500 Days

by Kurt Eichenwald

  161–162: Some details of Ivins’s testing and cleaning of the lab offices from FBI 302 of the interview of Bruce E. Ivins, April 24–25 2002; an FBI Electronic Communication from the Washington Field Office Amerithrax-3 Team to Inspection headed “Amerithrax; Major Case 184,” dated May 24, 2005, for case no. 279A-WF-222936-USAMRIID. Also see the Amerithrax Report.

  162: Some details of the creation of the Eastern Alliance, and the antipathy of the militias within it, from the Combined Arms Center Report and Gary Berntsen, Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda, Crown Publishers, 2005. Also see OEF Handbook.

  163–165: Some details about the engineering firms and activities at Ground Zero from August Domel Jr., World Trade Center Disaster: Structural Engineers at Ground Zero, a report prepared for the National Council of Structural Engineers Association, November 2001.

  165–166: Some details about the operations of Sufaat and his interactions with Sheikh Mohammed from Memorandum for Commander, United States Southern Command, “Subject: Combatant Status Review Tribunal Input and Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9KU-010024DP(S),” December 8, 2006 (Detainee Assessment, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed); Memorandum for Commander, United States Southern Command, “Subject: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000577DP (S),” May 5, 2008 (Detainee Assessment, Jamal Muhammad Alawi); and Memorandum for Commander, United States Southern Command, “Subject: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9MY-010021DP (S),” May 5, 2008 (Detainee Assessment, Mohd Farik bin Amin). Also see Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, “Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype or Reality?” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, January 2010; and the Opening Statement of Robert Spencer, United States v. Moussaoui, March 6, 2006.

  167–168: Some details of the capture of Salim Hamdan from the December 5, 2007, testimony of Major Henry Smith in Hamdan’s trial before a military commission at Guantanamo. Also see the FBI 302 of Hamdan’s interrogation of January 30, 2002, by Special Agents Pete Harrington and Craig Donnachie for file no. 265A-NY-2830350-302.

  167: Two works that explain a good deal about the Pashtun, the Pakistan-Afghanistan border culture, and the support for fundamentalist Islam there were both published in the journal International Security of Spring 2008. They are Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason, “No Sign Until the Burst of Fire: Understanding the Pakistan-Afghanistan Frontier”; and Seth G. Jones, “The Rise of Afghanistan’s Insurgency: State Failure and Jihad.”

  168–169: Events from the surrender to the first explosion at Qala-i-Jangi were described in “Proffer of Facts in Support of Defendant’s Suppression Motion,” United States v. John Philip Walker Lindh, crim. no. 02-37-A, filed with the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Additional details of the Taliban surrender to Dostum from a video of the event; details of the transport of prisoners from a report to members of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, “How We Failed to Get Bin Laden and Why It Matters Today,” November 30, 2009 (the Tora Bora Report); and details of the arrival and initial attack at Qala-i-Jangi from Alex Perry, “Inside the Battle at Qala-i-Jangi,” Time, December 1, 2001.

  169–170: Interrogation of John Walker Lindh from a video of the event. Also see Criminal Complaint, United States v. John Philip Walker Lindh, crim. no. 02-57-M, filed with the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Also see “Findings and Recommendations Regarding 15-6 Investigation of Photographs Taken of Mr. John Walker Lindh by 5th Special Forces Group (airborne),” Report of Proceedings by Investigating Officer/Board of Trustees, February 3, 2003.

  171–172: The uprising, Tyson’s experiences, and comments from videos and photographs of the event; Corpi d’Élite, “Enduring Freedom Spec Ops: Qala-i-Jangi, 25–28 November 2001”; Richard D. Mahoney, Getting Away with Murder, Arcade Publishing, 2004; Tenet, At the Center of the Storm.

  172: Some details of bin Laden at Tora Bora from the Tora Bora Report; Smucker, op. cit.; Peter Bergen, “The Battle for Tora Bora,” New Republic, December 22, 2009.

  173–174: Details of Katyal’s testimony from transcript, Senate Judiciary Committee, “Preserving Freedom While Fighting Terrorism,” November 28, 2001.

