Dark Eagles: A History of the Top Secret U.S. Aircraft

by Curtis Peebles

  The third wave followed shortly before dawn. Their targets were chemical and biological weapons storage bunkers. The late hour was selected because sunlight would reduce the danger from Anthrax spores. As they approached their targets, a weather front moved into central Iraq, with thin clouds at 5,000 feet. The F-117A's bombing system required a clear view of the target or the LGB would lose its lock. Of the sixteen bombs dropped, only five were hits. These targets were considered less important, but it was a preview of the bad weather that would plague the bombing campaign in the weeks ahead.[518]

  As the F-117 pilots turned for home, their mood was somber. They knew they had won a victory, but they were sure the cost had been high. Captain Rob Donaldson said later, "I came out of there on that first night and went 'Whew… I survived that one!' But on the way back, I really thought that we had lost some guys due to the heavy volume of bullets and missiles that were thrown up in the air."[519]

  At Tonopah East, the ground crews awaited the planes' return. The first wave landed at night, while the second and third came back after sunrise.

  One by one, the returning planes were counted.

  Every one returned.

  As the tapes of the strikes were reviewed, it became clear that something remarkable had occurred. In World War II, the RAF had sent huge armadas of bombers on night raids against Germany. Despite years of bombing and the loss of thousands of aircraft and crews, the RAF was never able to knock Germany out of the war, or even win air superiority.

  Now, a handful of planes had faced an air-defense network that dwarfed that of Berlin in 1943-44, struck at the heart of the enemy capital, and emerged without a scratch. Each plane's load was a fraction of that carried by a Lancaster bomber, but the results far surpassed all the years of area bombing the RAF had carried out at so heavy a price.[520]

  The Iraqi air-defense system died that night; with the headquarters hit and the IOCs and SOCs damaged and out of action, the individual antiaircraft guns and SAM sites were isolated. The operators were unable to operate their tracking and fire control radar, for fear a HARM missile would destroy them. Units in the field had limited communications with each other and with higher command. Electrical power was out in Baghdad. The three F-117A waves, the Tomahawk attacks, and the decoy raid, tightly interre-lated in time and space, had left the Iraqis unable to inflict significant losses on Coalition air operations.[521]

  The ultimate result of that night of thunder was this: in every war, there comes the time when it becomes clear who will win and who will lose. In the Civil War, it was the Battle of Gettysburg; in the Pacific in World War II, it was the Battle of Midway; in the Gulf War, that was the moment.

  THE BLACK JET AT WAR

  The ground fire that greeted the F-117As on the second night was described as perhaps the most intense of the Gulf War. Lieutenant Colonel Miles Pound said, "They knew we were at war that second night and they had every gun manned. And they were more than willing to use them." The last ten minutes before the target commanded the pilots' full attention. They could not afford to think about the lethal fireworks outside. Pound explained later, "My own technique was to run the seat down, so I wasn't distracted by what was going on outside. The lower you get in the cockpit, the less you can see outside. I would reduce the amount of distraction to the absolute lowest level and just concentrate on my target."[522]

  The targets on the second night included the lOCs and SOCs. Again, the goal was to disrupt Iraqi air defenses. The chemical and biological weapons bunkers not hit on the first night were also targeted. Also destroyed was an Adnan-2 early warning aircraft. In all, two waves were launched. One plane from the first wave had to abort due to system problems. Still a total of nineteen bombs were dropped, with thirteen hits.[523]

  On January 19, the weather front stalled over Iraq, and visibility was poor. The F-117As were able to score only six hits. The planes were unable to hit their primary targets in Baghdad, and few alternative targets were open. One of the planned targets was Hawk SAMs in Kuwait. These U.S.-built missiles had been captured during the invasion. The following night, January 20, saw improving weather, and seventeen hits were scored on lOCs and SOCs, ammunition storage sites, an ELINT ground station, bridges, telephone exchanges, and chemical warfare targets.[524]

  Although January 19 had been a disappointment for the F-117 pilots, other events that day would have a major impact on their operations. Beginning on the third day, it was planned to send large "packages" of F-16s to Baghdad during daylight. They would attack large targets such as oil refineries and headquarters. The round-the-clock missions — F-117As by night and F-16s by day — would serve notice that Iraq could not defend itself.

