Inside the Crosshairs

by Michael Lee Lanning

  Personnel authorizations offer at least a reasonable range of numbers. Marine FMFM 1-3B called for the assignment of one officer and thirty-five enlisted men in each infantry regiment’s sniper platoon and one officer and thirty enlisted men in each reconnaissance battalion’s sniper platoon. With eight infantry regiments and two recon battalions serving in the war zone at the height of the conflict, the formulas reflect that there were never more than 350 authorized Marine sniper positions in Vietnam at any one time. Considering the normal thirteen-month tour of duty for Marines, the arrival and departure dates of the regiments, and the date each division established its sniper school, calculations indicate that no more than 875 Marine snipers saw action during the war.

  Obviously any estimate of numbers must include replacements for casualties or illness. Sniper school instructors must also be included in the number, as well as the handful of Marines who acted as unofficial marksmen in their units before the establishment of the schools. More important, however, few if any units in Vietnam ever operated at full strength, and it was rare that any infantry regiment or recon battalion had its complete complement of snipers. Those factors imply that it is extremely unlikely that more than 875 Marines served as snipers in Vietnam, and that number may well be high by at least 100.

  Unlike the Marine Corps, the army had no official authorization for snipers in its combat units except for the antiquated and ignored guideline that one soldier in each infantry squad was to have a sniper rifle. General Ewell established a policy in the 9th Infantry Division for the assignment of two snipers to each brigade headquarters and six to each infantry battalion. If that had been carried over to the rest of the army’s twenty-five infantry brigades and eighty-one infantry battalions, it would mean a total of a few more than 500 sniper positions at the height of the war.

  Taking into account that the army did not train snipers until well after the Marine Corps established its schools, that soldiers served only twelve-month tours, that units withdrew at staggered times—and using a liberal method of computation—it would appear that no more than 1,000 army snipers ever served in the war. Even adding the 259 poorly trained and armed snipers who participated in 1967’s test Army Concept Team in Vietnam keeps the total below 1,300.

  But further investigation reveals the 1,300 figure to be extremely unrealistic. Major Willis Powell recalls that the 9th Division’s sniper school trained about 120 men before the majority of the units began withdrawing from the war zone. The other USAMTU training teams arrived in Vietnam only in the last year or two of the U.S. involvement in the war. In addition, many army units worked in terrain unsuitable for sniper activities. Also, some commanders did not need or want special marksmen. In some cases, commanders as high as division level disdained even the concept of the sniper and so did not train or use them.

  All in all, it is doubtful that the army trained and employed more than half the quasi-authorized numbers of snipers for a total of about 500. Adding the snipers who participated in the 1967 tests, a realistic number of army snipers who served in Vietnam is about 750.

  Based on those calculations, no more than 2,200 soldiers and Marines served as snipers in Vietnam. A more realistic figure is about 1,250. And even that number may be 10 to 25 percent too high.

  What it took to become a successful sniper in Vietnam differed little from the characteristics necessary in previous wars. In their 1942 study, “Equipment for the American Sniper,” George O. Van Orden and Calvin A. Lloyd included a chapter titled “What Is a Sniper,” but the authors admitted that they paraphrased a definition provided by Stephen Trask in his 1917 writings about World War I marksmen.

  According to Van Orden and Lloyd, “While the modern theories deal with fast-moving columns of masses instead of companies of men, there survives one lone wolf of the battlefields.… Wherever he chooses his hiding, he is there on the fringes of the fight, waiting, waiting, waiting, through perhaps all of a dreary day and a night. Little knots of the enemy may cross his vision. Still he holds the fire of his telescopically sighted rifle. His game is not to send a hail of rapid fire into a squad or a company; it is to pick off with one well-directed, rapidly delivered shot a single enemy, to send him beyond recall by skilled surgery in the brief flitting moment.

