Smersh: Stalin's Secret Weapon: Soviet Military Counterintelligence in WWII

by Vadim Birstein

  13. Chuev, Spetssluzhby, II, 192–206.

  14. Ibid., 205–6.

  15. Kahn, Hitler’s Spies, 360.

  16. Höhne and Zolling, The General Was a Spy, 42–44.

  17. Details in Kirill Aleksandrov, Russkie soldaty Vermakhta. Geroi ili predateli (Moscow: Yauza-Eksmo, 2005), 203, 207–12, 253–6 (in Russian).

  18. Chuev, Spetssluzhby, II, 174–6, 231-9.

  19. Hitler’s decree concerning the administration of the newly-occupied Eastern territories dated July 17, 1941, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/1997-ps.asp, retrieved September 7, 2011.

  20. Chuev, Spetssluzhby, I, 36–44.

  21. Ibid., 45–53.

  22. L. G. Ivanov, Pravda o ‘Smersh’ (Moscow: Yauza-Eksmo, 2009), 29–-30 (in Russian).

  23. HSSPfs: 1) Riga (Ostland): Hans-Adolf Prützmann, Jan–Nov, 1941; Friedrich Jeckeln, Nov 1941–Jan 1945; Dr. Hermann Behrends, Jan–May 1945; 2) Mogilev, later Minsk (Russland-Mitte): Erich von dem Bach-Zelewski, Jan 1941–Jan 1942; Carl Friedrich Count of Pückler-Burghauss, Jan 1942–Mar 1943; Gerrett Korsemann, Mar–Jul 1943; Curt von Gottberg, Jul 1943–Aug 1944; 3) Kiev (Russia-Süd): Friedrich Jecklen, Jun–Nov 1941; Hans-Adolf Prützmann, Nov 1941–Mar 1944; and 4) Nikolaev (Schwartz-Meer): Ludolf von Alvensleben, Oct–Dec 1943; Richard Hildebrandt, Dec 1943–Sep 1944; Arthur Phelps, Sep 1944.

  24. The Russland Ostland in Riga had branches in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Belorussia; the Russland Mitte in Minsk had branches in four Belorussian and south Russian cities, and the Russland Süd in Kiev had branches in 16 Ukrainian cities, the Caucasus and the Crimea. Details in Chuev, Spetssluzhby, II, 59–82, and Kovalev, Natsistskaya okkupatsiya, 115–38.

  25. A total of 168 Russian Orthodox and two Catholic churches were opened at the German-occupied territory of the Leningrad Region; before the war, there were only five Russian Orthodox churches in that area. In N. Lomakin, Neizvestnaya blokada (St. Petersburg: Neva, 2004), 493 (in Russian).

  26. Document No. III-43, in Moskva voennaya, 1941–1945: memuary i arkhivnye dokumenty, edited by K. I. Bukov, M. M. Gorinov, and A. N. Ponomarev, 591 (Moscow: Mosgorarkhiv, 1995) (in Russian).

  27. GKO Decision No.1074-ss, dated December 27, 1941. Document No. 207, in Lubyanka. Stalin i NKVD, 324.

  28. GKO Decree No. 1926-ss, dated June 24, 1942. Document No. 224 in ibid., 350–1.

  29. Details, for instance, in B. N. Kovalev, Natsistckaya okkupatsiya i kollaboratsionism v Rossii. 1941–1944 (Moscow: Tranzitkniga, 2004) (in Russian); Aleksandrov, Russkie soldaty Vermakhta.

  30. Details in Wilfried Strik–Strikfeld, Against Stalin and Hitler: Memoirs of the Russian Liberation Movement 1941-1945, translated from the German by David Footman (New York: The John Day Co., 1973), 118–20.

  31. Ibid., 181–6.

  32. See, for instance, Christian Streit, Keine Kameraden: Die Wehrmacht und die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangnen 1941–1945 (Bonn: Dietz, 1997).

  33. On the Lokot’ Republic, see B. V. Sokolov, Okkupatsiya. Pravda i mify (Moscow: AST-Press Kniga, 2002), 654–71 (in Russian).

  34. P. N. Paliy-Vashchenko, V nemetskom plenu. Iz zhizni voennoplennogo (Paris: YMCA-Press, 1987), 78 (in Russian).

  35. K. M. Aleksandrov, Ofitserskii korpus armii general-leitenanta A. A. Vlasova, 1944–1945 (St Petersburg, 2001), 31 (in Russian).

  36. Beria’s report, dated July 27, 1944. Document No. 271 in Lubyanka. Stalin i NKVD, 442.

  37. Figures from the German documents cited in N. M. Ramanichev, ‘Vlasov i drugie,’ Istoriya, no. 34 (2001), http://his.1september.ru/articlef.php?ID=200103403, retrieved September 7, 2011.

