1999

by Richard Nixon

  Our overall strategy must calibrate what we will do to protect an interest of strategic importance. We should not send in the Marines to defend a peripheral interest, but we must not flinch from doing so to defend a vital interest. We must match the level of our commitment to the importance of our stakes in a region. We should then match our capabilities—and the will to use them—to the threat we face.

  Our top priority must be our vital interests. U.S. policy-makers often allow themselves to be sidetracked by peripheral issues. While we have more at stake in Canada and Mexico than in any other countries, seldom do they get attention commensurate with their importance. Canada is a member of NATO and our largest trading partner. We should seek to involve the Canadians more actively, not only in the pursuit of greater prosperity through such measures as the recently signed free-trade agreement, but also in the search for greater Western security and global stability. Canada has a great deal at stake in the world—and has much to contribute to the world. It is not in our interest to have Canada stand on the sidelines rather than cooperate with us on our common concerns.

  Mexico’s economic crisis represents one of our greatest long-term security threats. We can ignore the problem only at our peril. While the United States cannot solve Mexico’s problems, we cannot afford to treat them as a sideshow. Our policies today simply tread water. That eases relations in the short term but courts disaster in the long term. As a result, we must take on the problem head on. Simply rescheduling debt indefinitely only postpones a reckoning and will eventually land the Mexican people in grinding poverty. We must start to develop, with Mexican leaders, a program to get at the root economic problems, rather than improvising temporary solutions to one crisis after another.

  As a rule, if faced with a Soviet military threat to its vital interests, the United States must be prepared to employ its own forces in their defense. As long as Kremlin leaders threaten the free world, we must not weaken our security ties with either Western Europe or Japan. But in our competition with Moscow that is not where we should expect the challenges from the Kremlin to arise. In the years before 1999, it will be in the Persian Gulf region that the Soviet threat to vital U.S. interests will be the greatest. It is also the region in which the United States is the least prepared to defend those interests.

  In my book The Real War, which was published just after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, I called the Persian Gulf the “oil jugular” of the West. I wrote that if control over access to the region’s reserves were ever to fall into Soviet hands, the Kremlin leaders could blackmail the West by threatening to strangle its oil-fueled economies. That is still true—and will continue to be true for at least the rest of this century.

  Access to Persian Gulf oil is a vital interest of the West. It would be a fatal error to let today’s low oil prices blind us to the fact that we depend on oil imports from the Middle East. Oil is still the most important energy source for the industrialized world, and imports account for over half of the oil consumed in the Western industrialized economies. Moreover, Western dependence on imported oil is certain to grow, not diminish, for the rest of this century

  In 1973, when the OPEC embargo produced gas lines which stretched for miles, the United States imported a third of its oil. In 1985, after a decade of concerted efforts to conserve energy and reduce our dependence on foreign energy sources, we still bought 27 percent of our oil abroad, while Western European dependence on imported oil stood at 63 percent and that of Japan at 100 percent. Although the United States imported most of its oil from areas other than the gulf, Western Europe imports about a third and Japan about two thirds of theirs from the area. Along the entire 7,000-mile route from the Persian Gulf to Japan, there is one oil tanker every 100 miles bound for Japanese ports.

  Without oil imports from the Persian Gulf, our allies would tumble into an economic free fall. They would suffer a collapse that would make the Great Depression look like a mild downturn in the leading economic indicators. No one should mistakenly believe that the United States would escape unscathed—for when oil prices go up they go up for everyone.

  Our dependence on oil from the Persian Gulf will almost certainly increase. American oil production will continue to decline, and American oil consumption will continue to increase as our economy grows. Since coal, natural gas, or nuclear power cannot make up the shortfall between supply and demand, we will find ourselves importing more oil. The U.S. Energy Department estimates that in 1995 the United States will import about 50 percent of its oil, while Western Europe will import about 70 percent and Japan 100 percent. Since the countries of the Persian Gulf hold 66 percent of the free world’s proven oil reserves, they will supply the lion’s share of oil imports of the industrialized democracies in the future.

