The Crisis of Rome

by Gareth Sampson

  Rome’s empire at this time was a disjointed affair, and in particular had no firm borders. As such, provincial boundaries were flexible, especially where it came to the Roman/non-Roman border. Furthermore, aside from Rome’s newly-acquired Gallic sphere of influence, all that lay to the north of Spain, Italy, Illyria and Macedonia was open barbarian territory. Here lay the vastness of the European continent, populated by a large and ever-changing array of native tribes, most of whom are only names to us now.

  Furthermore, there was never an easy or clear-cut differentiation between Roman and non-Roman regions, on either a political or cultural scale. An area under Roman control contained peoples who had strong links with those not under Roman control.

  In addition, there is the issue of alliances between Rome and those tribes not under their control. In most case these were nothing more than statements of friendship between the two, but as was seen in the case of the Cimbric migration below, these alliances allowed Rome to create buffer zones around their areas of formal imperium. This could have benefits as well as drawbacks. On the positive side, Rome would be alerted to any impending threat, long before it actually reached Roman territory, as happened in the case of the Cimbri. The only potential drawback with this system was that if they were not careful, Rome could get drawn into affairs that did not directly need its intervention, though these appear to have been few in number.

  The Northern Wars – The Northeast

  In annexing Illyria and then Macedon and Epirus, Rome acquired a huge exposure to ‘barbarian’ or tribal Europe, with few natural barriers between what was Roman and non-Roman and a large number of peoples within the Roman sphere but by no means Romanized. The Kingdom of Macedon itself had always had an ill-defined northern border and was prone to periodic raids and the occasional full-scale barbarian invasion (as seen by the Gallic invasions of the 280/279). In turning the kingdom into a province the Senate now had the problem of not only governing Macedon itself, but defending it from the barbarian tribes who did not respect Roman territorial boundaries. In effect this led to an almost constant period of warfare (whether on large or small scale) until Augustus took the north-eastern border up to the Danube, which in itself created new problems. The two decades in question (120–100 BC) were a period of intense military activity in this region.

  The Illyrian Wars of 119–117 BC

  As mentioned in Chapter 1, the Romans had already experienced their fair share of victories and defeats in Illyria in the 130s and early 120s. Yet in 119 BC it appears that once again Rome had to send forces to the region to quell rebellious native tribes. Our sources for these campaigns are few and unclear. Nevertheless, one clear campaign that we can identify was that of L. Caecilius Metellus, one of the consuls of 119 BC, who hailed from one of Rome’s leading families (see Appendix IV).

  Our sources report that Metellus fought a Dalmatian tribe in Illyria, and came back to Rome in 117 BC to celebrate a triumph, after which he earned the name ‘Delmaticus’ to celebrate his victory. He also restored the Temple of Castor and Pollux in the Forum, part of which can still be seen today. As for the war itself we have only four references, two of which are simple single-line entries in the surviving annals. The first of these comes from an abridgement of Livy stating that he subdued the Dalmatians.143 The second comes from Eutropius who states that both the consuls of 119 campaigned in Illyria against the Dalmatians.144 The third source is Appian, from the surviving fragments of his work on the Illyrian Wars, who is less than complementary about Metellus’ campaign:

  in the consulship of Caecilius Metellus, war was declared against the Dalmatians, although they had been guilty of no offence, because he desired a triumph. They received him as a friend and he wintered among them at the town of Salona, after which he returned to Rome and was awarded a triumph.145

  It is possible that Appian, writing several hundred years after the event, was using a source hostile to Metellus, though such actions can never be entirely ruled out. The scale of the war in Illyria is given greater scope by Appian, who slightly earlier in his narrative, stated that both Metellus ‘Delmaticus’ and his consular colleague, L. Aurelius Cotta, campaigned together against the Illyrian tribe of the Segestani. Morgan has an excellent analysis of the campaign and the sources.146

  Thus, from these scattered fragments, it appears that both the consuls of 119 BC were sent to subdue rebellious tribes in Illyria, with Cotta returning (most probably to hold the consular elections for 118 BC) and Metellus staying to fight the Dalmatians as well. The potential scale of the war can be seen from the need to have both consuls fighting there and the fact that there were two major tribes involved in the fighting. Though we are denied any details about the war itself, it does seem to have been a serious affair and a threat to Rome’s interests, albeit one that they successfully dealt with.