  38. Materialy po istorii Russkogo Osvoboditel’nogo Dvizheniya (1941–1945 gg.). Vyp. 2 (Moscow: Arkhiv ROA, 1998), 169 (in Russian).

  39. Lev Razgon, Nepridumannoe. Biograficheskaya proza (Moscow: Zakharov. 2007), 477–8 (in Russian).

  40. Bochkov’s Order No. 46-ss, dated May 15, 1942.

  41. P. G. Grigorenko, V podpol’e mozhno vstretit’ tol’ko krys… (New York: Detinets, 1981), Chapter 23 (in Russian), http://militera.lib.ru/memo/russian/grigorenko/33.html, retrieved September 7, 2011..

  42. S. S. Zamyatin, ‘Vremennye boitsy’ (in Russian), http://www.proza.ru/texts/2008/05/10/375.html, retrieved September 7, 2011.

  Part V. The Birth of SMERSH

  CHAPTER 16

  The Birth of SMERSH

  At the beginning of 1943, the situation at the fronts started to change. After the success in Stalingrad, Soviet troops began advancing into the southern part of Russia. With the tide of war now turned in the Soviets’ favor, desertions among their troops decreased considerably. Stalin’s attitude toward the army, especially toward officers, also started to change.

  The Turning Point: Spring 1943

  To increase patriotism among the troops, in January 1943 Stalin opened a propaganda campaign to remind servicemen of Russia’s past military glory during the imperial period. At first, shoulder boards similar to those used by the czar’s army officers and soldiers were introduced.1 Now the color, insignia, number, and size of the stars on the shoulder boards identified the troop type and rank.

  On January 28, 1943, Marshal Georgii Zhukov and 22 generals were awarded the newly introduced Order of Suvorov of the 1st Class for the victory in Stalingrad. This was one of three orders named after the historical Russian military heroes, Generalissimo Aleksandr Suvorov (1730–1800), General Mikhail Kutuzov (1747–1813), and Prince Aleksandr Nevsky (1221–1263). The movie Aleksandr Nevsky had already attracted public attention to this Russian hero who fought German knights in the thirteenth century. Filmed by the famous director Sergei Eisenstein, it was a blockbuster in 1938 and became even more popular in 1941, when on Stalin’s order it was shown again after the German invasion. Later Stalin personally edited film scripts that glorified Suvorov as a great warrior and Kutuzov as a savior of Russia from Napoleon’s troops. Stalin gave a copy of the film Kutuzov to Winston Churchill, who courteously wrote him back: ‘I must tell you that in my view this is one of the most masterly film productions I have ever seen.’2

  The Order of Suvorov was given to commanders for a successful offensive, the Order of Kutuzov for the successful planning of an operation by staff members, and the Order of Nevsky for personal courage. They were established on July 29, 1942, the day after Stalin signed the infamous Order No. 227 ‘No Step Back!’—apparently, to show that commanders would be not only punished, but also awarded.3 However, the first orders were given only at the end of December 1942–January 1943. The Order of Nevsky directly appealed to the czar’s time, when the Order of Saint Aleksandr Nevsky had been given since 1725. No historical image of Prince Nevsky existed, and in 1942 the designer depicted on the order a portrait of the actor who played Nevsky in the movie.

  In July 1943, the word ‘officer’ was also introduced.4 Until then, it was not officially used in the Soviet Union because it immediately created a mental association with White Guard officers. The Red Army officers were called ‘commanders’ and only after July 1943 did they become ‘officers’. In August 1943, a propaganda brochure entitled The Heroic Past of the Russian People was published mostly for the army politruki. Now Russia was considered the leading nation among the many nations inhabiting the Soviet Union.

  In the meantime, by 1943 Soviet intelligence and counterintelligence knew little about the complexity of the German intelligence and security services. This knowledge came later, as a result of the interrogations of numerous captured German intelligence officers, as well as German-trained Russian agents who voluntarily surrendered to the Soviets. Even so, it became evident that military counterintelligence needed to concentrate on fighting against the German enemy rather than focusing its attention on its own servicemen. After realizing this, Stalin ordered the creation of a real counterintelligence service, called SMERSH, which reported personally to him.

