Dark Eagles: A History of the Top Secret U.S. Aircraft

by Curtis Peebles

  The high point of the evening's "entertainment" was an individual with a Mideastern accent and a very loud voice who quoted from the Koran (chapter 51, of course). He announced, "All aliens! All aliens!.. We want to see the freedom of those captured aliens… Freedom, freedom of captured aliens! We are here to save the good from the bad!" He pointed accus-ingly at the Bureau of Land Management officers and said, "Fear in your God!"[838] This was not the typical land use meeting.

  In the desert, the situation was getting increasingly out of hand. On March 22, 1994, a group of visitors, including a reporter and photographer from the New York Times Sunday Magazine, were near the restricted area.

  The reporter wanted to interview one of the private security guards (nicknamed "Cammo Dudes"). This had proven difficult, as, when approached, the guards would quickly cross back into the restricted area to prevent being identified. When one of the white Cherokees passed their three-vehicle convoy, the vehicles turned diagonally across the road, trapping the Cherokee between them. The reporter then walked over and interviewed the guard. Showing remarkable restraint, the guard only said, "No comment," and, "Don't ask me any questions."

  The following day, the group was on Freedom Ridge when they discovered they were being watched by a telescopic camera. When they tuned a scanner to the sheriff's radio frequency, they discovered that search warrants were being issued. When the sheriff's deputy found them, he bluntly told them to surrender their film or be held until search warrants were obtained. Two rolls of film were surrendered. Never before had it been taken to this point. (The implication was that the new get-tough policy was in response to the "ambush journalism" of the day before.)[839]

  On April 8, 1994, an ABC news crew was stopped, searched, and detained for two hours. A video camera, sound-mixing equipment, tape recorders, microphones, batteries, cables, a tripod, radio scanners, walkie-talkies, and audio and videotapes were seized. The total value was estimated at $65,000.

  This was the first time that a search warrant had been served.[840]

  Accounts of the seizure were carried in local newspapers and by Aviation Week and Space Technology.[841] The equipment and tapes were returned six days later, and the report was aired on April 19. It included shots of the crew being questioned, a Russian satellite photo of the base on the XR-7 instruction sheet, and "sound bites" of enraged citizens at the public hearings. Other than the satellite photo, there were no shots of the Groom Lake facility itself. (It was accusations that the crew had filmed the site that had led to the search warrants being issued.)[842]

  This situation continued for another year. Then, during the weekend of April 8–9, 1995, the warning signs were put up. White Sides and Freedom Ridge were closed off. Groom Lake, and its secrets, were again hidden.

  RACHEL, NEVADA

  The center of the Aurora (and UFO) watching is Rachel, Nevada. A wide spot in the road, its population is about 100 people. The town consists of a Quik Pik gas station, RV park, thrift store, and the world famous "Little A-Le-Inn" (Little Alien) bar/meeting place/restaurant/hotel/UFO research center. Originally called the Rachel Bar and Grill, the name was changed in 1990 when the UFO watchers started showing up. Inside, the walls are lined with photos of UFOs and personalities. UFO books, T-shirts, bumper stickers, and souvenirs are for sale. An extensive UFO reference library contains numerous books, magazines, maps, and videotapes. The food is described as excellent.[843]

  On the surface, Rachel resembles the small towns (and their eccentric inhabitants) of fiction. But it is not another Lake Wobegon, it is more akin to Twin Peaks. Like the Black projects conducted at Groom Lake, Rachel has its "dark side."[844]

  Although the sign says "Earthlings Welcome," this does not extend to liberals. This political category is defined rather broadly in Rachel. During the standoff with the Branch Davidians in Waco, Texas, during early 1993, opinion in the town was solidly behind David Koresh. President Clinton and the federal government are vehemently cursed and despised. (Local federal employees [and their money], however, are "loved.")[845] During the Los Angeles riots, one person was heard to say, "If those damn [rioters] come near here we'll be ready."[846] The town's inhabitants think environmentalists taste as good cooked as roast spotted owl."[847]

  Rachel was also the site for annual UFO conferences. These had "a no-holds-barred Bible-thumping and conspiracy" slant. There was talk about "Frankenstein experiments" being done to humans at the secret alien underground bases.