  “He must harass the foe,” the authors continue, “taking an officer here, a man there. He must hammer relentlessly upon the nerves of the rank and file of the opposing forces, until his rifle crack, joining with others of his kind, becomes a menace more to be feared than the shrieking shells from cannon, or the explosive hail from the mortars. His bullet must come from nowhere. It must find a mark sometimes as small as a two-inch loophole at two hundred yards, or a man standing against a hazy background.”

  In conclusion, Van Orden and Lloyd note, “The sniper is an institution that should and does naturally appeal to American fighting men, and before our army is complete, we will undoubtedly have thousands of his breed.”

  CHAPTER 10

  Tools of the Trade: Arms and Equipment

  THE success of the sniper program in Vietnam depended upon the man behind the crosshairs, but Marine Corps and army leaders also recognized that their marksmen had to be properly armed and equipped in order to accomplish their missions. In “Equipment for the American Sniper,” Van Orden and Lloyd noted, “It is safe to say that the American sniper could be regarded as the greatest all-around rifleman the world has ever known, and his equipment should include the best aids to his dangerous calling that the inventive genius of the United States can produce.”

  Despite recognition of the importance of equipment, particularly rifles, the Marine Corps and the army entered the Vietnam War with antiquated sniper weapons, including M1Ds from World War II and Korea and a small number of ’03 Springfields that dated to World War I.

  Both services recognized that technology had improved durability and accuracy since World War II and looked for newer, better rifles with which to equip their special marksmen. In their search the two services took a variety of measures to determine which weapons systems to procure and ended up adopting different rifles.

  With a maximum effective range of 600 meters and reasonable accuracy at 400 to 500 meters, World War II–vintage M1Ds were available in ample numbers for Captain Bob Russell and his sniper instructor team to secure them for their school and graduates. Or they could have adopted the more modern M14 as the sniper weapon of choice since at that time every Marine arrived in-country carrying one as his basic weapon.

  Russell and his fellow instructors, however, concurred with the general consensus that the M1D lacked range and that the M14, having no scope to enhance its accuracy beyond the range of its “iron” or standard sights, was adequate only for the sniper team observer and not for the principal shooter.

  Russell faced the same quandary the corps had encountered in 1942 and again in 1951, when the Marine Corps had conducted studies to determine the best sniper rifle. In both tests the investigators favored the Model 70 sporting rifle introduced by Winchester in 1937 for target shooting and hunting. This bolt-action rifle, having a five-round integral magazine and interchangeable twenty-four- and twenty-eight-inch barrels, delivered the long-range accuracy the Marines sought. However, officials had decided against its adoption because of the complications of injecting another rifle into the supply system—especially one that required 30.06-caliber (7.62 × 63-mm) ammunition rather than the standard military 7.62 × 51-mm cartridges. For that reason, the Marine Corps resisted adopting the Model 70 as its official sniper rifle for more than a quarter of a century.

  However, when Russell and his staff sought a sniper weapon in 1965, they chose the Model 70 by default because it was the only rifle available that met the long-range accuracy requirement of the Vietnam battlefield.

  The selection of the scopes for the Model 70s occurred in similar manner. Sufficient numbers of Unertl 8-power telescopes had remained in the Marine logistics system since their procurement as early as 1943 for use
with the Model 70 and the M1903 sniper rifles in World War II.[42] While far from perfect, the distinctive twenty-four-inch-long Unertl 8-power scope would become one of the most recognizable pieces of equipment used by Marine snipers in Vietnam.

  Russell and his team were satisfied with their selection, in part because for years they had practiced and competed with Winchester Model 70 sporting rifles equipped with Unertl 8 power telescopic sights rather than standard military-issue weapons. Because they were so confident in the long-range accuracy of the Winchester Model 70, they adapted it as the “unofficial-official” sniper rifle for their students.

  The first dozen Model 70s to arrive in Vietnam were the very rifles that the 3rd Marine Division—including Russell and many of his staff—had used for years in national and international competition shooting matches. Now those same sharpshooters were using the same weapons to hunt the Vietcong and to train sniper volunteers. Despite their age, the rifles had been well cared for and were in excellent condition.

