Operation Anadyr (Timeline 10/27/62)

by James Philip

  Essex. There was a single airburst at an altitude of approximately two thousand feet one mile north of the centre of Southend.

  East Anglia (including Suffolk, Norfolk and Cambridgeshire). Two (2) ground burst strikes and three (3) airburst strikes appear to have been directed at US and RAF strategic assets in the region. Both ground bursts were in relatively open countryside. One struck four miles from Mildenhall, the other six miles from Ipswich. All three airbursts detonated in the general vicinity of air bases.

  Lincolnshire and Yorkshire. At least three (3) airburst strikes fell short of their intended targets detonating over coastal waters. However, one of these airbursts largely destroyed the city of Hull. Three (3) further airbursts targeted RAF V-Bomber bases. The city of Lincoln was destroyed by one airburst, and the cities of York and Leeds were severely damaged by airbursts respectively seven and six miles distant.

  North West England. An airburst over the Mersey Estuary largely destroyed the city of Liverpool and its western conurbations. A second airburst approximately five miles south of Runcorn is assumed to have fallen short of either Liverpool or Barrow-in-Furness. This latter may have been the target of a third airburst seven miles to its east over Morecombe Bay. This blast caused widespread damage to Barrow and to the towns around the Bay.

  Significant areas of the United Kingdom (Scotland, Wales and the Northern Ireland, the South West, West Midlands, and areas of Northern and North Eastern England) were not directly targeted and remain both economically and militarily intact. However, key industrial assets have been lost, and governmental, health, and transportation links have been severely impacted. In large areas civil order has broken down and the writ of the UKIEA is effective only in the undamaged parts of the nation.

  Industry and economy

  Immediately after the attack industrial production/capacity fell to approximately 10% of previous level (USA equivalent estimate is 85%).

  Within 30 days of the attack industrial capacity had recovered to 30% (USA equivalent is 93%).

  Projected 90 day recovery estimate is 35-40% (USA 94-96%).

  London and Liverpool were the two major national dock/trading hubs and both of these are currently dormant. However, Southampton, Bristol and Glasgow and other ports are gearing up to fill the gap.

  A large number of air bases survived the attack and the reestablishment of telecommunications linkages previously routed through London has been assigned high priority by the UKIEA.

  Disruption of power generation was minimal but the distribution grid is currently operating at 15% capacity meaning large areas of the country are subject to blackouts or have no power at all.

  Preliminary estimates are that 50% plus of all housing stock was either destroyed or so badly damaged as to be uninhabitable in the current wintery conditions prevailing across northern Europe.

  Aid from around the world is only just beginning to arrive in the United Kingdom. Bottlenecks at the available ports are anticipated, and the breakdown of law and order in wide areas of the country particularly in those regions on the edge of strike zones, combined with the dislocation of the road and rail system, complicated by the early onset of winter, threatens the distribution of food and other essential supplies.

  Casualty estimates

  Initial estimates of between 8 and 10 million fatalities (approximately 25% of the population of England prior to the attack) now seem low.

  The UKIEA now estimates deaths in the range 11 to 13 million (with perhaps 6-8 million of these deaths being from blast and burn injuries received in the attack, and other factors such as disease, exposure and the absence of normal medical facilities for the elderly, or for those who were suffering from pre-existing illnesses).

  In undamaged areas where the UKIEA has established civil and military control death rates have stabilised. Elsewhere, best estimates are that as many as two hundred thousand (200,000) people may be dying every week from the effects of injuries received during the attack, radiation exposure, starvation, insanitary conditions, disease and starvation.

  It appears that the onset of a ‘nuclear winter’ weather system over northern Europe is greatly adding to the difficulties of survivors. Snow has now been lying on the ground in most parts of the United Kingdom for the last seven days, during which time the temperature has not risen above 32 degrees Fahrenheit (zero degrees Celsius).