  The first of these daylight attacks was "Package Q" — seventy F-16s, as well as support aircraft. The strike was directed against the Daura petroleum refinery and the Baghdad nuclear research center. Bad weather, heavy ground fire, and smoke screens resulted in a failure. Almost no damage was inflicted on the reactors, and two F-16s were shot down.[525] It was clear the skies of Baghdad were too dangerous for conventional attacks. After Package Q, plans were dropped for similar raids. All attacks on Baghdad would be made by F-117As or Tomahawks.[526]

  This posed a daunting task. The Baghdad nuclear research center was huge, with four reactors and large numbers of support buildings — about one hundred structures in all. Each target would require individual F-117A strikes. The Black Jets would have to destroy Saddam's war machine one aim point at a time.

  Eight F-117As attacked the nuclear research center on January 21. Two reactors were destroyed, another was severely damaged, and research buildings were also hit. The Iraqis did not know the attack was under way until the bombs exploded.

  The F-117A strike was quite a contrast with Package Q. The eight planes had been supported by just two KC-135 tankers. The Package Q attack on the facility had consisted of thirty-two F-16 bombers, sixteen F-15Cs as air escorts, four EF-lllAs and eight F-4Gs to suppress the defenses, and fifteen tankers. For the next week, F-117As would make additional attacks on the site.

  The second wave of the night was equally successful. The fourteen planes had twenty-six hits and only two misses on a number of Baghdad targets, including a biological weapons plant that was claimed to be a "baby milk factory," with signs conveniently printed in English.[527]

  The F-117A strikes were twofold. On the tactical level, the goal was to prevent air defenses from functioning, and chemical or biological weapons from being used against Coalition troops. The strategic goal was long-term.

  Attacks on the Baghdad nuclear research center and chemical and biological weapons facilities were intended to prevent Iraq from emerging from the war with the ability to produce such weapons in the future. Bombing such targets as the Ba'th party headquarters and the secret police headquarters was intended to break Saddam's political hold on the country.[528]

  As the Black Jet's first week at war ended, there was a shift in activities; airfields were targeted as the F-117As tried to dig the Iraqi air force out of its hiding places.

  SHELTER BUSTING

  The Iraqi air force showed no more success in countering Coalition air strikes than ground fire. Mirage Fls, MiG 21s, MiG 25s, and MiG 29s fell to U.S. missiles during the first three days.[529] In several cases, Iraqi pilots flew into the ground during dogfights. Rather than face sure destruction, the Iraqi air force tried to ride out the attacks in their hardened aircraft shelters (HAS). These were built to withstand the blast from a nuclear explosion.

  Iraq's air force represented both an immediate and future threat. It was feared that the Iraqis might launch an "Air Tet" — a sudden, massive, and suicidal air raid, possibly using chemical weapons, meant for maximum propaganda and destructive effect. Like the Viet Cong's Tet Offensive in January 1968, the goal would be to turn the war against the Coalition, in a symbolic and psychological sense.[530] Such fears were not limited to senior military and political leaders. One U.S. Army reservist recalled having his
"head on a swivel" watching for Iraqi planes. His special concern was understandable; he drove a large, green fuel truck. (He had dubbed it "Sitting Duck.")[531]

  In the long-term, the Iraqi air force represented a potential threat to the whole Mideast. Its destruction would reduce Saddam's future role as a regional troublemaker. In either case, Iraq's air force would have to be sought out and killed.[532]

  The F-lllFs began the "shelter busting" campaign on January 21. They were joined the following night by the F-117As, when fourteen Black Jets attacked the Balad Southeast Air Base. One plane was forced to divert to an alternate target, but the others scored twenty-one hits on the HASs. The success was not what it seemed, however. The GBU-lOs penetrated the outer layer of concrete but were deflected by the second layer of dirt and rock. The inner concrete shell and the planes inside were unharmed. The Iraqis concluded that the HASs worked, and more planes were hidden away.

