The Bell P-59 Airacomet was a ground-breaking aircraft in many ways.
For American aviation, it ushered in the jet age and a half-century dominance of both military and civilian aerospace technology. Although unsuccessful as a fighter, the P-59 provided valuable experience. It underlined the kind of change jet engines brought to aviation. Although its propulsion was revolutionary, the P-59 was limited by outmoded aerodynamics. With its broad, straight wings and teardrop-shaped fuselage, the P-59 was very much a late-1930's design. The fake prop did not look at all out of place. Its top speed was limited to 389 mph at 35,000 feet — inferior to that of prop fighters.
In contrast, the German Me 262, with sweep wings and more refined aerodynamics, had a top speed of 580 mph. Clearly, it was not enough to simply stick jet engines on a propeller-driven airplane. (One early XP-59A design was a P-39 with two jet engines hung under the wings.) The revolutionary engines had to be matched with an equally revolutionary airframe.
Bell and the XP-59A created the modern concept of the Black airplane.
All the elements — the secret task, small design group, tight schedule, separate facilities, and the isolated test site — were present. Yet the plane marked the decline of Bell's role in fixed-wing aviation. The formal end came with another Black airplane, also unsuccessful. The heritage of the first Dark Eagle would be carried by another company, and at another place.
On January 8, 1944, the Lockheed XP-80 Shooting StarJet fighter made its first flight at Muroc. At the controls was Milo Burcham. The plane soon proved capable of reaching over 500 mph. Tex Johnston knew what it meant for the P-59. After seeing the first flight, he telegraphed Bob Stanley: "Witnessed Lockheed XP-80 initial flight STOP Very impressive STOP Back to the drawing board."[20] Later, a mock dogfight was held between a P-80 and a Grumman F8F Bearcat, the navy's latest prop fighter. Unlike the YP-59A, the P-80 held the initiative, controlling the fight. The F8F was never able to catch the jet in its sights long enough to get a shot. The era of the prop fighter was over.[21]
The XP-80 contract specified that the prototype was to be delivered in 180 days. Clarence L. "Kelly" Johnson, Lockheed's chief designer, went to company chairman Robert Gross. Gross told Johnson, "Go ahead and do it.
But you've got to rake up your own engineering department and your own production people and figure out where to put this project."
For some time, Johnson had been asking Lockheed management to set up an experimental department where there would be direct links between designer, engineer, and manufacturing. Johnson decided to run the XP-80 program on this basis. The only place for the new section was next to the wind tunnel. The tools came from a small machine shop Lockheed bought out.
The walls were wooden engine boxes, while the roof was a rented circus tent. Johnson assembled a group of twenty-two engineers; the new group had its own purchasing department and could function independently of the main plant. Working ten hours a day, six days a week, they had the XP-80 ready in 163 days.
Part of the secrecy surrounding the project was that Johnson's new section had no name. Soon after the makeshift shop was finished, Lockheed engineer Irving H. Culver was at the phone desk. The phone rang, Culver was alone, and he had not been told how to answer the phone. Culver was a fan of Al Capp's comic strip "L'l Abner." In the strip, "Hairless Joe"
brewed up "Kickapoo Joy Juice" using old shoes, dead skunks, and other ingredients. On impulse, Culver answered the phone with the name of that brewery.[22]
It was called "the Skunk Works."
CHAPTER 2
The Angel of Paradise Ranch
The U-2 Aquatone
Now the reason the enlightened prince and the wise general conquer the enemy whenever they move and their achievements surpass those of ordinary men is foreknowledge.
Sun Tzu. ca. 400 B.C.
With the end of World War II, the shaky alliance between the Soviet Union and the Western powers unraveled before the reality of Stalinism. Events during 1948 and 1949, such as the Berlin Blockade and the testing of the first Soviet A-bomb, underlined the need for information on the Soviet Union. The CIA and the British Secret Intelligence Service attempted to parachute agents into the Soviet Union between 1949 and 1953. The West also attempted to support resistance groups in the Ukraine, the Baltic States, Albania, and Poland. The efforts ended in failure. The agents were captured as soon as they landed, while the resistance groups were ruthlessly hunted down.[23]
The intelligence would have to be gathered from the air.