  In 1993, the audience of about two hundred met in an old tent. One observer thought this was appropriate, likening the atmosphere to an "evan-gelical flying saucer camp meeting" where the speakers' "every utterance is taken as the gospel truth." John Lear talked about the secret bases, the exchange program, the eighty alien races visiting the earth, and some forty UFO crashes over the years.

  Robert Lazar also appeared and was mobbed by the faithful everywhere he went. Lazar spent two and a half hours answering questions from the eager audience. These covered such areas as how the saucers worked, anti-matter generators, gravity waves, and, of course, Aurora. (Many Aurora believers also accept Lazar's claims and view Aurora as a test that would prove them — if Aurora was true, so must his captured saucer stories.)

  One of the conference moderators was Gary Schultz. He runs a group called Secret Saucer Base Expeditions, which has tours to the area. Schultz described a dark and sinister web of conspiracy, run by a "shadow government." UFOs represent only one strand of this web, which includes the death of David Koresh and the Branch Davidians, the B-2, the Council of Foreign Relations, Dreamland, and the local sheriff. This was backed up by quotes from "the only authorized version of the Bible."

  One observer, who believed UFOs are alien spaceships, wondered, "Does UFOlogy give rise to paranoia or vice versa?"[848]

  It is only fitting that in a time of delusion, the final word on Aurora, the nonexistent Dark Eagle, should be given by a nonexistent person. In late 1990, at the time the Aurora stories were published, there was a fad on the U.S. east coast for T-shirts with a black Bart Simpson. One read:

  "It's A Black Thing, You Wouldn't Understand."

  CHAPTER 13

  Invisible Horizons

  History, Stealth, and Innovation

  War is a matter of vital importance to the State; the province of life or death; the road to survival or ruin. It is mandatory that it be thoroughly studied.

  Sun Tzu Ca. 400 B.C.

  With the turn of the century, and the approach of the 100th anniversary of the first powered flight, this is an appropriate moment to look back on the role played by the Dark Eagles. The secrecy of the Dark Eagles, in most cases, was due to their involvement with the technology now popularly known as "Stealth." As a result, the Dark Eagles are inextricably intertwined with the history of stealth's development and application. In addition, beyond their importance in the history of both military aviation and reconnaissance, the Dark Eagles also provide a case study in the process of innovation.

  Though stealth's first practical applications were made a quarter century ago, the seeds of stealth are as old as military aviation. The concept had lain dormant, awaiting the circumstances that would finally transform it into an operational reality. This was brought about by the interplay of three factors — the changing nature of the threat facing the aircraft, what was needed to counter this, and, finally, what types of technology were available.[849]

  FROM THE GREAT WAR TO THE COLD WAR

  When World War I began in August 1914, the few operational military aircraft were slow, mechanically unreliable, and fragile. Yet, within a year, the basic shape of the war in the air had taken form: reconnaissance planes spotted enemy positions, while fighter aircraft dueled. Over London and other English cities, German Zeppelins and bombers attempted to destroy factories and break British will to continue the war.

  One factor that affected both offensive and defensive efforts was the lack of long-range detection and tracking systems. Although some work
was done with sound detection equipment, this had only limited use. The threat facing the aircraft was visual detection and tracking. What was needed to counter the threat was a means to make the aircraft harder to see. The competing technologies to meet the need were the then relatively new concept of camouflage, and the more exotic one of the transparent covering.

