Dark Eagles: A History of the Top Secret U.S. Aircraft

by Curtis Peebles

  The model also figured in congressional hearings. In late June 1986, two Lockheed engineers made accusations that hundreds of documents, photos, films, and tapes were missing. Representative John D. Dingell (D-Michigan) accused Lockheed of falsifying document audits to cover up the problem.[456] Dingell, as chairman of the oversight and investigation subcommittee of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, held hearings on the alleged security leaks on the F-19.

  During the hearings, a model of the Testors F-19 was passed around.

  Representative Ronald Wyden (D-Oregon) righteously complained, "It's bizarre. What I, as a member of Congress, am not even allowed to see is ending up in model packages."[457] Some officials complained that Dingell's hearings and the resulting publicity had unnecessarily compromised the program.[458] In the meantime, a greater, more tragic compromise had taken place.

  LOSSES

  The night operations of the 4450th Tactical Group continued to have an adverse effect on its pilots. One F-117 pilot later noted, "Each and every pilot in this group deals with being tired." This was made worse with the summer and the shorter flying hours. Part of the problem was the Right Stuff attitude—a pilot would never admit he was too tired to fly.

  Lieutenant Colonel John F. Miller, one of the three squadron commanders, wrote a memo on Thursday, July 10, 1986, (the last flying night of the weekly cycle). He noted, "I believe that these extended hours are taking their toll on overall pilot performance. I have detected more and more instances of poor judgment that weren't evident 2–3 months ago." He cited unpredictable physical reactions to the continued stress, and "a major problem with fatigue-induced burnout that is getting worse with time." He added, "if we liken our usual late-go to a time-bomb waiting to go off, then our extended summer hours are accelerating the countdown to zero. I believe we are on a collision course with a mishap." Lieutenant Colonel Miller recommended that the pilots be forced to take "extra time off every two or three weeks."

  As Miller was writing his memo, Maj. Ross E. Mulhare was preparing to fly a late-go mission. Mulhare had been declared mission ready in the F-117A on March 18, 1986. He was developing a new tactics training concept for the aircraft. Although an experienced pilot, he had a total of only fifty-three and a half hours in the plane. As he got ready, Mulhare told a colleague that he was tired and "just couldn't shake it."

  Mulhare took off from TTR at 1:13 A.M. PDT, July 11, 1986, in F-117A number 792. He flew northwest to the town of Tonopah, then headed southwest and climbed to 20,000 feet. The night was clear and dark, with no moon. After crossing the Sierra Nevadas, Mulhare turned south along the eastern edge of the San Joaquin Valley. During the flight, Mulhare was in contact with the Los Angeles and Oakland Centers. He received permission to descend to 19,000 feet. As he neared Bakersfield, Mulhare turned southeast, requested a descent to 17,000 feet, and canceled his instrument flight plan at 1:44 A.M.

  On the ground, Andy Hoyt, his sister Lisa, and her sixteen-year-old son, Joey, had pulled over at a rest stop. Hoyt saw "three red lights and a dark image behind them like an upside-down triangle." Hoyt got out his camera and took two or three photos before the object disappeared behind a hill. Suddenly, a pair of explosions "lit up the sky like it was daylight out."[459]

  F-117A number 792 had slammed into a hillside in the Sequoia National Forest, about fifteen nautical miles from Bakersfield. Major Ross E. Mulhare was killed in the crash.[460]

  An air force search party soon arrived and ordered all civilians out of the area.[461] The crash site was declared a national security area — no unauthorized people could enter the site, and no planes could fly within five miles of the crash site at altitudes below 8,500 feet. When Hoyt called Edwards Air Force Base to report what he had seen, the air force brought the three of them to a command post near the crash site. The film was developed, and two sets of prints were returned, minus the shots of the aircraft.[462]

  The air force said only that a plane had crashed and the pilot had been killed. They would not say what type of aircraft, where it had taken off, its mission, or where it was going. There was no doubt among the press about what had crashed; an investigator with Dingell's subcommittee was quoted as saying, "It is clearly the F-19 that crashed." Dingell requested a briefing on the crash, but was turned down.[463]

  The reports that followed the crash were a mixture of guesswork and speculation. Newsweek ran an article that claimed over seventy-two stealth fighters were operational; it speculated that the crash site would have to be cordoned off "forever" to prevent the Soviets from recovering debris. (In fact, the site was reopened after several weeks.) The New York Times claimed that the F-19 cost $150 million each. (The actual fly-away cost of the F-117A was $42.6 million, nearly identical to the $40 million cost of the F-15E Strike Eagle.)

