Descent into Hell: The fall of Singapore - Pudu and Changi - the Thai Burma railway

by Peter Brune

  The ability to see the enemy during his approach, and therefore employ accurate machine gun fire across the Strait and also to exploit the limited water obstacles, was dependent upon the available searchlights, headlights, artillery star shells and flares. Brigadier Taylor’s available searchlights were manned by the British 5th Searchlight Regiment. He delegated the authorisation for their use to the battalion commanders on each sector of his front, but in so doing, ordered that it would be ‘better to reserve their use for actual emergency, when they should operate, as would artillery, on the signal for defensive fire being given’.5 Taylor’s reasons for this decision were that sufficient time had not been given for their protection, and that in due course, they would be shot out. Despite the fact that only one light was destroyed by enemy fire before the landings, the remainder failed to be employed, ‘perhaps’ Wigmore thought, ‘because of misunderstanding or confusion . . .’6. Further, the problem of illuminating the Strait was compounded by the fact that the 2/15th Field Regiment would later record that there was an absence of star shells.7 Searchlights that fail to be used due to ‘misunderstanding or confusion’ and a lack of artillery star shells seem poor excuses for such a critical failure. Surely any heavy enemy artillery fire might have caused the lights to be switched on—at any price. Further, there seems little evidence as to why more flares were not used along that coastline, as any form of illumination would have greatly aided the machine gunners of the 2/4th Machine Gun Battalion and those of individual units. Warren has claimed that ‘. . . the idea that a handful of searchlights could have been profitably exposed in the face of the automatic weapons of a two division assault was always fanciful’.8 The fact remains that some light for some time from a unit stationed along the coast for that very purpose would have been of assistance in killing the enemy at his most vulnerable time: crossing the Johore Strait. When a significant defensive tool is available it should be used.

  If the 22nd Brigade’s massive front was hopelessly undermanned, if its intelligence was both poor and late, if its artillery was foolishly rationed, if its water obstacles were almost non-existent and the attempts to light the Strait pitiable, then the recurring problem of communication experienced on the mainland was beyond description. Although the Brigade’s wireless sets had just been returned after servicing, they yet again failed to work, especially during darkness. As on the Malay Peninsula, the dense vegetation prevented signallers having a clear line of sight and without it the sets were of little use. Communication between companies, to Battalion HQ, and then to Brigadier Taylor’s HQ was by signal cable, runner, and further back, by motor cycle. Lieutenant-Colonel Varley, CO, 2/18th Battalion:

  Despite the abnormally high rate of shelling the casualties in the Bn were light due to the fact that it had been impressed on all ranks the necessity for the construction of slit trenches holding one or two men and all ranks provided themselves with this cover . . . Signal comn was severed, faithfully repaired by linesmen and severed again . . .9

  Varley recorded that the Japanese artillery barrage during 8 February was heavier than any he had experienced during his entire First World War experience—including Pozieres. But while that barrage caused few casualties (probably because of the soft soil in which the mangroves grew), it continuously disrupted communications and added to Taylor and his battalion commanders’ ‘fog of war’.

  If the above-mentioned defensive deficiencies were critical, then General Bennett compounded the problem by a poor command decision just prior to the Japanese landings. At 7.30 am on the morning of 8 February 1942, the 2/19th’s CO, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Anderson, was ordered to hospital suffering from acute dysentery. General Bennett replaced Anderson, against the latter’s advice, with Lieutenant-Colonel Robertson (the former second-in-command of the 2/20th), who had only recently been promoted to command the newly formed Special Reserve Battalion. The 2/19th Unit History:

  Why was not Tom Vincent [the 2/19th Battalion 2/ic] given command of the Battalion? He knew all and everything about the Battalion defensive position; he knew of Colonel Anderson’s plans and methods and was highly respected and known by all ranks, and had proved himself capable of fighting and handling the Battalion at Muar . . .

  This was not meant to be against Lieut. Col. Robertson, but in all fairness he did not know the area; he did not know the Battalion, and above all the members of the Battalion knew this.10

  Although Lieutenant-Colonel Robertson was senior to Major Vincent, Bennett had previously promoted Maxwell to command the 27th Brigade despite the fact that Galleghan was his senior—seniority should not have been an issue.

