Call Sign Extortion 17
Page 14
The clock continued to tick, and now a feeling of panic was beginning to set in at flight control. Mission planners anxiously monitored their headsets, awaiting the one-minute call, hoping to hear news that Extortion 17 was on its final descent, that it would be setting down in a matter of seconds, unloading the SEAL team as planned.
Once again, there was nothing.
What’s going on? Why the delays?
Another minute passed. Now the new readjusted landing time of 2206 Zulu Time (2:36 a.m. local time) approached. Remember that the originally designated landing time was 2:32 a.m. The chopper had now hung in the air four minutes after it should have been on the ground.
The next communication from the chopper, the one-minute call, would come thirty-nine seconds later, at 22:06:39 (2:36:39 a.m. local time). This call was not a “one-minute” call at all, but rather, was a request for one of the Apache helicopters to provide a “sparkle,” that is to illuminate the ground with light. Testimony from the Task Force senior enlisted advisor (acronym TF-SEA) in Exhibit 48, page 23, gave insight into the state of mind of the flight controllers:
TF SEA: Sir, I specifically remember going and I’m pointing with this green [Afghan military member], XO [executive officer] was there. I go, “That’s the HLZ,” [helo landing zone] he said, yes. And they were scanning the area. And I was like, it looks pretty quiet. We got the three-minute call, and then they were just—six minutes later, I was going, what’s up with the infill, did they go in already.
Some mission controllers wondered if the SEALs were rappelling down to the ground with ropes after the three-minute call, which might explain why the chopper had been hovering so long. The rappelling theory was a hopeful theory which, of course, turned out not to be true. But it does show how flight controllers were grasping, almost desperately, for a belief that something positive was happening aboard the chopper in its final few minutes.
In reality, delay and confusion marked the flight’s final minutes. The request for a “sparkle” was Extortion 17’s final transmission.
Chapter 20
The Chopper’s Last Call
22:06:39 (2:36:39 a.m. local time)
Recall that the one-minute call did not take place on time and was delayed another one minute and thirty-nine seconds. The last communication from the helicopter, which came at 22:06:39 (2:36:39 a.m. local time) was not really a “one-minute” call at all.
It was not a “one-minute” call, because, alarmingly, the chopper still did not report that it was one minute from landing. As will be seen from the taped air traffic with one of the Apache helicopters accompanying Extortion 17, the old Chinook seemed confused, and made a premature request for a sparkle of the landing zone. That request raised questions with the Apache crew.
Simply put, to “sparkle” a landing zone, or to “put a sparkle” on a landing zone, means that one helicopter, generally an accompanying helicopter, will fire a laser beam from the sky, down to the ground, into the landing zone. Crudely defined, it’s like turning on a giant laser flashlight to fire a light beam down into the landing zone. Sometimes, this process is referred to as “painting” the landing zone.
This is done for the purpose of helping the main helicopter, in this case, Extortion 17, to find the landing zone on the ground, and to fly to that landing zone.
Part of the problem is that if the sparkle comes too early, or if the sparkle lasts too long, it can alert the enemy on the ground of the visual position of the approaching helicopters. Even though an enemy might hear the thunder of chopper rotors, in the pitch-black of night, it is still difficult to always know from what direction that noise is coming. But the sparkle, if seen, can change that dynamic in favor of an enemy.
To see a laser sparkle, the enemy must ordinarily be equipped with night vision goggles, or a camera, and must be looking at the right time. So the sparkle should be used, if at all, very conservatively, in very short bursts, and ordinarily within one minute of landing, which is important to keep in mind in examining the final transmissions of Extortion 17.
The following dialogue was taken from the Full Motion Video (FMV) feed, known as “Gun Tape 5” and it comes from one of the two Apache helicopters that accompanied Extortion 17. The “Gun Tape,” attached to the Colt Report as Exhibit 54, provided a twenty-nine-page verbatim transcript of communications between the two-man Apache crew and the ill-fated CH-47 crew.
Extortion 17’s flight from base camp to the landing zone should have taken no more than eight minutes. The full gun tape begins at 21:44:33 Zulu (2:14 a.m. local time) and ends at 22:24:27 Zulu time . So the gun tape ran approximately one hour, basically from the launch of the mission.
The excerpt in question occurs on page 17 of 29, beginning at the 22:06:39 mark (2:36:39 a.m. local time).
Approximately two minutes later, on page 18 of the transcript, at 22:08:34 (2:38:34 a.m. local time) Bryan Nichols’s voice is heard for the last time, with the words, “One minute. One minute.” At least, it seemed to be Bryan Nichols’s voice.
Then, seventy-two seconds later, the real-time description of the shoot-down begins at page 19 of 29, at the 22:09:46 (2:39:46 a.m. local time) mark.
Note the difference in time between these call-ins made by Extortion 17 and the actual time of the reported shoot-down. The Apache witnessed the shoot-down some three minutes after the odd request for an early sparkle, or some four minutes and forty seconds after the one-minute call was supposed to have been made.
