Dark Eagles: A History of the Top Secret U.S. Aircraft

by Curtis Peebles

  On August 22, 1980, Defense Secretary Brown held a press conference:

  I am announcing today a major technological advance of great military significance.

  This so-called 'stealth' technology enables the United States to build manned and unmanned aircraft that cannot be successfully intercepted with existing air defense systems. We have demonstrated to our satisfaction that the technology works.

  Brown noted that the effort had been kept secret for three years due to the efforts of the few people in government who had been briefed on the project and the contractors involved.

  However, in the last few months, the circle of people knowledgeable about the program has widened, partly because of the increased size of the effort, and partly because of the debate under way in the Congress on new bomber proposals. Regrettably, there have been several leaks about the stealth program in the last few days in the press and television news coverage.

  In the face of these leaks, I believe that it is not appropriate or credible for us to deny the existence of this program. And it is now important to correct some of the leaked information that misrepre-sented the Administration's position on a new bomber program…

  I am gratified that, as yet, none of the most sensitive and significant classified information about the characteristics of this program has been disclosed. An important objective of the announcement today is to make clear the kinds of information that we intend scrupulously to protect at the highest security level.

  Also at the press conference was William Perry. He explained that, "even as we acknowledge the existence of a stealth program, we will draw a new security line." The information to be guarded was the specific techniques used, how effective they were, the characteristics of the aircraft under development, and the funding and schedules of the programs. (In retrospect, it is clear the secret they were trying to protect was faceting.) Perry also noted that "stealth technology does not involve a single technical approach, but rather a complex synthesis of many. Even if I were willing to describe it to you, I could not do it in a sentence or even a paragraph."[383]

  The press coverage that followed the Brown statement indicated how little the popular press understood about stealth. A Newsweek article claimed stealth aircraft were equipped with "electronic jamming devices to reduce 'radar echo' aircraft normally give off." In fact, any electronic emissions would give the plane's location away. The article was illustrated with a CBS news drawing of a "stealth" airplane. It had nothing in common with what engineers thought a stealth aircraft would look like, nor did it look like the Have Blue. Instead, it resembled a navy F-8 Crusader with an inlet over the cockpit, two oddly bent curved wings, and a flat-tipped nose.[384]

  In the wake of the press conference, the Republicans charged that the White House had released classified information for political gain. President Carter responded by blaming the Ford administration for not classify-ing stealth from the start.

  Congress also became involved. On August 20, 1980, the House Armed Services Committee had been briefed on stealth. They were told that the subject was highly secret. Then, two days later, the press conference was held, which provided more information than they had been given. The committee held hearings, which cast doubts on the explanation for the disclosure. Benjamin Schemmer, editor of Armed Forces Journal, testified that in 1978 the magazine had withheld an article on stealth at the request of the Department of Defense; then in August 1980, he had been approached by William Perry, who encouraged him to publish a modified version of the original article. It was to be published no later than August 21 — the day before the press conference.

  More damaging was the testimony given by Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr., the former chief of naval operations. He testified that President Carter had decided to deliberately leak stealth information. This would be used as an excuse to announce the program's existence, so the administration could take credit for it. Zumwalt named as the alleged leaker of the information the deputy assistant to the president for national security affairs, David L. Aaron.

  Aaron submitted an affidavit with the committee denying Zumwalt's charges. However, he refused to testify under oath due to a dispute between the committee and the White House over executive privilege.

  The committee found Defense Secretary Brown's explanation for the press conference flimsy. In a report issued in February 1981, they stated they could not understand how the "damage-limiting tactic" was supposed to work. An official announcement was sure to attract more attention to the program than "no comment." Based on the testimony of Schemmer and Zumwalt, along with Aaron's refusal to testify and Brown's weak explanation, the committee concluded that the disclosure had been made for political ends. The committee also stated that the announcement of the stealth program had done "serious damage… to the security of the United States and our ability to deter or to contain a potential Soviet threat."[385]

  Any attempt to use stealth as an election year ploy by the Carter administration had backfired. The concept and possibilities of stealth, which few in the public and press could understand, did not mitigate the failure at Desert 1. Ronald Reagan was elected president in a landslide.

  The unveiling of stealth had another effect. It was to warn both Republicans and Democrats that misfortune awaits those who disclose Black projects. Not surprisingly, the new administration had very different ideas on how to handle Black airplanes.

  They disappeared from sight.

  THE GROOM MOUNTAINS LAND SEIZURE

  When the Groom Lake test site was established in 1955, the location's isolation was sufficient protection. It was about twenty miles from the near-est highway and thirty miles from any town. "Ozzie" Ritland, who selected the site, said they were looking "for the most isolated part of the United States of America" to test fly the U-2. During the U-2 operations, there were a few sightings, but as Ritland recalled, "they would see the airplane, but they weren't so curious and it was far enough into the desert."[386]

  Although there were a number of […] sightings, Groom Lake remained in isolation. Only crashes, such as Have Blue 1001, brought attention to the site. Despite this, no published account had mentioned Groom Lake. It was always "a base in Nevada."

