Crisis and Command: A History of Executive Power from George Washington to George W. Bush
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Jackson had declared war on nullification. Although perhaps in conflict with his views on the Bank and internal improvements, his view followed his guiding principle of democracy. If the majority of the people spoke through their elected representatives, a state had no right to frustrate their will. The Union had been the product of the Revolution, in which Jackson had risked his life as a young boy, and to which he had lost his mother and brother. He was not about to see it broken by a state, even the state of his birth. "There is nothing I shudder at more than the idea of the separation of the Union," he wrote in 1828.196 Although he firmly believed that the powers of the federal government were limited and that the states were to exercise all others not granted, Jackson believed even more in the permanency of the Union. State sovereignty could not justify secession.
Jackson hoped to reach a compromise as the election of 1832 neared. Without admitting the legitimacy of the South's grievances, he successfully urged Congress to enact a new bill that reduced tariffs. The national debt was being steadily reduced, and soon the revenue from the tariff would no longer be needed. A mere month after Jackson won reelection, South Carolina responded by holding a convention that declared the 1832 law void and threatened secession.
Jackson responded with a two-front strategy, one political and one constitutional. In his December 4, 1832, Annual Message to Congress, Jackson offered a political compromise. Tariff protections "should not exceed what may be necessary to counteract the regulations of foreign nations and to secure a supply of those articles of manufacture essential to the national independence and safety in time of war."197 There was "no reason to doubt" that domestic industry was "beneficial to our country," and he acknowledged that "large capital" had been invested in reliance on the tariff. Nonetheless, investors and producers had no right to expect "that the people will continue permanently to pay high taxes for their benefit, when the money is not required for any legitimate purpose..." In a nod to South Carolina, Jackson criticized a high tariff as tending "to beget in the minds of a large portion of our countrymen a spirit of discontent and jealously dangerous to the stability of the Union." He proposed that Congress study a gradual reduction of rates. To Jackson, the policy issue -- how high tariff rates should be -- was always open for bargaining.
The Union, however, was nonnegotiable. Six days later, Jackson issued an extraordinary proclamation that drew on his constitutional powers "for preserving the peace of the Union and for the execution of the laws."198 The American people, he said, spoke as one in electing the President; on behalf of the nation, Jackson left no doubts about his position on nullification. Nullification was "incompatible with the existence of the Union, contradicted expressly by the letter of the Constitution, unauthorized by its spirit, inconsistent with every principle on which it was founded, and destructive of the great object for which it was formed."199 He made short work of South Carolina's criticism of the tariff laws and denied that a state could pick and choose which federal laws to enforce. Even if the Supremacy Clause had not expressly provided for the superiority of federal law, it was inherent in the creation of the federal system. "Our Constitution does not contain the absurdity of giving power to make laws and another to resist them."200 If a single state could block federal law, the Constitution was useless. "Vain provisions! ineffectual restrictions! vile profanation of oaths! miserable mockery of legislation!"201
For Jackson, the question boiled down to what came first, the states or the nation. Only if the Constitution was merely a league, and the nation just an agreement of the states, could a state choose to withdraw or change the terms of the contract. But if the United States were a nation, representing the people directly, no state could set itself apart. Even before the Declaration of Independence, Jackson observed, "we were known in our aggregate character as the United Colonies of America," and "[w]e declared ourselves a nation by a joint, not by several acts..."202 The states have transferred parts of their sovereignty over issues such as war and peace to the federal government, and the allegiance of their citizens to the nation. No state could place itself above that act of union. Nullification was merely a "[m]etaphysical subtlety, in pursuit of an impracticable theory," designed to destroy the Union by forcing it to depend on the goodwill of individual states.203
It was no defense to claim that the tariff affected one region more than another. Every law impacts states and regions differently. On a point dear to him, Jackson suggested that the War of 1812 would have had a different outcome had states nullified laws that impacted them unequally -- a veiled reference to the talk of secession that had swept New England.204 It did not matter that Congress wanted to spend the money on unconstitutional projects, such as internal improvements, which Jackson himself had vetoed. What mattered was whether Congress's act in passing the tariff was constitutional, not whether its motive was.
It could not have been lost on observers that Jackson was arguing that states could not nullify a federal law, even though he had claimed almost the same power during the Bank fight. Nullification, however, did not undermine his claim of presidential power because the former represented the effort of a regional minority to block the authority of a national majority, while the latter (in his mind) represented the will of the people as a whole. Nullification struck at the very heart of Jackson's program, the expansion of majoritarian democracy. "The Constitution of the United States," he wrote in the proclamation, "forms a government, not a league ... "205 In that government, "all the people are represented," and it "operates directly on the people individually, not upon the States..."206 Because of this direct link between the people and the Union, the national government and its leaders could not arbitrarily choose to ignore the Constitution and give up powers to the states, nor could it allow a state to fence itself off from federal law. "[S]uch secession does not break a league, but destroys the unity of a nation; and any injury to that unity is not only a breach which would result from the contravention of a compact, but it is an offense against the whole Union."207
Secession, which Jackson believed was the real motivation behind nullification, directly contradicted American nationhood. "To say that any State may at pleasure secede from the Union is to say that the United States are not a nation," Jackson wrote.208 Robert Remini observes that Jackson was the first major American statesman to argue that the Union was a perpetual entity.209 Although there were antecedents, such as the Articles of Confederation, the Declaration of Independence, and Washington's Farewell Address, Jackson's proclamation represents one of the most compelling statements of the theory of American nationhood. Lincoln would owe much to Jackson's theory of the Constitution, the Presidency, and the Union.
