The Perfect King

by Ian Mortimer

  The end of the parliament was one huge feast. More than £439 - the equivalent of yearly wages for about one hundred and forty skilled labourers - was spent on this one meal. Edward held a great court for the men, while Philippa held a lesser court for the ladies. Twenty men were specially knighted to mark the occasion. Lord Berkeley received his official acquittal of any wrongdoing against Edward II. Two days later, on 18 March, grants were dispensed to the new earls and some of the knights, to keep them in the style befitting new men of rank. With Edward dining in state we might fairly see him presiding over a court full of confidence, looking to the future. Yet in reality it was a court beset by problems. As Edward feasted and his musicians played, and the new earls shared his dais, the Scots were planning an attack on the great stronghold of Stirling, and the French king was making plans to confiscate not just a few more English castles but the entire duchy of Aquitaine. If anything kept the smiles on the faces of the courtly retinue as they feasted that day in March 1337, it was that in Edward they had a man who, when faced with personal disaster, did not disappear in his own hunched conscience, or disdainfully shun his responsibilities as his father had done. This king faced up to his problems: he even found strength in them. He might have been aggressive, ruthless and dominating but he could turn his own mood and the mood of the court - and eventually that of the whole kingdom - simply through the force of his will.

  The parliament was followed by a flurry of diplomatic initiatives. Even while parliament was still sitting the new papal nuncio in England, Bernard Sistre, was despatched back to Avignon with letters of credence from the king and a spoken message: 'secret business' as it is habitually described in the records. Diplomatic exchanges were made with Alfonso of Castile, the elderly and dying count of Hainault (and his son - just in case), and the counts of Flanders, Guelderland and Juliers. Edward sent his negotiators to the Flemish cloth-working towns of Bruges, Ghent and Ypres, to discuss allowing the purchase of English wool. He sent several letters to the Gascon port of Bayonne, requesting warships, and prepared a defensive strategy for Gascony. He even sent messengers to Philip of France, still trying to find a way to negotiate rather than fight. This was certainly not appeasement - Edward's attempts to build a federation of forces against Philip were not likely to end in a climb-down, and Edward's only compromise was an offer to give up d'Artois if the man was given safe passage to his trial and Philip gave up his support of the Scots - but neither was it hankering after a European conflict. Considering that the French had burnt Portsmouth again and attacked Jersey during the parliament of March 1337, Edward's final attempts at a negotiated settlement appear very restrained.

  Edward's busy diplomatic embassy - led by Henry Burghersh (bishop of Lincoln), William Montagu and William Clinton (earls of Salisbury and Huntingdon respectively) - were given the task of presenting Philip with a series of demands, to permit diplomacy to continue. They were not welcome to proceed into France. Instead they remained at Valenciennes, dishing out royal grants and pensions to all those who might prove useful, until a grand meeting of diplomatic representatives took place there in early May. Straightaway the battle lines became clear: Louis, Count of Flanders, stood resolutely in support of Philip of France, and, like Philip himself, failed to attend the diplomatic party (although both men had been invited). John of Luxembourg, king of Bohemia, also refused to desert Philip. On Edward's side were the count of Hainault and his heir (Edward's brother-in-law, the count dying just after the meeting), the count of Guelderland (Edward's brother-in-law), the duke of Brabant (Edward's first cousin) and a host of minor counts and margraves: Berg, Juliers, Limburg, Gleves, Marck and Namur. Peace was discussed, and the intransigence of the French king examined. Then, seeing as Philip's allies had not sent representatives, the discussions turned to war. Edward's representatives took the lead. Edward would pay handsomely for the support of the other nations if war broke out. Even Edward's close relations were promised large amounts of money. William Montagu himself had some doubts about the strength of the coalition, and he was not alone in thinking that the German princes were only after Edward's gold, or England's wool (which for the cloth-working towns was just as valuable). The pope was also inclined to think the worst of the German princes' love of money. But nevertheless the negotiations continued, and towards the end of May it was clear that a military alliance had formed against France, led and financed by England.

  Edward remained at Westminster until 3 May. That day he began to head north with his army at a huge speed, reaching York in time for him to dine with Richard Bury and the earls of Northampton and Gloucester on the nth. The infantrymen with him were forced to march 'night and day' as he raced towards Stirling Castle, the strategically important fortress now besieged by the Scots. Edward saw an opportunity to engage them in battle and, if not to defeat them permanently, at least to do them such lasting damage that his policy of constant attrition would be sustained. But in reality his efforts and attention were now being directed towards the Continent, and the Scots understood that they merely had to return to their old tactics of waiting until the English king had departed before they attacked again. Thus, as Edward approached Stirling Castle, the Scots disappeared. They remained in hiding as long as Edward was in the vicinity. With the French supplying them through Dunbar, and Edward having to return south to deal with his alliance, they were safe, and free to fight another day.