  The Scordiscian Wars I (c.120–111 BC)

  As we have already seen, one of the greatest threats the Romans faced on their northeastern borders came from the Balkan tribes of the Scordisci. From the initial encounter in the 140s BC they were to be one of Rome’s most persistent enemies in the Balkan region, not being finally defeated until the reign of the Emperor Augustus (c.15 BC).147 Much of the information we have on them is both fragmentary and contradictory. There was no clear Romano-Greek concept of what ethnic group the Scordisci were. Strabo, Justin, the Periochae of Livy and Athenaeus all labelled them as Gauls; Appian named them as Illyrians and Florus as Thracians.148

  Those who labelled them as Gauls had them originating as the survivors of the great Gallic invasion of Greece in 279 BC, which sacked the Temple of Delphi.149 Again we see the Romano-Greek obsession with Gauls, fostered in Rome by the Gallic sack of c390–386 BC and in Greece of the invasions of 280–279 BC, as well as their lack of understanding of the tribal regions of Europe.150 The best modem analysis of them is by Papazoglu, in his work on the early Balkan tribes (see bibliography).

  Whatever their origins they were a powerful collection of tribes based on the Ister (Danube) in modern Serbia. Strabo divided them up into two main tribes, the Greater and the Lesser Scordisci, but again we have no way of telling how accurate a picture this was.151 What is clear is that they were clearly an expansionist tribe dominating the lower Danubian region. Again we have no clear idea of the process this took, but it is argued that they expanded both north and south from the Danube, dominating the tribes around them. This inevitably brought their sphere of influence to the borders of Macedon, which in 148 BC became Roman. It is interesting to note how quickly they clashed with the Romans following their annexation of Macedon, with our earliest reference being to a Roman defeat at their hands in 141 BC, which was possibly a catastrophic one, though we have no clear details.152 By 135, we find the Romans with the upper hand, operating outside the borders of Macedon and inflicting a defeat on them, with the sources then going silent on the matter.

  However, this peace was broken in the period around 120 BC when we find traces of a massive Scordiscian invasion of Macedon. The primary piece if evidence we have for this lies in an inscription which details the defeat and death of the governor of Macedon, Sex. Pompeius, at the hands of ‘Gauls’. This is backed up somewhat uncertainly by a fragment of Diodorus.153 The inscription comes from a commemorative stele set up in the town of Lete (in Macedonia) thanks to the victorious Roman commander M. Annius and contains details of the campaign. The stele is dated in the twenty-ninth year of the Romano-Macedonian era, which is most commonly agreed amongst scholars to equate to 120/119 BC.154

  The inscription gives us the basic details of the campaign, with a large tribal army invading the province of Macedonia. Naturally the governor, a Roman praetor named Sex. Pompeius met them in battle, but was killed and his men routed. They were rallied by the presence or arrival (this is not made clear) of Pompeius’ quaestor, M. Annius, who then led the Roman forces to victory, routing the invading tribe. Annius then moved forward towards the boundary of the province, where after seve
ral days he met another tribal force, reenforced by a Thracian tribe, named as the Maedi, led by their chieftain Tipas, and was again victorious. It is difficult to estimate the size of the force opposing him, but given his ability to defeat two tribal forces with relatively few men, we must be careful not to overestimate the strength of the enemy forces. Despite the stele of admiration for Annius, it is possible that these were no larger than raiding parties, rather than a full-scale tribal invasion.

  Unfortunately, there is a gap in our sources for events in Macedon between these battles in 119 and those of 114 BC. One view to take is that these Roman victories saw the Scordisci withdraw back to their own territory only to invade once more in 114 BC. However, it is has been argued that one of the consuls of 116, Q. Fabius Maximus Eburnus, fought a series of campaigns in Macedon in 115–114 BC and that the most likely opponents were the Scordisci.155 This puts an entirely different complexion on matters and argues for a long-running war or series of clashes from 120 onwards, with little respite for Rome. Once again, we see that in this period Rome’s military attention was in the northeast, not elsewhere.

