True Faith and Allegiance

by Alberto R. Gonzales

  Unfortunately, certain Democratic members of Congress and the media willfully chose to emphasize my original statements in the March 13 press conference, and almost totally ignored the corrected statements I made to the media the following day. When Kyle Sampson later testified under oath before the Senate Judiciary Committee, even he acknowledged that I had misspoke at the March 13 press conference, but he also testified that I had clarified my remarks.

  I had hoped the press conference and media interviews would calm the waters. I needed to focus on leading the Department of Justice, and there was much work to be done. Following the morning interviews on March 14, I received a positive briefing on the department’s efforts in Iraq in promoting democracy and the rule of law. Afterward, I met with an Egyptian delegation and then participated in a judicial selection committee meeting at the White House.

  Of course, by this time, having recognized flaws in our process, I had set about trying to address them, beginning with ideas for a series of reforms. One suggestion was the establishment of a task force of US attorneys and DOJ officials to develop a system to regularly review the performance of US attorneys. Second, create a policy of reporting contacts between local and state officials and US attorneys regarding ongoing cases. Third, establish a protocol involving the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal Division to ensure that the discipline or removal of a US attorney is not inappropriately connected to a public corruption case.

  Just prior to a scheduled lunch in the attorney general’s dining room with Democratic senator Sheldon Whitehouse on March 14, I received a call from President Bush, who was traveling aboard Air Force One. He told me that he planned to tell the press that he had talked with me about the US attorney dismissals, and I had promised to take corrective actions, which I had already outlined to Paul McNulty. We weren’t going to rehire the seven fired US attorneys, but we would do a better job in the future in handling any dismissals.

  I assured President Bush that the Department of Justice was working as hard as possible to be responsive to Congress. He seemed satisfied with that.

  The involvement of the eighth US attorney, Bud Cummins, who served the Eastern District of Arkansas and had been asked to speak at the hearing before the Judiciary Committee, along with three of the US attorneys who had been removed, continued to bother me. His case was quite different from the other seven. Bud had served his full four-year term, so in June 2006, the White House chose to replace him, and under my interim appointment power granted to the attorney general by the PATRIOT Act, I appointed Tim Griffin.

  My goal was to get Griffin in place immediately so he could establish himself and show the people of Arkansas that he could do the job, and then get him nominated by the president and confirmed by the Senate. Although the PATRIOT Act provision allowed the attorney general to appoint US attorneys for an unlimited duration, I preferred all the US attorneys carry the added authority associated with a presidential appointment and a Senate confirmation. It gave both the public and the US attorney added confidence.

  I knew, however, even to get Tim Griffin a hearing with the Judiciary Committee, he needed the support of at least one of the two Democratic senators from Arkansas, either Blanche Lincoln or Mark Pryor.

  Pryor was one of the few Democrats who had voted for my confirmation as attorney general. I liked him, and I thought he respected me. A former state attorney general, he understood the challenges of the office, and he could be a key vote in the Senate on a number of administration law-enforcement issues. I initiated a dialogue with Senator Pryor about supporting Griffin and told him that I intended to recommend the president nominate Griffin.

  Pryor remained suspicious and made it clear that he had problems with Griffin. I couldn’t understand why, but some in the White House believed that Pryor regarded Griffin as a potential political rival for his Senate seat, thus explaining his reluctance to see him receive any presidential appointment. Pryor did not tell me that, so I urged him to at least give Griffin a chance. “I will appoint Griffin on a temporary basis, and then you and I can both evaluate his work for possible nomination and hopefully confirmation,” I told Senator Pryor.

  Although Senator Pryor assured me that he would be open-minded about Griffin, in my judgment he never gave Tim a fair shot. Shortly after I had appointed Tim on an interim basis, Senator Pryor informed me that he would not support Griffin.

  I felt the senator was wrong about Tim, but I remained true to my word. Just as I had promised Pryor, I called Tim Griffin and informed him that I would not recommend him to the White House for a presidential appointment because he could not be confirmed without Pryor’s blessing, and I wanted a Senate-confirmed US attorney.

  After this, an e-mail between Kyle Sampson and an associate counsel at the White House was uncovered among the DOJ documents freely turned over to Congress. In the e-mail, Kyle discussed his thoughts about a plan to appoint Griffin under the attorney general’s interim authority, and then allow him to serve indefinitely without Senate confirmation until the end of the president’s term in 2008. Kyle had not discussed that plan with me. He may have hoped that we might go that route, but if so, it was nothing more than wishful thinking. That was never my intention.

  The disclosure of the e-mail elicited a prompt response by Pryor. On March 15, he went on the Senate floor, called me a liar, and demanded my resignation. He said, “I feel lied to. And the truth is, I was lied to, because I was told that the attorney general—and he not only said it to me; he said it to the Senate Judiciary Committee and he said it to the world—[that he] wanted a Senate-confirmed US Attorney in every slot. That is absolutely not true in Arkansas, based on the e-mail from the Justice Department.”1

  Pryor made his statements while I was working on strategies to make US neighborhoods safer and meeting with senior government officials from Sri Lanka.

