois, David II or anyone, under any circumstances. As early as August 1334 he was thinking of a new expedition to Scotland. He summoned parliament to meet in September, and made preparations for the defence of the north.

  Balliol's allies were deserting the English cause, Berwick was threatened with attack and, amid all this distant confusion, the idea that only he, Edward, could quell the Scottish revolt greatly appealed to him. At the September parliament he personally paid for a settlement between two of his warring lords - Edward Bohun and Henry Percy - in order to secure their support. He asked parliament to grant him a tax for the forthcoming war. As parliament -deliberated, news came that one of Edward's principal agents in Scotland, Richard Talbot, had been captured. Another, Henry Beaumont was besieged in Dundarg Castle, and yet another, David of Strathbogie, had been pursued and forced to swear allegiance to David II. It only remained for Edward Balliol to take the fast road back to safety in Carlisle for the north of England to be threatened once more. Parliament gave him everything he wanted.

  No one can doubt Edward's resolution in organising his new Scottish campaign. Troops were to assemble at very short notice, on 6 October, at Newcastle. Monthly loans were secured from the Italian bankers, the Bardi. Clerics and laymen were induced to give personal loans to the king New means of taxation were devised to maximise Edward's ability to raise and sustain an army.38 Old forms of taxation were revamped to guarantee delivery of specific amounts of silver.39 Once again, all those of sufficient income were ordered to become knights. Edward was not just mobilising English society, he was forcing it through a socio-economic funnel so that it might more efficiendy respond to his demands. By the end of December 1334, negotiations with Philip had been terminated, the army had gathered, banners bearing the royal arms and the arms of St George and St Edmund had been ordered, hundreds of pennons bearing St George's arms were in the making, and Edward was dressed in new armour and surrounded by a bodyguard of two hundred mounted archers picked from the men of Cheshire.

  Archers were an essential part of Edward's new army, and his willingness to employ them was one of the real achievements of his war policy at this time. It was experimental, cutting-edge strategic thinking, combining the manoeuvrability of the Scots army in 1327 with the firepower of the English archers at Dupplin Moor and Halidon Hill. On this expedition there were 481 mounted archers in his own household. He also provided 371 knights and men-at-arms. Other lords provided at least 838 knights and men-at-arms and 771 mounted archers.42 The sheriffs of the English counties also were required to raise and send large numbers of infantry archers. Lancashire alone was expected to provide four thousand, Yorkshire more than five thousand. Only a fraction of these turned up, but the message was emphatic. The sheriff of Lancashire may well have scratched his head on receiving the royal writ, and wondered where he was going to find four thousand men who could shoot longbows rapidly and accurately, but he would have known that this was what could be expected in future campaigns.

  Edward had two significant challenges to overcome. The first was that he had chosen to fight the Scots in winter, in Scotland. Moreover, of all Scottish winters he had chosen one of the very worst. In the words of one Yorkshire contemporary:

  that year, about the feast of Saint Martin (n November), frost, snow and hail began to fall, and they lasted continually for four months. And on the eve of St Andrew the Apostle (29 November), about midnight, flashes and bolts of lightning were seen, and terrible thunder crashes were heard. And in the same night, about the hour of dawn, the west wind blew up a tempest and blew snow everywhere, such that no one could remember ever having seen such bad weather. The new nave of Whitby Church was blown down ... the columns within the outer walls collapsed. . . and similarly many houses and churches throughout England and other places were destroyed.

  With weather so appalling it is a wonder that Edward managed to sustain a campaign at all. Having marched north from Newcastle on 14 November, many of his men would have been billeted in tents at the time of the storm; and after such a blowing and a soaking, four months foraging in frost and snow on reduced wages cannot have been a happy experience for anyone. Those sleeping
on the decks of the many ships Edward had requisitioned to attend off the northern coast must have had a particularly grim experience.

  Edward's second challenge was how he was going to engage the Scots in battle. As his father had learned, there was little point amassing an army if the enemy did not appear. After a period of service — three months in this case - the English troops could begin to return home, as the Scots knew. Edward's choice of strategies to try to bring them to battle was limited. One was to try and relieve Dundarg Castle, where Henry Beaumont was besieged by the Scottish leaders Sir Andrew Murray and Sir Alexander Mowbray; but that was a remote place, and offered little strategic advantage other than freeing Beaumont. Besides, not all the Scots were at Dundarg, and to try to relieve that siege would have been to follow their agenda, to respond to their initiative. Instead he began to establish a new centre of operations at Roxburgh Castle. There he ordered his masons to restore the walls of his grandfather's fortress, and spent the harsh Scottish winter, surveying the snowy emptiness around him.