  In the event of a Japanese breakthrough at any given 22nd Brigade Battalion perimeter, Taylor had ordered that platoons cut off should withdraw to their company HQ, and if necessary, cut-off companies to their Battalion HQ. The relevant HQ locations were known and the moves had been rehearsed, particularly at night. Kirby has criticised Taylor for this decision,11 but in the absence of a series of prepared withdrawal lines (a Malaya Command bungle), it was a fair plan. Percival’s edict that cut-off formations, however small, were to fight on and await reserve counterattack(s) was fanciful. Senior Australian commanders pondered the obvious: what reserve, in what strength and from where?

  Given the above withdrawal tactic, Robertson committed a terrible error on the very day of the Japanese landing. After a recce of the 2/19th perimeter, and during a heavy enemy bombardment of the battalion area (particularly Battalion HQ), he was of the opinion that ‘it would be best to move the Battalion HQ later in the day in the darkness in order to obtain some relief and to retain some control’.12 Despite the fact that the 2/19th’s senior officers ‘heatedly and vehemently’13 protested, Robertson confirmed his order. The move of Battalion HQ—and the consequent drain upon the signals’ personnel, and their time and equipment—was destined to be undertaken only hours before the enemy landing. Both the duration and intensity of the enemy shelling and bombing should have been reason enough for Robertson to have realised that this was no time to be making such a move—an enemy landing must be close.

  The Japanese soldiers who came in that first wave across the Johore Strait must have felt extremely vulnerable travelling in collapsible plywood boats across what they believed would be an illuminated killing ground into a withering hail of machine gun and artillery fire.

  D and C Companies of the 2/20th Battalion occupied key positions at, and around, the two branches of the Lim Chu Kang Road, which ran almost to the coast. Captain Richardson’s D Company was supported at the eastern track shoreline by three guns of Lieutenant Eric Wankey’s 13 Platoon, 2/4th Machine Gun Battalion. The guns were sited along a 100-metre stone retaining wall, which had a small jetty and sun shelter at its end. Apart from the machine gun pits, the soldiers of the 2/4th had buckets of grenades in anticipation of any enemy concentration at and around the jetty.14

  At about 10.30 pm, soldiers of Richardson’s D Company and Wankey’s machine gunners, peering through ‘a little light coming from the reflection of the burning oil tanks at Kranji’,15 saw the dark shapes of incoming barges. Wankey counted at least twenty craft approaching the jetty area. The Australians waited until the barges were within about 40 metres.

  Caught in that intense fire a number were sunk, others capsized, and their former occupants subjected to a further hail of machine gun and small arms fire as they floundered in the water. As the Japanese gained the jetty and shore around the embankment they were met by a stream of grenades lobbed into their craft and along the beach. Those enemy losses were quickly increased when a barge carrying explosives caught fire and illuminated other approaching craft. But the Japanese barges kept coming, and when they tethered one of their number to a fish trap off shore and set up a mortar, telling fire was returned onto the machine gunners, who began to take casualties.

  About 30 minutes into the battle Lieutenant Wankey and Private Loller took over one of the guns amidst that enemy mortar fire. Soon after, both me
n had one of their legs wounded by a mortar. Wankey refused to be evacuated and, propped up against a tree, continued to direct the three guns’ fire.16 Both Wankey and Loller later had their wounded leg amputated. Although the fighting often became hand-to-hand, Richardson’s D Company soldiers, ably assisted by the machine gunners, gamely held their ground during the ensuing three hours’ fighting. But while that dim light and then the hit to the explosives barge had provided an effective localised killing ground, successive craft were eventually able to pinpoint gaps in the coastline from which fire was not forthcoming and, landing virtually unopposed at these points, the attackers began to infiltrate inland.