  Surviving Military Capability

  Ground based US Strategic Nuclear Forces: all surviving units and personnel have been airlifted out of theatre. No attempt has been made to recover inoperable Thor ICBMs which remain in situ at RAF Hemswell, Bardney, Feltwell, Coleby Grange and as many as three (3) other sites. The recovery of these dual key assets has been raised with the UKIEA who have declined to prioritise the same.

  Holy Loch. All SSBNs have been withdrawn from Holy Loch. Local officers of the UKIEA in the Clyde/Glasgow area have refused permission for USN support vessels and tenders to depart Holy Loch. The UKIEA has been apprised of our concerns in this regard.

  RAF Strategic Nuclear Forces. Our best estimate is that a mixed force of some 30-40 serviceable V-Bombers either survived the attack or returned from missions. It is known that several V-Bombers landed away from the UK and have not yet returned to a home base. These assets have access to A-weapon stores in the UK and at surviving NATO depots under UKIEA supervision within the UK and in the Mediterranean.

  RAF. Elsewhere approximately 50% of assets survive although serviceability may be low given the priority the UKIEA has given to re-establishing the strike capability of the surviving V-Bomber Force.

  Army. The loss of all forces in Germany has impacted the morale of units in the UK. However, the surviving units in the UK are completely loyal to the UKIEA and are conducting themselves with a relatively light hand in civil policing roles in all major surviving centres of population. Units stationed overseas remain under discipline and apparently loyal the UKIEA.

  Royal Navy. Apart from the Chatham facility, none of the navy’s main bases was targeted. Subsequent to the attack all units were ordered to concentrate at Plymouth, Portsmouth, Rosyth and Londonderry, or at their appropriate overseas stations. Work details from ships in UK waters were subsequently sent ashore to assist in peacekeeping and other civil emergency activities. There are indications that major surface units overseas are being called back to home waters or redeployed to the UK’s Mediterranean bases at Malta, Gibraltar and Cyprus. C-in-C UK Home Fleet has notified CINCLANT that UK Fleet movements will no longer be routinely communicated to him and that all former areas of operational co-operation are under review. The British Pacific Fleet which includes three (3) operational aircraft carriers and at least twenty other warships took no part in hostilities and was not targeted by the enemy. This force constitutes the UK’s most potent remaining naval asset and is believed to be concentrating on Australasian ports.

  Overall. The attack significantly degraded the UK’s nuclear strike capability, eliminated up to 50% of its ground forces and its equipment, while leaving its naval forces largely intact. After the USA, the UK remains the most capable military nation on the planet.

  Political Assessment

  The UKIEA is struggling to regain control of all its territory.

  The UKIEA leadership, while not openly hostile to contacts with the US Administration, clearly believes that its current situation is by and large, the fault of that Administration.

  While having requested humanitarian assistance from the USA, the UKIEA is unwilling at this time to discuss military co-operation of any kind, or future European reconstruction plans with the USA.

  The leader of the UKIEA has communicated his dissatisfaction with the quantity and the quality of the USA’s assistance thus far, to the UK, and to the relatively undamaged departments of western and southern France.

  The leader of the UKIEA has further cautioned the USA not to see the current situation as an invitation to ‘interfere in the affairs of the Mediterranean’.

 
There are reports (unconfirmed) that the British Pacific Fleet, including the fleet carrier Ark Royal, may be planning to redeploy to the Persian Gulf, presumably to safeguard oil supplies in the event US help is not forthcoming.

  US vessels have been refused permission to dock at Gibraltar and at Malta in the last seven days with port authorities citing the need to prioritise ‘emergency support operations’ over hosting ‘inappropriate courtesy visits by foreign vessels’.

  British troops are now guarding CENTO’s Cyprus stockpile of 40 fully generated nuclear warheads, having previously removed all US personnel from the base outside Larnica.

  There are suggestions from Intelligence sources that there may be a growing disconnect between the UKIEA leadership and its military high command.