  As long as the Western economies are fueled by oil, the Persian Gulf area and its resources will remain a vital interest of the West. The Middle East had long been the crossroads where Asia, Africa, and Europe met. Now, with oil acting as the lifeblood of modern industry, the Persian Gulf has become the oil jugular of the West.

  Kremlin leaders have always understood that fact. Soviet interest in oil has always drawn Soviet interest to the south. Early in World War II, in negotiations to carve up the world with its allies in Nazi Germany, Stalin’s Foreign Minister told his counterparts that in addition to its objectives in Europe “the area south of Batum and Baku in the general direction of the Persian Gulf” was “the center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union.” When Berlin acceded to that formulation, Stalin ordered his general staff to draw up plans for the invasion of Iran. In its opening pages, the war plan described Moscow’s motivation with striking clarity in a quotation from Stalin: “In the final analysis, this is what it is all about: Who will own the oil fields and the most important roads leading to the interior of Asia?”

  After Nazi Germany turned its armies on the Soviet Union in 1941, the Kremlin invaded northern Iran to prevent German advances in the region, while Britain and the United States moved their forces into southern Iran. But after the war, as both Britain and the United States withdrew their troops on schedule, Moscow tried to carve off northern Iran by announcing that in the territory under Soviet control the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan and the Kurdish People’s Republic had declared independence from Tehran. The Kremlin immediately granted them formal recognition. Soviet units and Soviet-supported rebel military forces then tried to march on the Iranian capital. Stalin stopped and withdrew only after President Truman—at a time when the United States held a monopoly in nuclear weapons—delivered an ultimatum to Moscow. This critical decision by Harry Truman was as important as his decision to provide aid to Greece and Turkey in preventing Soviet domination over Western Europe.

  What is ominous is that Moscow has a greater incentive to push to the south today than it did in 1945. After World War II, Soviet oil fields were still in their prime, with production on the upswing. In the mid-1980s, oil production in the Soviet Union peaked and then began to decline, with little prospect for a recovery. That is why the Soviet Union is pressing forward with nuclear energy despite the Chernobyl disaster. It is also a powerful reason—apart from achieving dominance over Western Europe and Japan—to seek control over the Persian Gulf.

  In the late 1970s, the Kremlin deployed a pincer movement against the gulf. One pincer came from the southwest. In 1978, Soviet transports airlifted twenty thousand Cuban troops into Ethiopia, not only to assist its communist government in its war with Somalia, but also to establish military facilities across the Red Sea from Saudi Arabia. Later that year, a pro-Soviet group in South Yemen took power, thereby giving Moscow a beachhead on the Arabian Peninsula. South Yemen soon launched an overt military attack on North Yemen. From South Yemen, terrorists launched operations against Saudi Arabia and guerrillas conducted attacks in a border province of Oman. The other pincer came from the northeast. In 1978, a military coup put into power the Afghan Communist Party, which quickly signed treaties
with Moscow. When a popular rebellion threatened to topple the communist regime, the Soviet Union invaded the country, putting its fighter-bombers within reach of the Strait of Hormuz from their newly acquired Afghan bases. From both directions, Kremlin leaders were extending their reach to get their hands on the oil jugular.

  From 1953 to 1979, Iran under the Shah served as the principal pillar of Western security in the region. When the British withdrew from “east of Suez” in the 1960s, the United States, with over 500,000 troops in Vietnam, could not step into the breach. It was the Shah who filled the vacuum of power. He undertook a massive program to modernize his armed forces. His navy patrolled the gulf, and his army represented a powerful obstacle to any Soviet thrust. He protected Saudi Arabia and the other vulnerable sheikdoms in the region. He worked with other gulf states to create regional security arrangements. When the Shah’s government fell in 1979, it produced a new vacuum of power—at the very same time Moscow was achieving the capability to fill it. Had the Shah survived it is highly unlikely that the Soviets would have invaded Afghanistan.