  The German Imperial Air Service's experiments with the first stealth aircraft ended in failure. Translated into modern terms, although the transparent covering made the planes harder to see in some threat environments, such as clear weather, in others it was ineffective or actually made the plane more detectable. The glint in bright sunlight, for instance, would have been detectable for tens of miles. The material itself was not suitable for the rigors of combat. Today, it would be said that it reduced the planes' operational readiness due to excessive maintenance downtime.

  The technology that was finally selected to counter the threat of visual detection was to paint the aircraft in camouflage colors — blue underneath to blend into the sky, and multi-color patterns on upper surfaces — to make it harder for pilots of other planes to see them against the ground. Zeppelins and night-flying bombers had their undersurfaces painted black to merge with the dark skies. Such camouflage had limitations; an airplane silhouetted against a blue sky would be easily seen, while searchlights and even a moon-lit night sky could illuminate a black-painted aircraft. It did not have the technical and operational shortcomings of the transparent covering, however.

  Ironically, today the German Imperial Air Service is best remembered for "unstealth" airplanes, such as those of Baron von Richthofen's Flying Circus. Man-fred was known as the "Red Baron" because his DRI triplane was painted red. His brother Lothar's was red and yellow, while the squadron's other planes wore similar bright colors. The goal was not invisibility, but to be seen. This built unit morale, allowed the pilots to keep track of each other in the swirl of combat, and to in-timidate. The flashy finishes announced this wasn't an ordinary squadron. If the British pilots went into battle, they did so on the psychological defensive. If they broke off, then the German pilots had won without fighting.

  Among the lessons of the first World War was the importance of air power. Although the amount of damage done by the German Zeppelin and bomber raids was, in retrospect, minor, but they had a great psychological impact. Bomber fleets were seen as the weapon of the future. The bombers would always get through, deci-mating their targets with chemical weapon attacks. Some experts predicted that each air raid would kill tens of thousands of civilians, and within a few days there would be millions of casualties. The horrors of the Western Front would be inflicted on civilians, who would be left psychologically devastated. The appeasement of Hitler in the late 1930s was based, in part, on visions of this as the fate of London and Paris.

  What this apocalyptic vision assumed was the continued lack of a long-range detection capability. As long as incoming raids could only be tracked visually, bombers held the advantage. Interceptors would have to hunt for the bombers, and the probability of successfully engaging them was low prior to striking the target.

  The development of radar in the late 1930s changed the nature of the threat aircraft faced. Radar could provide early warning of incoming bombers. As the formations flew towards their targets, radar plotted their course, and fighter units ahead of them were alerted to take off. The controllers could then guide the fighters to intercept the bombers. It was the fighters which now held the advantage.

  Because of radar, the air war over Europe was not the kind of devastating thun-derbolt envisioned before the war, but, rather, a grim war of attrition. Even as the Allied bomber force grew in size and experience, and new aircraft and technology were introduced, German air defenses expanded to keep up. New fighter squadrons were added, the radar network was enlarged, and more flak guns were deployed.

  The price paid by Allied bomber crews was high — the loss rate among U.S. Army Air Forces bomber crews was higher than that of the infantry — while Royal Air Force's Bomber Command suffered losses higher that those of British Army ju-nior officers in World War I. At the same time, their attacks were a Second Front in the air, drawing off fighters, guns, fuel, and soldiers from the battle fields.

  The need facing the offensive air forces was to develop a means to hide the bomber formation from radar. The technology selected was brute-force jamming of the radar echos, and dropping chaff to fill the screen with masses of false echos.

  Air defenses attempted to counter these efforts with more sophisticated technology and experience. The countermeasures equipment aboard the aircraft was also improved, to meet the changes in air defenses. This on-going struggle between aircraft and air defenses became the pattern for the future.

  Ironically, the ability of radar to detect aircraft at long range, and the attempts by the aircraft to drown out the echos, meant that visual camouflage lost its importance. From the latter part of 1944 onward, U.S. Army Air Forces bombers and fighters were no longer painted in camouflage colors, but, rather, flew in bare-metal finishes. The U.S. Air Force continued this practice through the Korean War, and into the early years of the Vietnam War. The planes often carried colorful unit markings. It was not until 1966/1967 that camouflage again became standard.