  The blasé assertion in this last point which had been allowed to pass unchallenged by the State Department, the Pentagon, the CIA and the National Security Council before it got into JFK’s hands is symptomatic of the mood of the times.

  The inhabitants of JFK’s by then lightly radioactive modern Camelot – allegedly the ‘best and the brightest’ of their generation – had blundered into an unnecessary war and allowed Curtis LeMay, the gung ho Chief of Staff of the US Air Force, to run amok. The ‘best and the brightest’ had betrayed not just their own generation, but generations to come. The ‘best and the brightest’, having presided over the massacre of their European Allies were already, in the winter of 1962-63 too preoccupied wringing their hands and attempting to justify their folly to pause to read the runes of the future. They thought they’d inherited one world from the ashes of the old, instead they’d inherited another in which they’d be friendless pariahs for all their military might, economic effulgence and ultimately, selfish and futile, good intentions.

  In the months after the October War the Kennedy White House had the opportunity to become the saviour of western civilization. In the event it fluffed its lines, opted for parsimony and in the end sowed the seeds for new conflicts.

  There were some in Washington – not many but some – who cautioned against the post-war tide of national rebirth; but nobody in the White House was listening.

  However, not even the most pessimistic of Kennedy’s critics anticipated that things could go wrong so quickly. America enjoyed a year of dominion, mistress of all it surveyed without comprehending that it was the master of nothing.

  And then the unthinkable happened.

  The next war.

  Chapter 10

  08:44 Hours Zulu

  Monday 29th October 1962

  HMS Dreadnought, Barrow-in-Furness

  Lieutenant-Commander Simon Collingwood read his orders one last time and with a sigh and a sinking feeling in the pit of his stomach he concluded that he had no alternative but to obey them. Flag Officer Submarines was alive and if not exactly on top form, ensconced in a bunker at Devonport Naval Dockyard and his word was law.

  There was a knock at the door.

  Simon Collingwood turned the two sheets of paper he’d been staring at upside down on the blotter of his narrow desk.

  “Yes!”

  Lieutenant Dick Manville stuck his head around the door jam.

  “The Chief reports he has taken charge of the Emergency War Supplies Store, sir.”

  “Any trouble?”

  “No, sir. The guards were nowhere to be seen and none of the civilians roaming around the base had attempted to break in. The Chief has posted armed men and he’s gathering up odds and sods for a proper guard detail.”

  The Acting Captain of HMS Dreadnought was exhausted but he didn’t have time to be tired, let alone to snatch a few hours sleep. He felt like he’d been in constant motion ever since he was roused out of his bed over thirty hours ago. He stifled a groan, knowing he couldn’t afford to show his weariness even in front of a decent fellow like Dick Manville.

  “What about the priority inventory items we need?”

  “All present and correct. Unfortunately, there is no reserve for issue to the civilian authorities. There will be hell to pay when the civvies find out, sir.”

  Overnight another forty-one naval personnel had reported to Dreadnought. About half these men had been attached to the new Tribal class frigate Mowhawk, fitting out in a nearby dock, others were technicians assigned to the yard, and the remainder either lived in the area or had come to Barrow to report in simply because it was the nearest appropriate base.

  Collingwood had sent out a party to secure the local Territorial Army barracks and to seize any weapons it found. He’d surprised himself how quickly he’d begun to make hard decisions. At first he’d hoped to be able to combine the operational imperative of securing the immediate area around Dreadnought and safeguarding his civilian charges, but he’d privately accepted before he’d received orders from Fleet Command that this was not going to be possible.

  Most of the civilian dockyard workers had melted away and none of the senior managers had come into the yard since the attack. Simon Collingwood had found himself in command of not only his uncompleted submarine but of the entire dockyard complex. He’d received requests for men to help put out the fires in the town, rescue people trapped in collapsed houses and to provide backup for the virtually non-existent medical services. With insufficient men to secure the dockyard he’d had to refuse all pleas for assistance.