  By around 1.30 am Lieutenant Wankey’s machine gunners had expended about 10 000 rounds from each machine gun and, nearly out of ammunition and with clear evidence of having been outflanked, they destroyed their guns, were reorganised into a rifle platoon and withdrew. They managed to carry Wankey, Loller and their remaining wounded out to a truck.17

  Others in that perimeter were less fortunate. When his soldiers’ ammunition began to dwindle Richardson withdrew them to the airstrip behind his perimeter. That withdrawal became a series of confused hand-to-hand struggles conducted with the grenade, rifle and bayonet. Those of D Company and the machine gunners who had survived that ordeal arrived at the airstrip to be reinforced by three carriers and a reserve platoon. At around 5.30 am Lieutenant-Colonel Assheton ordered the reinforcements to withdraw to help form a battalion perimeter. That order did not reach Richardson.

  Away to the west C Company occupied about 1800 metres of coastline running up to the River Sarimbun, the boundary between the 2/20th and 2/18th Battalions. The great distances between platoons, the enemy mortar fire brought down on them from nearby Sarimbun Island and limited visibility and fields of fire in that thick vegetation enabled the Japanese to rapidly infiltrate the perimeter. When contact was lost with company HQ, the withdrawal of the C Company platoons became a scattered collection of soldiers each making their way back to Battalion HQ by ‘God and by compass’.

  While the fighting along that lengthy D and C Company coastline had been intense, confused, and had then caused the Australians to be broken up into isolated groups, Captain Merritt’s A Company and the Dalforce Company away to the east had had a relatively quiet time. When Assheton ordered the withdrawal of his D and C Companies, Merritt was also ordered to move back to the Battalion perimeter. An example of such a movement and its ensuing confusion in that terrain and darkness—which must surely have been repeated elsewhere—occurred when some A Company troops encountered a number of Chinese soldiers from Dalforce. These men, unable to converse in English, were shot.18

  If any evidence as to the success, size and rapid build-up of the Japanese landing and resultant infiltration of the 2/20th perimeter was needed, it came with the experience of Sergeant Shelly’s reserve B Company patrol which moved to the gap between the forward D and A Companies. Sergeant Shelly would later recall that: ‘There must have been a couple of battalions, landing craft were locked together and the men were jumping from barge to barge and forming up in company groups on the shore.’19

  During the early hours of 9 February 1942, the exhausted 2/20th Battalion and its Dalforce remnant—less Richardson’s D Company—made their way back to Assheton’s Battalion perimeter, which was located about one and a half kilometres inland astride the Lim Chu Kang Road. Richardson’s men stayed until about 10.30 am on the 9th, before finally receiving the order to withdraw to the Battalion HQ perimeter. We shall return to their fate.

  The central sector of the 22nd Brigade’s front was held by Lieutenant-Colonel Varley’s 2/18th Battalion. Two of Varley’s companies each with two platoons forward on the coast, and one in reserve, were deployed across this vital coastal ground. Captain Johnstone’s A Company was sited on the right flank just west of the River Sarimbun, while Captain Okey’s C Company formed the left flank. Both forward positions were on difficult ground. Two of John-stones platoons occupied the ‘high ground’—‘high’ when tidal islands were caused by each incoming tide. Okey’s ground was a maze of rises and tidal inlets. Varley deployed Major O’Brien’s B Company to the rear to guard a road junction that led both into the 2/18th perimeter to the north-east and into the left flank of the 2/19th perimeter. Captain Chisholm’s D Company was deployed at Battalion HQ as the unit reserve. The inhibiting common denominator throughout Varley’s ground was the vegetation, which consisted of a mixture of rubber, tidal mangrove and scrub. In the 2/18th perimeter therefore, the defenders were handicapped by poor vision across a very wide but thinly held perimeter, while the Japanese were in a position to use the numerous inlets and cover. Varley’s C Company in particular was always going to be heavily reliant upon accurate artillery support.