  No Scotsman in his right mind was going to attack Edward at Roxburgh, surrounded by his archers. The view from the castle walls remained empty, barren, and frozen. Troops, coming to the end of their periods of service, began to depart. Beaumont capitulated and surrendered Dundarg on 23 December 1334. Edward saw he was going to be left stranded. His reaction was to demand more men; those who had failed to respond to the summons before were now summoned again, and threatened with the forfeiture of their estates if they failed to come. But everyone could see that Edward was slowly being defeated by the Scots' strategy of avoidance, the cruel weather, and the need for the English infantry to return home to their farms and their spring sowing.

  By the end of January 1335 Edward realised he had no option but to retreat. Until the last he continued to demand reinforcements to replace his dwindling army, but on 2 February he left Roxburgh and headed south. To keep pressure on the Scots, he ordered as many ships as possible to begin a naval blockade. This included merchant ships as well as the handful of royal ships regularly maintained by the king. Mariners who would not volunteer were press-ganged into serving, and ordered to seize any ship taking cargo to or from the Scottish rebels. If Edward could not defeat them in battle, he would try other methods of attack.

  Edward was having to learn some hard truths about war. The battles he had yearned to fight as a teenager were turning out to be long, drawn-out campaigns. Strategies of supply mattered just as much as battlefield heroics. Leadership involved far more careful diplomacy than military glory. The French now demanded that Edward negotiate a solution to the Scottish question with them, and without the means to pursue a new offensive he had no option but to receive ambassadors. They arrived in March, quickly followed by envoys from the new (French) pope, Benedict XII. In early April Edward agreed to a truce until the summer, and even acknowledged the right of four Scots partisans to attend parliament, to present their case, as requested by the French envoys.

  It was not just warfare which was teaching Edward a few hard lessons. When parliament met at York on 26 May, it discussed money too. Money was becoming a subject of interest to Edward, who knew that continual failure to pay his men's wages would defeat his army as completely as any enemy. Moreover it would damage his ability to raise subsequent armies. If he wished to continue to fight his wars, he needed higher income from taxation. As taxation was granted or withheld by parliament, it seemed advisable for him to work with parliament to increase their willingness to grant him money. And parliament too wanted to use its influence to increase its wealth. At York in 1335 Edward began to pay his first serious attention to economic reforms. He passed the Statute of York, whereby free trade was permitted: 'merchant strangers may buy and sell within this realm without disturbance'. The Londoners were astonished by this, and complained bitterly that it went against charters to run their own affairs which Edward had previously granted them. But for the moment Edward was resolute. He only acted to reverse his free trade policy with regard to Londoners a few years later, when he found it in his interest to do so.

  Whoever had convinced him of the merits of allowing foreigners to trade freely had also set his mind thinking with regard to other financial matters. The Statute of Money was also passed, in an attempt to make sure that no gold or silver left the realm. Money was flowing from the kingdom to the Continent as a result of an unfavourable balance of trade. The cause, however, was not properly understood. It was thought that the shortage of silver was due to hoarding and people taking silver abroad. To prevent this, pilgrims were restricted to using Dover as their sole port, searches were to be made for money, it was forbidden to melt down money to make silver vessels, and no counterfeit sterling was permitted to be brought into the realm. Although it was not the solution, it was at least an honest attempt to tackle the problem.

  None of this distracted Edward from his war in Scotland. Everything came second to his military plans. He spelled the matter out clearly to the French and Scottish envoys that, as soon as the truce expired, he would attack again. As far as he was concerned, the truce served only one purpose. It was to give him time to gather his resources and to prepare for the next stage of the war. And he was serious. He had issued the summons for the next campaign, on 27 March, only a few days after he had left Roxburgh. When a gang of Frenchmen led by a Scotsman seized an English ship at the mouth of the Seine, stole its cargo and killed its crew, Edward had yet another excuse to renew his Scottish onslaught. Orders went to Ireland to prepare a great siege engine there and for the Irish justiciar, John Darcy, to raise more troops. Writs were sent out to the counties to demand specific numbers of men for the summer campaign. By June Edward was ready to fight again.