Jackson's conclusion followed his strategy of seeking political accommodation while preparing for legal and even military confrontation. He appealed to South Carolina's citizens to put aside thoughts of disunion. Jackson addressed them as "[f]ellow-citizens of my native State." Their leaders had deluded them, and he warned them as "a father would over his children whom he saw rushing to certain ruin."210 He appealed to their patriotism: "Carolina is one of these proud States; her arms have defended, her best blood has cemented, this happy Union."211
But Jackson left no doubts about what would happen if South Carolina did not compromise. "Disunion by armed force is treason."212 No one needed a refresher on what Jackson had done to the enemies of the United States. "The laws of the United States must be executed," Jackson declared.213" "I have no discretionary power on the subject; my duty is emphatically pronounced in the Constitution."214 The President left little doubt that he would resort to military force if need be. "On your unhappy State will inevitably fall all the evils of the conflict you force upon the Government of your country."215 Jackson promised that their defeat would be certain.
[The Constitution's] destroyers you can not be. You may disturb its peace, you may interrupt the course of its prosperity, you may cloud its reputation for stability; but its tranquility will be restored, its prosperity
will return, and the stain upon its national character will be transferred and remain an eternal blot on the memory of those who caused the disorder.216
South Carolina remained unmoved by the proclamation, which was greeted with widespread support throughout much of the country. Three days later, South Carolina's governor resigned to lead the state's militia; Senator Hayne became governor, and Calhoun became Senator. Twenty-five thousand South Carolinians volunteered to fight. The legislature authorized the governor to call out the militia and to begin a draft and appropriated $250,000 for arms.217 Jackson sent military troops and a naval vessel to reinforce the federal bases in Charleston Harbor. He ordered the War Department to prepare three divisions of artillery to move against the state the moment it resorted to force.218 In a letter to a Union supporter in the state, Jackson promised that if South Carolina attacked, he would "call into the field, such a force as will overaw[e] resistance, put treason and rebellion down without blood," and arrest those guilty of treason and rebellion.219 Jackson planned for 10,000-15,000 federal troops to occupy Charleston within two weeks of an outbreak of violence, and drafted an order calling the militia to defend the Union.220
Jackson turned to Congress for a peaceful solution. Congressional action would slow the rush to confrontation and serve as a forum to further isolate South Carolina. Jackson recognized that if he acted unilaterally, he "would be branded with the epithet, tyrant."221 He extended an olive branch by proposing to return tariffs to their 1818 levels.
At the same time, Jackson responded to South Carolina's military preparations by requesting a "Force Bill." Jackson informed Congress that he would continue the collection of federal customs in the port of Charleston and would move the location of the Customs House to a more defensible fort. South Carolina would have to fire the first shot, as it would in 1861. He wanted Congress to delegate broad authority to relocate these federal offices, make some technical changes to expand the jurisdiction of the federal courts in the area, and amend the Militia Acts to allow him to immediately call federal forces into action when federal law was obstructed. He labeled South Carolina's actions as "revolutionary in their character and tendency, and subversive of the supremacy of the laws and of the integrity of the Union," a "usurpation of power," and a threat to the "liberties and happiness of the millions composing this Union."222 He closed by making clear, once again, that the Union represented the people, that he acted on behalf of that people, and that a small minority could not secede from it. The Framers "bequeathed to us a Government of laws and a Federal Union founded upon the great principle of popular representation."223 Jackson was called upon to discharge the duty of protecting the Union. Congress must act to "solemnly proclaim that the Constitution and the laws are supreme and the Union indissoluble."224
While the Force Bill conveyed no new authority, it called for political support from Congress should military action become necessary. Congress remained the only national forum where different regional interests could negotiate a bargain, and it held the constitutional authority over tariff rates. Jackson's willingness to make a deal on the tariff, combined with his display of indomitable will on the constitutional issue, produced a political resolution. South Carolina postponed nullification while the Senate debated the force and tariff bills.
With the rare spectacle of Clay supporting the administration, the Senate passed the Force Bill after the few supporters of nullification left the Senate chamber in protest.225 Clay reached a bargain with Calhoun, in which the former supported a reduction in tariffs in exchange for South Carolina's repeal of its nullification law. Jackson's "promise" of war had convinced South Carolina's representatives to give way.226 The Clay-Calhoun tariff passed quickly at the same time as the Force Bill, which received an overwhelming 100-vote majority in the House -- a demonstration of Jackson's success in politically isolating South Carolina, not just in the North and West, but also in the South.