  I was stunned. Without even the courtesy of calling me—which Pryor easily could have done—he had gone on record in the United States Senate and called me a liar, with no opportunity to explain or rebut his disparaging remarks. Although the senator’s statement was blatantly false—I never lied to Pryor, nor would I—his comments on the Senate floor reinforced claims that we had removed the seven US attorneys so we could install our own nominees without the scrutiny of a Senate confirmation. Nothing could have been further from the truth.

  The new provision in the PATRIOT Act contemplated the interim appointment of a US attorney by the attorney general during an emergency period when the Senate could not act to confirm the US attorney. The Senate never intended to give up its power to review and confirm US attorneys. What I intended to do with Griffin was in keeping with the law—to appoint him on an interim basis and then have the president nominate him to the Senate for confirmation.

  Ironically, that was why I had initiated conversations with Pryor in the first place. Had I simply wished to appoint an interim US attorney indefinitely, I had the full authority of the law to do so. As with the confirmation process for judges, however, the home-state senators are almost always considered. Since Griffin would be serving in Pryor’s state, I felt it only courteous to engage him in the process. That made his attack on me even more disappointing.

  Months later, when the Department of Justice inspector general looked into the US attorney dismissals, the IG noted, “Our investigation did not find evidence that Attorney General Gonzales ever supported the idea to appoint Griffin to an indefinite term to avoid the Senate confirmation process.”2

  Under oath, Kyle Sampson testified that I had never supported the idea. Kyle was subjected to grueling and repeated questioning by senators who appeared almost desperate to get him to confess that I had misled Senator Pryor and the Judiciary Committee. Nevertheless, Kyle stood tall, and I was proud of him for telling the truth. In response to the same question, asked in a variety of ways, Kyle said three times that the idea of interim appointments to avoid Senate confirmation was never adopted by the attorney general. He answered four
times that I had rejected the idea and that I had been unwilling to consider it.

  According to transcripts, handwritten notes, e-mails, and other documents relating to the testimony of Harriet Miers, and released by the House Judiciary Committee on August 11, 2009—nearly eight months after President Obama had taken office—Harriet Miers testified that she spoke with me about the Griffin appointment and that I had told her that I did not intend to bypass the Senate. Harriet stated that no decision was made to use the PATRIOT Act appointment authority in the manner Kyle Sampson had described in his e-mail.

  Of course, when I testified before Congress, I emphasized those same points.

  It seems the only person who doubted my intentions was Senator Pryor of Arkansas. In fact, my decision to inform Griffin that I could not recommend him for appointment because Pryor opposed him actually did not sit well with the White House at the time. That was, after all, a decision about a presidential appointment, so it was really their call. Griffin later confided to the inspector general that Karl Rove had informed him that some people in the White House were unhappy I had decided Griffin would not be a presidential appointee. I understood that, but I had made a promise to Pryor and I had kept my word.

  Pryor’s inflammatory, false comments further damaged my standing as the US attorney general. His accusations made it more difficult to obtain the support of Senator Pryor’s colleagues, even Democratic senator Ken Salazar, whom I was proud to have introduced me at my confirmation hearing in 2005.

  Despite the media’s frenzied speculation that I might resign—they had already begun naming potential replacements—I was still the attorney general, so I wanted to take positive steps to get past the scuttlebutt. By this time, I had asked the department’s Office of Professional Responsibility and the DOJ’s inspector general to conduct their own independent investigations, so Congress and the American people could be 100 percent assured of the facts. I hoped this would show I had nothing to hide. Why would I offer up internal DOJ documents, and offer myself and other DOJ personnel to testify and give interviews, as well as request an internal OPR and IG investigation, if I had done something wrong?

  To ensure the independence and integrity of these internal investigations as well as those of Congress, I purposely did not talk to any of the DOJ employees who had played a significant role in the removals and had been interviewed by congressional staff members. Consequently, I was not able to answer many questions posed later at my hearing. I had no basis to refresh my memory. So my decision to order internal investigations may have helped shield the DOJ, but it indirectly hurt me.

  I met with Chuck Rosenberg, a career prosecutor, a US attorney, and formerly Jim Comey’s chief of staff, and I asked Chuck to come on board temporarily as my chief of staff until I could find a permanent replacement for Kyle. Chuck agreed. His appointment was intended as a clear statement that I refused to politicize the Department of Justice.

  I also hoped that by having Chuck as chief of staff, it might calm concerns among other US attorneys around the country. To that end, I held a conference call the afternoon of March 16 with the more than eighty remaining US attorneys. I repeated my personal regret that the dismissals of some of their colleagues had created a distraction interfering with all of us doing our duties. I reassured them that the firings were not intended to obstruct justice, and I informed them that future removals would be handled differently. I encouraged them to do their jobs, to follow the leads in their investigations regardless where the evidence might take them.

  That evening, I hosted a wonderful event at the Justice Department Great Hall for wounded soldiers and their families. I had been discouraged due to the developments of the past few weeks, but when I saw those brave, young, wounded soldiers and witnessed their indefatigable spirits, my own spirit lifted as well. Yes, my character and reputation had been attacked, but my problems seemed trivial as I met and talked with these heroes. I went home that night grateful to God, buoyed by the experience, and better able to put my own troubles in proper perspective.