  174–175: Some details of the capture of the Tipton Three from Shafiq Rasul, Asif Iqbal, and Ruhal Ahmed, “Composite Statement: Detention in Afghanistan and Guantanamo Bay”; Tania Branigan and Vikram Dodd, “Afghanistan to Guantanamo Bay—the Story of Three British Detainees,” Guardian, August 4, 2004.

  175: Some details of the opening volley in the Battle of Tora Bora from the Combined Arms Center Report and the Tora Bora Report. Also see OEF Handbook. The dialogue between Dailey and Berntsen was first reported in Gary Berntsen, Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda, Broadway, 2005.

  175–176: Details of the Soloway interview from Colin Soloway, “Tale of an American Talib,” Newsweek online, December 1, 2001.

  176: Campbell’s interview with Hamdi from Matthew Campbell, “The Fort of Hell,” Sunday Times (London), December 1, 2001.

  177–178: The problems at Tora Bora from the Combined Arms Center Report; the response from the Pentagon from the Tora Bora Report.

  178–179: Some details of the Bush-Ashcroft meeting from the White House press briefing by Ari Fleischer on December 12, 2001.

  179, 180: The bombing halt is described in the Combined Arms Center Report; the experiences with Zaman were first reported in Dalton Fury, Kill Bin Laden, St. Martin’s Griffin, 2008.

  179–180: Some details about al-Libi’s plan to engage in bogus “surrender” negotiations to allow for an escape—and his concern about younger fighters—from a June 20, 2008, memo from the Joint Task Force at Guantanamo to the Commander for United States Southern Command in Miami headed “Subject: Recommendations for Continued Detention Under DOD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000549DO (S)” (Detainee Assessment, Omar Ayden).

  181: The Ashcroft statements from a transcript of the press conference.

  182–183: Dialogue from the Senate hearing from a transcript from Senate Armed Services Committee, “The President’s Order on Trials by Military Tribunal,” December 12, 2001.

  183–184: Some details of Batarfi’s experiences from official government transcripts of two Administrative Review Board proceedings for ISN 627 (Batarfi). The transcripts are undated.

  184: Dialogue between Berntsen and Dailey was first reported in Berntsen, Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda.

  184–185: The journey out of Tora Bora by al-Libi and the young fighters from statements by al-Qaeda members, as well as innumerable government records. These include multiple memos from the Joint Task Force at Guantanamo to the Commander for United States Southern Command in Miami. They are a January 6, 2008, memo headed “Subject: Recommendations for Continued Detention Under DOD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000549DO (S) (Detainee Assessment, Hassan Said); a December 16, 2006, memo headed “Subject: Recommendations for Transfer Out of DOD Control (TRO) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9AF-000222DP (S)” (Detainee Assessment, Umar al-Kunduzi); a March 1, 2007, memo headed “Subject: Recommendations for Continued Detention Under DOD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9SA-000268DP (S) (Detainee Assessment, Abd al-Rahman al-Hataybi); a June 20, 2008, memo headed “Subject: Recommendations for Continued Detention Under DOD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9YM-000549DO (S)” (Detainee Assessment, Omar Aden); a December 1, 2005, memo headed “Subject: Recommendations for Continued Detention Under DOD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9SA-000273DP (S)” (Detainee Assessment, Abd al-Aziz al-Nasir); and a March 31, 2007, memo headed “Subject: Recommendations for Continued Detention Under DOD Control (CD) for Guantanamo Detainee, ISN US9SA-000196DP (S)” (Detainee Assessment, Musa al-Amri).

  185: Ivins’s poem from the original e-mail, date
d December 15, 2001. Also see the Dellafera affidavit.

  185–186: Ivins’s request for more spores from the original e-mail, dated December 17, 2001.

  186: The exact date of bin Laden’s departure from Tora Bora has been a matter of dispute; however, an American intelligence agency determined that it was December 16, and that information was shared with me. Other details from the Combined Arms Center Report and the Tora Bora Report and from “Summarized Detainee Sworn Statement” for detainee #801 at Guantanamo, unedited.