  It was also during World War II that the modern concept of "Black Projects"

  originated. This was a fundamentally different kind of security than that normally conducted by the military. It involved keeping secret, for example, the speed, altitude, range, and bomb load of a new aircraft. With the Allied efforts to break German and Japanese codes, or to develop an atomic bomb, however, the existence of these projects had to be kept hidden from all but a select few. The strategic advantages these technological breakthroughs gave the Allies would be lost if the Axis powers were to gain even a hint that they had been made. The result was a realization that, with some projects, it was not enough to hold a technological advantage over a potential enemy, it was also necessary to keep that advantage unknown to them.

  The start of the Cold War brought the first stirrings of stealth. To gain intelligence on the USSR, it was necessary to undertake covert overflights of its territory and that of its allies. To be both effective and politically useful, these overflights would have to remain unknown to the Soviets. It was a violation of international treaties to fly a plane in another nation's airspace in peacetime. If the overflights were detected, the Soviets would make every effort to shoot the planes down. Even if this failed, the inevitable Soviet protest would cause political problems.

  The need for the overflights to remain undetected by the Soviets was thought to be satisfied by designing an aircraft able to fly at altitudes of 70,000 feet or greater, something that could be done with existing aviation technology. This placed the aircraft above the reach of Soviet jet fighters, and, it was believed, would also make the plane difficult to detect by Soviet radar. U.S. radar had great difficulty spotting a target at an altitude of over 40,000 feet at a range of 200 miles. During World War II, American radar had been supplied to the Soviets, and, it was assumed, their radar would have similar problems tracking a high-flying target. It was on this basis that President Eisenhower gave approval for development of the U-2. The theory seemed to be confirmed when U-2 training flights began over the United States. Even with advanced notice, it was difficult to spot the U-2, much less track it.[850]

  Yet, on the first U-2 overflight of the Soviet Union, the Soviets were not only able to spot the U-2, but to track the plane and send MiG fighters after it. What had not been realized was that Soviet radar design had advanced considerably over those of World War II. The detection of the U-2 adversely effected the overflight program. The assumption had been that the Soviets would only detect a few unknown radar targets, and would not understand what was occurring. The Soviet's ability to track the U-2 changed both the threat to the aircraft, and what was needed to counter it. For the first time, an aircraft's Radar Cross Section (RCS) had to be redu
ced.

  Since the early days of radar, it had been known that not all aircraft echos were equal. Rather, they would vary according to the frequency of the radar, as well as the size, shape, and orientation of the plane. The problem was in the technology; the available means of analyzing a plane's RCS was no better than "cut and try."

  The first attempt, Project Rainbow, with its radar absorbing coatings, and special wires extending from the nose and tail to the wingtips, was disappointing. The wires and coating were effective at some radar wavelengths, while at others they actually increased the plane's RCS. The need was understood, but the technology to meet it was lacking. The best that could then be done was to paint the U-2 with the sinister-looking black iron ferrite-based paint. This reduced its RCS to a limited extent, and made the plane harder to spot.

  The various reconnaissance aircraft which followed the U-2 had to rely on a mixture of techniques to escape destruction. The A-12 Oxcart depended on altitude, speed, a low RCS and countermeasures. The A-12's altitude put it on the fringe of a Surface-to-Air Missile's (SAM) envelope, while its speed cut the time the SAM

  had to engage the aircraft. This, along with the low RCS made the A-12 difficult to track and to gain a radar lock-on for firing. Should a lock-on be made, then the countermeasures would break it.

  During the development program, the air force was worried that if an A-12 carrying existing countermeasures equipment was lost over hostile territory, this would compromise the systems used by U.S. fighters and bombers. Even if the countermeasures equipment was only similar, the Soviets would have an insight into U.S.