True Faith and Allegiance

by Alberto R. Gonzales

  We judge that Saddam continues his efforts to rebuild weapons programs, that, once sanctions are lifted, he probably will confront the United States with chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons within a matter of months and years. Today, while we have little direct evidence of weapons stockpiles, Saddam has the ability to quickly surge to produce chemical and biological weapons and he has the means to deliver them.8

  Several Democratic senators pushed to declassify and release to the public portions of the hearing on the NIE report by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, which they did, prompting even more confusion.

  It’s important to note, however, that the CIA was not alone in assuming Saddam had become a dangerous threat. Intelligence services from Britain, Australia, Spain, Poland, and Italy shared that opinion, and France and Germany expressed similar concerns.

  In October 2002, Congress passed a strong resolution authorizing the use of military force in Iraq. The resolution reflected a broad view by both Democrats and Republicans that Saddam Hussein’s rule in Iraq needed to end, by force if necessary, to protect the United States and international peace and security. This was a big deal, and even some of George W. Bush’s staunchest political opponents agreed that Saddam Hussein must go.

  Senator John Kerry, who later ran for president against President Bush before serving as secretary of state in the Obama administration, said at the time, “When I vote to give the president of the United States the authority to use force, if necessary, to disarm Saddam Hussein, it is because I believe that a deadly arsenal of weapons of mass destruction in his hands is a threat, and a grave threat, to our security and that of our allies in the Persian Gulf Region.”9

  Democratic senator and future vice president Joe Biden had made up his mind back in August. “We have no choice but to eliminate the threat,” Biden said. “This is a guy who is an extreme danger to the world.”10

  Senator Hillary Clinton weighed in as well. “In the four years since the inspectors, intelligence reports show that Saddam Hussein has worked to rebuild his chemical and biological weapons stock, his missile delivery capability, and his nuclear program.” Senator Clinton spoke confidently of information most of those attending the early-morning White House meetings were still reticent to mention because of the lack of reliability of our intelligence sources. Clinton said Saddam “has also given aid, comfort, and sanctuary to terrorists, including al-Qaeda members.”11

  With the congressional resolution in hand, we were now able to focus on securing a strong UN resolution and hopefully strong support from a coalition of allies. One of our former friends, however, continued to be a thorn. Once a West-leaning Muslim democracy and member of NATO, the country of Turkey had been a longtime friend of ours. We had maintained military facilities at Incirlik Air Base inside Turkey, which helped greatly during Desert Storm, and from which we had conducted humanitarian aid to Kurdish refugees in northern Iraq. But by 2002, new leaders representing the Islamist AKP party won a majority in the Turkish Parliament and were now encouraging the nation to move further away from the United States. The new Turk leaders opposed any additional US actions against Iraq.

  As we moved into late October, President Bush seemed to have less confidence in the UN inspections. “A weak inspections regime is not satisfactory,” he said during an NSC meeting. “There has to be something in place as an option to strengthen our hand. We want to be able to follow through if the UN fails to act with a strong inspections regime.” He surprised me by saying, “It’s my fault that we are at the UN and subject to UN trigger mechanisms.” He didn’t mean, of course, that it was his fault that we were members of the UN, but rather that we had attempted to evoke their involvement in making Saddam comply. The statement reflected his frustration.

  He quickly pivoted and reminded us, “We need to be patient; we need to stay on top of things and not avoid this moment to make the world more peaceful. This is a huge part of our responsibility. It is a hard issue, and we need to make sure that Blix understands there is another alternative. Blix needs to know that if there is a war, it is Bush’s responsibility and not Blix’s. But we are not the guilty party—we are the saviors.”

  I shook my head in appreciation of what we had just witnessed. One moment the president was frustrated at the UN’s sluggish participation, and the next he was the leader of the free world with shoulders big enough to handle the world’s problems.

  At the beginning of November, I worked with other lawyers to refine what we hoped would become an acceptable UN resolution, conferring with OLC and the NSC to resolve language issues that could create obstacles. Specifically, I worked on the matter of lethal force against certain individuals, members of al-Qaeda, and anyone who was a threat to the United States. Condi Rice and John Bellinger were particularly helpful in this regard.

  On November 6, the day after the midterm elections, I discussed the resolution with President Bush in his office. He was on the phone a lot, making congratulatory calls to the election winners, but we still had a good conversation. He pressed me about whether this resolution would take away his presidential authority.

  President Bush and Prime Minister Blair, along with Secretary of State Powell and his British counterpart, Foreign Secretary Jack Straw, finally won the day with the UN Security Council. Despite Russia and China’s frequent opposition to US proposals, and France’s and Germany’s coziness with Saddam—which may have caused him to think he could escape unscathed with merely another limp slap on the wrists—on November 8, 2002, the UN Security Council voted 15–0 to support Resolution 1441, condemning Iraq’s weapons programs and demanding that Iraq open suspected facilities for inspection. The resolution threatened “serious consequences” if Iraq failed to provide the UN with a comprehensive list of the WMD it had retained. Like a parent demanding a child obey before the count of three, and then counting, “One, two, two and half, two and three-quarters . . .” the UN warned Iraq that this was its final opportunity to come clean and comply with the requirements of the international community.