  Other articles were more accurate. An August 22, 1986, Washington Post story said that about fifty aircraft were operational, that the F-19 designation was incorrect, and that the plane was described as "ugly" due to its bulging, nontraditional shape. The plane's base was also identified as being Tonopah. Other reports described the daily flights to and from the base.[464]

  While the press chased rumors and shadows, the air force tried to find the cause of the crash. This was made difficult by the condition of the debris. A report by Robert M. McGregor, an engineer at the Air Force Sacra-mento Air Logistics Center, stated: "Without exception, in terms of physical damage to the aircraft, this is the worst crash that 1 have worked. Structural breakup was almost absolute. 'Shattered' may best describe the aircraft after impact… The right engine compressor drum… was crushed to half its normal length." The F-117A had hit the ground in a steep dive, between 20 and 60 degrees. There had been no in-flight fire, the engines were at a high-power setting at the time of impact, and Mulhare had not attempted to eject.[465]

  The most probable reason was pilot disorientation. At night, without the normal visual clues, a pilot cannot tell if he is flying straight or is in a turn.

  Lights on the ground can also be mistaken for stars. The problem was compounded by the F-117A's instrument panel design. Normally, the artificial horizon and other instruments are in the center of the panel, so the pilot can read them without moving his head. On the F-117A, the center of the panel is occupied by the FLIR-DLIR screen. To look at the instruments, the pilot had to turn his head. This took some getting used to, and more important, it could cause vertigo. An F-117 pilot later noted that most cases of disorientation were caused by a pilot moving his head while flying on instruments.[466]

  The death of Mulhare was a wake-up call for the 4450th Tactical Group.

  Although the training schedule remained demanding, pilots were more closely monitored for signs of fatigue and were better trained to resist disorientation. The attitude also began to change: admitting you were not fit to fly a mission was seen as a sign of strength, not weakness. Pilots would watch each other; if someone showed signs of fatigue, a buddy would pull him aside for a private chat.

  One of those who worked to instill this attitude was Maj. Michael C. Stewart. Several times, he had spoken about the need to avoid unnecessary risks. At 7:53 P.M. on October 14, 1987, he took off in F-117A number 815.

  The flight was a single-plane mission that would remain within the Nellis Air Force Base range. The night was clear and dark, with no moon. The mission was under visual flight rules. At 8:33 P.M., about three-fourths of the way through the mission, radar controllers noticed the plane had strayed to the left of its planned ground track. It then disappeared from their radar.[467]

  Shortly thereafter, a large fire on the Nellis range was reported to the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), which relayed word to the air force.

  The air force asked the BLM not to say where or how big the fire was.[468]

  The F-117A hit the ground in an area of gently sloping desert, digging a crater six to seven feet deep. The plane was 28-degrees nose down and in a 55-degree right bank at impact. There was no in-flight fire, and the F-11
7A was intact before impact. The engines were at a low-power setting. Major Stewart never attempted to eject.

  There were a number of similarities to the loss of Mulhare the year before. Both were experienced pilots but had limited time in the F-117A — 53.5 hours for Mulhare, 76.7 hours for Stewart. Both accidents occurred on dark, moonless nights. Again, disorientation was blamed.[469]

  As with the earlier crash, the air force released minimal information, but the press had no doubt that another "stealth fighter" had crashed. Because the crash had occurred within the Nellis range, however, there was not the publicity of the first loss.

  This changed less than a week after Stewart died. On October 20, an A-7D on a cross-country flight suffered a flameout. Its pilot, Maj. Bruce L. Teagarden, attempted to make an emergency landing at Indianapolis Airport, Indiana. The attempt was unsuccessful due to weather, and Teagarden was forced to eject. He landed safely, but the A-7D crashed into the lobby of a Ramada Inn, killing nine people. Press interest grew when it was learned that Major Teagarden was a member of the 4450th Tactical Group — the same unit Mulhare and Stewart had flown with.