  Stalin’s New Secret Service

  In March 1943, the reorganization of security services began. Vsevolod Merkulov, a m
an with ‘an athletic figure and a splendid head of thick dark hair flecked with grey’, who Stalin put in charge of the transition, gathered the OO heads of several fronts and armies in Moscow.5 Abakumov’s closest subordinates, Pavel Zelenin, Nikolai Khannikov, Mikhail Belkin, and Isai Babich, were among the participants. Merkulov told the assembled leaders that ‘the Central Committee and Comrade Stalin’ had asked the OOs to increase their efforts so ‘no spy, agent, or terrorist would escape the attention of the special departments’.6 It is likely the changes were discussed at a late-night meeting of the GKO, which both Merkulov and Abakumov attended on March 31 at 11:30 p.m.7

  In April, Merkulov presented Stalin with three different drafts for the revival of the early 1941 NKGB.8 In the first two versions, the new NKGB would include military counterintelligence under the name ‘Smerinsh’, that is, ‘Smert’ inostrannym shpionam’ or ‘Death to foreign spies’. The third version proposed two separate organizations, the NKGB and Smerinsh, as a directorate within the Defense Commissariat (NKO). This draft and other relevant documents were discussed at a GKO meeting that began at 10:05 p.m. on April 13.9 Leading NKVD and OO officers were invited—Merkulov, Abakumov, Lavrentii Tsanava, Nikolai Selivanovsky, Nikolai Korolev, Khannikov, Babich, and Nikolai Mel’nikov (deputy head of Sudoplatov’s 4th NKVD Directorate)—and all of them would end up being affected by the changes. General Filipp Golikov, the newly appointed deputy defense Commissar for Red Army personnel, and Aleksandr Shcherbakov, head of the GlavPURKKA, also attended. By 11:30 p.m. most of the participants had left, although Stalin, Molotov, Beria, and Malenkov continued their discussion until after midnight.

  The next day the Politburo ordered the NKVD to be divided into two parts, and the revived NKGB became a super-agency handling foreign intelligence, counterintelligence within the USSR, and so forth (Figure 16-1).10 Merkulov was appointed NKGB Commissar while Beria remained the head of NKVD. The responsibilities that the NKVD was left with—the organization of slave labor, police work, control of the system of POW camps, and NKVD troops—were far less important and glamorous than the intelligence and counterintelligence work that the NKGB now took on.11 Although this may seem a huge diminution of Beria’s power, in actuality he retained much of it through his control of his close associate Merkulov.

  Abakumov was summoned to Stalin’s office on April 15 and 18, and the final decision was made on April 19, 1943, at a Politburo meeting attended by Abakumov and Merkulov.12 As usual, the draft of the Politburo decision said that the decision was made jointly by the Party’s Central Committee and Sovnarkom (Council of Commissars). However, Stalin crossed out the words ‘the Central Committee’ with a blue pencil and signed the document as Sovnarkom’s chairman.13 The document was registered as Sovnarkom Resolution No. 415-138-ss; the two letters ‘ss’ (sovershenno sekretno) mean top secret, although members of the Sovnarkom had not seen it yet. The resolution ordered the NKVD’s UOO to be split into three separate military counterintelligence directorates within the NKO, Navy Commissariat, and NKVD, respectively, as had been done in early 1941.

  Two days later Abakumov was called to Stalin’s office again and the document finalizing the creation of SMERSH was signed.14 It had a singularly long, awkward title: ‘GKO Decision No. 3222-ss/ov [the letters “ov” mean “of special importance”] on the Responsibilities and Structure of the Main Directorate of Counterintelligence (GUKR) SMERSH (Smert’ shpionam).’ 15 Thus, in the final version the name ‘Smerinsh’ or ‘Death to foreign spies’, became ‘Smersh’, meaning ‘Death to spies’. The original, with Stalin’s signature, was sent to Abakumov.

  On April 29, Abakumov was again in Stalin’s office.16 Apparently, during this half-hour visit, Stalin signed a document specifying appointments for high-level positions within GUKR SMERSH, including heads of departments, which Abakumov had prepared two days earlier.17 Nikolai Selivanovsky became Abakumov’s first deputy, while Pavel Meshik and Isai Babich became deputies.

  Figure 16-1

  THE REORGANIZATION OF THE NKVD INTO THE NEW NKGB AND THE NKO’s SMERSH APRIL 1943 TO MAY 1946

  Abakumov was appointed deputy Commissar of the NKO, reporting directly to Stalin. Although he was relieved of the NKO post a month later, Abakumov’s removal as deputy Commissar was not a slight against him. Stalin simply wanted to reduce the number of NKO deputies. He promoted Marshal Georgii Zhukov to be first deputy, and replaced sixteen deputy commissars, including Abakumov, with only one, Marshal Aleksandr Vasilevsky, head of the General Staff.18 In any case, as head of GUKR SMERSH, Abakumov continued ‘to be subordinated directly to the People’s Commissar of Defense [Stalin] and to follow only his orders’, as Decision 3222-ss/ov mandated.

  On May 4, the Directorate of the NKVD Troops for Guarding the Rear of the Red Army (‘rear guard troops’) was promoted to a separate Main Directorate and given the responsibility of providing support for SMERSH’s activities.19 On December 1, 1944, Lt. General Ivan Gorbatyuk replaced Leontiev as head of this Main Directorate. These troops, now numbering 163,000 men, continued to capture German soldiers, spies, and paratroopers in the rear of Soviet combat units. The rear guard troops existed until October 13, 1945.