  It was while Edward was at Stirling, reinforcing his garrisons and repairing the walls, that Philip finally plunged Europe into war. On 24 May he confiscated the duchy of Aquitaine. So much attention had been paid to the English province over the last thirteen years - since the War of Saint-Sardos - that Philip cannot have had any doubt as to what would be the results of his action. He had asked the question which could only be answered by force of arms. The question was whether he ruled as an absolute king of a nation which included the duchy of Aquitaine (as if Edward was just another French vassal), or was Aquitaine beyond his control, absolute rule there being the prerogative of the king of England. Having confiscated the duchy, and done away with diplomacy, Philip VI had given Edward the choice of responding with force or forever losing a major part of his birthright. For Edward, who had championed the virtues of chivalry all his young life, and who had repeatedly proved himself prepared to use war to attain his ambitions in his other threatened territory, Scotland, this was no choice. It was a declaration of war.

  Edward immediately returned to the south. He gave orders for his already extensive coalition to be augmented still further. Alfonso of Castile was already at war. Promises were made and pensions offered to the palatine count of the Rhine, the counts of Geneva and Savoy, and more than a dozen others. Most important of all, negotiations for an alliance were made with the Holy Roman Emperor, Ludvig of Bavaria. For Pope Benedict XII, the news that Edward was in discussions with Ludvig - a heretic and an excommunicate - can only have caused him to pull out his hair. When it emerged that Philip too was in negotiations with the heretic emperor, he must have despaired. He wrote in mid-June to the archbishop of Sens and the bishop of Rouen, to see what they had done to prevent the war. At the end of June he wrote again. He wrote to both kings urging them to follow the path of peace, and sent a diplomat to each of them in turn, and castigated them for being so cordial to an excommunicate ruler. But despite his best efforts, it was apparent to all that Ludvig would side with either Edward or Philip, and there would be a great European war. All the pope could do was to try to use his influence to stave off the onslaught as long as possible.

  In theory Edward could have taken action with no further reference to parliament, but he was dependent on his people for finance, not to mention their goodwill. He had carefully brought every single decision regarding war with France to a council or parliament, and always he had abided by the decision not to take military action. Hence in May he had held a great council of magnates and prelates at Stamford to consider the repercussions of Philip's actions in Gascony. In July
he held another.'3 Diplomacy had failed. War was now unavoidable. Philip's catalogue of errors was growing longer by the season. He had failed to address the question of the Agenais, had attacked English shipping, had attacked English ports and the Channel Islands, had threatened to invade Scotland, had supported Edward's Scottish enemies, and had confiscated Aquitaine. In July 1337 he finally sent an army to invade the duchy and to prise die castles there from English control. His actions had caused several Gascon families to withdraw from openly supporting Edward. Far too much was at stake now to let these matters pass without recourse to military action.

  Edward was not set on sending an army directly to Aquitaine. Troops to help defend the duchy had been summoned in preparation, but a full-scale attack on the French there would have left England unprotected, and if Philip held back sufficient men from the duchy and used them to attack the coast of England, it would be very difficult to defend it. Besides, Edward could see other options. He chose in the end to send a limited force to the duchy, under the command of John of Norwich, and to retain men in England to constitute a second army; to assemble on the borders of Northern France, and to join with the forces of his many allies, thus directly threatening Philip's kingdom. He also played his trump card: English wool. Tens of thousands of sacks of it. For a year he had withdrawn wool from export; now, directing this precious resource carefully towards the looms of his allies in Brabant and away from those of his enemy, the count of Flanders, he could enrich his friends and impoverish his opponents. Moreover, he could do this at a profit. Through setting up an English wool company, under the oversight of the London merchants William de la Pole and Reginald Conduit, Edward could borrow large amounts of money advanced on an income to be derived from exported English wool. Using his political authority, Edward could ensure that the wool was bought at a minimum price through compulsory purchase and sold at a premium to the merchants in Brabant.'4

  The opening hostilities in the war were half-hearted. Philip's large army under the command of the count of Eu had marched into the Agenais at die beginning of July. At this time, Edward's small army under John of Norwich was still in Portsmouth, about to set sail. This left the French free for a short while to attack fortified towns and seigneurial castles in the region; but they did not do so with any great conviction. At the end of June Edward had sent letters to sixty-seven Gascon magnates thanking them for their loyalty to him, and similar letters to the leading citizens of more than twenty towns.1'1 His hopes that they would prove loyal when the French invaded proved well-founded. The fortified towns of Saint-Macaire, Saint-Emilion and Libourne each withstood a brief siege. Other, smaller fortresses did not, but they were cheap gains for the French. If they fell so easily, they would be difficult to defend when the time came for a counter-attack. And Philip was more anxious about the counterattack than he was about the initial progress of his army in the south. The growing awareness that Edward had not sent a large force to Aquitaine but was holding back, probably to attack the north of France together with his allies in the Low Countries, severely worried him.