COLD WAR OVERFLIGHTS
With the start of the Cold War, overflights of the Soviet Union began. In the late-1940s, the British used de Havilland Mosquito PR.34s to photograph northern ports such as Murmansk and Archangel. The armor was removed to raise the maximum altitude to 43,000 feet, above that of Soviet propeller fighters. The Mosquito overflights continued into 1949, until the introduction of the MiG 15 jet fighter made them too dangerous.[24]
With the start of the Korean War in June 1950, overflights began in earnest. In the fall of 1950, President Harry S Truman authorized a program to cover Soviet ports, islands, and coastal areas.[25] Initially, two different aircraft were used — the RB-36D Peacemaker and the RB-45C Tornado. The RB-36s were stripped of unnecessary equipment, including all the guns except the twin 20mm cannons in the tail turret. These featherweight RB-36s could reach altitudes of 58,000 feet, which gave them virtual immunity from Soviet MiG 15s.
The RB-45s were light jet reconnaissance bombers, which relied on speed and the brief duration of the overflight, rather than altitude, to escape detection. (Its performance was less than that of the MiG 15.) In 1952 and 1954, RB-45Cs were painted in RAF markings and made overflights of the western Soviet Union.[26] U.S. Air Force RB-45Cs, based in Japan, also overflew the Pacific coast of the Soviet Union.[27]
In 1953, overflight missions were taken over by RB-47 Stratojets, medium jet bombers with much better speed than the RB-36s or 45s. Their most spectacular mission was a mass overflight of Vladivostok at high noon by the entire RB-47 force. Each target was photographed by two or three aircraft. Only two planes saw MiGs, but no interceptions were made.[28]
These overflights were brief. The planes crossed the border, covered their targets, and were back across before Soviet air defenses could react. If the Soviets protested, the incident could be described as an "off-course training flight." These flights could not cover the Soviet interior, where the bulk of Soviet industrial and military facilities were located. In the Ural Mountains whole cities had been built that no Westerner had ever seen. Filling the blank spots would take a Dark Eagle.
ORIGINS OF THE U-2
The U-2 project was set in motion by Maj. John Seaberg, an air force reservist recalled to duty as assistant chief of the New Developments Office at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base. Seaberg, who had worked as an aeronautical engineer at Chance Vought, realized the new generation of jet engines being developed in the early 1950s had an inherent high-altitude capability. If matched with extremely efficient wings, the resulting aircraft would have a maximum altitude far above the reach of any interceptor. It would be ideal for reconnaissance.
By March 1953, Seaberg had written a formal design study. It envisioned an aircraft with a maximum altitude of 70,000 feet, a range of 3,000 miles, subsonic speed, up to 700 pounds of reconnaissance equipment, a one-man crew, and the use of existing engines. Two requirements would have a long-term impact on both this and later Black airplanes. Under "Detectability," the requirement stated: "Consideration will be given in the design of the vehicle to minimize the detectability by enemy radar." Under the category of "Vulnerability," it stated: "It is anticipated that the enemy will have limited means of detection and/or interception of a vehicle of the required performance. The greatest opposition to the operation of this aircraft can be expected to be encountered from guided missiles."
Major Seaberg went to possible contractors. It was decided to bypass large prime contractors such as Boe
ing, Convair, North American, Douglas, and Lockheed. The aircraft was highly specialized, and the number produced would be small. A smaller company would give it both a higher priority and a more innovative design. Bell Aircraft and Fairchild were asked to submit designs, while Martin was asked to modify its B-57 Canberra light bomber.
THE X-16 BALD EAGLE
By January 1954, the three proposals were finished. Fairchild's M-195 design featured an intake behind the cockpit and a tail mounted on a short boom. The landing gear was a tail wheel and two main wheels in the wing.
The Bell Model 67 was a large, twin-engine design of a more conventional appearance. The Martin RB-57D proposal had extended outer wings and new engines. All three designs used Pratt and Whitney J57 engines, which were the best then available for such extreme altitudes.