What was going on inside Extortion 17? Why the delay?
Was the chopper hovering dangerously in the air?
Chapter 21
The Odd Request for a “Sparkle”
The next few chapters analyze the final three minutes of Extortion 17, beginning with an examination of the gun tapes referenced in the Colt Report at page 17 of Exhibit 48.
In the transcript, “EX17 PC” is the Extortion 17 pilot in command, Bryan Nichols. BS is the “back seat” pilot in the Apache, who is the lead pilot of the apache. “FS” is the gunner and navigator, in the front seat of the Apache helicopter.
For purposes of analysis, the final three minutes of the flight are broken up into three segments over a final three-minute period. The first forty-nine-second segment involved Extortion 17’s odd request for a premature sparkle of the landing zone.
The second segment, coming two minutes later, was the final “one minute” call from Extortion 17.
The third and final segment, coming approximately one minute later, featured the Apache pilots’ description of witnessing the shoot-down, with the sad declaration of “Fallen Angel,” the universal, emergency, call sign that a US military aircraft has gone down.
Final Segment 1 (49 Seconds)—The Request for the Sparkle (2:36:39 a.m. Local Time)
22:06:39
EX17 PC:
Could you guys sparkle, please?
22:06:42
BS:
And roger. You one minute?
22:06:46
EX17 PC:
Negative, but our lane direction isn’t matching up just give them a little better idea where we’re landing.
22:06:51
[INAUDIBLE]
22:06:51
FS:
, could you sparkle LZ?
22:06:56
:
23/2 burn is on [INAUDIBLE] [author’s emphasis here and below]
22:07:01
FS:
Do we have burn in
sight?
22:07:19
:
.
22:07:28
BS:
Not even a minute out and you’re requesting a damn sparkle.
The first communication, “could you guys sparkle please,” was from the pilot in command of Extortion 17, Bryan Nichols. Although there is nothing to positively identify the voice as Bryan’s, the transcript designated the caller to be “EX17 PC.”
When he asked “Could you guys request a sparkle please,” he was asking that the Apache helicopter, one of two Apaches escorting Extortion 17 to the landing zone, make a request to the US Air Force AC-130 gunship flying 7,000 to 8,000 feet above them.
The Extortion 17 was accompanied through the dark night skies by three US aircraft with tons of offensive firepower that was never used, until after the fact. The two Apache attack helicopters code-named Gun 1 and Gun 2 and the US Air Force AC-130 gunship had been circling almost directly overhead.
As will be discussed later, the AC-130, prior to the shoot-down, had requested permission to attack enemy insurgents on the ground in the vicinity of the Extortion 17 shoot-down, but was denied permission to fire ahead of time. These insurgents, according to the aircraft commander, were only about 600 meters (just over 630 yards) away from the CH-47, and one of them could very well have fired the RPG that minutes later would bring down the helicopter. Had the AC-130 been allowed to pour fire into that area, there is a good chance that the area would have been cleared of enemy insurgents and Extortion 17 could have landed safely.
As a side note for those not familiar with military aircraft, an AC-130 is a fixed-wing aircraft, with four propellers—two on each wing. It can be used primarily as a heavy-load cargo plane, the C-130 variant, or it can be configured as an attack aircraft, heavily armored to provide fire support for troops on the ground.
Having been denied permission to conduct any pre-assault fire prior to Extortion 17’s landing, the AC-130’s mission, circling high overhead, was now to coordinate communications with the aircraft in the area, and to track enemy positions on the ground and report on those positions. It also had the capability to deliver devastating firepower to the ground if permitted by the rules of engagement.
Furthermore, it had the ability to “paint” the landing area with high-powered laser beams. So when Extortion 17 opened this exchange by asking “Could you guys request a sparkle please,” they were asking the Apache helicopters to relay a request up to the AC-130 gunship to hit the landing zone with a powerful laser beam.
That gathers this response from the lead pilot of the Apache helicopter (BS for “back seat”—remember the pilot sits in the back seat of an Apache helicopter and the gunner sits in the front). “And roger. You one minute?”
The Apache pilot was asking Extortion 17 if they were one minute away from landing for two reasons. First, Extortion 17 had already made its three-minute call, and its one-minute call was now overdue by a minute and thirty-nine seconds. Second, as was emphasized in earlier communications to Extortion 17, the request for a sparkle should come at the one-minute mark, in part to keep the enemy guessing for as long as possible about where the chopper will be coming in. Moreover, the burn or sparkle should be as short as possible to avoid the possibility of being seen by the enemy utilizing night vision.
With all this in mind, the Apache pilot was trying to verify with the Extortion 17 Pilot that he was now one minute from landing, and presumably, the sparkle would be short.
Note, however, the surprising reaction from Extortion 17, when asked if they were one minute out. “Negative, but our lane direction isn’t matching up just give them a little better idea where we’re landing.”
First off, Extortion 17 was saying that he was not one minute from landing. So this sparkle was being requested prematurely.