  And then we waited for Iraq’s response.

  Meanwhile, the National Security Council discussions coalesced around three main topics regarding Iraq: (1) The implementation of the UN resolution and getting international support for a possible war; (2) the actual military campaign; and (3) the post-Saddam Iraq. For more than a year, rarely was I in the Situation Room with the National Security team when at least one of those components was not discussed.

  General Tommy Franks joined us for our December 4 meeting of the NSC, so not surprisingly, the discussion focused on actual war planning. Again, the president expressed his concern about Turkey’s lack of cooperation in providing access to Iraq from the north. “We need to know what they are willing to do and plan around them if they will not help,” he said. “Can we win if Turkey will not help?” The president addressed his question to General Franks.

  “We will win,” Franks answered.

  “The key is flexibility,” President Bush said. “We have to be able to change our plans quickly, without any doubt of victory. If Tommy Franks has no doubt, then I have no doubt of victory.” General Franks’s astonishing success in Afghanistan gave everyone great confidence that his efforts in Iraq would also be successful, but everyone understood that Iraq was a much more sophisticated enemy than the Taliban.

  President Bush continued probing the general’s confidence level. “If I told you to attack within five days, what would it look like?”

  Franks said, “It could be done within four hours’ notice, but there are more risks. It will take a number of days to set up Patriot missiles, deal with Scud missile defenses, and move forces from the north, hopefully through Turkey. Additional time will be needed to move southern ground forces into position. The size of our force would be substantially smaller than one ordered to fight within thirty days’ notice.”

  The president nodded. Yes, we could go sooner, but more time for preparation was safer. Still, he pressed
Franks to reduce the number of days necessary to initiate military activities.

  Franks reiterated, “You can go even sooner, but there are more risks involved.”

  President Bush directed General Franks to take all necessary defensive measures, but to develop a plan to bring down the risks early. As I listened to this discussion, I sensed the president had crossed a line in his deliberations on the subject. “If we have to do this alone,” he said, “we will do it alone.” Then he continued firmly, “This may be the most important decision I ever make. Once we go, there is no turning back. We must tell our coalition partners that there is no turning back.”

  Franks nodded. “We will be in Baghdad very quickly,” he said. “The initial blast will take out much of the Republican Guard, although inside Baghdad we may encounter pockets of resistance, especially around mosques and schools. The enemy will seek to use human shields.”

  Don Rumsfeld suggested the formation of some type of advisory committee to help control the country after the fall of Saddam, facilitate the destruction of WMD, and round up any remaining bad guys. This was serious.

  I knew we had to be prepared for any contingency, but I left the meeting slightly discouraged that we would not be able to avoid conflict. We were no longer talking about the possibility of war. Now we were deciding how the war would be waged.

  On the UN front, the next big event was Saddam’s submission of a declaration of weapons. The president was skeptical. At the December 6 NSC meeting, he asked George Tenet whether we would be able to tell if Saddam’s weapons declaration was false. Tenet said, “Yes.”

  The president remained suspicious. “Saddam is moving stuff to Syria,” he said. “He will not disarm.” Nevertheless, he was resolved to wait on the Hussein declaration.

  Saddam’s report was received from the UN on December 10, and the principals met that afternoon to discuss it. The first impression by the CIA was that the declaration fell far short of being truthful, even more so than the 1998 report. There was no admission of an ongoing nuclear weapons program. Sections of the report appeared copied from previous unreliable declarations. The new declaration did not include specific information, and there was nothing to support Saddam’s claim that they had destroyed weapons stockpiles. Iraq acknowledged unmanned aerial vehicles, but did not connect them to their weapons programs. Their report on ballistic missiles we knew was inaccurate and incomplete.

  The CIA would complete its review in the next few days—probably before Blix completed his—so we agreed on the importance of going to the UN and the P5 nations (the United Kingdom, France, Russia, China, and the United States) to condition the environment. Blix and the P5 needed to have their eyes opened to the list of omissions and inaccuracies in Saddam’s declaration. These constituted a material breach and demanded a response.

  When the CIA completed its analysis of Saddam’s declaration, the NSC met in the Situation Room on December 18. We knew by now that Blix would report that there were gaping holes in the weapons report. The president spoke calmly but firmly: “If there are gaps, it is clear he is not willing to disarm. This is significant.”

  Colin Powell concurred. “Saddam has put the rope around his own neck,” he said. “It is up to us how quickly to tighten it.” Powell knew that Saddam was a bad guy, but he also wanted us to make sure our actions were based on truth, not rumor. He had been in Iraq during Desert Storm; he knew firsthand Saddam’s evil, and when he was convinced the Iraqis had purposely submitted an incomplete and incorrect weapons report, he knew what had to be done.

  Vice President Cheney asked whether we should trash Saddam’s declarations now. “Instinct is to go hard and heavy on material breach,” he said, “laying the groundwork to explain why we may have to use force. No one else will describe the declaration as clearly as the United States. Blix will offer a squishy assessment of the declaration.”

