Jassim the Leader: Founder of Qatar

by Mohamed Althani

  A few days earlier, Mehmed Pasha had sent an ultimatum, urging the sheikh to present himself at Bida and pledge loyalty to the Ottoman state. Unmoved, Jassim sent one of his relatives, Sheikh Khalid, with a bold response. Unless Mehmed was willing to withdraw his troops from Qatari soil, the Sheikh of Qatar would be disinclined to enter into negotiation over the 10,000 Turkish lira in taxes claimed. Neither man could afford to lose face now. It was clear to all the time for talk had ended; rather it was time to find out who really controlled the peninsula. Jassim made the first move, sending a sizeable detachment of horsemen to Salwa with orders to cut off Bida’s communications with provincial headquarters at Hasa. This was achieved successfully and quickly, and the detachment remained on patrol in the south to intercept frequent Ottoman attempts to call on the support of tribal reserves. As a consequence, Mehmed was unable to contact the clans he had paid for support, under the command of Sheikh Mubarak Al Sabah of Kuwait.

  The Wali retaliated by arresting Jassim’s younger brother, Sheikh Ahmad, and over a dozen other Qatari families, imprisoning these hostages on board the warship Merrikh, accusing them of spying on Ottoman troop numbers for the benefit of their fellow tribesmen at Wajba. Jassim immediately offered to pay the 10,000 Turkish lira in return for their release, but to no avail. Major Yusuf Effendi led out Mehmed’s troops, cavalry and cannon, intent on destroying Jassim’s positions at Wajba and all the men he found there. After two hours, the Ottoman troops had passed the fortress of Shebaka, and were just half an hour’s march from Wajba. It was here that they came under heavy gunfire from some three to four thousand of Sheikh Jassim’s hastily formed infantry. Taken unawares, the Ottomans fell back immediately to regroup near Mesaimeer, where the 11th Marksmen put up much more of a fight, killing around four hundred Qatari warriors. But the Turks were still forced back to Bida, harried all the way by Qatari cavalry. Over half the Turkish battalion lay dead, and a further 55 were wounded. They had lost their colours, cannon and over a hundred and fifty rifles. Jassim’s victory was near, but he still needed to take the fort at Bida, where the remnants of a once proud force now cowered.

  Deserting his soldiers in town, Mehmed fled to his ship and brought the corvette’s guns to bear on Bida in anticipation of Jassim’s arrival. He blasted many a building and caused the death of women and children, an event Jassim would never allow to be forgotten in the years following. Nevertheless, the fort came under heavy fire and its water supply was cut off. Mehmed had no choice but to appeal for a truce; he couldn’t possibly report to Istanbul that his entire force had been wiped out. The Wali offered to release his hostages in return for the safe passage of his remaining cavalry and men out of Qatar and back to Hufuf. Mehmed, the very man who had presented the Sheikh of Qatar with the title of Kapucibasi four years earlier, had badly underestimated Jassim’s strength. The sheikh had not only repulsed an attack, but forced an Ottoman surrender. He had truly become a national hero, by far the most important political figure in the region. Qatar was no longer just a trail or grazing pasture for the tribes of eastern Arabia. On 26 March 1893 Qatar had been truly united. It was a country, and no mistake.

  Jassim had always been a pragmatist; the victory was won but now he had to win the peace. Looking to restore the status quo ante bellum, he wrote to the Grand Vizier the very next day, laying out the injustices and misunderstandings which had led to the conflict. In part, Jassim hoped his explanations might temper the reports that, no doubt, Mehmed was firing off to the Porte from his base at Hasa.

  I sent Mehmed Hafiz Pasha my brother. But he sent him, along with other prominent members of this country, to jail. This attitude caused hatred among the people. I sent him word to the effect that even a governor of the State could not act against the orders of the State. On the sixth day of the holy month of Ramadan, while we were in the desert, we were taken unawares. Certain tribes suffered losses, even women and children were not spared. In the face of all these events, the tribes had no other choice but to unite their forces to put up a defence. … Under the circumstances, I humbly beg that an official be sent here to investigate the cruelties and oppression to which the people were subjected. It was Hafiz Pasha who compelled us to commit things we did not wish to happen and to retaliate.