  On the eighth night of the war, intelligence was received that Air Tet was at hand. It was reported that eight Tu-16 bombers at Al-Taqaddum Air Base were being loaded with chemical weapons for a dawn strike. Several F-117As were switched at the last minute to attack the base. They arrived over the field just before sunrise. The Tu-16 bombers were fully fueled and had support vehicles grouped around them. When the GBU-lOs struck three of the Tu-16s, they exploded in huge fireballs. Three of the remaining bombers were destroyed by a conventional strike the following day.[533]

  After the first disappointing HAS strike, the F-117A squadrons launched another attack on the night of January 24–25. This time the planes carried GBU-27 penetrator bombs. The night's first wave struck the Qayyarah West, Al Assad, and Kirkuk Air Bases. These targets required the F-117As be refueled by tankers flying inside Iraqi airspace — the best example possible of Coalition air supremacy. A total of twenty hits were made. The GBU-27s penetrated the HAS roofs and exploded inside. In many cases, the armored doors were blown off, and smoke and flame billowed out. It was the funeral pyre of the Iraqi air force.[534]

  In the wake of the successful HAS strikes, the Iraqi air force stood down for a day. Then on January 26, Iraqi fighters began fleeing to Iran. In the days ahead, the Iraqi planes ran a gauntlet of U.S. F-15s as they sought to escape. After arriving in Iran, the planes were repainted in Iranian markings.[535]

  The escape attempts put more pressure on the shelter-busting effort. The HASs had to be destroyed before all the planes "flew the coop." (A large Iranian air force was no more in the interest of stability than a large Iraqi air force.) To cope with the various demands, additional F-117As were flown to Tonopah East. A total of forty-two planes and nearly all the qualified pilots would see action. This enabled a total of thirty-four sorties per night to be launched, rather than twenty-eight.[536]

  The airfield attacks would continue until the end of the war, but the changing situation by the start of the third week of the war had already caused a shift of F-117A activities.

  STRATEGIC TARGETS

  On January 27, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf ordered the air force to shift all air activities except F-117As and F-111Fs to Kuwait. The ground war would soon be under way. F-111F crews began spotting tanks at night, and on February 5, the F-111Fs dropped eight GBU-12 LGBs which destroyed four Iraqi tanks and one artillery piece. The following night, a larger F-111F strike was made against Iraqi Republican Guard units. The results were spectacular, and the F-lllFs were immediately shifted out of the strategic campaign. They would concentrate on ground targets, a mission that became known as "tank plunking."[537]

  The F-117As would now have to carry the whole weight of the strategic bombing effort. The forty-two Black Jets would cover the wide variety of targets previously assigned to the sixty-six-plane F-111F force.

  The main targets for the third and fourth weeks were chemical, biological, and nuclear facilities. In contrast, the HASs accounted for only a small percent. The fourth week showed yet another shift. The number of F-117A attacks against command and control targets increased to nearly equal those directed at chemical targets. Other strikes included leadership targets and military support. The F-117As attacked fixed Scud targets, such as hide sites.[538] The Black Jets also struck SAM sites. On one occasion, sixteen Black Jets took out every SA-2 and SA-3 site from south of Baghdad to Tikrit. Later that night, twenty-four B-52s hit targets in the area without any losses. Without the F-117As to destroy the SAMs, it was probable that several of the B-52s would have been lost.[539]

  Whatever the night's target, one factor that remained constant for the F-117 pilots was the ground fire. Leatherman said later, "One thing that surprised me was that they didn't run low on ammunition." At the end of the first week, the minimum altitude of the F-117A strikes was raised to avoid the ground fire. Although the plane could not be detected, a random hit, (called a "Golden B.B.") was still possible. On one night, it seemed to Capt. Rich Treadway there was a "half-price-sale" on 37mm and 57mm ammunition:

  "You could tell where a bomb went off because the entire sector would be engulfed in tracers."[540] Some of the shots came close; Colonel Whitley recalled hearing the "pop, pop, pop" of rounds exploding nearby and feeling his plane move from the concussion.