  Russell’s request for additional Model 70s produced rifles from a variety of sources. The Marksmanship Training Unit at Quantico gathered several from its stocks and procured others from the Marine Corps Supply Center at Albany, Georgia, for transfer to the 3rd Division. Several of the Winchesters dated back to the Korean War and at least one had been used in the national rifle championship matches at Camp Perry, Ohio, in 1953. Many of the rifles were older than the Marines who would carry them into combat.

  With the Marine Corps’s commandant’s approval of sniper units in late 1965, the headquarters staff calculated the need for 550 additional weapons for Vietnam and the U.S. training base. Searches to fill that requirement reached the entire corps, bringing Model 70s from Marine bases around the world. Some arrived with markings on their stocks showing that they previously had been assigned to Special Services facilities, which loaned them to Marines and their families for use in target shooting and hunting. The condition of the rifles varied, but most could be rebuilt or refurbished to meet sniper requirements.

  While Russell and his staff began training their volunteers with the best rifle and scope available, the Marine Corps activated efforts to replace the equipment with a more sophisticated weapon system. In December 1965, the Marine Corps Headquarters instructed the Quantico Marine Schools Weapons Training Battalion to issue verbal orders to the Marksmanship Training Unit (MTU) to procure a rifle, telescopic sight, and mount suitable for use by snipers in Vietnam. The orders came with no deadline for a recommendation, but all parties involved were aware of the immediate need in the combat zone.

  On February 9, 1966, the officer in charge of the Marksmanship Training Unit responded to the commandant of the Marine Corps in a brief, well-thought-out response endorsed by the chief evaluator, Colonel Walter R. Walsh, a marksman of some renown who had helped establish the Marines’ World War II sniper training. “The indicated urgency for an early recommendation,” the letter began, “dictated that evaluation be limited to presently available commercial items.”

  Because the original instructions had provided no specific guidance, the letter explained that the evaluators had operated under some self-imposed assumptions. The assumptions of the MTU reflected their thorough knowledge of the characteristics of a dependable sniping system. Under a section titled “Self-imposed Assumptions,” the letter listed the requirements for the selected sniper system to use the standard 7.62-mm ammunition and “be simple, sturdy, and explainable with minimum amount of instruction.” The study’s authors assumed that most targets would be at ranges of less than 600 yards but that snipers would require a well-sealed telescopic sight that could sustain operations in conditions of high humidity and be “capable of adjustment at ranges up to and including 1,000 yards.”

  To meet the requirements, the MTU tested five rifles—including the Winchester Model 70, the Harrington and Richardson Ultra-Rifle, and three models of Remington—as well as seven different telescopes. The study discounted the Winchester Model 70 for its requirement of 30.06-caliber cartridges and eliminated the Harrington and Richardson because, as the evaluation reported, “These rifles are assembled from components of 3 manufacturers including a foreign made action.” They also rejected the Remington Models 600 and 700-ADL and BDL rifles as too light for military sniping operations. Only the Remington 700-40X merited positive comment: “This rifle is built on an action designed for the 7.62 mm cartridge. Trigger is internally adjustable. Relatively simple to bed.”

  Of the various scopes tested, the MTU found problems of insufficient power, insufficient adjustment capability, and weak seals that allowed moisture in the sight. Only the Redfield Accu-Range 3X-9X received positive comment: “Well-sealed, adequate internal adjustment, built-in range finder to 600 yards.”

  In analyzing the rifle and scope test data, the letter stated, “Based upon physical examination and use of the above equipment, coupled with personal experience of testing personnel with the above and similar equipment, it is believed that the Remington Rifle Model 700-40X, in combination with the Redfield Accu-Range 3X-9X variable power telescopic sight in Redfield mount, is the most suitable equipment now available for the purpose expressed.”