  Yet again, the press speculated. It was suggested that the A-7s had been modified with stealth systems or were playing the role of Soviet aircraft for stealth fighter practice missions.[470]

  OUT OF THE BLACK

  Although the erroneous reports effectively hid the true information, it was clear that the wall of secrecy around the F-117A was breaking down. In January 1988, Armed Forces Journal revealed the aircraft's actual designation was the F-117 Nighthawk.[471]

  More important, the "big secret" of stealth, faceting, was starting to leak out. In 1986, there were reports that the F-19 was not smooth, but rather had "a multi-faceted outer-body surface" and a "cut-diamond exterior." This was described as being thousands of flat surfaces, none more than eight square inches in size, which did not share the same "reflectivity angle."[472]

  The F-117A actually used large panels, but the basic principle was the same.

  A second major disclosure came in September 1987 with the release of a second Testors kit. This was a model of a (hypothetical) Soviet stealth aircraft, the "MiG 37B Ferret-E." The aircraft was made up of large, flat panels — faceting.[473] Reporters were soon being told by "reliable sources" that "if you want to see what the F-117 looks like, look at that MiG 37 model."[474]

  The stealth fighter was such an open secret by the fall of 1988, that even the air force could joke about it. At that year's Edwards Air Force Base Air Show a large area was roped off. It contained a ladder, wheel chocks, and an official display sign labeled "F-19 'Flying Frisbee.'" Of course, this was an invisible airplane, so no one could actually see it.[475]

  Bringing the F-117A out of the Black would have a number of advantages. The plane could be used in Red Flag exercises and could become part of standard war planning. There were benefits for the pilots too. With daylight flights possible, the fatigue from the late hours would be lessened.

  Night flights could start earlier and not have to race with the dawn. This would make the pilots' home lives easier. The problem was, ironically, that 1988 was also a presidential election year.[476]

  The air force had planned to announce the F-117A's existence in early October 1988. This ran into congressional problems. Senators Sam Nunn (D-Georgia) and John Warner (R-Virginia), the chairman and ranking minority member of the Armed Services Committee, warned that any release so close to the election could be seen as using classified information for political ends (harking back to the 1980 stealth announcement). They also complained that they had not been "adequately consulted." It was argued that if Congress had funded a Black program, then Congress should be consulted in any decision to declassify the program. A congressional staffer complained,

  "They can't just unilaterally release information at their insistence," and referred to the air force's "irresponsible handling" of the matter.[477]

  On November 10, 1988, the announcement was made. Pentagon spokesman Dan Howard admitted that the stealth fighter did exist and that its official designation was the F-117A. He stated: "It has been operational since October 1983 and is assigned to the 4450th Tactical Group at Nellis Air Force Base, Nev. The aircraft is based at the Tonopah Test Range in Nevada." The press release contained the facts that the first flight had been made in June 1981, that three had crashed, and that fifty-two had been delivered out of a total of fifty-nine ordered from Lockheed. A single photo was also released. The angular shape came as a surprise, as did the out-of-sequence "century-series" designation. The photo showed the plane in a slight turn and gave no clue as to size. (In fact, the photo had been electronically altered.) No information was given out as to the F-117A's dimensions, cost, range, or speed.[478]

  Where facts were lacking, the press was quick to speculate. Three-view drawings were published, showing a plane that was shorter, with much less wing sweep than the actual F-117A. Photocopies of the drawing were handed out to F-117 pilots. Some of the pilots, "laughed so hard that they started to cry."[479] It was suggested that the plane was supersonic, and that the air speed probes might be "gun barrels."[480] U.S. News and World Report claimed it had been flown near the Soviet border on reconnaissance missions.[481]

  The F-117A now began daylight flights, and the sightings also began. On April 12, 1989, ten F-117As were seen flying near Mojave, California, at about 5:30 P.M. They were heading east, flying about eight minutes apart.