  The 1979 Las Vegas Review-Journal article changed this; it named Groom Lake as the location of the test site. The article noted that while older maps showed Groom Lake, more recent ones did not. The article stripped Groom Lake of the anonymity that had protected the site for nearly twenty-five years.

  This was to have major consequences in the decade to follow.

  With the increased press attention, several code names for the test site soon became known. These included the Ranch, Area 51, and what was actually the call sign for Groom Lake's tower. The name's evocative and sinister sound ensured it caught the public's fancy — "Dreamland."

  With the publication of the name Groom Lake, the flaw in Dreamland's security became apparent. The site was bordered by public land. It was possible to hike into the area and observe the site, without trespassing.

  There was an obvious solution.

  The withdrawal of public land for military use must be periodically renewed. When the air force submitted a renewal to Congress, it added 89,600 acres of the Groom Mountains to the 3.3 million of the Nellis Air Force Base range.[387] For a full two years, Congress did nothing about the request.[388]

  In the meantime, the Reagan administration had begun a major buildup of strategic nuclear forces. This sparked opposition by "peace activists," such as Greenpeace. A standard tactic was attempting to disrupt military activities, particularly those dealing with nuclear weapons. On April 18, 1983, four Greenpeace demonstrators entered the nuclear test site via the dirt road that led to Groom Lake. For five days, they hid out in the mountainous ter-rain, before finally surrendering to the test site guards. It was widely believed that this incident caused the government to take action.

  In March 1984, acting on the orders of Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger and/or Preside
nt Reagan, armed guards were posted on the land.

  When hunters and hikers approached Groom Lake, the guards requested them not to enter the area.

  A reporter who went out to the site in May found the guards were "especially polite as they tell visitors they cannot drive farther along the dirt road" that led to Groom Lake. The reporter chatted with the guards and watched television while they waited for the supervisor to arrive. At the same time, orders were issued to ground all aircraft while strangers were "within earshot." The reporter repeatedly asked for the legal justification for the air force denying public access. The only reason given was "national security."[389]

  Throughout the west, resentment was building over federal land policy.

  About 87 percent of the land in the state of Nevada was not under state control; it was federal land. The Groom Mountain land seizure quickly became part of this "sagebrush rebellion." Local members of Congress were quick to become involved. Representative Harry Reid (D-Nevada) said, "People have a right to be upset. There has been no land withdrawal. They simply have closed land off for national security reasons." Representative Barbara Vucanovich (R-Nevada) requested a hearing "to bring it into the open."[390]

  It would be August 6, 1984, before Congress could get around to holding hearings on the Groom Mountains. The hearings before the House Subcommittee on Lands and National Parks saw a parade of Nevada officials, hunting and mining interests, and environmental groups such as the Sierra Club and Audubon Society. Nevada Governor Richard Bryan attacked the air force, saying that it had tried to "hoodwink the Congress and the state of Nevada." He continued: "For years, Nevadans have acquiesced to defense-related land withdrawals, but the time has come to draw the line. I strongly suggest to you that the day is past when the federal government can look at Nevada… as an unpopulated wasteland to be cordoned off for whatever national purpose seems to require it."[391]

  Governor Bryan did not object to "the legitimate security needs of our country," but said, "if the federal government withdraws the land, then Nevada must be compensated."[392]

  The subcommittee chairman, John Seiberling (D-Ohio), also attacked the air force. He told John Rittenhouse, the air force representative, "There is no higher level than the laws of the United States." When Rittenhouse said he could explain the reasons only in a closed briefing, Seiberling exploded:

  "Shades of Watergate. All I am asking you is under what legal authority this was done. I am not asking you the technical reasons. That certainly is not classified."

  Rittenhouse responded, "We had no legal authority, but we asserted the right to request people not to enter that area.""Newspaper headlines read, "AF admit to illegality."

  The Groom Mountains land issue also became involved with wilderness policy. Representative Sieberling proposed a trade-off — the air force could have the Nellis Air Force Base and Groom Lake land if 1,408,900 acres of the National Wildlife Range was designated a wilderness area. This would close it to any development and restrict access to backpackers. The deal would also restrict the tests the air force could conduct and limit the land withdrawal to December 31, 1987, pending an environmental report. He then offered to withdraw the wilderness provisions, if Senator Paul Laxalt (R-Nevada) would provide assurances he would get the Nevada congressional delegation to act on a wilderness bill that year. (Nevada had yet to produce a wilderness plan ten years after it was required.)[393] Representative Reid said the provision had been put into the bill to force the Nevada delegation to come up with a wilderness bill.[394]

  The legal maneuvering continued for the next three years, and involved "compensation" for the loss of recreation, grazing, and mining claims on the land. Many of the land use-wilderness issues, such as whether snow-mobiling would be allowed in some areas and the building of a paved road from Rachel, Nevada, into the Nevada Test Site, had nothing to do with the Groom Mountains, but they blocked passage.[395]

  By March 1988, the issue had not been resolved, and the temporary land withdraw would soon expire. John Rittenhouse told the Senate public lands subcommittee: "We have operations which would have to cease if the public were allowed to be [there]. It would be extremely detrimental to our national defense effort… Our concern is for any visual sightings by anyone."[396]

  The extension to the land withdraw the air force sought was itself part of the political power plays — Reid wanted only a ten-week extension, in order to pressure Senator Chic Hecht (R-Nevada) to act on the wilderness bill.[397]

  Environmentalists also continued to complain they were not getting enough.