Historians consider Jackson's victory in the nullification fight his greatest achievement as President. He stopped a movement to undermine the supremacy of federal law that could have brought secession three decades early. Although he threatened military force, he kept pushing for a political solution that would avoid conflict and preserve the Union. Jackson could not have reached this result without a broad vision of his duty to enforce the law, his power as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief, and his role as representative of American democracy. He used this robust understanding of the Presidency to pursue his understanding of the United States as a Union of one people. A President with a smaller conception of the office, like some of his successors, might have disclaimed any role in settling the issue of secession -- after all, there is no enumerated power in the Constitution giving the President the authority to settle political disputes between the regions -- and allowed South Carolina to go its own way. Jackson's genius was to harness the theory of one Union and one American people to the rising forces of democracy, but he could not have succeeded without a broad understanding of his constitutional powers and the willingness to use them.
CONCLUSIONS
JACKSON RECONSTRUCTED the Presidency. His tenure in the office was every bit as revolutionary as that of Washington or Jefferson. He did not restore the office by breaking its constitutional limits, as critics claimed, but by fulfilling the broadest visions of its Framers. They wanted the office to rest on the choice of a national electorate, bringing accountability and responsibility, but with enough distance to avoid the whims of temporary public passion. They wanted the President to be independent of Congress and exercise his own constitutional powers.
Jackson broke Congress's control over the office and established the Presidency as a coequal, competing voice of the people's wishes. The people, not Congress, would select the President. It would be the people, not Congress, whom Jackson represented. Critical to reasserting the Presidency's independence was Jackson's declaration of the right to interpret the Constitution for himself, rather than defer to the Supreme Court or Congress. In making the Presidency the primus inter pares of the national government, Jackson drew upon the other powers of his office, including control over the execution of the law, removal of subordinates, and of course, the veto pen.
Jackson's exercise of the Presidency's powers produced results that many would not agree with today. Jackson almost single-handedly conquered Florida for the United States, and set the stage for Texas's annexation, without legislative approval and support. While removing the Bank from politics, Jackson's war against Biddle destroyed the benefits of an independent central bank. A national bank, properly managed, could have helped smooth the boom-and-bust cycles of the American economy in the decades to come. Removal of the Indians allowed for broader settlement of the Southwest, but it visited untold suffering on the Cherokee and other tribes. Jackson's strong faith in American expansionism did not include a place for Indians, and the results of his policies remain one of the terrible examples of the nation's mistreatment of its own people.
Jackson's exercise of the powers of his office did not go without criticism and opposition. Like other Presidents who have made broad claims of executive authority, Jackson was attacked as a tyrant or dictator. Congress attempted to use its own powers to oppose Jackson, going so far as the only censure of a President in American history, but the people sent Jacksonian majorities to Congress that reversed these efforts. Nonetheless, Jackson's use of presidential power sparked a seismic political response, the creation of the Whig Party whose platform centered on executive restraint. Opposition to Jackson's use of presidential power restored the two-party political system to America.
Despite these negative aspects to his time in office, scholars continue to regard Jackson as one of the ten greatest Presidents. His foreign policy expanded the frontiers of the nation and opened land to economic development. Expansion did not trigger the centrifugal forces of nullification, and Jackson exercised the full powers of his office to protect the Union and the supremacy of federal law agai
nst the birth of secessionism. He democratized the political system by ending the corruption of the Bank, turning out longtime officeholders, and opening up the rising South and West. He reestablished the Presidency as an independent center of power that could pursue policies in the national interest, even if at odds with congressional wishes. He could not have achieved any of these goals without a reinvigorated understanding of the constitutional powers of the office. He bequeathed to a future President, Abraham Lincoln, an understanding of the office that allowed him to save the Union when secession came.
Jackson's restoration of the constitutional powers of the Presidency reached its apogee under his protege, James K. Polk. Scholars consider Polk to be another of America's ten greatest Presidents, and today he is ranked even above his former mentor. Polk had served as Speaker of the House during the Jackson administration and was later elected governor of Tennessee. When the leading candidates for the 1844 election, Van Buren for the Democrats and Clay for the Whigs, both announced they would not support the annexation of Texas, Polk went the other way with the blessing of Jackson. Supporters of expansion at the Democratic convention blocked Van Buren's nomination, and Polk emerged as the dark horse candidate. He sought to unify the Democratic Party by promising to serve only one term. Whigs campaigned on his relative obscurity by asking, "Who is James K. Polk?" They received their answer when Polk won on the platform of annexing Texas, occupying all of the disputed Oregon territory (which would have included parts of Canada between the contemporary borders of Washington State and Alaska), and acquiring California. Polk prevailed in a close election with 1,337,000 votes to Clay's 1,299,000, but by a larger Electoral College advantage, 170-105.227