  Between 10:30 and 11:30 P.M. that night, another group of at least six planes was spotted flying the same route. On April 18, two similar waves of F-117As were also seen. Other sightings were made at TTR, where camera-equipped observers photographed the planes as they made takeoffs and landings.

  Despite the F-117As coming out of the Black, speculation about the aircraft continued. It was reported, for example, that the F-117A had "a distinctive, although faint engine whine" — a claim that amazed Tom Morgenfeld, a Lockheed test pilot who had flown the F-117A since the early 1980s. He had "never heard anything more than the standard GE F404 engine noise."[482] Two different "sizes" of F-117AS were also reported. People began watching the skies, looking and listening for "other" Black airplanes — the ones that were still being kept secret.[483]

  With the disclosure of the F-117A, the 5540th Tactical Group underwent a name change. It became the 37th Tactical Fighter Wing. This was the former designation of the F-4G Wild Weasel unit. The 4450th, 4453d, and 4452d Squadrons became the 415th "Nightstalkers," the 416th "Ghost-riders," and 417th "Bandits" Tactical Fighter Squadrons (TFS). These had been the designations of the first U.S. night-fighter squadrons during World War II.[484]

  Thirteen months after it came "out of the Black," the F-117A flew its first combat mission.

  PANAMA

  During this time, relations with Panama were deteriorating. In early 1988, Panama's military dictator, Gen. Manuel Noriega, had been indicted by two Florida grand juries on charges of laundering drug money. He laughed off the charges and dismissed Panama's president in February.

  During the May 1989 presidential election campaign, Noriega's "Dignity Battalion" goon squad beat up opposition candidate Guillermo Endara.

  Endara won the election, but on October 1, Noriega prevented him from taking office. Two days later, a coup attempt was made but collapsed when loyalist Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) rescued Noriega. The coup leaders were executed the following day. On December 15, Noriega declared a state of war between the United States and Panama. The following evening, PDF soldiers killed a marine lieutenant and arrested a navy lieutenant and his wife who had witnessed the shooting. The officer was beaten and his wife was threatened with sexual abuse.[485]

  In response to these events, President George Bush issued orders to invade Panama. The attack was to strike PDF forces, capture Noriega, and rescue political prisoners. One of the targets was the Battalian 2000 barracks at Rio Hato. United States Army Rangers were to be dropped at the adjoining airfield. The PDF tro
ops would have to be neutralized before the airdrop. Army Lt. Gen. Carl W. Stiner, the XVIII Airborne Corps commander, requested F-117As be used. They would not bomb the two barracks, but rather the 2,000-pound LBGs with time-delay fuzes would be directed to aim points near the buildings. They would act as "a giant stun grenade," to confuse the PDF troops without killing them. The use of F-117As was based on their night-bombing accuracy, rather than stealth, as the PDF lacked heavy air defenses.[486]

  On the night of December 19, 1989, six F-117As from the 415th TFS took off from TTR. The flight would require five in-flight refuelings. Two of the planes were targeted on Rio Hato, two more were to provide support for an attempt to capture Noriega, and the final pair were in-flight spares should any of the others suffer malfunctions.

  As the planes neared Panama, the attempt to capture Noriega was called off because he was not at any of the potential targets. Two of the F-117As continued on to Rio Hato. While they were in flight, the first problem occurred. Three hours before the invasion was to start, the PDF was tipped off to the coming U.S. attack (possibly due to American press reports). By H hour, 1:00 A.M. December 20, they had already occupied the airfield.[487]

  As the two F-117As approached the release point, a moment of confusion occurred that would mar their debut. The original plan was for the lead plane to drop its bomb in a field near the barracks on the left, while his wingman would drop his bomb in a field near a barracks on the right. Just before the drop, the wind direction changed. The lead pilot, Maj. Gregory A. Feest, responded by telling his wingman to switch targets with him. At the drop point, however, the lead pilot bombed his original aim point. The wingman adjusted his aim point even farther to the left, following the changed plan.[488] One bomb, intended to land about 100 yards from the 7th Company barracks, actually landed 260 yards away. This was only 18 yards from the 6th Company barracks, which was too close. The other bomb impacted near a basketball court, about 40 yards farther from the barracks than intended.[489]