  The groups Citizen Alert and the Rural Coalition tried to use two mining claims as "bargaining chips." They would be given up in exchange for the groups having a "say" in the writing of a report on military activities in Nevada, action on land claims by the Western Shoshone Indians, and return of one member's pilot license.[398]

  The day before the extension was to expire, the House separated the Groom Mountain issue from the wilderness bill. The withdrawal was approved on a voice vote and sent to the Senate.[399] Approval was given and it was sent to President Reagan.

  This brought the Groom Mountain land seizure controversy to a close. It had taken a total of six years — twice the time needed to develop, build, and conduct the flight and RCS tests of the Have Blue. The new boundaries of the Dreamland restricted area were laid out in straight lines. It was not realized at the time that a few spots had been missed, but that did not matter — for the moment.

  While this controversy dragged on, the descendent of Have Blue had made its first flight, undergone systems development, and reached operational status behind the shield of the mountains. A few months later, this Dark Eagle would be publicly unveiled to questions about its cost and whether stealth would work.

  Two years later, it would make history.

  CHAPTER 8

  The Black Jet of Groom Lake

  The F-117A Senior Trend

  Subtle and insubstantial, the expert leaves no trace; divinely mysterious, he is inaudible.

  Thus he is master of his enemy's fate.

  Sun Tzu ca. 400 B.C.

  By mid-1978, the Have Blue 1001 had proven the basic concept of stealth.

  Lockheed proposed two different operational stealth aircraft. One was a medium bomber about the size of the B-58 Hustler. It had a two-man crew and four engines. The other was a fighter-sized aircraft with a single-man crew, two engines, and a payload of a pair of bombs.[400]

  The air force chose the stealth fighter design, and on November 16, 1978, Lockheed was given a contract to begin preliminary design work.

  Extreme secrecy enveloped the program, code named "Senior Trend." At the start, only twenty people were authorized to know of this Dark Eagle's existence.[401]

  SENIOR TREND

  The Have Blue aircraft had been designed solely to test faceting, with no allowances for tactical systems or weapons. The little experimental plane would have to be transformed into an operational aircraft. This meant more than simply adding these systems; the aerodynamic and RCS testing had also revealed the need for other design changes.

  The most obvious change to emerge during the redesign was the tail. The Have Blue's twin fins were canted inward to shield the platypus exhausts from infrared detectors above the aircraft. In practice, however, the fins reflected the heat toward the ground, making the plane more visible from below. The twin fins were also mounted on a pair of booms, which proved structurally inefficient. In the stealth fighter, the fins were moved farther aft and canted outward, in a V shape (similar to the V-tail of the Beech Bonanza light plane). This also improved control effectiveness. The fins were attached to a central spine that also carried the weight of the weapons.

  The Have Blue's wing sweep was an extreme 72.5-degree angle. This resulted in a poor lift-drag ratio, which cut into payload and range performance. Highly swept, low-aspect ratio wings also lose airspeed rapidly in a sustained high-g turn. The sweep angle was reduced to 67.5 degrees, and th
e wings were extended as far back as possible to improve performance.

  Operational requirements also resulted in a change to the design of the windshield and nose. The pilot would need a heads-up display (HUD) for flight information. The plane would also carry two infrared imaging systems — one looking down, and the other looking forward. Neither the HUD nor the forward-looking system could be fitted into the Have Blue's nose shape. This gave the new design a distinctive appearance, over the more conventional shape of the Have Blue's nose section. Although operationally required, the change did slightly increase the plane's RCS.[402]

  A major concern was maintenance: extreme care had to be taken with the Have Blue to preserve its stealth. With the operational aircraft, the total number of maintenance hours per hour of flight time was to be similar to that of conventional twin-engine fighters. The portion related to the stealth design was to be limited to a small fraction of the total. To meet the requirements, servicing accesses for aircraft subsystems were located in the wheel wells and weapons bays. All the aircraft's avionics were located in a single bay. This minimized the need to remove and replace RAM coating during maintenance.[403]

  Most of the changes from the Have Blue were internal — a reengineered cockpit, revised inlets and exhaust system, tactical systems, a braking parachute and arresting hook, an anti-icing system for the inlet grid, fuel tanks in the wings, retractable antennae, formation and anticollision lights, an inflight refueling receptacle, and, finally, two weapons bays.[404] Each bay would hold a single 2,000-pound bomb. Those bombs would be as remarkable as the aircraft itself.