  The Iraqis tried various techniques to shoot down an F-117A. They began using "barrage fire," directing all the antiaircraft fire into specific parts of the sky, in hopes the Black Jets would fly into it. On one night, they held their fire, watching for the glow of the F-117A's afterburners as the planes sped away from the target area. Once it was spotted, all the guns would fire at the glowing targets. The Iraqis were very confident it would work and even alerted Jordanian reporters in advance. Colonel Whitley and Major Leatherman were over Baghdad when it was tried out. Leatherman recalled "it was eerily quiet — even after our bombs hit." (The F-117A does not have an afterburner, and the exhaust is shielded from the ground.) One night it seemed an F-117A had taken a hit. A postflight inspection found that RAM on part of the tail was gone. At first, it was thought to be battle damage, but the RAM actually had delaminated. Ironically, there was disappointment — the F-117A had so far escaped damage, and everyone was worried about what would happen if it was hit.[541]

  As the fourth week of the Black Jet's war neared its end, the attack plan again shifted. Leadership targets became a high priority, as they had been during the first week. On the night of February 11–12, a total of thirteen strikes were made. The following night, thirty-two strikes were made. The targets included air force headquarters, the Ministry of Defense headquarters, Ba'th party headquarters, several intelligence headquarters, and radio and telephone facilities. One of the targets was the Al Firdos district bunker.

  AL FIRDOS

  In the early morning hours of February 13, two F-117As dropped a single bomb each on the Al Firdos bunker. Both LGBs penetrated the roof and exploded inside. It was one of twenty-five bunkers that had been built as command posts, but at the start of the Gulf War, it was not in use. On February 5, trucks were observed unloading communications equipment at the bunker. Three black circles were painted on its roof, to simulate bomb hits.[542] Intelligence indicated it was being used as a communications center for one of the Iraqi intelligence agencies bombed out of its original headquarters. Within a week Al Firdos was added to the target list. What no one knew was that the upper floor of the bunker was also a civilian shelter, reserved for the families of the political elite.[543]

  When the bombs exploded inside the bunker, a hundred or more women and children were killed. That morning, CNN carried grim film of the bodies being removed from what the Iraqis called "General Shelter 25." They claimed it was an air-raid shelter, not a command post, and t h a t it had been a deliberate attack intended to kill civilians. The Iraqis also showed Western reporters a sign (in English) identifying it as an air-raid shelter.

  The United States countered the claims, noting that it had been hardened against nuclear attack, was surrounded by a chain-link fence and barbed wire, and had a camouflaged roof. Photos of th
e "shelter" also showed computer cables in the wreckage. All these were inconsistent with an air-raid shelter.[544]

  The dismay and controversy that followed the Al Firdos bunker bombing effectively ended the strategic air campaign against leadership targets in Baghdad. General Schwarzkopf told the air force that they could not hit any targets within Baghdad without his specific permission. For a week after Al Firdos, he was unwilling to give permission to strike any Baghdad target, for fear of civilian casualties.

  With leadership targets off-limits, another approach was taken. Rather than the substance of Saddam's regime, three symbols were recommended for attack. These were Ba'th party headquarters, a sixty-feet-tall statue of Saddam, and the huge victory arches commemorating the Iran-Iraq War. The latter were moldings of Saddam's forearms, holding swords that crossed 150 feet above an avenue. Schwarzkopf approved the choices, but the targets ran into a particularly American difficulty — lawyers. The statue and the victory arches, military lawyers said, were "cultural monuments," which could not be bombed under international law. Although they were likened to "Hitler's Nuremberg parade grounds" in the official history, the objection stuck and permission was withdrawn on January 25. It would not be until the eve of the war's end that targets within Baghdad were again approved.[545]

  END GAME

  With the halt on bombing leadership targets, the F-117As were turning to other targets. Schwarzkopf directed that a seventy-two-hour bombing campaign be planned to destroy nuclear, chemical, and biological targets should a cease-fire be imminent. At the time of the Al Firdos strike, more than a dozen suspected chemical and biological bunkers remained to be hit. Priority was given to research and development sites, however, rather than storage bunkers, to prevent Iraq from having such weapons in the future.

  The seventy-two-hour list was headed by the Baghdad nuclear research center. F-lI7As struck it on February 18, 19, and 23. Weather continued to be a problem; only four of ten aircraft bombed on the eighteenth, while four out of six scored hits the next night. Finally, on the twenty-third, thirteen F-117As bombed the site in good weather, with eighteen out of twenty-six bombs hitting structures in the compound. Other F-117As bombed suspected nuclear facilities across Iraq, including the Al Qaim uranium extraction facility in western Iraq.