In early May 1954, the evaluation was completed and approval was given to build two of the designs. The Martin RB-57D was to be the interim aircraft, able to provide a limited high-altitude capability in a short time. It would not meet the full requirement, however.[29] To do this, the Bell design was selected. To hide its reconnaissance mission, it was designated the "X-16." X (for experimental) normally signified such research aircraft as the rocket-powered X-l, X-2, and X-15. The program was given the code name "Bald Eagle." A total of twenty-eight were to be built.
The X-16 was a very large, yet delicate-looking aircraft. It was 60.85 feet long, with a wingspan of 114.85 feet, but the cylindrical fuselage was only 4 feet in diameter. It used "bicycle" landing gear — front and back wheels with two retractable outriggers in the middle of the wings for balance (similar to the B-47). There were three sensor bays — one in the nose, and one in front of and one behind the rear landing gear bay. The cameras could cover an area 50 miles wide and 795 miles long. Weight was the primary concern. The two J57 engines produced only 743 pounds of thrust each at 65,000 feet. Above this, the thrust dropped off sharply. The X-16 weighed 36,200 pounds fully loaded, and there was no margin for added weight or drag.
The X-16 mock-up was finished in mid-1954. It consisted of the fuselage and included the cockpit, camera bays, a stub wing, and landing gear. A separate mock-up of the J57 engine was also built. The mock-ups were housed in a special tent, with access limited to project personnel. By October 1955, the prototype X-16 was 80 percent completed. But it was already too late.[30]
THE CL-282
Kelly Johnson also had heard about the request for a special high-altitude aircraft. Although Lockheed had not been asked to submit a proposal, he did so anyway. The CL-282 was an XF-104 fuselage fitted with long-span wings. It was much smaller than the X-16—44 feet long with a 70.67-foot wingspan. The emphasis was on weight savings. The airplane had no landing gear; the CL-282 was to take off from a wheeled dolly, then land on two skids. The cockpit was unpressurized, and there was no ejector seat. The camera bay was behind the cockpit.
Johnson's proposal arrived on Seaberg's desk on May 18, 1954, some two weeks after the go-ahead for the RB-57D and X-16. In June, Seaberg recommended the CL-282 be rejected. The primary reason was its use of the General Electric J73 engine. This was an unproven (and ultimately unsuccessful) design. The XF-104 fuselage could not be easily enlarged to accommodate the preferred J57 engine. The air force agreed with Seaberg's recommendations. But Johnson had already submitted the proposal elsewhere.[31]
The CIA was keeping in close touch with the air force on the emerging special reconnaissance program. The CIA's assessment of the CL-282 was very different from Seaberg's. It was "considered to be the best." It had a maximum altitude of 73,000 feet over the target and a speed between 450 and 500 knots. The prototype could be ready in a year, with five planes delivered in two years. The X-16, it was noted, could only reach 69,500 feet and had inferior speed and range.[32]
The CL-282 proposal came at a critical time. Although the Soviets exploded their first A-bomb in 1949, they had limited production facilities. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, Soviet delivery systems were similarly limited. They had only Tu-4 bombers — copies of the B-29 propeller bombers.
They were slow and capable of only a one-way attack on the United States.
By the early 1950s, this situation started to change. The first operational Soviet A-bombs were being deployed. Test flights of the Soviet turboprop Tu-95 and Mya-4 jet bombers were under way. The Soviets were also working on long-range ballistic missiles. For the first time, a surprise nuclear attack on the United States seemed possible.
On March 27, 1954, President Dwight D. Eisenhower told the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization, "Modern weapons had made it easier for a hostile nation with a closed society to plan an attack in secrecy and thus gain an advantage denied to the nation with an open society." The United States was vulnerable to both a surprise attack and political blackmail. These fears also drove up military spending, which Eisenhower saw as a danger to the U.S. economy. On July 26, Eisenhower asked Dr. James R. Killian, the president of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, "to direct a study of the country's technological capabilities to meet some of its current problems." The group was to look at ways of overcom-ing the lack of strategic intelligence on the Soviet Union.