  The army was set to muster at Newcastle on 23 June 1335. This time Edward was joined by a foreign ally, Count William of Juliers (now a part of Germany), who had married Queen Philippa's sister. From the shires another large contingent of archers was ordered: more than 5,500 of his total army of more than thirteen thousand. Balliol came south to join him and take part in the war council. Two armies would proceed, one led by Edward, the other by Balliol. With Edward rode his brother John, earl of Cornwall, the count of Juliers and the earls of Warwick, Lancaster and Hereford. Bailiol rode to Berwick with the earls of Arundel, Oxford and Angus. The contrast with the reign of his father, who rarely managed to persuade more than two or three earls to join in a Scottish expedition, was striking. Any Scotsmen unfortunate enough to witness the approach of either of the two armies would have had no doubt that this was a serious display of English military strength.

  Edward was in his element. Leading his men, he could forget his ecclesiastical advisers and his money troubles, and he could fully exercise his favourite faculty, to command. This was the exertion of real power, combined with the unquestioning loyalty of his men, and the comradeship of his friends. In south-west Scotland, in the forest of Dalswinton, he brought forward a destrier clothed in Sir William Montagu's arms, and gave it to him as a present. He also gave Montagu one of his two precious eagle crests. This was honour indeed, and it pleased Edward to favour Montagu in this way. As he had recendy been reminded, his friends would not necessarily always be with him. Sir Edward Bohun, one of the men who had risked Mortimer's wrath in 1330 and who had commanded one of the battalions at Halidon Hill, had drowned crossing a river in the appalling weather of the winter of 1334. On the way into battle, there was no saying who would be the next of the companionship to be struck down.

  The summer campaign of 1335 was war without compromise. Knights were dubbed, prayers were said, and then die looting, raping, killing and burning began. Few who found themselves in the path of the English armies escaped. Even monastic property was destroyed: Welsh troops under Balliol's command attacked a nunnery and a monastery. Gradually the two armies closed in on Glasgow. At Cumbernauld, Balliol found the tower held against him. After burning it, he captured more than two hundred men and women found sheltering inside. The men he kil
led; the women he spared. Chivalry - an intense contrast of light and dark even in peacetime — became horrific in times of war.

  Edward pushed on to Perth. Wherever they went, the English wrought destruction. The sailors of Newcastle attacked Dundee and burnt much of the town, including part of a friary; they also burnt a friar and looted monastic property. The conduct of such individual raids was largely beyond Edward's control, but he did nothing to stop the destruction. His thirteen thousand troops were taken on swift marches up and down the kingdom as much to strike fear into the hearts of the Scottish civilians as to engage with their troops. It had become part of his policy to demonstrate his power in person by showing he could, at will, destroy any semblance of nationalist power in Scotland. It was a logical strategy. After repeated campaigns of this nature, who could reasonably be expected to serve a rebel leader, and entertain further death and destruction? That Edward would never earn the love of the Scottish people in this manner was relatively unimportant, in his opinion.

  Then came August 1335. Although Edward did not yet know it, the French parliament had declared that France would support the Scots with six thousand troops, including one thousand men-at-arms. There was a message to this effect on its way to him. Philip also invited Edward to submit his quarrel with David II to the arbitration of himself (Philip) and the pope, for Edward's quarrel was endangering the crusade. At the same time, Robert of Namur was making his way to Edward, to help him in his campaign. With only one hundred supporters, however, Namur was chased by the Scots to Edinburgh, where he was captured. More humiliatingly, after his English guides had been killed, he was set free upon swearing an oath that he would not fight in Scotland. Namur then went to Berwick, and caught ship with Philippa, joining Edward at Perth. Namur was a nephew of Robert d'Artois, a cousin of Edward and a bitter enemy of Philip. There was also a message on its way to Edward placing the disagreement between Philip and d'Artois beyond negotiation. All these messages and men were closing in on Edward over the course of August. The battle lines of the first stage of the first great war of European nations - the Hundred Years War as it came to be known in the nineteenth century - were being drawn up.