by Don Brown
SME-JSOAC: So just to be able to provide fire support if needed. Is this your standard TTP? [TTP stands for Tactics, Technique, and Procedures]
AIRCRAFT COMMANDER: Really quick an important point I think at this juncture is, we had requested to engage those two individuals and we were denied—
Two pages later, at page 9 of Exhibit 40, the navigator of the AC-130 testified that the gunship was not allowed to fire on the enemy combatant squirters, but instead, was told to watch them on the ground and report their positions [author’s emphasis]:
NAVIGATOR: Basically like we said we were passing periodic updates to the first one we passed was when the squirters were 200 meters away. . . . They said they didn’t want us to engage; what he passed to us was that they wanted to follow those guys and figure out where they stopped. And then find out exactly where they were and then basically use that as follow-on after they were done clearing and securing the actual Lefty Grove site.
Further evidence of the rules of engagement preventing pre-assault fire appeared at Exhibit 53 of the Colt Report. In this exhibit Colt and his team were interviewing five men, including the pilot and co-pilot of each of the two Apaches that were in the air with Extortion 17, and also the Helicopter Task Force commander, the immediate boss of the four pilots being interviewed.
Consider this testimony from the co-pilot of one of the Apache helicopters (Gun 1), at pages 14–15, in response to a question from Brigadier General Colt about pre-assault fires:
Apache Co-Pilot: “We have to take the 47s in on all the LZs . . . We are not cleared for pre-assault fires or anything like that . . .”
The Ground Force Special Missions Expert then asked a follow-up question at page 69 of the exhibit, which generated this response, first from the helicopter task force commander at page 70: “And to get back to your question about pre-assault fires, the ROE and the tactical directorate are pretty specific about what we can and can’t do.” To this comment, the Ground Force Special Missions expert immediately responds, “From my experience, pre-assault fires are next to impossible.”
In other words, even though the AC-130 gunship specifically requested permission for pre-assault fire, the rules of engagement prevented US military aircraft from clearing out the landing zone to ensure a safer landing for Extortion 17.
The purpose of this ludicrous rule, by the way, prohibiting pre-assault fire, was to appease the Afghan government, which had launched protests to the Obama Administration about the practices. The Administration acquiesced to that demand and ordered the US military to refrain from pre-assault fire, which was ultimately why the landing zone was not cleared of hostile RPG-toting Taliban insurgents, and why Bryan Nichols, David Carter, and the SEAL team members lost their lives that day.
Chapter 34
Hypocrisies and Inconsistencies in the Rules of Engagement
To further illustrate the ludicrousness of the US rules of engagement as set down by US military planners in Washington, and the haphazard application of those rules, the record shows that on two occasions, within two hours after the shoot-down, US helicopters were in fact firing rounds into the ground in the area of the attack. The first chopper provided post-assault fire that came seconds after the shoot-down (see below), and a second chopper poured pre-suppression fire into the landing area before US Army Pathfinders, dispatched to secure the wreck scene, landed on the ground (see next chapter).
In the emotional and adrenaline-charged seconds following the shoot-down, one of the Apache helicopters broke protocol, broke the rules of engagement, and opened fire into the ground, attempting to fire in the area of the RPG attack. This burst of fire came at 0240:18, just thirty seconds after the shoot-down at 0239:48 (Enclosure H, page 5).
In the exchange below, note what the pilot said, and note also, how in the aftermath, Brigadier General Colt seems to put the pilot on the defensive in his questioning of that decision to open fire.
At 22:11:43 Zulu time (2:41:43 a.m. local time), seconds after the shoot-down, the gun-tape (Exhibit 54) reveals the co-pilot of the Apache helicopter closest to Extortion 17 making these comments.
Roger, we are circling overhead. I saw where the [EXPLETIVE] explosion came from, man. I’m searching the buildings. If I see [EXPLETIVE] anybody with a weapon, I’m firing.
These comments on the gun tape were made one minute and twenty-five seconds after one of the Apaches first fired at 2:40:18 AM. The record isn’t clear which of the Apaches fired first, and which fired second. All that is clear is that the Apaches did not fire until after the shoot-down.
But with Extortion 17 in flames on the ground, that Apache helicopters, either on or both of them, did, in fact, almost immediately open fire in the aftermath of the shooting. For that, the pilot was treated to a thorough cross-examination by Brigadier General Colt.
First off, note that Colt tried to frame his questions in a way that suggests that the squirters (enemy Taliban) who were spotted on the ground from overhead aircraft were not close enough to Extortion to pose a threat.
That supposition is rebuffed by the co-pilot of Apache 1, who testified that the squirters could have been at the landing zone site for Extortion 17 (Exhibit 53, pages 73–74).
BG COLT: For clarification, you said “that’s where the threat was.” You are still referring to the Alpha and Bravo. But in your assessment from Alpha and Bravo, those forces at the time could not have applied effective fires against the aircraft on its approach to the LZ?
Apache Co-Pilot: Not the approach. But when they would have been at their LZ, they would have been within—from Bravo, I believe it was close to 600 meters . . . But those guys—the reason why we saw them as such a threat is because they had squirted from a place where [they] had just engaged six individuals that were heavily armed moving in a very military manner.