  By 114 we hear of the dispatch of another consul, C. Porcius Cato, to battle the Scordisci. Once again our sources for the campaign are meagre, but what emerges is that an unnamed battle, either in Macedonia or Thrace, took place between Cato and the Scordisci which ended with the utter defeat and destruction of the Roman army.156 Cato survived and returned to Rome, where he was prosecuted and disgraced. We have no details of the size of the forces involved or the Roman casualties. For Rome, the consequences were grave, as with no force to oppose them, the Scordisci rampaged throughout Greece, apparently reaching as far as the Adriatic and sacking the temple at Delphi.157 The fear at Rome was such that they engaged in a traditional human sacrifice and had two Greeks and two Celts buried alive in the Forum Boarum.158 Though the sources are confused, it does appear that a Roman commander, M. Didius managed to defeat the Scordisci and drive them, at least temporarily from Macedon.159

  The situation became graver for Rome when they received the news from their new allies in the northeastern Alps, the Taurisci (see below), that a large northern tribe, the Cimbri, were migrating towards them. For the consuls of 113 BC, civil war in Numidia was of little importance. On two fronts now Rome’s northern borders were under threat. Macedon and Greece had been invaded and ravaged by the Scordisci, whilst to the west, the Cimbri were approaching Roman-allied territory. The two consuls of the year were C. Caecilius Metellus and Cn. Papirius Carbo; Metellus received the command against the Scordisci and Carbo was sent to investigate the arrival of the Cimbri.

  For Metellus’ campaign we have no details other than a brief note that in 111 BC he was awarded a triumph for his activities in Thrace.160 His triumph was held on the same day as that of his brother (see Appendix IV) and it is again possible that this triumph was awarded more for political than military reasons.

  Other than his triumph we have no records of his activities, but given the work done by his successors in Thrace, we must conclude that there was no major confrontation between his army and the Scordisci. It is possible that he ensured that they were chased from the Roman provinces, but again this is speculation. It has also been argued that the arrival in the region of the migrating Cimbri led the Scordisci to evacuate Roman territory of their own accord in order to face up to this new threat to the north, though there is no direct evidence for this.161

  It is unclear whether C. Caecilius Metellus retained command of the war for the year 112 BC. Certainly he did not return to Rome to celebrate his triumph until 111, but we know that one of the consuls of 112, M. Livius Drusus, arrived in Macedon and pursued the war against the Scordisci.162 In fact, we hear nothing about Metellus’ activities at all this year. What is clear is that Drusus had far greater success than Metellus:

  Didius, finding them wandering about and dispersed in undisciplined plundering, drove them back into their own land of Thrace. Drusus forced them further still and prevented them from re-crossing the Danube.163

  Marcus Didius, with great determination, checked these tribes that before had been always invincible and were roaming about without civilization or laws. Drusus confined them within their own bounds.164

  Despite the omission of Metellus, it seems that Didius checked them in Macedon and Drusus took the fight to them over the border in the non-Roman Balkan region, defeating them and temporarily ending the conflict. Drusus returned to Rome to celebrate a triumph for his activities in 110 BC. It has been argued that Drusus did not actually reach the Danube, which was not done until decades later.165 Of additional interest is the actual triumph that Drusus celebrated, as it is recorded as being over both the Scordisci and the Macedonians. This latter element has led to speculation that once again a revolt broke out in Macedon against Roman rule, brought about by the Scordiscian invasion, possibly with the two groups allying. Though we have no other details it appears that it was soon crushed. This merely serves to emphasize the possible crisis that Rome faced on its northern borders in this period.

  The Northern Wars – The Northwest

  Rome’s northwestern borders were of a different nature to those of the northeast. In the east Rome held Illyria and Macedon and shared a huge land border with the tribal regions of Europe. In the west, until recently, Rome had formally held nothing on the other side of the Alps and Pyrenees. As noted earlier, the victories in the Gallic War in the 120s gave Rome hegemony over the tribes of southern Gaul. This was reinforced by the creation of the colony of Narbo in 118.166 This led to the embryonic province of Gallia Narbonensis, but was more of a buffer zone than a Roman province.