  The president called me about 7:15 on Tuesday morning, March 20. He was hopeful that the worst fallout from the US attorney case was over. “Let’s move on,” he said. We talked briefly. “Hang in there and fight, Fredo,” he encouraged me. He joked that at least the US attorney firings had diverted attention from the department’s inspector general’s report on abuses relating to the FBI’s use of National Security Letters. Then he repeated what he had often said before: “This is just another example of Washington at its worst.”

  The president told me the White House would inform Congress that they would release documents between the White House and Department of Justice, and certain staff members would be able to sit for private interviews. He was not willing to let the White House staff testify regarding the US attorney dismissals because it would set a bad precedent.

  I agreed with the advice that Fred Fielding, now White House counsel, had given to the president.

  The president reassured me that he fully supported me. But even as he said those words, I questioned how these events might possibly impact him. On the other hand, I was no quitter, and I certainly did not wish to reward the despicable conduct of the political hacks. Most importantly, I knew that I had done nothing improper.

  “I will stay on and fight if you want me to, sir,” I told him, “but I worry that there may come a time when you need to do something different. If that time comes, we should do it.” Without stating it, we both knew that we were talking about my leaving the administration. “I love my job, I love my country, and our family loves you,” I told him, “but I’m willing to do whatever needs to be done.”

  “The White House will produce their documents,” the president said, “and then we will all see where matters stand.” He needed to assess the situation then, he said.

  That same morning, I attended a terrorism briefing with the president at 8:25. The entire Homeland Security briefing team was present, and President Bush made a point of telling everyone that we were going to fight these attacks on the Justice Department. He told me that on his recent trip to Mexico, the Mexican president had offered to defend me. President Bush thanked him but said, no, he would defend me.

  As the briefings began, President Bush paused, looked at me, and said quietly, “One day we will be sitting on a porch in a pair of rocking chairs somewhere in Texas and laughing about all this nonsense.”

  When the briefings concluded, we all turned to leave. President Bush winked at me and said, “Go get ’em, Fredo!”

  The president’s strong support in front of my colleagues was encouraging in the face of the numerous stories in the press predicting my imminent departure from the administration. The White House did its best to knock the air out of such stories. Aboard Air Force One on the way to Kansas City, White House press secretary Tony Snow confirmed to the traveling press corps that the president had called me at 7:15 a.m. to reaffirm his support. “It was a very strong vote of confidence,” Tony explained.

  White House deputy press secretary Dana Perino also confirmed the president’s call and emphasized that I still had the president’s backing despite the controversy. When pressed, Perino stated straightforwardly that rumors of a search for my replacement were “untrue.”

  In the days and weeks that followed, I met in person with as many US attorneys as possible. I traveled around the country on what I referred to as “The Listening Tour,” expressing my regrets but also listening to the concerns of our US attorneys. I explained to them in person what had happened in regard to their dismissed colleagues, allowed them to ask questions, and encouraged them to continue their good work. Most of the US attorneys were quite appreciative of my efforts, even if they disagreed with the way the dismissals had been handled.

  In one of several meetings that I hosted with our prosecutors to explain the removals, Tom Moss, the US attorney from Idaho, spoke straightforwardly. Tom was slightly older and more experienced than many of our other U
S attorneys, and I valued his opinion. Tom admitted that the dismissal of his former colleagues was painful for him because they were friends. He believed, however, the removals were not inappropriate, and he was angry about the scurrilous accusations repeatedly hurled at me suggesting that certain removals were motivated to obstruct justice. Tom offered encouragement in the form of a metaphor, comparing the Justice Department as a castle under siege. “You are the moat surrounding the castle,” he told me. “You need to stand firm and defend the department and the employees from this attack.” I appreciated Tom’s support, and I needed it.

  Regardless of where I went, the firings dogged me at every event. Whether I was reporting progress on fighting the meth epidemic, child predators, or identity theft, the media inevitably regurgitated the Democrats’ talking points regarding the US attorney dismissals and my future plans.

  For now, my plans were to continue as attorney general as long as President Bush wanted me to do so. I hoped and prayed that was God’s plan as well. Nevertheless, many in the media speculated that my future depended on my performance at my hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee—an event now only a few weeks away.

  CHAPTER 36

  TOO SAD FOR A COUNTRY SONG

  As the controversy over the US attorney dismissals dragged on, President Bush encouraged me to hang in there, and I was more than willing to do that, but I worried about the continued suggestions that the Department of Justice had suffered under my leadership. I knew the facts would confirm that the US attorney removals were not improper, but how could I defend myself against attacks that morale was low at DOJ? When events heated up in March 2007, White House press secretary Tony Snow was tremendously helpful in coming to my defense. Tony was a highly respected former journalist and newscaster, and also known as a person of impeccable character. If Tony told you something, you could believe it. And Tony was telling the reporters hovering over the US attorney story that there was nothing improper there and the president fully supported me as attorney general.