  Jassim’s request for a fact-finding mission was initially accepted and the case was taken up by Said Effendi, a widely respected religious scholar based in Basra, who personally met Sultan Abd ul-Hamid II in April before travelling on to Qatar. He proposed reconciliation, but the Ministry for War in Istanbul felt that for all the benefits this might provide within the peninsula, it would give completely the wrong impression to tribes in the rest of eastern Arabia. Reconciliation would imply the Ottoman state was incapable of reprisal. It would imply weakness. And in the meantime, Hafiz’s friends fought to have the investigation stopped before it started, afraid any incompetence revealed might end their career prospects. The Grand Vizier weighed in on the side of those working to prevent Said Effendi’s mission, unreservedly recommending Mehmed Hafiz Pasha’s account of the war to the Sultan and the necessity for ridding Qatar of Sheikh Jassim bin Muhammad bin Thani.

  But despite all the pressure on the Sultan to use force, he instead demonstrated a genuine appreciation of the situation. Apportioning some blame to Jassim, Abd ul-Hamid II was clear on the point that the Qayamaqam should have presented himself at Bida when asked to do so by the Wali of Basra. The Sultan decreed, however,

  Jassim had expressed his wish to be appointed Qayamaqam of Qatar upon its capture in 1871 and has not since then shown any mutinous behaviour. The British had claims of protectorate over the Oman tribes in the environs of Qatar, the Muscat Sultanate and the Bahrain Sheikhdom. Their intention to extend the scope of these aspirations as far as Qatar should not be a far-fetched conjecture. Under the circumstances, in chastising the instigators of those incidents which took place in Qatar, a more judicious and moderate action would have been more pertinent. Consequently, instead of despatching troops to punish them as the Governor of Basra seems to suggest, it behoves us to clarify the matter in the first place and unravel the motives for the dispute. Political and military investigations must be conducted in the region, and according to the result obtained they must be enlightened about the evil consequences.

  Jassim had got his investigation, to be managed by a committee comprising Said Effendi, Colonel Rasim Bey and Mubarak Al Sabah, the ambitious half-brother of the Qayamaqam of Kuwait.

  In the meantime, London had got wind of the events at Wajba and Bida and sensed opportunity. The torpedo cruiser HMS Brisk arrived at Bida on 25 April, bearing a Colonel Adelbert Cecil Talbot. Naturally, Talbot’s mission was undertaken without any reference to Ottoman officials, even though Brisk had anchored right alongside the Merrikh, with Mehmed Pasha on board. Mehmed was using the corvette as a base while he awaited the Commission’s questions with a due sense of dread. To end the awkward stand-off, for neither recognised the right of the other to involve themselves in Qatar’s affairs, Talbot called on the Pasha. He offered his own services in mediation between Jassim and Mehmed. The Wali didn’t hold back on the subject of Jassim, and what he’d like to have happen to him, but the bottom line remained: Qatari affairs were an internal Ottoman issue that did not concern any British official.

  Talbot hadn’t expected any other response and sailed on to Wakra to meet up with Jassim, the main objective of his mission. Jassim was happy to accept the British invitation, and came aboard with his brother Sheikh Ahmad and Muhammad Abd ul-Wahhab. All were talkative and there was much to discuss. Describing in detail how the Merrikh’s shelling of Bida had killed scores of women and children in the town, Jassim stated that, at the age of 68, he wished for a peaceful life under British protection and intended to transfer his power to Ahmad, who would be based at Bida. The venerable sheikh continued that should he receive no justice after the investigative committee had concluded its work, he would personally lead an army to push the Ottomans out of Hasa and
Qatif. The war had eaten into his funds and commerce had been badly affected. He was unable to pay the pearl divers their advance because the future was so uncertain. Sheikh Ahmad shared his brother’s opinion, and suggested the 1868 agreement between Britain and Qatar have the dust blown off it.

  In a telegram to Lord Curzon, the Viceroy of India, Talbot advised that Britain engineer a situation by which the Turks be invited to leave Qatar. ‘Bida is at present deserted by Arabs, and will remain so unless their safety is assured … I strongly recommend effort being made to procure their withdrawal and reinstatement independently of Qatar chiefs on footing of Trucial Chiefs.’ Jassim, he added, was prepared to pay 9,000 krans annually to have the Ottomans stay out of the peninsula since their presence was ruining the country’s prosperity.