  Today the United States is the only country that can safeguard Western interests in the Persian Gulf. None of the pro-Western gulf states is strong enough to do the job. None of our European allies have the forces or the will to do so. We, therefore, must step up to this vitally important issue, but so far we have not.

  We must act on the military front to improve our capability to project American power into the gulf. We have made significant progress in this area. President Carter created the Rapid Deployment Force. President Reagan has upgraded the RDF into the U.S. Central Command, and Congress has appropriated billions of dollars for its forces. But we have not yet done enough. The Pentagon has made a disproportionate share of overall congressional budget cuts in the forces which would defend the Persian Gulf. As a result, the United States will not soon meet the goal of being able to deploy four divisions in the gulf within thirty days.

  We cannot defend our interests in the gulf—or deter a Soviet move against them—if we cannot get our forces there. We need to invest substantially more in our airlift and sea-lift capability. It therefore must be made a top-priority item in our defense budget in the eleven years before 1999.

  We must also act on the diplomatic front to forge closer ties with the countries in the region. It is impossible for the United States to intervene in the Persian Gulf without access to air bases in Saudi Arabia and other smaller gulf states. We need to base air forces there so that we can protect our ground forces as they establish a beachhead. Without air superiority, an American landing in the Persian Gulf would become a replay of the British landings at Gallipoli in World War I.

  Improving our ties with these states requires the United States to undo the damage done by the Iranian arms deal. For our friends in the region, Khomeini’s Iran is a much greater threat than even the Soviet Union. We must therefore assure them that the Iran fiasco was an aberration which will not be repeated. But we also must become actively engaged in efforts to settle the Palestinian question. It is this issue and our close ties with Israel that lead the gulf states to keep relations with the United States at an arm’s length.

  Even if we take these needed steps, our vital interests will be at risk unless the United States has the will to defend them. The perception that however powerful its armed forces may be, the United States will never use them is a dangerous one. It adds to the risk of war because it tempts aggressors to believe that aggression can succeed at little cost. Yet that is the exact perception that liberal candidates for President in 1984 encouraged when they took turns promising never to send American forces to fight for the Persian Gulf. Whoever makes that kind of pacifist pledge in 1988 will disqualify himself from being considered as a responsible leader of the United States and the free world.

  In the current crisis in the Persian Gulf, the United States cannot afford to be disengaged. What happens in the Iran–Iraq war today profoundly affects our ability to safeguard the region from Soviet intervention in the future. If ever there was a war in which both parties deserved to lose, it is the Iran–Iraq war; if ever there was a war in which the United States could not afford either party to lose, it is also the Iran–Iraq war. An Iraqi defeat would lead to Iranian fundamentalist domination of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the entire gulf region. An Iran bled white by massive losses of manpower would become vulnerable to Soviet subversion and intimidation.

  In this war, we should seek a solution that provides peace without victory, while having no illusions about the ability of our diplomats to bring it about quickly. In the meantime, however, we should strengthen our friends in the gulf. We should encourage and assist recent moves toward greater regional defense cooperation, including the reintegration of Egypt not only in the Arab world but also as a potential military ally of the Arab gulf states. We must continue our involvement in escorting reflagged tankers in the gulf, for our presence gives our friends the confidence needed to spurn Iranian threats. We must remain ready and willing to launch stiff reprisals on military and economic targets in Iran for any attacks on our vessels.

  At the same time, after months of fruitless debate, it is time for Congress to put up or shut up on the issue of invoking the War Powers Act. If members of Congress intend to try to intrude on the proper role of the President in foreign affairs, they should vote the question up or down. If they cannot muster the votes—and no one believes they can—they should stand aside and let the President operate without interference. As it is, Khomeini has been taking potshots at our tankers and naval forces in the hope of triggering the War Powers Act and starting the sixty-day clock for a U.S. withdrawal. The endless congressional debate, while well intentioned, only serves to bring our servicemen in the gulf under fire.