Second, the words “lane direction not matching up” and “a little better idea where we’re landing” suggest that there was confusion aboard Extortion 17. At a time when they were supposed to be making their one-minute call on final approach, they couldn’t seem to find the correct “lane direction” and they didn’t seem to even know where they were landing.
Chapter 22
The Final Seconds: Who Is “Them”?
The Extortion 17 pilot said he was requesting the sparkle to “give them a better idea of where we’re landing.”
Who was “them?”
Perhaps “them” was the SEAL team inside the chopper. But the statement is odd. It’s odd in part because the SEAL team would be sitting in jump seats, inside the cargo bay, facing inward, waiting for exfil. The SEAL team would not be crowded around the three windows on each side of the back of the chopper, looking out to see what’s down there. First off, there aren’t enough windows in the back of the CH-47, and there’s not enough room for that sort of thing. It’s not like there are windows by every seat, like a commercial airliner. The SEAL team would be at this point facing inward, readying their weapons to storm out the back of the Chinook once it touched down.
Perhaps “them” was someone else. Could “them” have been the seven unidentified Afghans who illegally infiltrated the chopper, and whose bodies were later apparently cremated, thus destroying DNA evidence to make their identification next to impossible?
Was the Extortion 17 pilot, Bryan Nichols, trying to tell us something here? Could “them” have been someone on the ground? Could there have been another “them” with an interest in knowing where that chopper was about to set down?
Maybe the use of “them” was not significant. But given the odd circumstances already surrounding this mission, from the infiltration of seven unidentified Afghans, to Extortion 17’s seemingly strange and odd confusion over finding the landing zone, something that should not be that difficult, the very odd word choice here should be examined.
Overhead, the AC-130 pilot realized that Extortion 17 was confused. In Exhibit 40 of the Colt Report, the AC-130 pilot said (on page 22), “it seemed from our perspective a little confusion on exactly where the HLZ [Helo Landing Zone] was going to be.”
After Nichols asked for the “sparkle,” he explained that he was off-center and was asking for the sparkle to “show them the landing zone.”
Why did Extortion 17 seem to have such a hard time finding the landing zone? Why all the delays? Why the confusion? In this age of GPS technology, there should have been absolutely no confusion as to the precise location of the landing zone.
If we have that kind of precision in commercial airliners, then why couldn’t Extortion 17 find the landing zone?
Neither the Apaches nor the AC-130 had any problems locating the landing zone. Why, then, was Extortion 17 having the problems that it was having?
Yes, Bryan Nichols was a young pilot. But he had been flying for three years, and even a young pilot should be able to find a landing zone using GPS navigational systems. Besides, he had a more experienced co-pilot, David Carter, sitting beside him in the cockpit, and they were certainly able to find the landing zone earlier in the evening, when they dropped off the Ranger team several clicks outside the battle zone.
Pinpointing the landing zone should have been the simplest of tasks. The confusion aboard Extortion 17 does not seem like pilot error; it smacks of something else going on in the aircraft. The question is, “what?”
In the transcript the Apache co-pilot and gunner, designated in the transcript as “FS” for “Front Seat,” asks, “could you sparkle LZ?”
Here, LZ is, of course, the acronym for landing zone, and the co-pilot of the Apache helicopter is radioing up to the AC-130, requesting that the “sparkle,” that is the high-powered laser beam, be flashed down into the landing zone.
Next we hear, “23/2 burn is on [INAUDIBLE].” This was a communicati
on from the AC-130 overhead, and the phrase “burn is on” means that the laser is now burning, and the sparkle has begun.
It’s important to note the time that the sparkle begins. It’s 22:06:56, or 2:36:56, just four seconds before 2:37 a.m.
By this time there had already been a considerable delay in landing, and officers at flight control were concerned that the helicopter was stalled in the air. One of the Apache pilots flying alongside Extortion 17 was also perplexed, as detailed in the next chapter.
Chapter 23
Extortion 17’s Bizarre Behavior
The Apache pilot seemed disgusted that Extortion 17 was requesting the sparkle prematurely. He chided the Extortion 17 pilot in no uncertain terms: “Not even a minute out and you’re requesting a damn sparkle.”
Based upon a review of the flight transcript, there seemed to be a certain disgust in the Apache pilot’s tone here, because he understood that a sparkle requested prematurely and outside of a minute from landing could alert the enemy on the ground and prove unnecessarily dangerous.
Even Brigadier General Colt raised this question himself, at Exhibit 53, in the transcript of his team’s interview with both Apache pilots after the shoot-down. The general’s comments were captured at page 32 of Exhibit 53, as follows:
BG COLT: . . . sparkle? I believe that there was commentary about “I don’t know why he’s asking for it so soon.”
. . . it sounded like [it] was an incredulous comment that he just asked for the burn at three, why did he do that? I mean normally, he calls at one. We’re not even clear if there was even a one-minute call, or if that was the moment that he was struck.