  The same order that created GUKR SMERSH within the NKO created a parallel organization within the Navy Commissariat, the NKVMF, which was simply a reorganization of the 9th Department of the UOO that dealt with the navy.20 This organization was known as the Navy UKR SMERSH. A month later the 6th Department of the UOO, in charge of monitoring NKVD troops such as the Border Guards and rear guard troops, was reorganized into a third counterintelligence unit, the OKR Smersh, which remained within the NKVD.21 At the time, the NKVD troops grew into a separate army: in 1942, the number of servicemen in these troops was 420,000, and by January 1945, it reached 800,000.22

  The Navy and NKVD counterintelligence units were smaller and therefore less significant than the NKO’s SMERSH. This is evident from the fact that they were organized as a UKR and an OKR, respectively. In all Soviet acronyms, ‘G’ at the beginning means ‘Main’; ‘U’ means ‘Directorate’; ‘O’ means ‘Department’; and ‘KR’ means ‘Counterintelligence’. A ‘Main Directorate’ is a larger organization than a ‘Directorate’, and a ‘Directorate’ is bigger than a ‘Department’. UKRs were subordinated to the GUKR, and each of the UKRs was comprised of departments. In typed documents of the NKVD’s OKR Smersh, only the ‘S’ in ‘Smersh’ was capitalized, while in NKO and NKVMF documents, SMERSH was spelled in all capital letters. UKRs were always comprised of one or more OKRs.

  The Navy UKR SMERSH was headed by Pyotr Gladkov and two of his deputies, Aleksei Lebedev and Sergei Dukhovich. It consisted of four departments, along with an investigation unit, a ciphering section, an operational equipment section, and some miscellaneous units. It was given its own building in a central part of Moscow and moved out of the Lubyanka building. Besides the main headquarters in Moscow, each of the four fleets—the Baltic, Northern, Black Sea, and Pacific—had its own field OKR or Department of Counterintelligence that reported to the Navy UKR SMERSH in Moscow.

  The OKR Smersh consisted of six sections, a special group (used for secret operations), a group for the registration of informers, and a Secretariat. Its head reported directly to NKVD Commissar Beria. Besides the Moscow headquarters, there were numerous branches of OKR Smersh: an OKR in the NKVD rear guard troops at each of the twelve fronts; two OKRs in the interior NKVD troops (in Ukraine and on the Northern Caucasus); ten Smersh departments in each of the border guard groups; and a department in the First Motorized NKVD Division and the Special Motorized NKVD Brigade.23 As with the other two SMERSH organizations, there was a vertical, centralized command structure in which each OKR reported to the next higher OKR level. Also, there were OKR Smersh departments in four big industrial cities: Moscow, Kuibyshev (now Samara), Novosibirsk, and Sverdlovsk (now Yekaterinburg).

  The work of the NKVD’s Smersh was based entirely on reports from informers. During 1943 and 1944, it arrested 293 alle
ged traitors to the Motherland, 100 espionage suspects, 76 ‘German supporters’, and 356 deserters among the NKVD troops.24 Additionally, in 1944 almost 10,000 servicemen, including 450 officers, were transferred from the NKVD troops (which were considered elite units compared to the military) to the Red Army because of ‘compromising materials’ the OKR Smersh had collected on them.

  Besides its primary function of spying on NKVD troops, the NKVD OKR also kept an eye on the activities of Abakumov’s SMERSH. For example, NKVD counterintelligence reported to Beria on SMERSH officials who had sent looted property from conquered European territories to the Soviet Union. If arrested, SMERSH officers and their informants were tried by military tribunals of NKVD troops, not of the Red Army.25

  Similarly, SMERSH officers reported to Abakumov on the false information that investigators of the rear guard troops extracted from arrested locals by beatings and torture. At the same time, there was also cooperation between the NKVD’s Smersh and Abakumov’s SMERSH. If the NKVD’s Smersh captured German paratroopers dropped behind Soviet lines, they were transferred to Abakumov’s SMERSH for full investigation.

  Of the three military counterintelligence organizations, the NKO’s GUKR SMERSH became the most important and powerful agency by far. For simplicity’s sake, from this point on, this organization will be referred to as SMERSH.

  The Structure and Function of SMERSH

  A separate attachment to GKO Decision No. 3222-ss/ov detailed the organization of SMERSH and its branches in the army:

  The ‘Smersh’ organs are a centralized organization. At the fronts and military districts the ‘Smersh’ organs (the NKO ‘Smersh’ directorates at fronts and NKO ‘Smersh’ departments at the armies, corps, divisions, brigades, military districts, and other units and organizations of the Red Army) are subordinated only to their higher organs…