  Britain’s foreign secretary, Lord Kimberley, was willing to enter into negotiations with Sultan Abd ul-Hamid II on the basis of the offer made by Sheikh Jassim and Sheikh Ahmad. But the suggestion was dismissed, and the Sultan expressed confidence that the commission he had established would resolve the dispute to everyone’s satisfaction. The British interjection had the effect of spurring the Commission to greater haste. Mehmed Hafiz was dismissed, even before the Commission’s findings had been published in June. The Ottoman relationship with Qatar, it proposed, should be re-established along the same lines as existed before the war. Jassim would pay his taxes, return the weapons he had captured and pass the Qayamaqamship to his brother Ahmad. In return, the Ottomans would facilitate the return of Bida’s population and drop their plans for a customs house, among other administrative reforms. The Sultan accepted nearly all its recommendations, except for agreeing to Jassim’s resignation, though he was happy for Ahmad to take over the day-to-day duties of the position. Jassim feigned a semi-retirement at Lusail for the first time, though it was a ruse which the British understood. A Major James Sadler, a temporary Resident in 1894, observed that Jassim ‘probably finds it convenient for the present to interpose his brother as a buffer between himself and the Turks’. His perceptive observation did him credit. Jassim had won the peace.

  Ottoman revenge at Zubara

  Jassim had escaped the revenge of the Turkish bureaucracy in part by hinting at a British desire to make Qatar a protectorate, keenly aware that Ottoman policy was shaped by suspicion of foreign intrigue. London’s hardening resistance to acknowledgement of Istanbul’s sovereignty over the peninsula added body to the conviction, as did events on the ground. First, the Ottoman administrator in Bida and his wife were murdered by two Turkish soldiers a year after the peace. The perpetrators managed to escape only as far as Wakra before Jassim’s men caught up with them. Secondly, and a year later, a huge migration from Bahrain saw Sultan bin Muhammad, a grandson of bin Turaif and the chief of the Al bin Ali tribe, settle in Qatar with over one and a half thousand followers. He had left Bahrain owing to a dispute with Sheikh Isa over a shooting. Sultan applied to Jassim for permission to settle in Zubara, which was given.

  Sheikh Isa had never accepted the presence of any Bahraini rebel in Zubara and appealed to the Political Resident to take up the issue. He insisted the Al bin Ali must return and impressed upon the political agent that the maritime peace was bound to break down if their settlement were allowed to prosper. The British agreed, and sent Colonel Frederick Wilson to Jassim that he might convey ‘a strong and very distinct warning that such a settlement will not be permitted … you must at once abandon any such project, which will not be tolerated. I confidently expect an early and satisfactory reply from you, as this matter will not admit to uncertainty or delay.’ Britain had never accepted Ottoman authority, but now it was telling the Sheikh of Qatar what he could or could not do inside his own country, simply out of its concern that Bahraini shipping might be harassed.

  Jassim was too experienced to respond directly to such attempts at duress, and wrote back merely that if Britain was no longer prepared to demonstrate ‘friendship and good will’, then their objections to Zubara’s settlement should be taken up with the Sublime Porte. The reply had snookered Wilson, since Britain didn’t recognise Ottoman authority in Qatar. The colonel decided therefore to browbeat Sultan bin Muhammad instead, assuring him that his men would be ‘routed’ if they didn’t stop their constructions and return to Bahrain. Wilson also offered to mediate on the Al bin Ali’s behalf to ensure they were not molested on their return. Sultan didn’t have Jassim’s political experience, and wrote back that he might consider leaving only after the end of the pearling season in early October 1895.

  Wilson refused the delay, believing it was a ploy to buy time for the fort’s repair. He had received intelligence that the new Mutasarrif at Hasa, Ibrahim Fawzi Pasha, had sent masons to Zubara, and even a detachment of soldiers. The British threatened to seize Sultan’s pearling ships if he didn’t acquiesce, but Jassim sought to reassure Sultan, helping him with the construction of houses and a mosque, and equipment for his fleet. A flagpole was erected specifically to raise the Ottoman standard, for this was exactly the kind of circumstance in which Jassim would welcome Turkish troops. Seeking to beef up their presence in Zubara, Jassim also called on his son-in-law, the Bahraini rebel par excellence Nasir bin Mubarak, and on the new Mutasarrif of Najd to march in support at once. Ibrahim Pasha did put in an appearance to review the situation personally, and promised on his return to Hasa to contact Basra on the need for soldiers and ships at Zubara.