  In late August Edward won the auction for the Holy Roman Emperor's support. He undertook to pay Ludvig an advance of 300,000 florins (£50,000) in return for two thousand men. It was a very large sum. And he was distributing grants of this magnitude all across Germany: at 15 florins for each man-at-arms per month (£27 per year), he was engaging imperial, royal and ducal support by advancing sums equivalent to ten months in the field. He was betting heavily on victor)'. And well he might: he seemed to be emerging as the surer diplomatic hand and the more capable strategist. Philip had invaded Aquitaine but it was Edward who had taken the military initiative in threatening the north of France. And he had not even left England.

  Edward summoned parliament to Westminster to discuss the wars with Scotland and France in September 1337.'7 Parliament took the remarkable step of granting taxation for the next three years: an unprecedented grant, which demonstrates how much the kingdom supported his leadership. One of the reasons for this probably lies in Edward's policy of making proclamations throughout the country, so that the people were aware of the dangers posed by French aggression. More than any other previous king, Edward consulted his subjects on his foreign policy, sending out important representatives such as the archbishop of Canterbury and William Bohun, earl of Northampton, to explain his decisions to the leading men of the counties. The result was that parliament agreed that Edward should go to take charge of the military alliance formed in the Low Countries, and to meet the Holy Roman Emperor, Ludvig of Bavaria.

  *

  It might appear that all was going well for Edward in late 1337, and that the root of his problem - King Philip and Aquitaine - was soon to be confronted. He was about to set out to join with his magnificent array of allies, to attack a strategically indecisive French king who was not prepared to take risks or to stretch himself financially as far as Edward. But not only had his problems of Scotland and France not gone away, he had manoeuvred himself into a position of extreme debt. The three years' taxation would not even repay his borrowing to date, let alone his planned future expenditure. Worse, he had put himself at the mercy of his allies, and was now dependent on them doing what they had promised to do. Worse still, he had committed himself to providing men he simply he did not have at his immediate disposal. Leaving troops in the north to hold the border against the Scots, leaving an army — albeit a small one - in Aquitaine, and securing the southern coast meant that there were fewer troops to take abroad. And whereas he could borrow money from the Italian merchants and Conduit's and de la Pole's wool company, and promise to pay sums he did not actually have, he could not borrow men. His advisers cautioned him that the grand expedition might have to be cancelled.

  Edward did not cancel, he postponed. At which point Philip agreed to peace negotiations. Edward, too good a diplomat to refuse to deal with Philip, but eager not to lose momentum, upped the stakes by agreeing to negotiate but at the same time threatening to claim the throne of France. On 6 October 1337, three days after he had despatched a high-level diplomatic mission to France, he issued writs to the count of Hainault, the count of Juliers, the duke of Brabant and the earl of Northampton, appointing them his lieutenants in France, using the title 'King of France and England' in one set of documents and 'King of England and France' in another. Such a declaration was not just a fist in the face of the French king, it was an insult to the pope, who regarded Edward's potential claim to the throne of France as possibly the most destabilising aspect of the whole controversy. Benedict XII had just written to the two cardinals he had deputed to deal with Edward and Philip, ordering them to proceed to England straightaway, without waiting for Edward to cross to France. As Benedict put it: 'for once there [in France] he cannot easily return, and the Teutons who want to get his pay would incite him to war. That the spark may not become a flame, the nuncios should dissuade the king from crossing the sea.' Now this new claim to the throne was guaranteed to undermine any possible peace negotiations. It threatened to undermine the basis of French sovereign power, and thus Philip's right to act in Aquitaine. Although Edward did not follow up this claim with further writs issued in his name as king of France, that he had done so once, and on an international stage, was enough.

  In early November the pressure on Philip increased further. On the 6th the pope wrote to him outlining in full the implications of Edward's alliance with the rulers of the territories of Germany and the Low Countries. Benedict informed Philip that Edward was planning to bribe Ludvig of Bavaria to resign his position as Holy Roman Emperor. If this were to happen, Edward would be elected in his place, with command over the German princes. Even if Ludvig were not to resign, Edward was going to be appointed Vicar of Lower Germany (the Low Countries) for life 'so as to be nearer to France, and so better able to attack it'. The pope further informed Philip that his enemies had gathered men, money and supplies, so that he (Philip) was almost entirely isolated. This confederation, the pope c
laimed, was to last for the lifetime of Edward and Ludvig and their sons. Further marriage alliances would bind the allies closer together. In short, the pope was outlining how Philip had been totally outmanoeuvred by Edward, who now had most of Europe behind him. The only chance Philip had was to make peace with England.