  186–187: Descriptions of the terms of the Geneva Conventions from file folder, National Security Council Information, undated memo headed “For Attorney General Only: Legal Background”; Ray Murphy, “Prisoner of War Status and the Question of Guantanamo Detainess,” Human Rights Law Review 3:2(2003); Judgment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, The Prosecutor Delatic et al. (IT-96-21) (“The Celebici case),” November 16, 1998; Task Force on National Security and the Rule of Law, New York City Bar, “Reaffirming the U.S. Commitment to Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions,” June, 2008; and “Sixty Years of the Geneva Conventions: Learning from the Past to Better Face the Future,” International Review of the Red Cross, August 12, 2009. Also see March 6, 2003, letter from Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch, to Donald Rumsfeld.

  188: Details of Taft’s position from William J. Haynes memo to Rumsfeld, dated January 11, 2002, and headed “Detainee status.” Also see memo from Taft to Gonzales, dated January 10, 2002, and headed “Draft memo from John Yoo (Taft memo).”

  189: Leaflet quotes from a copy of one of the original documents.

  189–191: Some of the details of the attempted shoe bombing from United States v. Richard C. Reid, crim. no. 02-10013-WGY, transcript of October 4, 2002. Also see criminal complaint, United States v. Reid, filed December 23, 2001; and Cathy Booth Thomas, “11 Lives: Courage in the Air,” Time, September 1, 2002.

  191–192: Seligman’s background is described in Rob Hirtz, “Martin Seligman’s Journey,” Pennsylvania Gazette, January/February 1999. The meeting at his house was first described by Scott Shane and Mark Mazzetti, “In Adopting Harsh Tactics, No Inquiry into Past Use,” New York Times, April 22, 2009.

  192: Information about the SERE program from Department of the Army, “Code of Conduct, Survival, Evasion, Resistance, and Escape (SERE) Training,” Army Regulation 350-30, December 10, 1985; U.S. Air Force, “Fact Sheet: U.S. Air Force Survival School,” undated; Armed Services Report; and July 25, 2002, memorandum from the JPRA chief of staff for the Office of Defense General Counsel, “Subject: Exploitation.” Also see January 15, 2003, memo from John F. Rankin and Christopher Ross to the officer in charge, FASOTRAGULANT (Fleet Aviation Specialized Operational Training Group Atlantic), “Subj: After Action Report Joint Task Force Guantanamo Bay (JTF-GTMO) Training Evolution” (Rankin Ross memo). Some of the details of the discussions to apply the techniques in Guantanamo from “JTF GITMO SERE Interrogation SOP,” December 10, 2002; also see December 17, 2002, memo from Timothy James to JTF-GTMO/J2.

  193: The earliest days of Mitchell and Jessen’s involvement in the interrogation program, and the role and details of SERE training, from “Report of the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate: Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody,” November 20, 2008 (Armed Services Report); Central Intelligence Agency Inspector General, “Special Review: Counterterrorism Detention and Interrogation Activities (September 2001–October 2003),” May 7, 2004 (CIA Interrogation Report); February 28, 2002, memo for Colonel Cooney, “Prisoner Handling Recommendations”; and September 24, 2007, testimony of Joseph Witsch before the Senate Committee on Armed Services in “Hearing to Receive Information Relating to the Treatment of Detainees.” Also see Jim L. Cox, “Complaint: Dr. James Elmer Mitchell (License No. 23564),” submitted to the Texas State Board of Medical Examiners, 2007 (Cox complaint); and June 6, 2007, letter from Stephen Soldz et al. to Sharon Brehm, Ph.D., President, American Psychological Association (Brehm letter).

  193: The lack of knowledge of Mitchell and Jessen on the subject of interrogation from the CIA Interrogation Report. Also see Cox complaint and Brehm letter.

  193–194: The history of the Manchester Manual from the Behavioral Analysis Program, Operational Training Unit, Counterintelligence Division, FBI Headquarters, “Terrorist Training Manual,” undated; Jason Lewis, “Lessons in Jihad as Secret Terror Manual Translated by MI5 Is Made Public by America,” Daily Mail, March 15, 2008; and U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence—Threats, “A Military Guide to Terrorism in the Twenty-first Century,” August 2003.

  194–195: Despite both public statements and court filings by the governments of the United States and Britain describing the Manchester Manual as an al-Qaeda document, it is not. Indeed, even a cursory reading makes that clear.