  In addition to its vital interests in the Persian Gulf, the United States has critical interests in other countries in the Third World. We have an enormous stake in the economies and natural resources of these countries. Some also occupy key strategic positions which make them major prizes in the American–Soviet competition. Most important, it is in the Third World that we can expect to see the greatest gains and losses in the U.S.–Soviet competition.

  Since the end of World War II, there have been 120 wars in which 18 million people have been killed—and over forty of them are being waged today. Except for the conflicts in Northern Ireland, the Falkland Islands in 1981, and Greece in 1947, all these wars have taken place in the Third World. The sharpest conflicts between the United States and the Soviet Union have occurred in the Third World. The most important battles in the American–Soviet competition are not along our borders but in remote villages and small countries whose names few Americans know. It is there that people and territory will be won and lost in the American–Soviet struggle.

  In pinpointing Soviet aggression today, it is no longer enough to look for the smoking gun: we must now look for the hidden hand. While the Soviet Union is not responsible for all the conflicts in the Third World, it has started several and seeks to exploit most of them. We must recognize the role the Soviet Union and its surrogates play in instigating and supporting insurgencies against noncommunist governments—and take the appropriate counteraction.

  To protect our interests in the Third World, we must learn how to respond to three situations: (1) a noncommunist government under attack by communist subversion; (2) a noncommunist government at peace but vulnerable to a communist insurgency; and (3) a communist government under attack by anticommunist forces.

  When a friendly noncommunist government finds itself threatened by a communist insurgency, the United States should be predisposed to help it meet that threat. Without a sustained effort along the front lines in the battle between freedom and communism, the United States cannot compete effectively with Moscow.

  We must become involved in these conflicts not only on behalf of our own interests, but also in support of the interests of the people of threatened Third World countries. British historian P
aul Johnson wrote that “the essence of geopolitics is to be able to distinguish between different degrees of evil.” Those who oppose U.S. involvement to stop the spread of communism in the Third World because they do not like the noncommunist regimes we at times have to support fail to understand that point. We do not like dictatorships. But we must recognize the difference between communist dictatorships and noncommunist dictatorships. A noncommunist dictatorship allows some freedoms; a communist dictatorship allows none. A noncommunist regime allows some opposition and consequently creates the chance for peaceful change; a communist regime allows no opposition. A noncommunist government might support our foreign policy; a communist government will oppose it.

  Soviet-supported communist regimes seek to export their repression, while noncommunist governments do not. North Vietnam’s communist leadership did not rest content until it ruled all of Indochina. Cuba has fomented communist revolution in Latin America for thirty years. It succeeded in Nicaragua in 1979, and the Nicaraguan communists, in turn, took up the task of subverting El Salvador and other Central American states.

  While U.S. friends and allies might not have perfect records on human rights, theirs are without exception better than those of Moscow’s clients. Cubans were better off under Batista than under Castro; the Vietnamese were better off under Thieu than under Hanoi’s communists; Cambodians were better off under Lon Nol than under Pol Pot. Since 1945, twenty times as many people have been killed by communist governments as have died in wars to stop communism. We must remember that a communist peace kills more than an anticommunist war.

  Our support for noncommunist governments under communist attack should be guided by a policy which came to be known as the Nixon Doctrine after I announced it in Guam in 1969. It states that in the future, unless a major power intervened in a Third World conflict, the United States should not commit its combat forces. We should provide military and economic aid to friendly states in whatever amounts necessary to defeat Soviet-supported insurgents, but the country under attack must undertake the responsibility for providing the troops to mount its own defenses. If a country cannot mobilize the capability and the will to fight and win after receiving our aid and training, sending our own troops to do the fighting would at best provide only temporary success. Once we withdrew, the enemy would take over.