  At about 10.30 pm A Company’s 7 and 8 Platoons, each sited on a tidal island, were assaulted. When two enemy motor launches landed around 80 men onto Lieutenant Vernon’s 8 Platoon ‘island’ position the Australians either killed or dispersed them. Lieutenant-Colonel Varley:

  They were then subjected to heavy mortar fire which caused thirteen casualties in the platoon and were again attacked by a fresh force . . . eventually under weight of numbers [they] were forced to withdraw over the River Hantu and mangrove marshes on its banks while the river was at high tide. Some men were unable to swim and wounded men were on their hands, however by joining rifle slings they managed to get across and take their wounded with them, several trips being made by the platoon commander [Lieutenant Vernon] with the wounded.20

  Lieutenant Richardson’s 7 Platoon (no relation to Captain Richardson in the 2/20th), which was deployed on the second tidal island, was bypassed on both flanks, but remained in its perimeter during that night and the following day. When the defenders withdrew at daybreak, the battle had swept well past them and only small parties managed to regain their lines.21

  On Varley’s C Company front the Japanese, although taking heavy casualties in front of 15 Platoon’s hill position, were able to both infiltrate around, and bring repeated pressure upon, the Australians’ posts. As that pressure intensified Captain Okey gave the order to withdraw. During that movement 15 Platoon remained relatively intact, and later made the reserve lines of Captain Chisholm’s D Company near Battalion HQ, but the remaining members of the company became ‘split up in the darkness, amid hills, swamp and jungle, and under attack’.22 Despite the fact that the soldiers of the 2/18th fought with great courage and persistence that night, the darkness, the difficulty of movement in that vegetation, and most of all, the isolated nature of the Battalion platoons and sections made it impossible to prevent outflanking and eventual withdrawal. And in that darkness, with the enemy on their heels, platoons became splintered and disorientated, and command control impossible. During the early hours of 9 February Varley withdrew his 2/18th Battalion into a defensive perimeter around the village of Ama Keng. When the remnants of A and C Companies reached his HQ—now numbering seven officers and 81 other ranks between them—Varley immediately deployed them ‘on a rise west of the Lim Chu Kang road’,23 while D Company was sited to cover the northern approach to Ama Keng. O’Brien’s B Company had been broken up during its movement back from the Battalion’s left flank. In a stroke of luck, the greatly diminished 2/18th Battalion’s perimeter was strengthened by the employment of around 200 engineers from the 2/10th Field Company.

  Of the three 22nd Brigade battalions defending that north-west coast, the 2/19th was now, without doubt, the least qualified. With its dynamic commander hospitalised on 8 February, and both its other ranks and officer establishment massively reinforced by often ill-trained and therefore inexperienced soldiers, that magnificent battalion of Bakri and Muar fame was now the same unit in name only.

  Captain Keegan’s B Company and a HQ Platoon were disposed on the right flank on the coast near the River Murai, which separated the 2/19th and 2/18th Battalion perimeters. The right flank was manned by Captain Vincent’s D Company, while Captain
Thomas and his C Company formed the Battalion reserve just west of Lieutenant-Colonel Robertson’s Battalion HQ. The 2/19th’s left flank bordered the River Berih, which also separated the 22nd Brigade sector from Brigadier Ballentine’s 44th Indian Brigade. That river was an obvious Japanese landing site, since from the village of Choa Chu Kang, which lay behind it, an enemy force might use the road from the village to gain access to the Tengah airfield. From that feature, the same road would provide speedy access to the villages of Bulim and Keat Hong, and then the vital causeway road at Panjang village. It will be remembered that the airfield and a line extending south-west from Panjang village were Yamashita’s first two objectives. As a response to this threat, Anderson had deployed Captain Cousens’s A Company at Choa Chu Kang village. To further bolster this crucial 2/19th sector, the 2/15th Field Regiment had registered the area and it contained more machine guns than any other 22nd Brigade perimeter.

  As had occurred elsewhere along the north-west coast that night, the Japanese landed in great force at their chosen locations. In the case of the 2/19th, a promontory in the northern part of Captain Keegan’s B Company was the chosen point. At around 10.30 pm, Keegan’s soldiers saw many ‘little dots’24 heading towards them which gradually materialised into 50 barges, some driven by chugging engines, some in tow, and others being rowed.25 Keegan’s men shot red Verey flares requesting artillery support and white flares to illuminate the enemy approach. The former were not seen at the rearward relay point, but the latter must have been of some use, however temporary.