  This is an enormously important fact. The Manchester Manual was at the center of some of the most sweeping and controversial decisions by the Bush administration. When detainees at Guantanamo launched hunger strikes and accusations of abuse, the Defense Department dismissed the actions and allegations as the false representations called for in the instructions of the manual, including directions that Islamists should falsely claim to have been tortured whenever they go to court. (No instructions to engage in such a deception exist in the document; I will explain below.)

  Also, as the section in the main book text makes clear, the Manchester Manual was used to construct a psychological profile and analysis by James Mitchell and Bruce Jessen. The Defense Department wanted to use the document to assess “resistance strategies” employed by al-Qaeda members. But not only was the document unrelated to al-Qaeda; its “resistance measures” were irrelevant to anything either the Pentagon or Mitchell was looking for.

  In other words, this mislabeling of the Manchester Manual as an al-Qaeda document was an error of massive proportions that fed false information about bin Laden’s group to intelligence and law enforcement agencies in both the United States and Britain. Indeed, had someone analyzed the document correctly, at least some of the detainee abuse problems that occurred in the Bush administration could have been avoided.

  Because I am contradicting the accepted version of this story, I will describe in detail both the evidence and the process that led to my conclusion that this document was not used by al-Qaeda. At one point early in my reporting, I was speaking with a foreign official and mentioned the Manchester Manual as an “al-Qaeda training manual.” The official smiled at me and asked, “Have you ever read it?” I had to admit I had not—until then, I had relied solely on the representations in court documents and published reports. He suggested that I take the time to review it myself.

  I did, and was astounded. Very quickly, it became obvious there were problems with the official representation; even a cursory reading made it clear that the Manchester Manual could not be an al-Qaeda document. Once I reached that conclusion, I spoke to two officials with a Middle Eastern intelligence service. Both agreed that their government had long known that the manual was not an al-Qaeda document, despite the representations of the American and British governments. One of the men called the idea that it had anything to do with al-Qaeda “absurd.”

  The evidence is overwhelming.

  Starting with the basics: At no point does the manual mention al-Qaeda or bin Laden. It is not in digital format; instead, it was handwritten by at least two different people. Many have made the mistake of assuming it was written on a computer because the government translation came off a word processor; however, the Arabic version did not. The version found by the Manchester police on a computer was composed of digital scans of the original document.

  That is important for several reasons. If this document was written in the middle to late 1990s (a best-case scenario, given that it was found in 2000) and was meant for widespread distribution, why was it not in a
format that allowed for easy delivery? If the document was scanned at the time of its writing, someone must have had a computer. Yet it was not written on a computer.

  This is part of why both the Middle Eastern intelligence service and I reached the same conclusion: that this document was written long before 2000.

  Of course, those details about the format and structure of the document are merely suggestive. The information contained in the record is conclusive: The document was written between October 1990 and 1993. Those dates are critically important, as I’ll explain below.

  The evidence about the lack of connection between the Manchester Manual and al-Qaeda can be broken into numerous categories:

  1. Date of writing: As I mentioned above, this document was written, at the latest, in the early 1990s. During that time period, al-Qaeda was just getting started and was flush with cash. was flush with cashwas flush with cashwas flush with cashwas flush with cash

  Some of the proof about the date that the Manchester Manual was written comes from its references to technology. Digital cameras, cell phones, the Internet—none of these were in common usage at the time the document was written.

  Affordable digital cameras were widely available by 1994; the first mass-market version, the Apple QuickTake 100, manufactured by Kodak, could be purchased for less than $800. At that same time Fuji, Kodak, and Nikon all offered digital cameras for sale. By the following year, 1995, Canon introduced its Sure Shot 60 Zoom, which could be purchased for about $80.

  Why does that matter? Because only film cameras were available at the time the Manchester Manual was written.

  Whenever surveillance photographs are taken, the document says “the photographer should be experienced with film processing and developing.” The reason, it says, is that the film cannot be taken to an outside film-processing service.

  Of course, many of the terrorists might be using film cameras. However, while the document is comprehensive in its description of how to use technologies, there is no mention and no description of digital cameras—where the photographs should be stored, whether they can be shipped online, etc. And, of course, there would be no need for all of the photographers to be proficient in film development unless they needed to develop film.