So we assessed that these guys were trained military. They weren’t just five guys that picked up a weapon for a weekend of fun. These guys were legitimately, to me, the real thing, and that’s where we saw the threat.
It’s very clear that the Apache crews viewed the squirters as mortal danger to Extortion 17.
Two points: First, neither the Apaches nor the AC-130 were allowed to fire against Taliban insurgents on the ground considered to be a threat to Extortion 17. These insurgents, by the way, were all over the ground, posing a threat to Extortion 17. They were not in some building 220 meters away.
Second, when the Apache fired immediately after Extortion 17 was shot down, General Colt grilled the Apache pilot as if the pilot were under cross-examination, asking the pilot if it was generally the pilot’s procedure to engage a point of origin without positively identifying a target:
Consider this exchange, from page 40 of Exhibit 53:
BG COLT: Is it a general TTP [tactics, techniques and procedures] of yours to engage a POO—or suppress, I should say, a POO without PIDing the target?
PB65FS: (Apache Co-Pilot): Sir, I wouldn’t say it’s a TTP. I saw when they went down. And if there was any survivors, I wanted suppression fire to be placed where I thought the POO was.
The Apache co-pilot’s testimony went on to say that the Apache fired between seventy and one hundred rounds in the area near the downed chopper to prevent anyone from approaching it. The co-pilot testified that they believed that the RPGs might have been fired from a qualat, which is a primitive Afghan compound made of a mud-brick substance.
The implication from General Colt here was, “look, you shouldn’t have fired unless you positively identified your targets as the enemy.” Also, it was in the military’s best interests to suggest that the RPG was fired some 220 meters away from a building. In this way, they can argue that their failure to allow pre-assault fire did not contribute to the SEAL team’s deaths. In other words, “pre-assault fire wouldn’t have helped because the shot was fir
ed from out yonder.” If the Apache pilot fired into the ground after the shoot-down, that suggests the shot might have been fired from somewhere other than the building 220 meters away. The military brass couldn’t have that.
Again, there were contradictory reports from multiple witnesses about the true point of origin of the attack. The Combat Assessment Team at Bagram Air Base concluded that the “Point of origin was never positively identified or actioned” (Exhibit 60, page 42).
Regardless, the absurd point here is that the Apache was allowed to, or rather got away with, firing after the shoot-down, i.e., post-assault fire, but wasn’t allowed to protect the SEALs by firing pre-assault rounds before the shoot-down.
Chapter 35
Indefensible Inconsistency: Pathfinders Get Pre-Assault Fire but SEALs Don’t
Adding insult to injury, the US Army’s Pathfinder team, the team that goes in to help secure the area on the ground after a crash or shoot-down of a US military aircraft, was, unlike the Navy SEAL team, protected with pre-assault fire before it landed. This occurred less than two hours after the shoot-down of the SEAL team, at 4:14 a.m. This was revealed in the interview of the Pathfinder commander, at Exhibit 65 of the Colt Report, and also at Enclosure H.
Remember that the shoot-down takes place at 239:48 a.m. (Enclosure H to Colt Report).
At 4:14 a.m., with the US Army Pathfinders unit now in helicopters approaching the landing zone adjacent to the downed Extortion 17, the UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters accompanying the Pathfinders poured pre-assault fire into the landing zone prior to the Pathfinders setting down (Enclosure H, page 7).
Then, one minute later, at 4:15 a.m., after Black Hawk helicopters have strafed the landing zone with machine-gun fire, the Pathfinders set down, approximately 600 meters southeast of the downed Extortion 17 (Enclosure H, page 7).
The Pathfinder commander reported that the Black Hawks put a few rounds in the ground to make people scatter prior to landing. Here’s that testimony from Exhibit 65, page 6 of the Colt Report.
SME-MH47: And they did pre-assault fires into that HLZ?
TF CDR: Roger, this time they did. Again for what we talked about earlier put a few rounds down in the field to make people duck their heads and I spoke specifically to the crews that were doing it, one of them which was our company SIP, we told him look we are coming in here we are doing it fast, deliberately, controlled, and putting him down and getting them out.
This exchange demonstrates a radically inconsistent application in the rules of engagement, all within a matter of ninety minutes. The SEALs were denied pre-assault fire, which led to their deaths but the Pathfinders were given pre-assault fire prior to landing, allowing them to land safely to secure the Extortion 17 crash site.
Common sense prevailed and the Pathfinders received pre-assault fire before their landing at 4:15 a.m. But if common sense had prevailed earlier, and pre-assault fire had been allowed at 2:38 a.m., the SEALs could have landed safely, and there would have been no need to deploy the Pathfinders to the scene.
Remember, the math showed the shooter was between 119 feet and 178 feet from ground zero (the ground under the chopper when it was struck by the RPG). This is significant, because either one of the two Apache helicopters flying with Extortion 17 or the AC-130 gunship could have easily sprayed that area with gunfire to clear it out, which most likely would have saved American lives. But the rules of engagement for this mission foolishly prevented pre-assault fire.