One member of the panel Dr. Killian assembled was Dr. Edwin H. Land, a noted photo scientist. Dr. Land was named to head Project 3 of the Technological Capabilities Panel, often called the "Land Panel." Dr. Land once said that discoveries were made by people who had freed themselves from conventional thinking and had the ability to take a new look at old data. Dr. Land realized that technological advances promised a revolution in photo reconnaissance — thin plastic film bases, lens designs which increased resolution 500 percent, computer custom grinding of lenses, and innovative camera designs that allowed a single camera to provide both high-resolution and horizon-to-horizon coverage. Use of a camera incorporating these advances would save weight, increase performance, and provide the intelligence the United States needed."
The Land Panel was briefed by Seaberg on the Fairchild M-195, the Bell X-16, the Martin RB-57D, and the Lockheed CL-282. Aware of the growing support for the Lockheed plane, Seaberg showed the panel a graph that demonstrated that all three designs were aerodynamically similar. If the CL-282 was fitted with a J57 engine, it would be competitive. The following day, Johnson underwent intensive questioning about the CL-282. Johnson said he would use a J57 engine. He also promised to have the prototype ready within eight months after the go-ahead. This was an extraordinary schedule — the RB-57D and X-16 projects had been under way for several months yet the RB-57D would not fly until November 1955, while the X-16 would not go aloft until early 1956. Johnson said he could beat them both, although all Lockheed had was a "paper airplane."[33]
On November 5, 1954, Dr. Land wrote a memo to CIA Director Allen Dulles. Entitled, "A Unique Opportunity for Comprehensive Intelligence,"
it stated about the CL-282: "No proposal or program that we have seen in intelligence planning can so quickly bring so much vital information at so little risk and at so little cost."
Land noted that, "We have been forced to imagine what [the Soviet's] program is, and it could well be argued that peace is always in danger when one great power is essentially ignorant of the major economic, military, and political activities… of another great power… We cannot fulfill our responsibility for maintaining the peace if we are left in ignorance of Russian activities."
The memo recommended that the CIA develop the CL-282, then set up a task force to operate the aircraft, make the overflights, and analyze the photos. Cost for six aircraft, training, and operations would be $22 million. The memo stressed time was of the essence — soon the Soviets would develop radars, interceptors, and guided missiles able to reach 70,000 feet.[34]
On November 24, 1954, a meeting was held with President Eisenhower.
Present were Allen Dulles, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Defense Secretary Charles Wilson, Air Force Secretary Harold Talbott, and Air Force Genera
ls Nathan Twining, Donald Putt, and C. P. Cabell. Eisenhower agreed to production of thirty "special high-performance aircraft." Initial funding would come from a special CIA fund. The air force would buy the special high-altitude version of the J57 engines. Total cost was $35 million. Once the aircraft was ready, he would decide on the overflight program.[35]
Eisenhower was very specific about how the program was to be run. The aircraft "should be handled in an unconventional way so that it would not become entangled in the bureaucracy of the Department of Defense or troubled by rivalries among the services." This meant the air force would provide support, but the CIA would have control of the program. By having the CIA make the overflights and analyze the photos, the intelligence would not become entangled with the internal politics of the air force. Additionally, as a "civilian" aircraft, it could be "disowned" if shot down.
The initial contract for twenty airplanes at a cost of $22 million was signed on December 9, 1954. Unlike an air force contract, there was not a long list of technical specifications. The CIA listed only performance specifications. The project was given the initial code name "Aquatone." Later, this was changed to "Idealist." To the Skunk Works, the aircraft was "the Article" or "the Angel."
THE ANGEL
Johnson quickly assembled a group of twenty-nine engineers to develop the aircraft. They were warned that the project was so secret that their employment record might have a two-year gap. Dick Boehme was named chief engineer, and Art Viereck was head of manufacturing. The […] were crammed together in "slumlike conditions," […] Vere only a few" steps from the production floor. They began a punish- […] no one what they were doing.
Dark Eagles: A History of the Top Secret U.S. Aircraft Page 3