  Furthermore, whilst Rome had had no formal holding on the far side of the Alps, they had created a series of informal relationships with the various tribes that dwelt within the Alpine region, some established by force and some by diplomacy (backed up by the threat of force). As mentioned above, it was this informal system that alerted the Romans to the impending arrival of the Cimbri in the region. In 115 BC the consul M. Aemilius Scaurus advanced across the Istrian Alps and gained the submission of the local tribe, the Taurisci, an action that was to have important repercussions soon afterwards.167

  The Cimbric Wars I

  The initial problem we face in analysing the early phase of the war is working out the nature of the enemy that Rome was facing. Strabo and the Periochae of Livy both state that the migrating tribe was the Cimbri, whilst Appian (whose Gallic War fragment is the largest account of this initial encounter) has them as Teutones. Velleius neatly side-steps the issue by having both tribes present.168 The problem we face is that until the campaigns of 102–101 BC, the sources do not separate the various tribes. There are two clear possibilities, each equally as valid.

  The first view is the view that the three identifiable tribal groups (the Cimbri, Teutones and Ambrones) all migrated at the same time and were one mass and were referred to by one tribal name simply for matters of expediency or ignorance by our sources. The second view is that at this stage, there was only one tribe or people (the Cimbri) who entered the region at this time, and that the others followed later (in the late 100s BC). As will be detailed below, part of this discussion centres on whether it was a whole tribal migration or merely some of the tribes and peoples of the Cimbri. It is possible that, rather than being one event, this tribal migration may have happened over a successive number of years, with certain tribes going one direction and others in another direction. If one tribe found a hospitable region then they may have sent word to those left behind or heading in other directions to draw them to them. Whilst ultimately there is simply insufficient evidence to form a definitive conclusion, the analysis of the events of 104 BC (see Chapter 9), do lend themselves to the theory that the other tribes (of Teutones and Ambrones) did only enter the picture to assist the Cimbric invasion of Italy. For that reason the author prefers the view that at this point it was merely the Cimbri that Rome dealt with and will be solely refered
to as such.

  The Origins of the Cimbri

  The next issues we need to address concern the identity of the Cimbri and their reasons for migrating. Their appearance in 113 BC is the first time they can be found in the surviving historical records, unlike their allies the Teutones, who can be found in the works of the explorer Pytheas.169 A number of ancient sources who comment on them come up with a number of different possible backgrounds for them.

  Plutarch and Strabo present the fullest surviving discussions on the origins of these tribes, though we know of others that existed, such as Poseidonius (see Appendix V). Plutarch argues that they were Germanic, though he acknowledges that others gave them Gallic or even Scythian origin.170

  The key problem here for our ancient sources was their lack of knowledge concerning both the geography and ethnicity of the tribes of Europe. In the period in question, Rome had penetrated no further north than southern Gaul and had no direct contact with any peoples of the outer-lying regions, other than trade via middle parties. By the time of the Empire, the Romans had penetrated and annexed all of Gaul, Britannia and for a while Germany, thereby gaining greater knowledge of the races that occupied these regions. Therefore, we have accounts written at the time, based on a scant knowledge and those written later with a greater understanding of the geography and ethnicity involved. Furthermore, the Romans had a tendency to see all races of the north as Gauls, certainly the ones who raided southwards. Both the Greeks and the Romans had suffered previously at the hands of Gallic invasions; Rome had been sacked in c.390–386 and Greece had suffered an invasion in 280–279, which resulted in a fresh battle at Thermopylae and an attack on Delphi. Thus for both the Greeks and Romans any such northern invaders summoned up memories of the Gauls and thus all invaders became Gauls.

  An added problem is that when Rome did extend their dominion to include Northern Europe, they tended to introduce an artificial boundary between Gallic and Germanic based on the Rhine, but this was an artificial separation not based on any corresponding ethnic boundaries, and the problem with this is that what constitutes a Germanic tribe in the late first century BC and what we more commonly understand as a Germanic tribe of the later Empire and Dark Ages is another matter.