  Walsh and his fellow marksmanship instructors knew that the Winchester Model 70 had supporters at many levels within the Marine Corps, so they added a paragraph before their recommendations to head off objections to their findings: “The presence in the Marine Corps Supply System of a number of Winchester Model 70 rifles was considered. However, these are all chambered for the .30-06 cartridge. Modification to the 7.62 mm cartridge could be accomplished, but would be expensive and not especially desirable. Additionally, rifles that are nominally Winchester Model 70s are now found, due to factory modifications made over the years, in 3 different types. Many of these parts are not interchangeable.”

  The MTU letter also recommended “a hard carrying-shipping case with protective foam-padding containing desiccant and fungicide be provided for each rifle/scope unit.”

  The corps’s leadership acted with remarkable speed. On April 7, 1966, the Marine Corps adopted the rifle, scope, and mount as recommended, designating the system as the M40, although for the remainder of the Vietnam War some would refer to it as the Remington 700, Model 700, or Remington M40.

  Remington had marketed several types of 700s, including the two other models that the MTU found to be “too light,” as hunting rifles for several years, and had found wide acceptance of the Model 40X as a competition rifle before its selection by the MTU as a sniper weapon.

  On May 17, 1966, the Marine Corps issued a supply contract to Remington detailing the specifications of the Model 40s and an order for delivery. By the end of the year Remington had completed 700 rifles and then produced nearly 300 additional weapons over the next five years. Remington modified the finish and added military swivels (for a sling) at its Custom Shop in Ilion, New York, and redesignated the rifle the Model 40 to comply with Marine specifications.

  The M40 shared several characteristics with the Winchester Model 70 that it replaced. Both had a five-round magazine and a bolt action. Some critics at the time noted that bolt-action rifles required additional physical motions by the shooter to eject a spent shell and to reload a round into the chamber—movements that might compromise a sniper’s “hide” position—and they argued that semiautomatic rifles made better special marksman weapons.

  Others countered that the additional moving parts in semiautomatic rifles made them less steady and therefore less accurate than bolt-action weapons. Marine marksmen admitted the slight weakness of “bolt-guns,” but believed both the Winchester Model 70 and the Remington M40 to be superior to any other bolt-action or semiautomatic rifle available.

  The supply contract for the Remingtons also spelled out the specifications for the Redfield scopes and mounts to match the new rifles. The Redfield 3X-9X variable power telescope had entered the commercial market in 1962. At slightly less than thirteen inches long, the scope weighe
d only three quarters of a pound and proved to be rugged as well as resistant to humidity and moisture. More important, a simple power-selection ring allowed the marksman to enlarge or reduce the image between a magnification of 3.3X and 9.1X. Movement of the power-selector ring also adjusted internal stadia wires that provided the range-to-target measurement on an internal indicator scale.

  Of all its characteristics and capabilities, the Redfield scope’s ability to accurately indicate range proved the most vital. Snipers, even those with extensive “trigger time,” had difficulty in determining the distance to the target. Adoption of the Redfield scope ended the sniper’s having to make his own range estimate.

  The Marines sent 150 of the sniper systems to the Camp Pendleton scout-sniper school. A few of the rifles and scopes arrived in Vietnam during the final days of 1966, and by the end of the first quarter of 1967 adequate systems were in-country to arm the instructors and field snipers.

  The final subparagraph of the MTU’s letter to the commandant of the Marine Corps recommended that “action be taken to insure availability of match-grade ammunition for use in the rifle.” Thus, along with the M40 sniper rifles came special ammunition manufactured for the marksmen’s use on the range and the battlefield.

  Target shooters and snipers alike knew that, regardless of the sophistication of their rifles and scopes, much of their accuracy depended on the quality of their ammunition. The optimum ammunition contained no variance in the amount of propellent, the size or weight of the bullet, or the shape of the cartridge. Each round should have the same characteristics and strike at the same place when fired under the same conditions.

  At the time of the Vietnam War, ammunition manufacture had become extremely standardized, producing highly accurate cartridges. The tolerances of mass production, however, allowed slight variation, and while that had little influence on the fire of conventional riflemen, it did affect the consistency and accuracy of target shooters and combat snipers.