  Secretary Rumsfeld reported that deployment orders for a major force were nearly ready to go. He noted with concern that we might declare Saddam had committed a material breach and then not do anything about it. He cautioned that our words and actions must match.

  The president then asked the question I had been asking myself for months, especially after receiving Saddam’s bogus weapons declarations: “Is war inevitable?”

  Powell answered quickly, “No.”

  President Bush was not so sure. “I think war is inevitable. Saddam is not going to disarm. The quicker we determine, the better off we are.” In discussing what sort of statement the administration should make, the president stated emphatically, “We need to ratchet up the level of concern. We need language that is tougher than Blix, but short of a declaration of war. People want us to exhaust all options before we go to war. I believe in plain speaking. Tell the American people what we think.”

  As the nation prepared for Christmas, we prepared to deal with Iraq. On December 19, the NSC met to discuss threats from al-Qaeda and to assess preparations for Iraq. The president asked whether our priorities were too broad—in other words, could we deal with both al-Qaeda and Iraq? “We have told the country that we can do both,” Bush said, “so by God, we have to do both. The first priority is to go after the terrorists that come after the United States; the second priority is terrorists who take action in other countries.”

  After the al-Qaeda discussion, we received a briefing by Tommy Franks. He reported that the ratio of man to man would be different in this war. Historically, it is three to one, offensive versus defensive. “Here it is one to six,” Franks said, “the first time in history that manpower is combined with technology so completely.” He also said, “We are cocked and ready to go in February; our force will be 250,000 strong.”

  The president asked, “When you get to Baghdad, tell us again why the operation doesn’t bog down? Do we hit the wall?”

  Rumsfeld added, “We have to precondition what victory is.”

  Tommy Franks replied bluntly, “There will be dancing in the streets.”

  The president looked at Tommy and said wryly, “If not, then we will be doing some dancing to explain what we have done.”

  Discussions with General Franks continued the following day. The president seemed to have great confidence in the general, a fellow Texan. “I don’t expect everything to go perfectly as planned,” he said. “I just want to win.”

  We moved to a discussion of targets and the anticipated casualties. The president emphasized that we wanted to bomb facilities, not the people of Iraq. He was particularly interested in hitting Saddam’s “hardened” facilities, including tunnels. “Saddam either doesn’t believe us, or does not know that we are about to hit him.”

  “On the first day of the attack,” Tommy Franks said, “Saddam will believe us.”

  President Bush nodded. “That is sad,” he said.

  Complicating matters further, right before Thanksgiving the UN sent inspectors to Iraq for another round of inspections. While we hoped this might work to our advantage with the international community, especially if Saddam was uncooperative, the process was painfully slow, and I could tell that President Bush was growing weary of it all. He had shown great patience to this point, but the inspections once again placed our timetable in the hands of equivocators. We had lived with issues surrounding Iraq now for nearly a year. At the same time, I was immersed in the Michigan affirmative action cases, while attending every meeting of the National Security team. It was a busy time.

  In our January 17 discussions, the president was emphatic that the United States would not go into Iraq for oil. The oil belonged to the Iraqi people, he stated repeatedly. I nodded as the president said, “I want the first message to the Iraqi people to be that I am not just bringing guns; I am bringing butter.”

  As Rumsfeld and Franks continued to monitor the movement of more American troops into a position where they could attack Iraq, we received some disappointing news. On January 22, 2003, French president Jacques Chirac and German chancellor Gerhard Schroeder anno
unced they would not support the US ouster of Saddam Hussein if the use of force proved necessary. At a time when our coalition of countries was building, this was a setback. No doubt, Saddam smiled in his palace as he imagined his business partners protecting him. Ironically, the decisions of France and Germany would make war more likely rather than less, since Saddam would have a reduced incentive to cooperate and comply with the UN resolutions.

  Despite France’s and Germany’s decisions, nearly fifty nations eventually joined the coalition led by the United States and Great Britain. Thirty of those countries contributed visibly, while others, particularly Arab states, participated in important but more discreet manners. The Arab countries, especially, wanted the United States to deal with Saddam quickly and decisively, to get in, take him down, deal with the WMD, and get out as fast as possible.

  As Cheney had predicted, the United Nations weapons inspector, Hans Blix, indeed provided a squishy analysis of Saddam’s contemptuously incomplete weapons declarations. Blix told the UN Security Council, “Iraq appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament which was demanded of it and which it needs to carry out to win the confidence of the world and live in peace.” Blix also acknowledged that one thousand tons of toxic nerve gas, a lethal chemical weapon that Saddam had actually used previously, remained “unaccounted for.”12 A logical assumption might be that Saddam still possessed the nerve gas or had access to it.

  On January 28, the president hosted a cabinet meeting in which reports about ongoing events in Afghanistan and Iraq were presented. He was calm and determined as he spoke about the United States doing the right thing, no matter how difficult. “We are the light,” he said, “in a very complex world. We will have allies with us when we attack. We are a compassionate nation, and we must help others to pursue opportunities.”