  Collingwood hardened his heart anew. In the new world in which they lived today’s hard decisions would be the first of many to come in the days, weeks and years to come. His people, his ship came first. Even if Dreadnought hadn’t been the most sophisticated and the most powerful vessel in the Fleet, even if she’d just been a worn out old minesweeper, she’d have come first. Once he’d reminded himself of his duty his thoughts had swiftly clarified and his resolve set in concrete.

  Radioactive fallout was the problem.

  Dreadnought could not be made fit for sea for some weeks so she couldn’t steam out into the North Channel and sit out the worst of the radioactive bloom from the attack underwater. Nor could she batten down in the graving dock. She had no internal power and was totally reliant on the land for succour. Therefore, her people, his people had to be protected as best as possible while the boat was being made ready for sea.

  Simon Collingwood the man, wanted to protect the civilians sheltering on board HMS Dreadnought; Lieutenant-Commander Simon Collingwood, the acting Commanding Officer of Britain’s first and only nuclear powered submarine didn’t have a remit for sentimentality. In a universe in which the average temperature was approximately two degrees above absolute zero there were, inevitably, times when the well of pity ran dry and this was one such time.

  The acting-Captain of HMS Dreadnought redrew his immediate priorities.

  One – secure the boat.

  Two – draft men with technical or operational experience and, or expertise onto the boat’s roster.

  Three – activate the boat’s Westinghouse S5W reactor.

  Four – the boat would join 1st Submarine Squadron at Devonport to prepare for her first operational deployment at the earliest date.

  Simon Collingwood turned his mind to practicalities.

  Securing the boat and identifying men with critical skills would be a relatively straightforward business. Activating the boat’s reactor would be fraught with dangers. Sailing the boat to Devonport he’d worry about if he survived reactor activation.

  First things first.

  In the training and preparation of its first nuclear submariners the Royal Navy had adopted the tried and tested US Navy model. Simon Collingwood’s training had been long, arduous and comprehensive. He knew Dreadnought’s systems from bow to stern and from the keel to the top of her fin-like sail. Most of all he was a highly qualified reactor engineer fully conversant with the protocols of safe operation and more importantly, all the things that could go wrong with a nuclear power plant. He had medical practitioner’s understanding of radioactive contamination and its effect on the human body.

&n
bsp; The radiation monitor he’d had mounted in the cockpit at the top of the sail hadn’t gone off the scale yet. All protective and prophylactic measures against fallout products needed to be instituted now.

  Fallout was likely to contain three specific isotopic threats: strontium-90, iodine-131 and 133. Some warheads were intrinsically ‘dirtier’ than others and Soviet weapons tended to be ‘dirtier’ than their western counterparts. However, there was no point worrying about that because there was very little anybody could do to mitigate against the effects of irradiation by the majority of the more esoteric and short-lived fusion and, or fission isotopic by-products. The main thing was to focus on the longer-lived killers that one knew had to be constituent parts of any fallout cloud.

  The physics of nuclear fallout both terrified and oddly, reassured Simon Collingwood as he organised his thoughts and regimented his emotions to do what he must do in the next minutes, hours, days and months. The situation was so desperate that only in duty was there a semblance of peace of mind.

  The most dangerous fallout by product of a nuclear explosion was strontium-90. Sr90 is a bone seeker which biochemically behaves like calcium the next lightest of the group 2 elements. Like calcium, after ingestion about 70–80% of the dose gets excreted but virtually all remaining Sr90 is deposited in bone and bone marrow. About 1% of the total dose accumulates in blood and soft tissue. The presence of relatively low concentrations of Sr90 in bones greatly increases the risk of developing bone cancer, cancer in adjacent soft tissue or leukaemia. The biological half life of Sr90 in the human body was approximately eighteen years. Sr90 attacks the bone marrow and destroys the body’s ability to produce the white blood cells necessary to fight infection. Anybody breathing in air, or consuming food or fluids heavily contaminated by Sr90 might die of something as innocent as the common cold within a week.