The US Navy SEAL team was not given the same protection as the US Army Pathfinder team, and the US military has given no cogent explanation for the foolish and inexcusable decision to deliberately deny pre-assault fire for the SEAL team and the Americans aboard Extortion 17.
As long as the US military remains in Afghanistan, or in any area where known insurgents are on the ground with RPGs and other weapons capable of shooting down US aircraft, as was clearly the case with the Tangi Valley on the morning of this shoot-down, the rules of engagement should be changed to always allow pre-assault fire into a landing zone to save American lives. Political correctness should not come into play when it comes to saving American lives.
Chapter 36
The Disappearing Black Box: Further Evidence of Inconsistencies and Cover-Up
One of the most disturbing aspects of the Extortion 17 mission involved the disappearance of the flight data recorder, otherwise known colloquially as the “black box.” As previously pointed out, Exhibit 65 of the Colt Report, which contains testimony of US Army Pathfinders, was labeled by the military as the Black Box exhibit and outlined the efforts made by US Army Pathfinders to locate the helicopter’s black box.
Exhibit 65 discussed the Pathfinder’s attempt to find the black box in the midst of the wreckage of Extortion 17, a search that extended over a period of two days and resulted in “the first time,” per the Pathfinder commander’s testimony, that the Pathfinders had been unable to recover a black box. If discovered, the black box could have provided clues, maybe even the absolute answer to what happened aboard Extortion 17.
The black box is the box (actually orange in color) which typically contains an aircraft’s (1) flight data recorder and (2) cockpit voice recorder. In virtually every aircraft mishap in commercial or military aviation, the first question asked is, “what about the black box?”
Not only does the black box record crucial data concerning the function of the aircraft systems recorded in the flight data recorder, in real time, but often the pilots’ voices are recorded and preserved, which can help investigators determine what happened to a flight.
What if, for example, the seven unidentified Afghans had attempted to either disrupt or sabotage the flight? Had that happened, there is a good chance that some clues would have been found on the cockpit voice recorder (one of the components of the black box). Or, if other problems had arisen, there is, again, a reasonable chance that the cockpit voice recorder would have recorded these problems.
The Army’s Orders to the Pathfinders: “Find the Black Box!”
When the Pathfinders arrived on the ground to comb through the Extortion 17 wreckage, one of the first instructions given to the entire Pathfinder team was “Find the black box.”
However, it’s important to realize that although the Pathfinders were on the scene within an hour-and-a-half after the shoot-down, they were not first on the scene. A Special Operations group known as “Lima Bravo” had beaten them there, by well over an hour. The Chronology at Enclosure H showed that the first forces arrived at the crash site at 3:04 a.m. Also, an unidentified coalition group entered the crash zone, examined the area, “surveyed the aircraft,” and then left along an unidentified road. All this occurred before the Pathfinders arrived, and all this is mysteriously and without explanation omitted from the Executive Summary of the Colt Report. This crucial point will be examined in more detail later.
But first, look at the testimony of the Pathfinder Commander on the team’s search for the black box.
At page 11 of Exhibit 65, a member of the Aviation Shoot-Down Assessment Team (ASDAT3) was questioning the officer who was in charge of the Pathfinders on the ground, the Pathfinder Commander (PF CDR).
ASDAT3: How about a play book for the [inaudible], the maintenance recorders in the aircraft, by different airframe w[h]ere those locations are so in the event you find a few slides you’ve got some pretty significant damage, you guys know a focal point on the aircraft what to get and what’s classified, what’s going to help us paint the picture? Do you guys have a book like that? Was that fed to you?
Pathfinder Commander: We actually do have a standardized list with pictures for a CH-47 with the radar detection, ATIRCM, everything in the radio suite in the back, and how to get it out.
So in response to the questions about the recorders located on the helicopter, the Pathfinder commander said th
at the Pathfinders were equipped with photographs for the radar detection, ATIRCM (Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasures) and the radio suite in the back.
Later the Pathfinder platoon leader testified directly about the efforts to locate the black box, at page 13 of Exhibit 65 [author’s emphasis]:
ASDAT3: Does anybody brief the follow-on forces that come in behind you on what to look for on that site?
PF PLT LDR: Sir, in this case the first night we went—we looked for the flight recorder, but because the way the fire had burned down we were told to look for the flight recorder—I think this is actually the only time we hadn’t been successful in recovering that—by the cockpit near the pilot seat on the left hand side and we got as much as we could, but it was still smoldering at that point. And then, after the flood came in, we looked again and we also—we briefed the human remains team and the downed aircraft assessment team as well as everyone else who was working on the stretchers to look for the flight recorder in any of the wreckage, but to my knowledge no one—we had a couple, I guess, false alarms, but we could never actually find the actual flight recorder.
The testimony revealed several things about the search for the flight recorder. First, it implied that the Pathfinder team might actually have seen the flight recorder, were unable to initially recover it, and when they came back, it was gone: “We were told to look for the flight recorder—by the cockpit near the pilot seat on the left hand side and we got as much as we could, but it was still smoldering at that point.”