  HMS Sphinx cruised into Zubara in July. She was commanded by a Captain Pelly, who was under orders to seize all ships in the harbour should he fail to effect the town’s abandonment. Pelly sent for Sultan bin Muhammad, who refused to come. A six-hour ultimatum was prepared and the captain ordered one of his men, John Gaskin – later to become the British political agent at Bahrain and a fluent Arabic speaker – to deliver it. As Gaskin was walking towards Sultan’s house, two Ottoman soldiers blocked his path to ask by whose permission he entered the town. Gaskin replied that Britain didn’t recognise Ottoman authority in Qatar and he would proceed within Zubara wherever he liked without reference to them or their superiors. A heated discussion followed and eventually the ultimatum was allowed to pass, but not the man carrying it. Gaskin returned to his ship while Sultan communicated to the Sphinx that he was no slave or subject to Sheikh Isa bin Ali, and though he could not contend against the power of the British government, ‘no force or action on their part would compel him to return to Bahrain’. He added that both he and Sheikh Jassim bin Muhammad bin Thani had a few days previously written to Sheikh Isa bin Ali, and private negotiations were more likely to lead to their conciliation than threats from the British government, with which Sultan had nothing to do.

  The ultimatum given, the twenty-gun sail and paddle steamer Sphinx swung into action, seizing eight Al bin Ali boats and conveying them to the Sheikh of Bahrain on 8 July. The Ottoman officer Arab Effendi protested to Pelly in writing, maintaining that Zubara was a part of Qatar and, therefore, the property of the Ottoman state. The Al bin Ali, Effendi added, were the inhabitants of Qatar ‘from ancient days, from grandfather to grandson. I do not understand your actions, this is contrary to all laws and usages; and if you have any reason for the same, negotiate with me and receive my reply and prevent your committing these injustices. If any of them [the ships] disappear and anything lost there-from, you are answerable.’ Meanwhile, Jassim had come in person to Zubara, and his presence gave the half-built town new hope. Sultan determined to continue in his resistance to such unjust demands and the Sheikh of Qatar offered genuine support. Advising the chief of the Al bin Ali to send his pearling ships round to Bida, on Qatar’s eastern shores, Jassim also provided tents and camels to aid the tribesmen in their hour of need.

  By mid-July, Pelly had returned from Bahrain and was on the hunt for more of Sultan’s ships, chasing down nine more off the tip of the Qatari peninsula. Now Jassim attempted to reason with Wilson.

  I stood guarantee for them [the Al bin Ali] to Shaikh Isa that no mischief would a
rise from the side of Zubara or from its inhabitants, and they have committed no offence. They are poor who earn their livelihood; they are not slaves. Their original domicile was Qatar and they resided in Furaiha and Zubara, and then removed to Huwaila and Bida. They have not been ruled as slaves. This proceeding is contrary to your justice, and is a wrong unbecoming of you.

  Pressed by Jassim, the Ottomans retaliated, responding to British hectoring by impounding nine Bahraini boats. Sheikh Isa had dispatched them to ferry those of the Al bin Ali who might wish to escape the tense situation and return ‘home’. Pelly demanded to know by what authority the boats had been seized. Effendi replied with a didactic attempt at educating Pelly in the ancient history of the Al Khalifa and their migration to Zubara from Kuwait. Their conquest of Bahrain was made possible, he opined, by the contribution and sacrifices made by the major tribes of Qatar. Secondly, he pointed out, the Al Khalifa paid taxes and/or tributes to Qataris, particularly during the era of Rahma bin Jabir, and, therefore, Bahrain belonged to Qatar. Lastly, and by way of a side note, the Ottoman officer, who clearly had a flair for the historical but not for the political, asserted that both Qatar and Bahrain were parts of the Ottoman Empire. We’ll never know whether Pelly made it to the end of Effendi’s essay, but it hardly mattered, the situation had just escalated. The Ottoman navy had arrived.

  There is much that has been written on the strength of the Royal Navy, and a veritable dearth of material on the Ottoman. This is a great injustice. While it is true that Admiral Ibrahim Pasha had lost the Battle of Navarino in 1827 during the Greek rebellion against Ottoman authority, it should be remembered that he had been fighting the combined fleets of the British, French and Russians, who had sent ten ships-of-the-line against his three. Two years later, Istanbul launched the biggest warship the world had ever seen – the Mahmudiye. Almost one hundred yards long, the Mahmudiye had 128 cannon mounted along three gun decks, manned by over 1,200 sailors. She was a true monster that belittled Britain’s 74s. And even in the second half of the century, Istanbul was the first home for submarines that could fire torpedoes under water, in 1886. The truth is that the only thing the Ottoman navy lacked was a decent budget; their warships were the match of any in the world.